A History of Japan’s National Police Reserve 1950-1952::Army or Constabulary? by French, Thomas William
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON 
 
FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES (WINCHESTER) 
 










A History of Japan’s National Police Reserve 1950-1952: 







































FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES (WINCHESTER) 
SCHOOL OF HISTORY 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
A HISTORY OF JAPAN’S NATIONAL POLICE RESERVE 1950-1952: 
ARMY OR CONSTABULARY? 
 






This work is an empirical study of the history of Japan’s National Police 
Reserve from its creation in July 1950 to its end in October 1952. It is the 
first ever attempt at a comprehensive and exclusively focused history of 
the force. The work examines the domestic and international origins of the 
force, the American Constabulary model upon which it was based, the 
NPR's character, and its evolution into its successor forces, the National 
Safety Force and Ground Self Defence Force.  
 
The study also seeks as its first aim, to demonstrate the Japanese 
influences on the creation of the force, especially that of the Japanese 
Communist Party, whose policy of violence during the period is a highly 
neglected area of the historiography. 
 
The second main aim of this study is to reveal the actual organisational 
character of the NPR. This is required in a field where there is much 
debate over the character of the force but hitherto little work based on 
primary sources. 
 
As the NPR has not yet been the exclusive subject of any academic 
monograph the study makes important contributions in a number of fields. 
Despite no detailed analysis having been done to date on the nature and 
organisational character of the force many assumptions are made about 
its character. By providing this analysis this study contributes significantly 
to clarifying many misconceptions currently held about the force. 
 
Alongside these major contributions the study also contains many original 
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A Note on the Text 
 
 
Adhering to standard conventions, Japanese names will be given in their 
Japanese style, surname first, except when cited. All other non-western 
names are presented in their commonly used form. In common with the 
accepted convention no macrons have been used in Japanese place 
names. All dates are presented in the British calendar style (day / month / 
year). American spellings such as ‘defense’ are employed where sources 
use them. All references to the SCAP archives held in the National Diet 








Despite recent advances in the study of the history of postwar and occupied 
Japan, particularly from cultural and social perspectives, many areas of the 
history of the initial postwar years remain under examined. The history of the 
Japanese National Police Reserve (NPR) is one such area which is 
particularly unexplored. Often merely confined to the footnotes during 
historians‟ discussions of the „reverse course‟ (the alleged abandonment of 
the Occupation‟s efforts at democratisation and disarmament in favour of 
reconstruction and rearmament) or the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, 
the NPR has never been the sole subject of an academic monograph or 
journal article in English.1 The absence of a detailed examination of the NPR 
seems to have led to the widespread assumption by many historians that the 
force was in fact an army of sorts from its very inception and that it was 
merely created in order to slake American desire for rearmament, or as a 
result of the Korean War. 2  Domestic unrest and most other factors 
contributing to the creation of the NPR are, like the NPR itself, usually rapidly 
glossed over, or simply ignored by many authors. 
 
This study seeks to fill these gaps in the scholarship by producing the first 
complete scholarly history of the National Police Reserve. 3  This study 
attempts to provide the first full picture of the origins, character, operations 
and evolution of the force. This approach requires both a synthesis of the 
                                                   
1
 M. Schaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1997, pp 45-46; E. Takemae, Inside GHQ, The Allied Occupation 
of Japan and Its Legacy, Continuum, London, 2002, pp 487-490; J. Dower, Embracing 




 An Official History of the force does exist but does not cover the entire life of the force: U.S. 
Army Center of Military History Historical Manuscripts Collection: The Korean War, (YF-A4), 
Far East, US Army Forces and Eight United States Army Military History Section, History of 
the National Police Reserve of Japan, July 1950- April 1952, 1955, Reel 14. 
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existing scholarship on the period with a new exploration of the neglected and 
marginalised areas of the history of the NPR and its context. In revealing 
these neglected areas of scholarship this study pursues two principal aims 
which match the hitherto neglected areas of the history of the force; first to 
examine the domestic Japanese influences, both from the state and non-
state actors (including the JCP), on the creation, character and evolution of 
the NPR; and second, to reveal the actual organisational character of the 
NPR. These aims are achieved through the use of an evidence base of 
primary sources, supported where required, by secondary sources.  
 
The reasons behind the neglect of the NPR by scholars are numerous and 
include the fact that the subject is still controversial in Japan and that a more 
nuanced analysis would not be fully compatible with many of the trends in 
historiography. Furthermore, the subject has been afflicted by the antipathy 
towards military subjects and the highly critical attitude towards US postwar 
foreign policy of the Vietnam War protest generation of American scholars 
who are still influential in the field. In addition to the NPR, the closely related 
topic of the perceived communist threat to the internal security of Japan is 
another area which is marginalised in recent scholarship. The „military policy‟ 
of the Japanese Communist Party‟s (JCP) is often ignored as it does not fit 
with arguments describing Japan‟s postwar developmental „miracle‟, or the 
„reverse course‟. 4  Furthermore, the position of the episode as an 
embarrassment to both the Right and Left in Japan has resulted in many 
Japanese historians neglecting the subject, as noted by Hasegawa. 5 
Scholarship on these subjects has also been hampered by a shortage of 
declassified Japanese source material and a scarcity of published 
                                                   
4
 C. Johnson, Japan, Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State, Norton, London, 
1995, p 8; J. Dower, „Reform and Reconsolidation‟, in H. Wray and H. Conway (eds), Japan 
Examined, Perspectives on Modern Japanese History, University of Hawaii Press, 1983, p 
350.  
5
 K. Hasegawa, „Student Soldiers, The Japanese Communist Party‟s “Period of Extreme 
Leftist Adventurism”‟, Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2006, p 43. 
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recollections of participants, with many being careful to protect their 
reputations and avoid possible repercussions.6  
 
Alongside the actions of the JCP, the influence of the Japanese state is also 
often neglected in most studies of the NPR. The Japanese government is 
usually characterised as being cajoled or „ordered‟ to create the force when in 
fact it was a willing, even enthusiastic, supporter of stronger internal security 
forces.7 The influence on the force of other non-state actors such as the 
Japanese Right has also been largely neglected, with the notable exception 
of John Weste‟s 1999 work on Hattori Takushiro. 8  The nexus of these 
Japanese influences with the competing American actors has also been 
neglected, with most studies on the subject focusing solely on the American 
input into the force, an approach which diminishes the Japanese influence 
and distorts the picture presented towards that of a top down, American 
imposed project. This study examines each of these neglected areas in order 
to address the deficiencies in current accounts of the force. 
 
Examining the contribution of these domestic influences to the creation and 
evolution of the NPR is the first primary aim of this study. The study also 
seeks to provide a more complex insight into the competing Japanese and 
American interests and plans for the Japanese security forces, and examine 
of the transformation of the NPR into the National Safety Force (NSF) and 
                                                   
6
 Wakita, a former JCP „guerrilla‟ is a notable exception in this regard. K. Wakita, Chōsen 
Sensō to Sugita-Hirakata Jiken, Sensōshi no Kuhaku wo Umeru (The Korean War and the 
Suita/Hirakata Incidents, Filling The Gaps in Postwar History), Akashi Shoten, Tokyo, 2005. 
7
 R.J. Samuels, Machiavelli’s Children, Leaders & Their Legacies in Italy  and Japan, Cornell 
University Press, London, 2003, p 206; T. Maeda, The Hidden Army, Edition Q, Tokyo, 1995, 
p 6; H. Ōtake, „Defense Contributions and One-Party Dominance: The Opposition in Japan 
and West Germany‟, in T.J. Pempel, Uncommon Democracies, One-Party Dominant 
Regimes, Cornell University Press, London, 1990, p 138; J. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, 
Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System, The Athlone Press, London, 1988, p 72; J. 
Weste, „Great Britain and Japanese Rearmament, 1945-1960‟ in M. Iokibe, C. Rose, J. 
Tomaru and J. Weste (eds), Japanese Diplomacy in the 1950s, From Isolation to Integration , 
Routledge, Oxford, 2008, p 35; M. and S. Harries, Sheathing the Sword, The Demilitarisation 
of Japan, Heinemann, London, 1989, p 234. 
8
 J.L. Weste, „Staging a Comeback: Rearmament Planning and Kyūgunjin in Occupied Japan, 
1945-52‟, Japan Forum, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1999. 
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Ground Self Defence Forces (GSDF), including an analysis of the evolution of 
its capabilities, organisation and role.  
 
The second central theme of this work, and perhaps its main contribution, is 
an examination of the character of the NPR based on a range of primary 
sources. This includes an examination of the NPR‟s structure and operations 
and the living conditions of its members. This work is keenly required in a 
field where there is much debate and many unsubstantiated assumptions are 
made over the NPR's character. Furthermore, the detailed analyses of the 
concepts which informed the creation of the NPR which this study also 
includes, constitute another new contribution to the field.  
 
Aims and Structure 
 
This study provides the first complete and exclusively focused history of the 
NPR through examining its context, creation, operations and evolution. In 
order to provide as full a picture as possible of the force, the primary aims of 
this study are to explore the domestic Japanese influences on the force and 
to reveal the structure and character of the NPR.  
 
The work also shows the origins of this constabulary model in similar forces 
created by the US before 1950. The examination of the partial movement 
away from the constabulary model with the metamorphosis of the NPR into 
the NSF and GSDF, is another aim of this work. The influence of the 
international political situation and American conceptions of the Cold War 
also influenced the creation of the NPR and are therefore also examined in 
this study. These aims detailed are achieved through the examination of the 





I. The JCP and the Domestic Context of the Creation of the NPR: 1945-
1950 
 
In keeping with the first primary aim of showing the domestic influences on 
the NPR this chapter illustrates the threat the JCP was perceived to represent 
to the internal security of Japan, a threat which was seen to require the 
creation of the NPR. This chapter also seeks to reveal the Japanese 
government‟s conceptions of security which favoured a constabulary as a 
defence against the JCP threat and the initiatives undertaken by the 
Japanese government to create one. 
 
II. The International Context of the Creation of the NPR: 1945-1950 
 
In keeping with the overall rationale of this study of providing a complete 
history of the NPR, the purpose of this chapter is to illuminate the 
international factors and events behind the decision to create the NPR. The 
chapter seeks to broaden the existing knowledge of the origins of the NPR, 
particularly by exploring the non-Japanese organisations which influenced its 
development. The chapter focuses on the neglected area of the American 
sponsored constabularies which preceded the NPR in Europe, the Philippines 
and South Korea. The chapter also includes an examination of the influence 
of the outbreak of the Korean War on the final decisions behind the creation 
of the NPR including the Japanese government‟s influence on its creation. 
Some attention is also paid, by way of brief summaries, to the international 
political situation and American attitudes to strengthening Japan‟s security 
forces.  
 
III. The Organisational Character of the NPR 
 
This chapter fulfils the second primary aim of this study by revealing the 
nature and organisation of the NPR including its structure, posture, training, 
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capabilities and internal security role. This chapter also details the links 
between the NPR and the Japanese civil police as these are highly significant 
in demonstrating the constabulary character of the NPR. The chapter 
concludes with an examination of the attempts by hawkish elements of GHQ 
and their Japanese allies to transform the NPR into an army through the 
induction of high ranking former Imperial army officers into the force, a further 
example of the Japanese influences on the force. 
 
IV. The Operational Aspects of the NPR 
 
This chapter again contributes to fulfilling the second key aim of this work by 
further revealing the character of the NPR by exploring its operational 
aspects. In doing so the chapter illustrates the constabulary character of the 
force, the battles over its direction and the influence of the JCP on the NPR. 
The chapter provides a survey of the living conditions and legal position of 
the NPR's members, the typical duties of the NPR, and an examination of the 
JCP‟s „military campaign‟ of the period. This analysis provides another 
perspective on the „bottom up‟ attempts by the JCP to seize control of the 
force and turn it into a tool of the Left, as opposed to the „top down‟ attempts 
by hawks in GHQ to use the force as a tool of the Right. The key question as 
to why the NPR was never used in its original internal security role is also 
examined in detail, with the use of „Bloody May Day‟ as a case study. Finally, 
the development of the NPR's role in disaster relief operations are also 
examined. 
 
V. The Evolution of the NPR 
 
In seeking to provide the first complete history of the NPR, the overall 
purpose of this study, this chapter explores the end of the force and its 
evolution into the National Safety Force (NSF) and Ground Self Defence 
Force (GSDF). The chapter demonstrates that the gradual evolution into the 
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NSF and GSDF represented a partial departure from the constabulary nature 
of the NPR. Nevertheless, these moves towards a more externally focused 
force did not eliminate the entirety of the NPR's constabulary structure and 
some elements of it survive to this day. The examination of these vestiges of 
the NPR in the modern GSDF and the other commonalities and differences 





The English language scholarship on the NPR exists across a chronological 
and ideological spectrum. The approach many American scholars employ on 
the subject focuses mostly on the international context of the force. 9 This 
strength is an aspect of the existing scholarship which benefits the content of 
this study, but the general emphasis on the international and American 
influences on the force tends to obscure other equally powerful influences 
from within Japan itself. The examination of the domestic influences on the 
force forms the first main aim of this study, an aim clearly validated by the 
current neglect of the subject. The second main of this study is to examine 
the character of the force. This is again required due to the scant amount of 
attention played to the character of the force until now. The common 
approach by most English language scholars is to label the force (usually as 
an army from its very creation) using a very thin source base, with most 
sharing a single secondary source as the root for their judgements.10 This 
                                                   
9
 Some British and Australian scholars are working in the field but it remains largely an 
American preserve, partly as a legacy of the Occupation itself and the academic careers 
pursued by former participants from the 1950s onwards. 
10
 The single source used is Frank Kowalski‟s memoir, see below. Dower, Embracing Defeat, 
Japan, p 547; J. Dower, Empire and Aftermath, Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese 
Experience, 1878-1954, Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University Press, London, 
1988, p 384; H.B. Schonberger, Aftermath of War, Americans and the Remaking of Japan 
1945-1952, Kent State University Press, London, 1989, p 252; R. Drifte, The Security Factor 
in Japan’s Foreign Policy, 1945-52, Saltire Press, Brighton,1983, pp 102-103; R.B. Finn, 
Winners in Peace, MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan, University of California Press, 
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seems a gross oversimplification of a force which was influenced by many 
differing policy actors and events, and whose character evolved over time. 
This weakness again confirms the requirement for a study such as this which 
aims to fully explore the character of the force using a broad and varied range 
of primary sources. The remainder of this section is devoted to a general 
survey of the scholarship on the NPR followed by specific engagement with a 
number of key works which make reference to the force. 
 
As Carol Gluck noted in her historiographical essay; „Entangling Illusions – 
Japanese and American Views of the Occupation‟, American scholarship on 
the period shifted into roughly two ideologically and chronologically distinct 
groups in the early 1970s, with the earlier, first generation of Occupation 
historiography being challenged by an emerging second generation.11 The 
first generation, also sometimes characterised as the „orthodox‟ school, 
mainly argued that the Occupation‟s reform agenda was largely complete by 
1948 and the „reverse course‟ (the alleged reversal of GHQ‟s progressive 
agenda in the later years of the Occupation), far from being a reversal of 
policy, was a new initiative adopted to confront the challenges of the 
emerging Cold War after reform was complete.12 In this Justin Williams (the 
former Parliamentary and Political Division Chief of Government Section) and 
others deny that the „reverse course‟ ever actually occurred at all: „the 
reverse course concept . . . does not stand up under close scrutiny‟.13 Gluck 
argues that the position of the first generation of scholars, particularly in 
works produced prior to the late 1960s, constructed a historiography which 
she claims depicted the Occupation as a „heroic narrative‟ in which 
                                                                                                                                                
London,1992, pp 265-266; Takemae, Inside GHQ, pp 487-488, Maeda, The Hidden Army, pp 
22-23; Schaller, Altered States, p 268, notes 44-46. 
11
 C. Gluck, „Entangling Illusions - Japanese and American Views of the Occupation‟, in W.I. 
Cohen (ed), New Frontiers in American-East Asian Relations, Columbia University Press, 
New York, 1983, p 171. 
12
 J. Williams, „American Democratization Policy for Occupied Japan: Correcting the 
Revisionist Version‟, Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 57, No. 2, 1988, p 184. 
13
 J. Williams, Japan’s Political Revolution under MacArthur, A Participants Account, 
University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1979, p 208. 
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enlightened and benign American reforms were highly successful. 
Correspondingly, the emphasis of most scholarship of this era centred on the 
more progressive earlier period of reform, whilst arguing that the later 
changes in policy were made largely to preserve the earlier reforms and 
strengthen the Japanese economy.14 These earlier works do tend to focus on 
the successes of the Occupation period, which were later further magnified 
by the success of the Japanese „developmental model‟ in the second half of 
the twentieth century.15 
 
Despite the first generation of Occupation historians questioning the 
existence of the „reverse course‟ their position on rearmament and the 
creation of the NPR remains somewhat ambiguous. Williams argues that the 
internal security risk created by the departure of the US troops for Korea in 
the late summer of 1950 necessitated the creation of the NPR, but that its 
establishment was a natural evolution of policy following the completion of the 
reform agenda.16 Generally, their position reflects the period in which much of 
their work was produced and the background of its advocates, many of whom 
were members of GHQ. Its ideas tend to be evocative of the pre-1960s 
American self-confidence earned from victory in the Second World War, the 
elevation of the nation to superpower status and the more optimistic and 
positive conception of US foreign policy held by much of the American public 
before the Vietnam War. First generation historians also sometimes fall prey 
to the overt „red baiting‟ and the labelling, as Williams does, of opponents as 
„revisionists‟ or even communists.17 A further interesting point is that many 
historians in this group, including Williams, have their own reputations to 
promote and defend as they were participants in the Occupation. Due to this, 
these historians are often sensitive to being labelled „imperialists‟ or being 
accused of working solely in the interest of the US. 
                                                   
14
 Gluck, „Entangling Illusions‟, p 214. 
15
 M. Metzler, „The Occupation‟, in W.M. Tsutsui (ed), A Companion to Japanese History, 
Blackwell, Oxford, 2007, p 266. 
16
 Williams, „American Democratization‟, pp 186, 187. 
17




In the early 1970s, following the declassification of large amounts of relevant 
American documents and the unravelling of much of America‟s Asian policy 
with looming defeat in Vietnam, US scholarship on the Occupation began to 
chart a new course.18 In contrast to the original, first generation approach, 
which stressed the positive results of the Occupation and the successful 
changes it instigated within Japan, the second generation of scholars, highly 
influenced by the pacifism and anti-establishment politics of the Vietnam 
protest era, sought to stress the continuity of elements of Japanese politics 
and society and the negative or retrogressive aspects of US policy.19 The 
approach of the second generation can be seen, in part, as a reaction to 
failure in Vietnam, with most scholars of this generation seeking to show the 
failures of US policy, and attempting to link the Occupation more closely to its 
Cold War context and the wider context of alleged US imperialism.20 
 
This new approach produced a series of monographs and articles which 
added considerably to the depth and breadth of scholarship on the period.21 
The roles of General MacArthur and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida were 
reduced to a more human scale and the roles of the Japan lobby (groups of 
interested non-governmental individuals and organisations in Washington) 
and Washington were further explored. The second generation generally 
characterised the „reverse course‟ as the abandonment of reform in the 
interests of stability, taken in response to the downfall of the Yalta system 
and nationalist China, fears of Japanese or global economic collapse, and 
concern over the possibility of war with the USSR.22 
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Dower, Schonberger and the Kolkos thus adopted a position more critical of 
the Occupation, arguing that the „reverse course‟ evidenced a self-serving 
betrayal of earlier reforms by the US and the squandering of a chance for 
genuine „peace and democracy‟ in Japan. As Schonberger argued, American 
„policy rested on enlightened self interest more than generosity or good will‟.23 
In contrast to the separate approach favoured by the „orthodox‟ school, 
Dower, Schaller and Schonberger sought to link the policies pursued within 
Japan to the global American perspectives and the onset of the Cold War: 
„American policymakers treated Japan not as an isolated experiment in social 
engineering but primarily within the framework of global economic concerns 
and Cold War fears‟. 24  This study employs this element of the second 
generation‟s approach in linking US Cold War strategy and concepts such as 
the constabulary model to the creation and development of the NPR. 
 
The second generation‟s arguments also seem at least superficially similar to 
those advocated by many Leftwing Japanese scholars during the same 
period, which also tended to emphasise the significance of „reverse course‟ 
and argue it represented a betrayal of the early democratic promise of the 
Occupation. 25 Significant amounts of international co-operation between 
scholars did take place in this period, although, as Gluck states, the 
historiographical roots of both groups of scholars remained firmly planted in 
their respective academic communities. 26  The general second generation 
perspective is indeed somewhat similar to the Japanese perspective in its 
criticism of American policy as anti-communist, anti-fascist, imperialistic and 
largely self-interested, but is devoid of much of the Marxist ideology and 
historiographical arguments of some older Japanese scholarship.27 
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The second generation‟s criticism of the „reverse course‟, and the renewed 
conservative hegemony in Japan it precipitated, also extends to the creation 
of the NPR, often employing the creation of the force as proof of the 
conservative character of the „reverse course‟. Dower, in his central and 
prominent position as the leading US historian of the period, is illustrative of 
most second generation scholars in his argument that the „reverse course‟ 
formed a fundamental shift in US policy which was used by the ruling 
triumvirate of the Japanese bureaucracy, conservative politicians and big 
business to reconsolidate their power.28  With regard to the NPR, Dower 
argues that rearmament had been planned long before the outbreak of the 
Korean War and the „reverse course‟ represented the decisive shift of US 
policy from „demilitarization‟ to „rearmament‟.29  
 
This position does seem misleading as the character of the NPR was far from 
preordained at its creation and evolved for years after its birth.30 However, 
the emphasis of some second generation scholars on American concerns 
over the internal stability of Japan as key to their policy in Asia is useful when 
attempting to explore the reasons behind the creation and evolution of the 
NPR. As Schonberger argues, „the internal economic, political and 
psychological weakness of Japan was a major threat to the postwar 
American security in Asia because it enhanced “the possibilities for intrigue, 
subversion and seizure of power by the Japanese communists” allied to the 
Soviet Union‟. 31  This emphasis on the internal security aspects of the 
Occupation is one which has helped inform the first main aim of this study.  
 
Due to the vast expansion of scholarship on the Occupation from the 1970s 
onwards and the wider variety of perspectives employed by historians, the 
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term „reverse course‟ may have outlived what usefulness it once had and in 
recent years this trend of broadening the field and the questioning of earlier 
assumptions has continued with the emergence of a third generation of 
historians. Headed by a reinvigorated Dower and mostly made up of Japan 
specialists, the new generation of scholars largely eschewed the „traditional‟ 
high level policy approach, opting instead for a social and cultural emphasis 
on the period, perhaps typified by Dower‟s highly influential Embracing 
Defeat.32 Answering a question raised by Gluck in the 1980s over why the 
Japanese themselves were underrepresented in the history of the period, the 
third generation adopted an approach which sought to show more Japanese 
perspectives on the Occupation. Dower is particularly successful in doing this, 
clearly describing the „internal Cold War‟ between the Left and Right within 
Japan during the period and showing more of a balance between the „bottom 
up‟ day-to-day Japanese perspectives on the Occupation and the American 
dominated „top down‟ approach of the previous two generations. 33  This 
approach is one which this study seeks to adopt, aiming to both examine the 
NPR from both „top down‟ and „bottom up‟ perspectives, looking at both the 
policy formation process and the living conditions of its members. A good 
example of this approach in this study is the examination of the two principal 
attempts to seize control of the NPR. Originating from either side of the 
ideological divide of Japan‟s „internal Cold War‟, the plot by Japanese 
Rightists and GHQ hawks represented a „top down‟ attempt to convert the 
NPR into a new Japanese army, whist the attempt by the Japanese 
Communist Party to infiltrate the force represented a „bottom up‟ approach to 
turn the force against the Japanese government. 
 
Despite his weighty contribution to the historiography of the period, Dower‟s 
work on the NPR does contain several weaknesses. Like many studies, it 
lumps the NPR, NSF and GSDF together, oversimplifying the evolution and 
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character of three distinct forces. In contrast to Dower‟s approach and in 
order to counter this common oversimplification, this study focuses principally 
on the NPR itself, although some discussion of the evolution of the force into 
the NSF and GSDF and the commonalities and differences between the 
forces does take place in the final chapter. Dower‟s work also suffers, like 
that of many other historians, from a lack of clear definitions and certain 
weaknesses in those he does employ, particularly that of rearmament. 34 
Dower‟s works also contain no mention of the JCP‟s military policy of the 
1950s onwards. This omission may be an honest mistake but in sections 
such as „Domestic Peace Keeping and the Political Left‟ in Empire and 
Aftermath in which claims are made about the Japanese government 
pursuing oppressive, reactionary policies against the Left, the lack of any 
mention of the concurrent JCP policy of violent revolution could expose him 
to accusations of political bias.35 Finally, Dower uses a limited source base in 
his discussion so the NPR, for example in Embracing Defeat, his most 
significant work on the Occupation, he uses no primary sources, and only 
cites himself, Hata, Igarashi and his Kowalski manuscript.36 
 
Although there are weaknesses in his approach Dower can be excused these 
shortcomings somewhat. When producing major studies such as Embracing 
Defeat and Empire and Aftermath it is unreasonable to expect large amounts 
of research and attention to be dedicated to such a relatively small element of 
the history of the Occupation. This if further underlined by the fact that the 
NPR had a relatively mild impact on the social, political and cultural history of 
the Occupation and the political history of Yoshida and postwar Japanese 
political leadership, that these studies respectively addressed.  
 
The overreliance on a surprisingly narrow number of sources is sadly 
common to most of the work on the NPR. All tend to choose sources which 
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usually correspond neatly with their arguments. Most frequently cited is 
Kowalski‟s Japanese language memoir (or its English manuscript) of his 
service as an American advisor to the NPR.37 From this the same single 
quotation about the supposed use of the term „special vehicle‟ to describe a 
tank is used by almost all scholars seeking to demonstrate the NPR was an 
army.38  
 
This reliance on a single source is in itself a weakness but Kowalski‟s memoir 
also suffers from a number of drawbacks. The work was written twenty years 
after the event, at the height of the Vietnam War, and during a period in which 
Japan had again begun to be seen as a threat by some in the US due to the 
worldwide expansion of Japanese carmakers and other major Japanese 
companies. This international backdrop may have influenced the memoir‟s 
highly critical, cynical and accusatory tone. The original English manuscript, 
of which Dower holds the only full copy, was written three years after 
Kowalski lost his seat in Congress, and this decline in his fortunes may have 
also contributed to the negative tone of the work.39 The work has never been 
published in English, but with its accusations and assumptions about the 
NPR it found a more receptive audience in Japan, where it has gone through 
three editions (1969, 1984 and 1999). This fact and the limited availability of 
the original manuscript make access to, and hence critical engagement with, 
Kowalski‟s work difficult for most scholars. This often extends to the subject 
covered, with some historians accepting Kowalski‟s conclusions without 
comment, analysis or any further supporting sources. This weakness clearly 
demonstrates the need for this study, which employs a broad base of primary 
sources, especially when examining the character of the force. 
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Kowalski‟s role as deputy head of the GHQ body which oversaw the NPR 
also casts some shadows over his usefulness as the sole source upon which 
to analyse the NPR. First, Kowalski was largely taken up with the central, 
Tokyo based administrative and liaison duties his role entailed and was not 
actually in the field with the NPR, with commanders such as Burgheim who 
publically hailed the NPR as an internal security force.40 Much of Kowalski‟s 
role also involved close contact with the Japanese leadership of the NPR and 
the constant struggles with them over the character of the NPR may well 
have soured his feelings about the force. Kowalski also served happily under 
the hawkish Shepard, one of the staunchest advocates of rearmament, and 
despite his eventual disclosure of a plot to install Imperial army officers in the 
NPR, that Kowalski also recommended the use of nine hundred officers to 
the same plotters, and was heavily involved in the plans for the massive 
expansion of the force, reveal his hawkish attitude. A further example of this 
is his description of himself as „the man who rearmed Japan‟ and Kowalski‟s 
Right-of-centre political position is further confirmed through his membership 
of the US Subversive Activities Control Board from 1963 to 1966. 41 Finally, 
as Kowalski had served in military training roles for the majority of his career, 
this experience may well have also influenced his views of the NPR, 
discouraging him from drawing a distinction between an army and a 
constabulary.  
 
In 1973 James Auer produced an admirable study of the NPR's naval 
counterpart, the Maritime Safety Agency and its eventual successor, the 
Maritime Self Defence Force (MSDF). Auer argued that the MSDF differed 
from a navy in a number of ways, many of which are also applicable to the 
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NPR. These included the absence of military law, a national security law and 
conscription; the fact that overseas deployment is prohibited; and that 
members of the Self Defence Forces are civilians.42 These points are useful 
to this study in that they assist in helping to assess the character of the NPR 
in general and the non-military aspects of it in particular. For example, the 
legal position and civilian nature of the members of the MSDF are identical to 
those of the NPR and are examined in detail in this study as they represent 
one of the key pillars of the NPR's constabulary character. However, despite 
these valid and useful points and his effective analysis of the MSDF, 
curiously Auer is weaker on the NPR, claiming that it was just a „disguised 
army‟ from the start and using Kowalski as his single source to justify this 
claim (with no page reference and a mistake in the publisher‟s name). 43 
These shortcomings are particularly disappointing because if Auer had 
applied just some of his own theories on the MSDF to the NPR, rather than 
simply using Kowalski, he would have produced an effective analysis of the 
force and could have clearly demonstrated its constabulary character.  
 
In what some historians such as Gallicchio still consider the best work in 
English on the subject, Weinstein paints a more balanced picture of the 
NPR. 44  Weinstein argues that the Japanese government pursued an 
independent policy on security which predated the militarization of US Asian 
policy which took place from 1949 to 1951. Weinstein claims that the 
Japanese government formed the opinion that war between the superpowers 
was a possibility and could entail either an attempt at armed revolution by 
communists within Japan and/or a Soviet attack on Hokkaido. 
Correspondingly, they believed that Japan should pursue a defence 
agreement with the United States as the best way of ensuring its external 
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security.45 Citing Japanese documents and using interviews with key actors, 
Weinstein presents an argument that the Japanese leadership sought to 
create a constabulary able to maintain internal security. The force was also 
intended to perform the dual role of a concession to help convince the US to 
agree to a mutual defence treaty, and a tool of the state to confront the 
perceived threat from the JCP. 46  This effort to take on responsibility for 
internal security also reflects the Japanese elite‟s desire to avoid becoming 
an American military satellite and their real fear that internal subversion 
represented the most significant threat to the survival of the Japanese 
government.47 Weinstein‟s work is valuable and mirrors the first main aim of 
this study in attempting to show the influence of Japanese domestic politics 
and internal security on the force. Nevertheless, in focusing on the policy 
aspects of the NPR Weinstein is less effective in examining the nature of the 
force and never really justifies his conclusions through references to the 
character of the NPR grounded in primary sources. 
 
The British historian Reinhard Drifte argues that the NPR was always 
destined to become a military force although its true nature was initially 
concealed.48 However, somewhat contradictorily, he maintains that although 
the US administration abandoned demilitarization as relations with the USSR 
declined, no unified view had been formed on Japanese rearmament before 
June 1950.49 Drifte also comments on the Japanese administration‟s concern 
over internal security and desire for strong internal security forces.50 Drifte‟s 
argument that the NPR was always destined to become a military is disputed 
by this study. However, his position on the confused and conflicting nature of 
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the American position on Japanese security during the period is a valid one 
and one which is explored in more detail in the second chapter of this study. 
 
Welfield offers another position on the NPR, arguing that debate over Japan‟s 
future security intensified after the fall of nationalist China in 1949, with the 
US military and the Japan lobby pressing for rearmament, but with the State 
Department seeking to avoid such a provocative move in an attempt to 
maintain a working relationship with the Soviets and America‟s Pacific allies. 
Welfield characterises Prime Minister Yoshida as maintaining his distaste for 
the Japanese armed forces after 1945, but also mentions his belief that 
Japan would one day need a military of some kind. The Rightwing General 
Willoughby, head of GHQ‟s principal intelligence arm (G2), is also portrayed 
as preserving a clique of former Japanese staff officers in a bid to form a 
cadre of potential future generals in the event of Japanese rearmament. 
Attention is also paid to Yoshida‟s concerns over the questionable ability of 
the decentralised National Rural Police to deal with serious instability and his 
corresponding fears of communist insurrection. 51  Welfield describes 
MacArthur‟s and Yoshida‟s view of the NPR as that of a paramilitary 
constabulary, which they did not want to develop into an army. This fusion of 
the international and domestic influences on the NPR is one which is adopted 
by this study in an attempt to show the full range of influences on the force. 
Furthermore, Welfield‟s brief examination of the attempts by elements of 
GHQ and Japanese former officers to seize control of the force is another 
strong point of his work, and is again one which is examined in more detail in 
this work, in support of the first primary aim of exploring the domestic 
influences on the force. Welfield‟s work also demonstrates the necessity of 
this study and the validity of its aim of producing a full examination of the 
character of the force through highlighting the difficulty most historians have 
in accurately describing the NPR: „both organisations [the NPR and Maritime 
Safety Force (MSF)] were rather more ambiguous in character than is often 
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supposed‟.52 It seems Welfield‟s brief analysis is also useful in showing that 
the creation and evolution of the NPR were influenced by a mix of Japanese 
and American  attitudes, ideas aims and interests, which resulted in behind-
the-scenes struggles over the character of the NPR. This again is an area 
that this study seeks to replicate and build upon. However, despite the merits 
of his argument Welfield again suffers from his limited source base in which 
he does not use any primary sources and relies very heavily on the Asahi 
Shinbun newspaper and the official SDF yearbook (Bōei Nenkan).53 
 
The husband-and-wife team of Meirion and Susie Harries 1989 work 
Sheathing the Sword, The Demilitarization of Japan, in spite of its production 
by non-specialist journalists, does contain some interesting conclusions. 
Despite inaccuracies such as the assumption the NPR was an army from the 
start, that an Imperial Japanese Air Force existed, and that Yoshida was 
„ordered‟ to set up the NPR, the Harries do hint at the internal security role of 
the NPR and make reference to the role MacArthur and Yoshida had in 
attempting to preserve the constabulary character of the force.54  
 
The misconception that Japanese government was „ordered‟ to create the 
NPR is one which is unfortunately shared by most work on the subject.55 This 
interpretation of the immediate events which led to the creation of the NPR is 
one that this study challenges through citing Japanese desires for an internal 
security force like the NPR and the fact that the Japanese government was 
happy to create the force once authorised to do so by MacArthur.56 It seems 
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that this interpretation is often used as it fits more comfortably with the 
discussions of the „Red Purge‟ or the „reverse course‟ within which most 
studies situate the NPR.57 As well as obscuring the Japanese desire for an 
internal force and the error of characterising the MacArthur letter as a 
coercive order, this approach also undermines the aims of much current 
scholarship through reducing the role of the Japanese to that of passive 
„victims‟ of US policy. 
 
In recent years the Australian John Weste has produced several pieces 
relating to aspects of the character of the NPR: one in 1999 looking at one of 
the Rightwing plots to seize control of the NPR, and another in 2008 on Great 
Britain and Japanese security. 58  These studies, whilst making a useful 
contribution, have a number of flaws which further work on the subject, such 
as this study, will help to mitigate. For example, Weste‟s 1999 paper relies 
heavily on Kowalski and the Harries and only identifies one of the three plots 
to install Hattori Takushiro and other purgees into the NPR.59 His 2008 paper 
„Great Britain and Japanese Rearmament, 1945-1960‟ suffers from many of 
the common oversimplifications of the subject, again arguing that Japan was 
„ordered‟ to create the NPR and that Washington heavily promoted 
rearmament in 1950.60  Weste also makes no reference to the perceived 
internal security threat from the JCP and the Japanese government‟s 
rejection of an external security force. However, both of these elements are 
picked up on by Shibayama‟s chapter in the same edited volume and also 
form key strands of the first principal aim of this study. 61 
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Another recent work on the Self Defence Forces (SDF) has been produced 
by Hertrich. Despite some questionable arguments about continuities existing 
between the virtues and values of the IJA and SDF, and that MacArthur 
„ordered‟ Yoshida to set up the NPR, Hertrich makes some valid and 
interesting points on the NPR/SDF.62 For example, Hertrich correctly argues 
that that the NPR was created to fill an internal security role, that participation 
in disaster relief operations has an influence on the identity of the SDF, and 
that elements of the NPR‟s character persist in the ambiguous character of 
the modern SDF. 63  These comments about the influence of the internal 
security and disaster relief roles of the NPR on its character are themes 
which are also replicated and expanded upon in this work. 
 
The Japanese approaches to the history of the period are useful in 
complementing this study of the NPR. Nevertheless, like their English 
language counterparts, the approach of the majority of Japanese scholars to 
the subject, of focusing on the high level policy process and international 
context of the force leaves two principal gaps: the domestic, and especially 
non-governmental, influences on the NPR, and the actual examination of the 
character of the force. These gaps correspond exactly to the two central aims 
of this study: to examine the domestic influences on the NPR and its 
character. A general survey followed by more specific analyses of the 
Japanese historiography follows, highlighting current issues in the field and 
how they relate to the aims of this study. 
 
Despite some overlap in recent years Japanese scholarship on the 
Occupation often differs both in terms of methodology and ideology from that 
of the United States. 64 With the Occupation forming such an important phase 
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in postwar Japanese history and with the influence of the United States still 
looming so large over contemporary Japan, the issues surrounding the 
Occupation, and particularly those which are considered more controversial, 
still provoke emotional and often polarised debate. There is also something of 
a taboo over discussion of the NPR, SDF and security issues in general. In 
Japan this taboo has two principal origins: pacifism and the country‟s 
international position. The widely held „emotional pacifism‟ of much of Japan‟s 
population has its roots in the demilitarization and educational reform policies 
of the Occupation, added to the international political position the Japanese 
state found itself in after defeat in 1945. 65  As Hata argues, due to US 
protection after 1945, Japanese citizens, insulated from the realities of 
international politics, did not feel connected to the Cold War, and often 
developed unrealistic or even utopian conceptions of security issues.66 This 
long standing taboo over the discussion of defence policy and the overriding 
pacifist norm in Japanese society made it challenging for many years for 
Japanese academics to adopt anything other than a critical position on issues 
such as the NPR without risking their reputations or being labelled 
nationalistic. Despite a lessening in intensity since the 1990s, this reluctance 
to adopt controversial or unpopular positions was enhanced by the fact that in 
Japan even the most methodological Japanese scholars often have a public 
role, serving on government commissions and contributing to national policy 
debates, opportunities which would have been jeopardised by controversial 
or critical opinions on defence issues.67 
 
Although the newer generations of Japanese scholars are not as influenced 
by Marxist ideology, some current scholarship still retains a more political 
bent than some contemporary American scholarship. 68  Like many of the 
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second generation of American historians, some contemporary Japanese 
scholars, such as Sakamoto Yoshikazu, tend to view the early Occupation 
years as something of a socialist utopia, which was snuffed out by 
reactionary imperialists rather than allowed to bloom into a true „social 
democracy‟.69 As well as the Japanese academic community‟s legacy of anti-
establishment, Marxist historiography, the shortage of available post-1952 
declassified Japanese government material gave some Japanese authors in 
earlier years licence for the inclusion of analyses based on scant evidence.70 
The current Japanese Left tend to emphasise the significance of the „reverse 
course‟ and the betrayal of the early democratic promise of the Occupation, in 
order to match Cold War interests. As a result the Japanese Left tend to 
cherish the earlier period of the Occupation and hold the 1947 constitution, 
the central surviving element of the Japanese state from this period, in high 
regard.71 
 
In contrast, Meltzer argues that Japanese conservative historians tend to 
view the same early period as one of „social engineering‟ and „victor‟s justice‟ 
which ceased once the US began to understand the danger of the JCP and 
communism to Japan, which, naturally, the Japanese Right had seen all 
along. This tilts the Right‟s emphasis toward favouring and focusing on the 
latter period of the Occupation. This and the distaste of the Right for the 
pacifism of the constitution leads many to argue that only once the 
constitution is redrawn will Japan be once again fully sovereign.72 
 
Despite the seemingly unbridgeable chasm between the two, the Left and 
Right do sometimes agree on some matters. First of these is a tendency to 
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agree that the impact of the Occupation is exaggerated. Although the 
motivations for saying so vary from a wounded nationalism, to an effort to 
promote the early JCP, many Japanese accounts are united in claiming that 
the Occupation mainly served to complete domestic policy efforts or social 
processes. Second, most Japanese historians seek to emphasise the 
negative aspects of the American interregnum at the expense of the positive 
contributions, with conservatives criticising the early years, and the 
progressives criticising the partial retrenchment of the later years. 
 
One of the regularly referenced works on rearmament and the NPR is Hata 
Ikuhiko‟s work, Shiroku Nihon Saigunbi (Historical Record, Japanese 
Rearmament). In this work Hata takes issue with leading historian Iriye 
Akira‟s arguments that throughout the Occupation the US had always wanted 
to integrate Japan into the Western bloc as a non-militaristic, capitalist 
partner and that the Cold War was not directly involved in determining the 
course of US policy for Japan.73 In contrast Hata argues that the influence of 
the Cold War was the single most significant factor on US policy, ultimately 
resulting in the „reverse course‟. 74  On the subjects of the NPR and 
rearmament Hata argues that Article Nine of the 1947 „Peace Constitution‟ 
was developed as the result of a bargain between Prime Minister Shidehara 
and MacArthur over the preservation of the Emperor on one side and the 
desire for insurance against re-militarization on the other.75 Describing what 
he terms as the „drama of the politics of rearmament‟, Hata asserts that rapid 
change in Japan‟s international environment and intensified Cold War 
pressures resulted in the „reverse course‟ and that a complex web of 
competing Japanese and American interest groups influenced the direction of 
Japanese security policy. This emphasis on the influence of the complexities 
and competing interest groups of the Occupation and domestic Japanese 
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politics are elements of Hata‟s work that this study seeks to replicate. Hata‟s 
work also is useful as it provides a slightly differing perspective from that of 
the majority of Japanese scholarship and is often cited, despite its age and 
high level policy focus, as one of the better studies on the subject. However, 
Hata‟s role as the official historian of the Japanese Ministry of Finance and 
hence his ties to the Japanese bureaucracy and government could be used 
to question some of his arguments and motivations. 
 
Takemae Eiji, originally an historian of Japanese labour reform, adopts a 
position on the NPR very close to that of Dower. Takemae‟s major English 
language work, Inside GHQ, The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy, 
an expansion of an earlier work in Japanese, argues, like Dower, that the 
NPR was an army from the start. 76  Like Hata, Takemae is good at 
highlighting the complex and shifting alliances between competing American 
and Japanese actors in GHQ, the Japanese government and Washington. 
The influence of these battles, usually between progressive and hawkish 
American and Japanese groupings, are an element of Takemae‟s work that 
this study seeks to employ.77 In spite of the merits of this approach, again like 
Dower, Takemae employs a thin source base in characterising the NPR as 
an army, using Dower, Kowalski, Maeda, Sebald, and a single primary source 
(an earlier version of the December 1951 Civil Affairs Section report on NPR 
used in this study).78  Furthermore, in most of his work Takemae makes 
almost no mention of the JCP violence and his total discussion of the NPR in 
the 560 page Inside GHQ amounts to just over three pages.79 
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One of the most significant Japanese historians of postwar Japan is Masumi 
Junnosuke. Masumi tends to focus on the domestic politics of Japan and is 
especially useful in his examination of the JCP in this period. Masumi gives a 
brief but effective account of the twists and turns of the JCP „military policy‟, 
highlighting the factional problems it generated within the party and using 
some key JCP documents of the time, such as the 1951 „New Line‟ and 
Cominform Directive No. 172.80 This approach is one which is also employed 
in this study which seeks to use original documents wherever possible to give 
a fuller picture of the JCP in the era of the NPR. Despite strengths in 
discussing the JCP, Masumi is weaker on the NPR and fails to really link the 
NPR and JCP, despite the former being created to counteract the latter. This 
weakness shows the need for a study such as this, which reunites these two 
fundamentally connected subjects. 
 
Perhaps the most influential scholar currently working in this field in Japan is 
Ōtake Hideo, the author of several works on the subject and the editor of a 
three-volume collection of related primary documents. Ōtake is somewhat 
typical of Japanese academia in adopting a fiercely critical approach to the 
creation of the NPR and the question of rearmament. In line with many 
Japanese historians, Ōtake argues that despite his belief that states should 
possess militaries of some kind, Yoshida and his government were passive in 
the events leading up to the creation of the NPR, with the force being 
imposed upon them by the Americans largely as a result of the outbreak of 
the Korean War. 81  Ōtake asserts that Yoshida wanted to take the time 
necessary to reform the Japanese constitution and win over the Japanese 
population before embarking upon rearmament but was forced to follow the 
„deception tactics‟ of GHQ, beginning with the formation of the „so-called 
police reserve‟, and which he was again forced to use in the 1954 creation of 
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the SDF, thus perpetuating the „culture of lies‟ which Ōtake alleges surrounds 
the SDF to this day.82 Ōtake‟s work demonstrates that the lasting controversy 
over the NPR and SDF still appears to restrict the detailed analysis of the 
issue divorced from the ideological and political attitudes encompassing 
Japanese academia and parts of the Japanese population. Through his 
emphasis on Japanese domestic politics Ōtake‟s approach shares some 
elements in common with the first primary aim of this study but the absence 
of any detail on the actual character of the NPR despite his accusations, both 
lessens Ōtake‟s contribution and reinforces the need for this study. 
  
Kataoka contributes several interesting concepts to the debate around the 
NPR, but suffers from a lack of clear definitions of the terminology he uses. 
Building on the late 1960s work of Kosaka, Kataoka argues that postwar 
Japan deliberately eschewed military affairs and traditional power politics, 
preferring to focus on trade and industry, an approach which he uses to 
characterise Japan as a „new Venice‟.83 Alongside this theory Kataoka offers 
some interesting reflections on the NPR/GSDF, claiming that due to the 
confinement of the forces to the territorial space of Japan and their 
constabulary character, Japan is effectively a protectorate of the United 
States.84 It does seem that in some ways Kataoka overplays his hand, as it is 
difficult to argue that the modern SDF is entirely a constabulary force. 
Furthermore, despite actually using the term he offers no explicit definition of 
what a constabulary actually is, perhaps relying on the implicit, standard 
North American usage. Again focusing on high level international policy 
debates, Kataoka‟s work offers little to this study in terms  of approach in 
general, but his discussions of the constabulary nature of the force and the 
influence of its territorial confinement are useful starting points for several of 
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the main strands of the discussion of the character of the NPR undertaken in 
this work.  
 
A further author useful to a certain degree for historiographical comparison, 
despite his journalistic writing style, is Maeda Tetsuo. Maeda‟s work is typical 
of the popular anti-military, anti-establishment variant of the Japanese 
approach to security issues. Maeda argues that MacArthur thought up the 
NPR on a brief visit to the frontline in Korea in summer 1950 and with that 
idea „the pacifism and disarmament that MacArthur had so forcefully and 
tirelessly promoted in Japan soon ended‟. 85  Maeda follows the common 
argument that the NPR was clearly intended as the first step in rearmament 
and was forced upon a confused Japanese Cabinet and population. Clearly, 
Maeda‟s work is of limited academic value as it neglects vast areas of 
evidence (again largely relying on Kowalski‟s work) and pursues a clearly 
inaccurate and biased ideological line. Nevertheless, the work is useful as an 
indicator of the passion behind the debate over security in Japan and the 
ideological motivations informing, albeit to a lesser extent, the arguments of 
Japanese scholars.86 Maeda‟s omission of the perceived JCP threat and his 
claims that the NPR was an army from the start, lack a sufficient evidence 
base and further support the aims of this study.  
 
Masuda Hiroshi, the editor of a two volume collection of documents on 
security in postwar Japan, also recently produced a major work on the 
creation of the SDF entitled Jietai no Tanjō (The Birth of the SDF).87 In this 
Masuda argues that most people in Japan believe that the NPR was created 
as a police force to avoid constitutional problems, and principally came into 
being due to the pressing need for internal security forces following the 
emergency dispatch of the US Occupation tactical troops to Korea. 88  In 
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opposition to what he sees as the prevailing view, Masuda gives his own 
reasons for the creation of the NPR, providing a detailed and convincing 
explanation only flawed by the omission of reference to internal security 
factors and the perceived threat from the JCP. 89  Furthermore, Masuda‟s 
principal argument that MacArthur‟s personal prestige and influence allowed 
him to defy Washington‟s policy and avoid rearming Japan is  interesting as it 
seems to conflict with the opinions of other writers such as Schonberger who 
claim that MacArthur‟s personal power declined sharply after the debacle of 
his failed presidential candidacy campaign in 1948.90 Masuda‟s hints towards 
the internal security origins of the NPR are an element of his work which is 
built upon in this study, but interestingly the fact that he does not link the JCP, 
the biggest perceived internal threat, to these concerns shows a weakness of 
his work on this subject. 
 
A recent work entitled „The Korean War and The National Police Reserve of 
Japan: Impact of the US Army‟s Far East Command on Japan‟s Defense 
Capability‟ by Kuzuhara, a fellow of the Japanese National Institute of 
Defence Studies, also offers some interesting conclusions. Kuzuhara argues 
that prior to the Chinese intervention in Korea the NPR was a constabulary 
but afterwards it assumed more of a military character.91 This is an accurate 
conclusion but some flaws in Kuzuhara‟s analysis, specifically those re lating 
to the capabilities of the NPR and NSF and their assumption of heavy arms, 
and his lack of a definition of a constabulary weaken his contribution 
somewhat.92 Kuzuhara‟s emphasis on the character of the NPR complements 
the second primary focus of this study but his lack of attention to the JCP 
threat and some shortcomings in his analysis of the NPR's capabilities do 
weaken his usefulness. 
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After surveying the existing scholarship on the history of the NPR a number 
of strengths and weaknesses are clearly evident. The vast majority of the 
work on the subject is dedicated to the high level policy processes which led 
to the creation of the force. Some attention is paid to Japanese domestic 
influences on the force, with historians such as Ōtake and Masumi making 
contributions in the study of the Japanese government and the JCP. However, 
little on the domestic influences exists in English and even less on the JCP in 
this period. 
 
This gap in the scholarship is matched by a similar neglect of the character of 
the NPR, on which there is virtually nothing written in either English or 
Japanese. Across the historiography there is a tendency by virtually all 
historians to characterise the NPR (usually as an army) without reference to 
its actual character. Furthermore, where such references do exist they are 
usually justified through reference to a single secondary source (Kowalski). 
This inadequate approach to the study of the NPR is further compounded by 
the absence of any mention of the internal security threat posed by the JCP 
at the time which formed the principal domestic impetus behind the creation 
of the force. This separation of the NPR from its context and its premature 
characterisation as an army, makes its creation look like a reactionary part of 
the „Red Purge‟ or „reverse course‟ forced needlessly on a reluctant Japan. 
 
These weaknesses underline the need for this study. The twin aims of 
demonstrating the domestic influences on the force and the true character of 
the force, target the two weakest areas of the work on the force. This 
approach validates the aims of this study and demonstrates its contribution 
by to filling an obvious gap in the historiography. Some studies on the subject 
have good points but all have weaknesses. This study attempts to unify the 
best elements from the existing scholarship and in doing so attempts to 
provide as full an analysis as possible of the character of the NPR and all of 
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the influences upon its creation and evolution. In achieving this aim reference 
to a firm and broad base of primary sources has been necessary and the 
following section examines the approach taken by this study to their analysis 
and use.  
 
 
Methodology and Sources 
 
This thesis is an empirical study involving the extensive examination of 
primary sources supported by reference to the relevant secondary literature. 
As noted above, the initial chapters of the study will describe the domestic 
influences on the high level policy debate which led to the NPR‟s creation. 
The second part of the study will consist of an examination of the NPR from 
an operational and structural perspective in order to determine its character. 
The latter portion of the work will employ the bulk of the primary material, due 
to its aims, originality and the corresponding dearth of secondary literature. 
This approach, which combines examinations of the executive decision-
making process and the structure, character and role of the force, will 
illuminate the nature, creation and operation of the NPR from a number of 
differing perspectives. The dearth of primary source based research on the 
force also make this approach the most effective in contributing to the debate 
and will also provide the material necessary to provide a clear picture of the 
character, origins and evolution of the NPR. Whilst challenging some of the 
specific conclusions of certain second and third generation historians, this 
work does not seek to entirely reject their approaches to the study of the 
Occupation. If anything this work seeks to support some of their ideas 
through linking the NPR to overall US Cold War strategy and by revealing the 
Japanese influences on the NPR. However, this thesis does seek to reject 
their key position that the NPR was an army from the start, through reference 
to primary documents which reveal the true character of the force. In general 
the value and bias of the specific primary sources employed are individually 
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addressed in the text but a general review of the respective merits and 
shortcomings of the archives and collections employed comprises the 
remainder of this section. 
 
Following from the year of research conducted there, the principal primary 
source materials employed for all chapters, and especially those dealing with 
the character of the NPR are the documents found in the Kensei Shiryoshitsu 
(Postwar Japanese Political History Room) of the National Diet Library, Tokyo 
(NDLT). The NDLT houses both microfiche copies of the GHQ/SCAP 
archives and the records of the Japanese government as well as numerous 
other collections related to Japan‟s postwar history. The GHQ archives 
contain the complete correspondence of all levels of the SCAP bureaucracy 
and US military in Japan as well as that of much of the Japanese government 
and bureaucracy. The material in these archives and collections contributed 
significantly to the content of this study, particularly in its provision of middle 
and lower echelon reports and material on both the JCP threat and the NPR. 
A particular strength of the archives, and the Occupation archives in 
particular, is the brief period of clarity the Occupation imposed on the 
Japanese bureaucracy which was previously and subsequently notable for its 
unaccountable opacity and significant political power.93 
 
Nevertheless, the archives do have some drawbacks in terms of their content, 
principally in lacking record groups of particular interest to some scholars. For 
example, the Japanese archives do not contain RG-6: Records of 
Headquarters, Far East Command (FECOM), 1947-1951, which consists of 
material on the military side of the Occupation and the Korean War; mainly 
comprising intelligence summaries, memoranda, orders and plans related to 
the operations of the Occupation. These could possibly contain much on the 
NPR but are inaccessible in Japan. In order to overcome this shortcoming 
key documents absent from the NDLT were obtained from the MacArthur  
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Memorial Archives, Norfolk Virginia. 
 
A major drawback of the Japanese archives until recently was the lack of a 
Japanese freedom of information act and a corresponding declassification 
system. This lack of legislation meant that until 2001 Japanese politicians and 
bureaucrats could permanently remove sensitive materials from the public 
domain.94 Although not much of an issue during the life of the Occupation 
due to the liberal American attitude towards the GHQ archives, the following 
years saw the re-imposition of much of the Japanese reluctance to divulge 
the inner workings of government. This restriction of access to documents 
with potentially embarrassing or controversial content was particularly evident 
amongst the more delicate areas of government, especially materials relating 
to the SDF, the very existence of which remains a controversial subject even 
today. After decades of campaigning a freedom of information act was finally 
passed in 1999 but was not promulgated until 2001, in order to give officials 
„time to prepare‟. It is probably not a coincidence that the years 1999-2001 
saw a vast increase in government waste disposal, as thousands of sensitive 
documents were shredded or burnt.95 This mass deletion of controversial 
documents has recently been confirmed through the controversy over the 
existence of an alleged secret 1960 nuclear deal between Japan and the US 
which violated Japans‟ postwar non-nuclear principles. 96  The documents 
confirming the existence of the pact have been difficult to trace in the 
Japanese government archives, most likely due to their disposal in 1999-
2001, but US documents and a recent government inquiry have confirmed 
their existence, and deletion at some point in 1999 - 2001.97 
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Despite the freedom of information act coming into existence scholars still 
face severe obstacles when seeking to access and use certain materials in 
Japan. Much of the material released has been heavily redacted and the 
powerful „Personal Data Protection Law‟ of April 2005, somewhat hampers 
freedom of the press, making it much easier for individuals or the government 
to suppress information or accusations they do not like. 98  Furthermore, 
events such as the Defence Agency‟s investigation of 142 individuals who 
had filed freedom of information requests, the following bungled cover-up, 
and the recent arrest of a Mainichi journalist who received some sensitive 
documents just prior to their publication by the government, reveal the extent 
to which Japan has yet to fully embrace both the letter and spirit of the 
principle of freedom of information.99 
 
One of the principal and most valuable sources, particularly for dealing with 
the international context of the creation of the NPR, are the volumes of the 
Foreign Relations of the United States. 100  These volumes cover the 
correspondence between bureaucrats, diplomats and military officers in the 
higher strata of the American state. The FRUS volumes are effective in their 
coverage of most of the major policy documents and correspondence 
between the US policy elite and hence are very useful in examining the 
policymaking process and in revealing the actors involved in it. The relevant 
volumes of the FRUS are also useful for the examination of those areas of 
Japan policy, such as the peace treaty negotiations, in which Washington 
was more directly involved. The broad strategic documents relating to 
American policy on Japan can also all be found in the FRUS, including those 
relating directly to the shifts in Japan policy which provided the background to 
the creation of the NPR, such as NSC 13, 48 and 68. The volumes of the 
FRUS also provide a useful window on the attitudes of policymakers in 
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Washington and Tokyo and reveal the statements, opinions and complex 
interwoven relationships between the numerous concerned US agencies and 
individuals both in Tokyo and Washington. The volumes are helpful in 
revealing these often conflicting and sometimes confused agendas which 
competed in the policy formation process which eventually resulted in the 
creation of the NPR. 
 
However, the FRUS does have some limitations when used as a source for 
the study of the NPR. These limitations are principally due to the scope and 
depth of the content as well as the nature of the FRUS. One of the main 
drawbacks is the absence of the responses and contributions of the middle 
and lower ranked officials involved in actually executing or administering the 
decisions taken by their superiors. Due to this the entire narrative of the 
implementation and adaptation of policy to the available means and 
resources is largely omitted. This omission has serious consequences for the 
study of the NPR as the form and function of the organisation itself are rarely 
explored and the operations and evolution of the force after its creation 
receive little mention. Furthermore, as the volumes deal with inter-American 
communication there is almost no Japanese authored content on the NPR. 
Moreover, as the FRUS only deals with the correspondence of the US state, 
important non-state actors‟ views are likewise absent. This impediment 
proves especially telling as it means the FRUS does not contain the views 
and reports of actors such as the highly influential „Japan lobby‟ who pressed 
for the creation of a Japanese constabulary to protect Japan‟s internal 
security from the late 1940s and had the ear of many in GHQ, Washington 
and the Japanese elite.101 Furthermore, as the FRUS is primarily concerned 
with chronicling the foreign policy of the United States, certain areas directly 
relating to the creation and evolution of the NPR are omitted. Principal 
amongst these is the nature of the political situation within Japan and the 
communist unrest within the country around the time of the NPR‟s creation. 
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Although some mention is made of the domestic political situation with Japan, 
the internal politics of Japan are not exhaustively covered and hence other 
sources must also be consulted. 
 
The usefulness of the FRUS also suffers somewhat from the way in which its 
content is presented. Entries are given in chronological order but are largely 
unannotated, with minor entries presented next to highly influential and widely 
read documents, with little indication provided by the editors of how well or 
widely received the content was. Despite this, the problem can be overcome 
somewhat through the examination of secondary literature and the content of 
the FRUS itself to see which opinions seem to prevail and how they ultimately 
influenced policy. As the FRUS is an official publication of the United States 
government, the content of the series is subject to the declassification laws of 
the United States and hence key content may be absent.  
 
Despite a pretty comprehensive coverage of documents in the volumes 
covering the Far East in the late 1940s and early 1950s, some doubt has 
been cast over the content of the later 1950s volumes, particularly the one 
dealing with Japan and Korea between 1958 and 1960. 102  Although this 
volume contained some omissions and deletions, nothing it contained, or 
perhaps did not contain, matched the glaring omission of the CIA sponsored 
overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq from the 1989 the volume 
relating to Iran in the years 1952-1954.103 The widespread criticism of this 
volume resulted in 1991 in a new law, in which the US government stipulated 
that future volumes of FRUS needed to contain as full of a record as possible 
and had to be published within thirty years of the events described.104 Despite 
improving transparency these reforms have materially slowed down 
production of the series, with the volumes currently several years behind 
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schedule. In using the FRUS these limitations are unavoidable and are 
difficult to negotiate but the material provided is nevertheless highly useful 
and content which may or may not have been withheld can only be 
speculated upon. 
 
The shortcomings of the FRUS mean it is primarily useful as a source for 
examining the background to the creation of the NPR, especially in relation to 
the attitudes towards the Cold War, Korean War and Japan‟s role within US 
global policy. To produce a more complete picture of the NPR other sources 
will need to be employed to augment the content of the FRUS, these will 
need to include the opinions of the Japan lobby and the press, various 
Japanese perspectives, and GHQ documents dealing with the operational 
aspects of the NPR.  
 
The collection of primary documents edited by Ōtake also provides a useful 
source of information but, like the other sources employed for this study, 
suffers limitations.105 Ōtake‟s collection is an edited three-volume Japanese 
language compilation of documents relating to Japanese security from 1945 
to the creation of the SDF in 1954. The volumes contain a wide range of 
materials including: Japanese and international newspaper articles, 
documents from FRUS, transcripts of interviews with historians and 
participants, Japanese government documents and official memoranda, 
policy statements and correspondence from the major Japanese political 
parties, summaries of speeches, and other materials relevant to the NPR‟s 
creation, evolution and historical context. 
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Despite containing a wealth of useful material, Ōtake‟s collection does have 
its limitations. In contrast to the largely complete FRUS, Ōtake‟s work seems 
quite the opposite, the content having been selected by the author to support 
his arguments and the materials are divided into sections which are 
introduced with a commentary by Ōtake.106 This employment of the evidence 
does not render the primary documents themselves less useful but it casts 
doubts over how the documents were selected and which, if any, were 
omitted or edited to avoid the inclusion of content which could question or 
undermine his arguments.  
 
The inclusion of interviews, mostly conducted in the 1980s, also generates 
questions over the reliability of Ōtake‟s work. The interviews were clearly 
selected by Ōtake to help support his arguments and those being interviewed 
often had their own motivations and agendas to pursue and were unlikely to 
portray themselves or their actions in an unsympathetic light. The inclusion of 
interviews with leading figures such as Ohashi Takeo, former Cabinet 
minister and Attorney General, demonstrate this. 107  Also in interviewing 
participants so long after the events in question took place, it is possible that 
the interviewees could have forgotten much of what they experienced or that 
their recollections are coloured by hindsight and the knowledge that the NPR 
eventually shed much of its constabulary character and evolved into the 
GSDF. This problem seems particularly of note when applied to both the 
study of the NPR and the communist guerrilla campaign which formed the 
context of its creation. In 1950 nobody knew that the communist guerrilla 
campaign would prove a damp squib and the NPR would become the GSDF. 
It seems that opinions expressed by participants at the time could be more 
useful than those given fifty years later when the course of events had 
unfolded, influencing their perceptions of the past.  
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Ōtake‟s work can be considered a useful source of primary documents which 
can prove time consuming and difficult to locate elsewhere. Despite some 
weaknesses and the influence of Ōtake on the content of the work, it seems 
that if the documents themselves are employed without reference to Ōtake‟s 
commentary they can prove highly useful. Furthermore, as noted above 
Ōtake‟s views on the NPR and its context are useful as they help to illustrate 
the historiographical position of many Japanese scholars, as Ōtake is 
possibly the most prominent scholar now working in this field in Japan. 
 
Further useful archival sources are the Foreign Office and War Office 
documents held within the British National Archives at Kew.108 The archives 
contain reports, memoranda, documents and general correspondence sent 
between British diplomats, military officers, politicians and members of the 
UK Liaison Mission to Japan. The advantage of the British documents is that 
they provide a somewhat more objective viewpoint on the NPR and its 
context. This advantage stems from the British being less ideologically 
influenced than the Americans and simultaneously being separated from both 
the decision making process and the implementation of policy. Despite this 
separation, the British were still able to observe conditions and events 
through the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF), and the British 
representatives in the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for 
Japan. However, due to the British separation from the policymaking process 
not all information was provided to Britain‟s representatives, especially on 
potentially controversial topics upon which the British government might 
oppose the US. Examples of this include the disputes over Japan‟s trading 
relations with the rest of Asia, and the NPR, albeit to a lesser extent.109 
Although some useful documents are present in the National Archives, as 
British attention was largely focused elsewhere in the immediate postwar 
years, the amount of material available for the study of the NPR is relatively 
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sparse. There are more documents available detailing the communist 
subversive activities in Japan but the materials available for both subjects 
contain many American-authored documents which are duplicates of those  
found in the National Diet Library, Tokyo. Furthermore due to the highly 
restricted nature of the British intelligence archives and the strict penalties 
which exist for former intelligence officers who reveal state secrets, the British 
record of events of the era, particularly those relating to security and 
intelligence, is far from complete. 110 
 
Despite some flaws, the British documents provide another perspective on 
the NPR and prove a useful supplement to the Japanese and American 
documents. The employment of British documentary sources also helps to 
free the analysis somewhat from what Gluck and Asada viewed as the often 
blinkered, exclusively US-Japanese perspective which, in their view, often 
over-influences the content and approach of many scholars.111 
 
The final principal compilations of primary documents employed in this study 
are the Rearmament of Japan microfiche collections edited by Masuda 
Hiroshi.112 These recently compiled collections contain a mass of relevant 
primary material, running to over one thousand fiche in total. The collection is 
almost exclusively presented in English and covers a very broad range of US 
military, government and media documents. The content of the collection is 
very useful in the examination of the international context of the creation of 
the NPR and also contributes somewhat to the material on the operations of 
the NPR, the Japanese civil police and the JCP. Despite their breadth of 
content, the collections do not generally extend down to the level of the daily 
routine of the NPR. Consequently, the material gleaned from the collection is 
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largely supplementary to that found in the GHQ/SCAP archives and FRUS. 
Again, like Ōtake‟s collection, this volume is an edited work and suffers from 
the same editorial influences, strengths and weaknesses, albeit to a lesser 
extent as Masuda provides almost no commentary. Masuda‟s collection also 
suffers from the absence of many of the most significant documents on the 
NPR such as the 1949 Gunpowder Staff Study and the essential July 1950 
planning document, Increase in Japanese Security Agencies.113 Even key 
documents such as the various elements of the Police Reserve Order a re 
hard to find and the collection contains very little from the GHQ/SCAP 
archives on the living conditions and operational aspects of the NPR.114 
 
Whilst each of these sources has its drawbacks, if taken together they 
complement each other and their respective weaknesses and shortcomings 
can be mitigated somewhat. A comparison of the documents gives a better 
impression of events and especially the perceptions of the individuals and 
organisations involved. This is especially important in a subject where 
perceptions of events are central. For example, this emphasis on the impact 
of perceptions of events and intentions on the character of the NPR actually 
converts some of the weaknesses of certain sources to strengths in revealing 
the attitudes of various actors. The intelligence sources employed in this 
study are a good example of this.115 
 
The use of personal accounts such as memoirs of the key participants also 
shares this paradoxical strength/weakness. The works of MacArthur, Yoshida, 
Kowalski and others are useful in that they reveal the authors‟ perceptions of 
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events (albeit influenced by hindsight) through the defence of their actions 
and their criticism or praise of others.  
 
This study also employs many documents which were secret or restricted 
during the period. The influence of these levels of access upon the 
perceptions of individuals involved in the study is interesting and often is 
reflected in their opinions of the NPR. The hawkish attitudes of individuals 
such as Charles Willoughby (head of G2) and the senior members of the US 
Army are a good example of this. Willoughby‟s position as head of G2 gave 
him access to most of the assessments of the USSR and JCP, leading him to 
occasionally overestimate their capabilities, thus making him even more 
vociferous in his calls for a new Japanese military.116 The heads of the US 
Army were also naturally preoccupied by the Soviet military threat and saw 
little of the material on the perceived internal threat of the JCP. This 
influenced their attitude, with most preferring a Japanese army capable of 
assisting in containing or combating the USSR, over a constabulary designed 
to ensure the internal security of Japan and of little or no use for external 
security.117 However, when examining, as this study does, the force in its 
entirely such nuances are of less consequence, except in illuminating the 





Much of the debate over the origins and nature of the NPR stems from the 
failure of most historians approaching the subject to adequately define the 
                                                   
116
 Garthoff, „Foreign Intelligence‟, pp 37-38. For more on Charles Willoughby and the NPR: 
see Chapter 2, pp 140-144; Chapter 3, pp 209-220. 
117
 For more on the position of the US military on the NPR see: Chapter 2, pp 104-145; 
Chapter 5, pp 277-296. 
44 
 
terminology they employ. 118  Clear and explicit definitions are especially 
important in a subject area where some have argued that the nature of the 
NPR is the subject of „pure sophistry‟ or even the „Orwellian misuse of 
language‟.119  
 
These accusations have their roots in the New Year 1950 message given by 
MacArthur to the Japanese people in which he stated that „by no sophistry of 
reasoning can it [article nine of the 1947 constitution] be interpreted as a 
complete negation of the right to self-defense against unprovoked attack‟.120 
Dower, quoting Kowalski, and perhaps unintentionally MacArthur, uses the 
phrase to characterise his view that the NPR, NSF and SDF were armies in 
disguise, shrouded by Yoshida's cloak of false names and what Ōtake calls 
„confusing, contradictory and tricky‟ statements. 121  These accusations are 
backed up by Dower, Schaller and Takemae through reference to a single 
line from Kowalski‟s work in which he criticises as disingenuous the use of 
the term „special vehicle‟ to describe a tank.122 This is a translation of the 
Japanese word „Tokusha’ (special vehicle) as opposed to the Japanese for 
tank „Sensha’ (literally „war vehicle‟). As the explicit use of the term „war‟ 
would have violated the constitutional prohibition on the maintenance of „war 
potential‟ clearly such a name was out of the question, whatever the intended 
use of the vehicles.123  The fact that these vehicles had uses other than 
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combat and were not really issued to the NPR during its life, lessens the 
impact of these historians‟ assumptions about the character of the force.124 
 
In order to address these deficiencies and allow future debate within a unified 
set of concepts, clear and unambiguous definitions are required. Key to any 
effective set of definitions dealing with the NPR is that of a „constabulary‟. A 
„constabulary‟ is defined in its standard North American usage by Encarta as: 
„a military style police force: an armed police force that has been organized 
according to a military model but is separate from the army‟.125 
 
In most states, aside from the United Kingdom (where this term conjures up 
images of the village bobby), a constabulary is considered to be a 
paramilitary internal security police force. As almost all the policymakers in 
this study were American or were operating in an American English 
environment (GHQ) the phrase would have been taken in its American 
meaning. Also, as is demonstrated in chapter two, the term „constabulary‟ 
was in common use by US military officers and politicians before the NPR 
was created, in reference to the Philippines Constabulary (PC), Korean 
Constabulary (KC) and other paramilitary police forces.126 Within some of the 
primary literature the term „gendarmerie‟ is occasionally also employed with 
the same meaning, for example in this quotation from George Kennan (a 
senior State Department official), describing the requirements for internal 
security in Japan: „a central, uniformed gendarmerie or central constabulary 
comparable to the French Guard Mobile . . . would seem both desirable and 
suitable‟.127 
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The basic North American definition provides a good starting point but it is 
necessary to further refine it, taking into account other theorists‟ ideas, in 
order to provide a satisfactory definition. This requirement is further enhanced 
due to certain historians and policing theorists using the term without any 
explicit definition, presumably relying on the standard American usage given 
above. Those using the term without a definition include Boot, Kataoka, The 
Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai (History Studies Society), Watanabe and Uemura.128 
Mawby also gives no precise definition but lists the following identifying 
characteristics for paramilitary forces (basically identical to constabularies): 
light armament; police type training elements, uniform and rank structure; 
tactical deployment; links with the armed services; personnel transfers with 
the police; domestic ministerial responsibility; and police type disciplinary 
codes and living arrangements. 129  Perito builds upon this by defining 
constabularies as „armed forces of a state that have both military capabilities 
and police powers‟.130 He also provides some characteristics which he sees 
as common to all constabularies: first the presence of police functions (e.g. 
traffic control, criminal investigations, public security, border and public order 
duties), and the assistance of the civil police in times of need, in „patrolling, 
providing area security, staffing checkpoints‟ and intervening directly if events 
go beyond the capacity of the civil police. 131  Perito also argues that 
constabularies are trained to function as part of the armed forces of states in 
wartime but in a secondary, subordinate role to those providing external 
security (usually the army). Within this situation a constabulary would function 
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as mobile light infantry, operating behind the lines, on internal security 
duties.132 Building upon these contributions the specific definitions used in 




A paramilitary police occupying a middle tier between the civil police and an 
external security force (usually an army), tasked with an internal security 
mission confined to the territory of the state it serves and characterised by 
close contact and personnel transfers with the civil police, a membership 
subject to civil and not military law, equipped with light weapons and in 
possession of a number of clearly police-type characteristics, often including 
arrest powers. 
 
Rearmament (of ground forces) 
 
The complete political and organisational recreation of an explicitly named 




Security concerning direct state versus state conflict, usually conducted on a 
large scale between the regular uniformed forces of two or more states. 
Despite the term „external‟, external security of a state can be contested both 




Security concerning state versus non-state conflict or unrest, often on a small 
scale. These include state responses to indirect aggression by other states in 
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the form of guerrilla or irregular incursions, and a state‟s responses to internal 





A force with the domestically and internationally recognised function of 
providing external security for a state, including offensive military operations 
outside the borders of that state, being also equipped to do so and subject to 





The JCP and the Domestic 




In keeping with the first primary aim of this study of showing the domestic 
influences on the NPR, this chapter illustrates the threat the Japanese 
Communist Party (JCP) was perceived to represent to the internal security 
of Japan. This was a threat which was seen to require measures including 
the creation of the NPR. As noted in the introduction this topic has 
received almost no attention in English and virtually no studies link the 
NPR to the key domestic driver behind its creation, the JCP‟s campaign of 
violence. Also, in order to further reveal the Japanese influences on the 
force, the second main aim of the chapter is to show the Japanese 
conceptions of security which favoured a paramilitary police force or 
„constabulary‟ as a defence against the perceived JCP threat. This 
examination of two of the central domestic influences on the NPR is split 
into two sections, the first dealing with the history of the JCP until the 
adoption of its „military policy‟ in 1950, and the second examining the 
Japanese conceptions of internal security and the corresponding desire 
for an internal security constabulary. The first section of this chapter is 
largely contextual and elements of it do not explicitly or directly relate to 
the creation of the NPR but its inclusion is necessary to illustrate the 
growth of the perception of the JCP as a threat to the Japanese state; a 





The early years of the Occupation of Japan found the country with a 
shattered economy, few prospects for recovery with a population whose 
wretched living conditions played into the hands of Japan‟s Communists. 
With the growth of the Communist dominated union movement, added to 
the influence of the Cold War and JCP election gains, the initial toleration 
of the JCP by GHQ shifted to a policy of outright hostility.1 Underpinning 
this change in attitude was the perception amongst the authorities that the 
JCP threatened the internal security of Japan and that concerted 
measures were necessary to prevent Japan becoming communist. 2 
Alongside the creation of the NPR, one of the most significant of these 
measures was the „Red Purge‟ of late 1949 onwards.3 The „Red Purge‟ 
remains a highly controversial topic with historians debating its legality and 
effects, opinions vary, although many historians are highly critical of the 
purge and its legacy.4 However, many of these accounts are flawed in that 
they neglect or even entirely omit the violent incidents of the summer of 
1949 and the JCP‟s „military policy‟ of 1950 onwards. Absence of these 
incidents in historical accounts gives an incomplete picture of events and 
simultaneously relieves the JCP of any measure of responsibility for its 
own fate. Without analysis or documentation of the existence of the 
incidents of the summer of 1949 and the military policy, the JCP moves 
from a group many in Japan had begun to see as a serious and active 
threat to internal security, to that of a „victim‟ of „reactionaries‟ within SCAP 
and the Japanese government, a passive actor depicted as having no 
influence over its own destiny and subject to the whim of its American 
overlord.  
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This approach both relieves the JCP of any blame and responsibility for its 
own actions and neglects the fact that many of the measures of the US 
were taken in response to the actions of the JCP and that the Occupation 
of Japan represented a discourse between various Japanese and 
American actors. Some of this distortion relates to the historiographical 
approaches of the scholars involved, who often seek to demonstrate the 
continuities between the pre-1945 and postwar Japanese states and use 
the „Red Purge‟ as a key piece of evidence to justify their claims. These 
historians, including Dower, argue that the „Red Purge‟ signalled the 
„suppression of free speech and thought‟, made a ‟mockery of the rule of 
law‟ and „resulted not merely in an attack upon genuine democratic 
practice but also in a disregard of social well-being‟.5 Japanese historians 
are also highly critical of the period, often viewing the „Red Purge‟, with its 
removal of thousands of Left-leaning academics as a betrayal of early 
democratic promise of the Occupation and a direct attack on their 
academic freedom.6 In a good example of the strength of feeling held by 
many Japanese academics, Uyehara describes the „Red Purge‟ as an 
„ideological slaughter‟, comparing it to the ethnic cleansing of the Balkan 
wars of the 1990s.7  
 
Although it seems that Uyehara and others push the point a little far, the 
„Red Purge‟ was excessive and resulted in the unfair and often arbitrary 
dismissal of thousands largely on the basis of political affiliation. 
Nevertheless, as those political affiliations were with a party advocating, 
and arguable attempting to practice, the overthrow of the government by 
force the „Red Purge‟ raises questions beyond the scope of this work as to 
whether anti-democratic measures such as mass sackings are justifiable, 
ethical, or even effective, against such a violent and similarly anti-
democratic opponent. Despite the sacking of many genuinely innocent 
people, the Japanese government was not responsible for the majority of 
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the cuts, with private industry making the largest reductions. In addition 
large numbers of these reductions were an economic necessity to trim 
down Japan‟s artificially inflated staff levels, loosen the paralysing grip of 
the highly powerful and largely militant union movement and steady a 
faltering economy.8 Moreover, the „Red Purge‟ did not go as far as similar 
anti-Leftwing measures in other countries and did not result in the outright 
banning of the JCP. With this the full spectrum of political parties, survived 
in Japan to this day, which is more than can be said of Germany or even 
the United States.9 Furthermore, despite the validity of the claims that the 
purge disregarded the due legal process, this was often the case with 
Occupation-imposed directives. Critical historians also rarely mention the 
simultaneous lack of regard for the democratic process, the law or even 
the value of human life demonstrated by the JCP through its violent 
actions. Opinions such as that of Prime Minister Yoshida are instructive in 
that they also reveal the notion held by many at the time that the „Red 
Purge‟ was necessary in order to prevent a communist revolution in 
Japan: „these people were not dismissed because of their ideas or the 
simple circumstance that they were Communists, but because the policies 
and activities of the Japanese Communist Party were clearly of a 
destructive nature, menacing public safety‟.10 These beliefs were also held 
by many members of the public, shocked by the events of the summer of 
1949 and the international situation. For example, a work colleague of the 
future JCP „guerrilla‟ Wakita Kenichi told him that, in his opinion the „Red 
Purge‟ was „necessary to prevent violent revolution‟.11  
 
Clearly, the key to a clear and balanced appraisal of measures such as 
the „Red Purge‟ is an examination of its causes rather than just its events 
and results. Chief amongst these causes, aside from the international 
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factors, was the threat to internal security the JCP was believed to 
represent.12 In the minds of the authorities, this threat was seen to require 
action to be successfully warded off. Actions undertaken included a 
package of austerity measures designed to ultimately make the Japanese 
economy self-sufficient and hence alleviate the economic conditions which 
had assisted the Communists (the „Dodge Line‟), the „Red Purge‟, and the 
bolstering of Japan‟s internal security forces, including the creation of the 
NPR.  
 
The JCP‟s military campaign and the incidents of the summer of 1949 
which preceded it are a highly neglected area of scholarship, especially in 
the English language, with the only major study of the events of 1949 
being produced nearly forty years ago.13 The subject and its relation to the 
creation of the NPR are also marginalized in Japan, with the incidents 
representing an embarrassment to both the Left and Right. The JCP 
official history describes the military policy as a result of „interference‟ and 
Stalin‟s „great power chauvinist attitude‟, which forced the adoption of an 
„ultra-left adventurist line which stressed the construction of mountain-
village strongholds, the self-defense struggle and the self-defense 
organizations . . . that disregarded the actual Japanese situation‟. 14 
Presidium Chairman of the JCP and Diet member Fuwa Tetsuo also 
attempts to distance his party from the military campaign and shift 
responsibility for it to Stalin and the USSR: „it was a Stalin-type policy - 
proposed by him and produced with his participation under his direction‟.15 
The prevailing negative depiction of the „Red Purge‟ and its eclipse of the 
JCP military policy coupled with the controversy surrounding the NPR 
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make it very difficult for Japanese historians to analyse either, except in 
highly critical terms, without becoming the subject of public criticism.16  
 
Likewise, within western scholarship the subject remains neglected. For 
example, one of the foremost studies of the international context of the 
Korean War, Stueck‟s 370-page The Korean War, An International History, 
contains a mere two lines about the JCP military policy.17 Furthermore, 
there are very few complete examinations of the JCP between 1945 and 
1955, and even fewer written after the 1960s. Moreover, even fewer of 
these were not produced as part of the wider American anti-communist 
Cold War effort.18 Those studies which do exist usually analyse the JCP in 
the context of other events such as the „Red Purge‟ or the labour 
movement and do not explicitly focus on the JCP itself.19 Also, as noted by 
Metzler, even the more contemporary and sympathetic analyses of the 
JCP often ignore its Leninist character and the role of the Cominform.20 
Clearly, any examination of this subject and its connection to the creation 
of the NPR requires a detailed analysis of the events of 1949 onwards and 
the responses they provoked from the authorities. This study will do this 
as it is fundamental to the first main aim of the work. 
 
The availability and use of primary sources on the JCP during this period 
also present challenges, a fact which also explains some of the neglect of 
the subject. The first problem, well highlighted by Garthoff is that 
intelligence material is rarely used by historians. Garthoff cites four clearly 
unjustified principal reasons behind this deliberate neglect: unfamiliarity 
with the sources, unfamiliarity with the subject, the view that intelligence 
represents an overspecialised niche beyond their remit, and the belief that 
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the use of such sources is not quite academically respectable.21 Perhaps 
all four are reflected in the scholarship of the NPR and JCP, and the use 
of, and critical engagement with, intelligence sources from the GHQ 
archives represents another original aspect of this work.  
 
A further issue with the use of such sources is the nature of the subject 
matter. At this stage the JCP had began to become a highly secretive 
organisation and due to this, much of the material available on this period 
comes from the Japanese police and Occupation intelligence agencies. 
The agendas, policies and politics of these security services influenced 
their positions, and as Jenkins argues, „it is impossible to understand the 
problems of unrest or illegality which a particular society encounters 
unless we know the nature and structure of the agencies assessing such 
threats and their particular interests in giving the picture they do‟ . 22 
Jenkins‟ point is an apt one and hints at some of the political and personal 
motivations which may have influenced the portrayal of the level of 
Communist threat to Japan. Jenkins‟ argument also helps us appreciate 
the opposite deduction: that it is impossible to understand the internal 
security agencies of a state (including the NPR) without reference to 
internal conditions of that state. This underlines the validity of the first 
main aim of this study, in that it is impossible to truly know the NPR 
without reference to its perceived opponent, the JCP.  
 
A further interesting point is raised by Cohen (the head of the labour 
division of Government Section during the early years of the Occupation) 
when he states his belief that „it is the nature of security officers to be 
suspicious, to think the worst of everyone, and to give more weight to 
security needs than fairness‟. 23  The important question this raises is 
whether the very nature of internal security forces makes them 
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institutionally paranoid especially when dealing with secretive „opponents‟. 
Internal security forces often end up seeing threats everywhere and 
exaggerating them when they do, as a result of their opponents‟ secrecy, 
but also to fulfil their mission and hence justify their continued existence, 
funding and favour. The latter being a particular concern amongst 
agencies with overlapping jurisdictions such as existed in Occupied Japan 
(such as CIC, G2 and the CIA).24 Nevertheless, if we attempt to employ an 
objective perspective on the sources and try to examine the raw 
intelligence material, free from analysis and editorial influence, much 
useful information can be drawn from the GHQ documents. Furthermore, 
the use of intelligence reports on the same subject from rival intelligence 
services such the CIA and G2 can also help highlight some of the 
misleading or erroneous content of such material. This study also seeks to 
employ actual JCP material as far as possible, as this is a way of largely 
avoiding some of these pitfalls. Nevertheless despite these drawbacks, it 
remains true that perspectives, even if inaccurate, inform policy. 
Policymakers are only able to act on what they know or see, or more 
accurately, what they think they know or see. 
 
 
The JCP 1945-1950: ‘Peaceful Revolution’ to 
‘Military Policy’ 
 
Following Japan‟s collapse in 1945, the Communist party rose, phoenix 
like, from the ashes of near political extinction. The removal of its 
staunchest Rightwing opponents, its legalisation and the release of all 
political prisoners by SCAP revitalised the Party. 25  The dire economic 
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conditions, booming labour movement and the fact that the Communists 
were one of the very few political groups which had no links with the 
previous regime saw membership soar (see table I). 26  Under the 
leadership of Tokuda Kyuichi and guided by the theories of Nozaka Sanzo, 
the JCP sought to exploit the conditions and discontent it found in Japan 
by adopting a policy of „peaceful revolution‟ and an image of a „lovable 
Communist Party‟. Under this policy, labour and union activities and an 
effort to achieve revolution via the ballot box, rather than through violent 
means, were pursued.27 
 
Table I. Estimated JCP Membership, 1945-5528 
 





These tactics proved effective and in the elections of 23 January 1949 the 
JCP won nearly 10% of the total ballot, almost 3 million votes, and saw 
their seats grow from 4 to 35, an all time peak (see table II and figure I).29 
Results in urban constituencies were even more favourable, with, for 
example, the JCP polling 22% of the vote in Osaka.30 The party had 
gained huge prestige from the looming Communist Chinese victory across 
the East China Sea and the unpopular 1947-48 Socialist coalition 
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government made many on the Left vote Communist in 1949.31  Poor 
economic conditions and rumours about the forthcoming economic 
stabilisation measures and the mass sackings which would inevitably 
ensue also pushed many to vote for the only party which seemed to offer 
a viable alternative.32  
 
Table II. The JCP in Elections for the House of Representatives, 1946-
195333 
 
Election Total Vote (Rounded) Total Vote % Seats Total Seats % 
Apr 1946 2,136,000 3.8 5 0.7 
Apr 1947 1,003,000 3.7 4 0.6 
Jan 1949 2,985,000 9.8 35 4.8 
Oct 1952 897,000 2.5 0 0 
Apr 1953 600,000 1.9 0 0 
 
One of the key factors in the JCP‟s election success was the fact that after 
five years of occupation Japan‟s economic conditions had hardly 
improved: inflation, shortages and the general economic malaise 
continued, with some Occupation measures even worsening conditions. 
Washington and GHQ both saw that change was needed and in early 
1949 Republican senator and president of the bank of Detroit, Joseph 
Dodge, was dispatched on a special mission to prevent Japan becoming a 
permanent economic ward of the United States and alleviate the 
                                                             
31
 Stockwin, The JCP in the Sino-Soviet Dispute, p 101.  
32
 H.H. Baerwald, „The Japanese Communist Party, Yoyogi and Its Rivals‟, in RA 
Scalapino (ed), The Communist Revolution in Asia: Tactics, Goals and Achievements, 
Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs NJ, 1969, p 215. 
33
Based on Figures in Kim, Deradicalization, p 297. The large number of votes, 
seemingly not reflected in the percentage of votes in 1946 is due to the very high election 
turnout (75%), hundreds of small political parties taking part and electoral constituency 
reform in 1947, see Oinas-Kukkonen, Tolerance, Suspicion, and Hostility, p 53; E. 
Takemae, Inside GHQ, The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy, Continuum, 
2002, pp 263-265. 
59 
 
conditions which were proving a boon to the JCP.34 Dodge laid out a 
rigidly conservative nine-point plan of halting inflation by pegging the yen 
to the dollar, letting businesses sink or swim on their own merit, halting 
reparations and Zaibatsu (large industrial conglomerates) dissolution, and 
balancing the government‟s budget through the shedding of hundreds of 
thousands of public sector jobs.35 Although most of GHQ hoped for the 
best, doubt remained whether Japan could ever recover, with a State 
Department report stating that Japan „might‟ attain self supporting status 
(i.e. not propped up by US aid) in 1954/55, and with Joseph Dodge and 
General Marquat (head of Economic and Scientific Section) doubting that 
this would ever be possible due to Japan‟s vast trade imbalance and rapid 
population growth.36  
 
The personnel reductions spread to the private sector and around three 
million people lost their jobs in 1949. The cutbacks were also used to 
reduce the power of the unions and Communists, with many JCP 
members jettisoned in the first mass sackings.37 The Japanese National 
Railways (JNR), with one of the biggest and most radical unions in Japan, 
was first and hardest hit, losing almost 100,000 staff in ten days in early 
July.38 Resulting from these reductions, the JCP grassroots‟ desire for 
action, and the sense amongst the JCP leadership that the time was right 
to probe the resolve of the Yoshida government, what later became known 
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1946 1947 1949 1952 % Seats
% Vote
 
The events of the summer of 1949 marked the beginnings of direct militant 
action by the JCP. The incidents also heightened perceptions within GHQ 
and the Japanese government that the JCP posed a threat to Japan‟s 
infrastructure serious enough to necessitate further strengthening of the 
internal security forces. Even before the „Dodge Line‟ programme passed 
in the Diet, some members of GHQ were worried about its potential impact 
on political stability. Chester Hepler, the acting chief of the Labour Division, 
warned Dodge of the danger of strikes and the „dangerous social, political 
and economic consequences‟ of the economic stabilisation programme, 
but Dodge and others ignored his advice and pressed on whilst supporting 
the „Red Purge‟ and the repression of the resulting wildcat strikes.40 
 
Nevertheless, Hepler‟s predictions proved accurate and, as Aldous notes, 
the programme of economic stabilisation „provoked social unrest, 
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sabotage and subversion‟.41 The initial cuts and the looming threat of 
more resulted in „amateur revolution-making‟ by the JCP‟s grassroots 
members.42 The Taira incident in particular stressed that the Japanese 
civil police might be unable to cope if faced with full-scale, organised 
unrest. The capture of a police station and the town it policed (the Taira 
Incident), the apparent assassination of a senior government figure (the 
JNR President), and the destruction of two trains and the resulting deaths 
and injuries (the Matsukawa and Mitaka incidents) heightened the 
perception of many in GHQ and the Japanese government of the threat 
that Japan faced from the JCP.43  
 
The incidents and the heightened perception of the JCP threat also 
prompted the simultaneous perception of the requirement for the means to 
cope with similar events in the future through the strengthening of Japan‟s 
internal security forces. Alongside calls for a constabulary force, the labour 
troubles and train wrecking gave further strength to demands from parts of 
GHQ and the Japanese government for the reversal of the previous policy 
of police decentralisation through the amalgamation of the new, small and 
often feeble Municipal Police units into the National Rural Police.44 
 
The end of the summer of 1949 did not mark the end of worsening 
relations between the JCP and the authorities. The JCP had used the 
waves of discontent triggered by the economic stabilisation measures to 
attempt to position itself as the champion of nationalism and peace in the 
face of American and Japanese „imperialist monopoly capitalism‟.45 The 
more radical tone of the JCP‟s propaganda and its increasingly lawless 
attitude further added to the concerns of the authorities and prompted 
moves to clamp down on its activities. In response to the JCP‟s seemingly 
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violent reaction to the Dodge line, at this point more formal anti-
Communist moves began to take place, in a phase later christened the 
„Red Purge‟. Despite the increased pressure on the Communists through 
police raids and a simultaneous reduction in their control over the unions, 
the JCP still managed to achieve some successes, such as the April 1950 
election to governor of Kyoto of Ninagawa Torazō, who proceeded to 
vigorously and publicly denounce the conservative politics of the Yoshida 
Cabinet.46  
 
However, the sands within GHQ were shifting and the notion that the JCP 
was largely independent of Moscow and should be treated as a normal 
law abiding political party were swiftly eroding.47 From the incidents of 
1949 onwards there was increasing concern amongst both the Japanese 
government and GHQ over the links the JCP had to Moscow and whether 
its new violent tactics were the result of orders from the USSR.48 Yoshida 
was also concerned as to whether the JCP was possibly preparing for a 
revolution by force, and over the JCP‟s attempts to create a rift between 
Japan and the US through increasingly radical and subversive 
propaganda.49  
 
Furthermore, with the departure of most of the progressive or socialist 
civilians within GHQ from 1946 onwards the vast majority of those who 
remained in the organisation were either military men or conservative 
civilians, most of whom shared a deep antipathy to communism.50 This 
shifting balance of political opinion influenced the perception of the JCP 
within GHQ, helping to frame it as a threat to Japan‟s internal security. 
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The perception of the JCP as a threat can be seen in GHQ documents 
such as Civil Intelligence Section (CIS) reports which began to claim that 
„the Japanese communist party have become a dangerous subversive 
force operating against the democratisation of Japan‟. 51  CIS also 
characterised the JCP in the same 1949 report as „well trained, fully 
indoctrinated obstructionists‟ and „a menace to all duly constituted 
democratic authority‟.52 The seriousness of the threat the JCP was viewed 
to pose can also be seen in attempts by the ultra-conservative head of G2, 
General Charles Willoughby, to prevent the reduction of CIS, and even to 
expand it, in the face of GHQ cuts.53 Although dating from 1948, a further 
CIS document reveals the threat to internal security a more militant JCP 
was thought to present: „the real danger of communism in Japan does not 
lie in political success but in the traditional technique of creating disorder, 
[and] seizing the government by force as in the case of Russia, China, 
other countries where communists have come to power‟.54  
 
Plans for a purge of leading Communists from public office were drawn up 
and swiftly enacted after a group of US soldiers who had been observing 
and photographing a large Communist demonstration outside the Imperial 
palace in Tokyo were badly beaten and thrown into the moat on 30 May 
1950.55 In his memoirs Yoshida cited what he saw as clear links between 
this event and the JCP‟s move towards violent revolution:  
 
Japan‟s communists came out openly for revolution by force, and 
held what was termed a „rally for the rising of the people‟ in the 
outer grounds of the Imperial palace in Tokyo, in the course of 
which several officers and enlisted men of the U.S. Occupation 
forces were injured. This incident seriously alarmed both the 
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Japanese Cabinet and General MacArthur‟s headquarters resulting 
in a purge of JCP leadership and Akahata ban.56  
 
On 6 and 7 June SCAP directed that the entire Communist Party central 
committee and seventeen employees of the JCP newspaper Akahata be 
purged under SCAPIN 550, the directive originally used to remove ultra-
nationalists and militarists from office.57 Under this and subsequent uses 
of SCAPIN 550, the JCP also lost thirteen of its Diet seats, as most of its 
upper echelons were purged.58 Under the purge the JCP‟s leaders were 
banned from engaging in any form of political activity and had to report to 
the police regularly. However, the leadership swiftly disappeared 
underground and many escaped into exile in the USSR and Communist 
China.59  
 
The flight of the JCP‟s upper strata, despite a series of major police raids 
aimed at capturing them, cast further doubt in the minds of the Japanese 
and American authorities over the reliability of the police. This failure also 
increased fears that the civil police had been infiltrated by the JCP and 
had tipped off the Communists in advance, as was argued by Occupation 
reports at the time.60 The escape of the JCP leadership again highlighted 
and strengthened the demand for a centrally directed and reliable 
constabulary force capable of taking on jobs considered too dangerous or 
sensitive to be left to the civil police. 61  The disappearance of the 
leadership also revealed the widespread underground party organisation 
the JCP had been developing in anticipation of a government crackdown, 
an organisation based around an espionage style cell structure and one 
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designed to maintain secrecy as far as possible. The underground party 
organisation included thousands of secret members, cells attempting to 
infiltrate the police (and later NPR), and cells which participated in 
sabotage operations and guerrilla style attacks.62 The perceived threat to 
internal security from these underground JCP units and the waves of 
strikes and unrest wracking the country prompted some of the most 
afflicted prefectures to take measures into their own hands to ensure 
domestic stability, such as Yamaguchi which created its own constabulary 
style „Special Anti-Riot Police‟ unit to deal with the increasing number of 
Communist related violent incidents.63  
 
The „Red Purge‟ as it came to be known, also encompassed the largely 
unjustified and excessive removal of tens of thousands of alleged radicals, 
unionists, and socialists from their posts in both the public and private 
sectors and was accompanied by promotion of the „Anti-communist 
Democratization League‟ (Mindō) and other anti-communist union 
movements. Unions themselves declined in number by 5,000 and their 
membership by more than 800,000 in 1949.64 Despite the disruption of the 
purge, the JCP‟s covert and overt wings kept publishing magazines, wall 
newspapers and increasingly radical pamphlets. These were produced by 
the JCP‟s underground cells and distributed both covertly to other cells, 
and overtly to the public. As the JCP felt it had little to lose and that its 
objectives were best served through direct attacks on the Occupation and 
Japanese government, previous concerns about censorship and legal 
constraints were ignored and illegal, direct criticism of the Occupation was 
a principal feature of propaganda in this period.65 
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However, the JCP‟s mass propaganda effort suffered a serious blow with 
the suspension of the publication of Akahata two days after the outbreak 
of the Korean War after printing a large photograph of Kim il Sung and text 
of his radio address calling on South Koreans to support the North‟s 
invasion.66  Despite the crackdown and purge, SCAP stopped short of 
outlawing the JCP, a move pressed for by many Japanese and American 
conservatives. A ban was avoided due to the fear that if one were 
introduced the JCP would disappear entirely underground, becoming 
much harder to monitor. GHQ was also unwilling to set the dangerous 
precedent of banning a political party in a country where it was meant to 
be resurrecting democracy.67 
 
Whilst events in Japan were propelling the JCP towards recourse to 
violence in the face of the „Red Purge‟ and the curtailing of the arenas of 
politics in which it could participate, the JCP also came under pressure 
from Moscow to turn to violence.68 On 6 January 1950 the Cominform 
newspapers For a Lasting Peace, For a People’s Democracy and Bulletin 
printed an article severely criticising the JCP and Nozaka‟s peaceful 
revolution tactics. The text, an editorial penned by the anonymous 
„Observer‟, contained vitriolic condemnation of Nozaka and his „peaceful 
revolution‟ theory:  
 
Nozaka‟s “theory” has nothing whatever in common to Marxism-
Leninism. . . [It] is an anti-democratic, anti-Socialist theory. It serves 
only the Imperialist occupiers in Japan and the enemies of 
independence …The Nozaka “theory” is simultaneously an anti-
patriotic and anti-Japanese “theory”.69  
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This public rejection of the „peaceful revolution‟ approach, which had 
served the JCP somewhat successfully until 1949, shocked the party 
leadership who initially refused to recognise or act on the criticism.70 
However, the call for an adjustment of the JCP‟s direction was reinforced 
eleven days later with an article with similar, if slightly milder, content 
appearing in an editorial in the Remin Ribao, an organ of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), in which the hope was expressed „that the 
Japanese Communist Party will take appropriate steps to correct Nozaka‟s 
mistakes‟.71 These criticisms, added to a reprint in Pravda of a speech by 
Liu Shaoqi, which stated that the Chinese method of armed struggle was 
the path of all Asian countries (including Korea and Japan) to communism, 
amounted to a concerted, public effort by Stalin to decisively shift the 
policy of the JCP to one of overt violence.72 Despite initial disbelief, the 
JCP leadership accepted the situation and Nozaka issued a „self-criticism‟ 
explaining his actions and errors, confessing that he was wrong to have 
thought that a people‟s government could be achieved through the ballot 
box, and publicly endorsing the new „military‟ policy of the JCP.73  
 
This external change of policy triggered a period of factional struggle 
within the JCP and radical Left in Japan which was to last for decades. 
The JCP initially split into two factions. The 'Mainstream' faction led by 
Tokuda and Nozaka accepted Stalin‟s criticism but wanted to pursue the 
military policy in moderation, not provoking the US too quickly, allowing 
themselves time to expand the party‟s underground wing and to retain 
some of the gains made during the „lovable‟ period. This was opposed by 
the „Internationalist‟ faction, led by Miyamoto Kenji, which advocated a 
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hard-line, rigid acceptance of the Cominform programme. 74  This split, 
coupled with the „Red Purge‟ and the flight of much of the top tier of the 
party, largely paralysed the overt central party leadership during much of 
1950 and 1951. The crisis of leadership and internal factional struggles 
eventually led to the internationalist faction temporarily seceding from the 
JCP, although it subsequently returned to the fold under Chinese and 
Soviet pressure. The internationalists eventually conceded control of the 
JCP to the mainstream, but in doing so, and through their resistance to 
Mainstream policy, they succeeded in forcing party policy in a far more 
radical direction than that it had travelled prior to the Cominform criticism. 
Nevertheless, this factional struggle consumed much of the energies of 
the JCP in this period and weakened both the leadership and its central 
control over the policy of violence. 75 
 
Following the adoption of the „military line‟ (Gunji Rosen) laid out in the 
Cominform criticism, the JCP began to adopt increasingly violent tactics 
aimed at disrupting the infrastructure and military manufacturing capacity 
of Japan and eventually aiming at the overthrow of the Yoshida 
government and the eventual establishment of a Communist government 
by force. A further short-term aim was to contribute directly to the 
communist war effort in Korea. This was to be achieved by tying up as 
many US tactical troops as possible in putting down disturbances in Japan 
and by impeding the ability of Japan to supply the US/UN troops through 
disrupting its infrastructure and its ability to manufacture arms and 
supplies. The contribution they sought to make to the Korean conflict 
helped recruit and motivate many radical Koreans, who, with students, 
formed the core of many of the JCP‟s „military‟ units.76 One of the principal 
tactics adopted was that of sabotage, particularly against the railways, the 
central pillar of Japan‟s mass transport system. Attempts were also made 
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to disrupt the ports and shipyards supplying materials and shipping for the 
logistical support of the US/UN war effort in Korea.77 Notable incidents of 
supposed sabotage recorded by the Japanese police and GHQ are 
numerous. For example they include a reported plan by a Korean JCP cell 
to derail a train between Haenosaki and Sasebo city stations in Nagasaki 
prefecture on around 1 May 1950 with stolen dynamite, a move which was 
apparently thwarted through the authorities discreetly moving all available 
railway security guards to the area.78 A case of suspected train sabotage 
was reported on 13 July 1950 at Mitsuseki in Yuzawa, Akita prefecture, 
but, as often occurred, the Civil Transport Section of GHQ (CTS) did not 
receive official confirmation from the Japanese National Railways (JNR), 
who dealt with the matter through the local police.79  
 
Clearly the authorities believed the supposed sabotage to be a genuine 
problem. Evidence of the seriousness with which the authorities took the 
sabotage campaign and the need they felt for an adequately armed 
constabulary force capable of protecting Japan‟s crucial infrastructure can 
be seen through the contact between the Chief of the JNR‟s security 
guards and the head of CTS. The Chief of the JNR‟s security guards, 
Kitamura, and head of CTS (land) D.R. Changnon met to discuss 
anticipated sabotage in multiple locations on 1 May 1950.80  Kitamura 
argued that his men only had clubs and no arrest powers and that 
although their presence could deter possible saboteurs, the fact they 
would have to wait for the National Rural Police to come and arrest them 
would mean any who had been caught could probably escape. Kitamura 
promised to put his men on twenty-four hour watches in the suspected 
target areas but noted: „under the present circumstances . . . the security 
guards of the J.N.R would prove effective only to a very limited degree‟. 
Changnon and later H.T. Miller, head of CTS, agreed that there was a 
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need to explore supplying some of the more reliable security guards with 
firearms.81 The concerns over the sabotage campaign and the perceived 
need to take adequate measures to counteract it, including the 
strengthening of the security forces, were also manifested by a focus on 
the problem by the GHQ intelligence arms, the Japanese Special 
Investigations Bureau (SIB) and the police, including the compilation of a 
monthly report on alleged sabotage activities from the outbreak of the 
Korean War onwards.82  
 
These reports are instructive in revealing some of the major incidents 
attributed to the JCP which occurred during the campaign such as the loss 
of two F80c fighter bombers and their pilots on takeoff and the damaging 
of another plane from 8 to 15 April at Itazuke Air Force base due to 
deliberately contaminated water injection mixtures. Other incidents 
recorded involved the cutting of telephone lines at multiple points and the 
removal of sixty yards of cable at the US military base Camp Hagen, 
Aomori, and track damage resulting in the derailment of an engine and 
baggage car of a ten coach express in Kamigawa, Hokkaido on 17 May 
1950.83 
 
 A recurring crime, which may or may not have been committed by 
Communists, was the widespread theft of large amounts of telephone wire 
due to the inability of GHQ and the police to protect it and the inflated 
price of copper due to the Korean War.84 The theft and sale of such wire 
on the black market may have proved a boon to the JCP‟s beleaguered 
finances, whilst simultaneously contributing to the sabotage campaign.85 
The CTS reports are useful but the fact that they rely largely upon 
Japanese press and police sources for much of their information means 
that some inaccuracies may have crept in. However, this could also mean 














that the number of minor incidents which were not reported might be even 
greater, as local police forces were severely overstretched and the 
production of extra reports and their translation and dispatch to GHQ in 
Tokyo may have been seen by many as a waste of time. It should also be 
noted that many of these incidents may not have been sabotage 
conducted by JCP cells, but as is illustrated in table III and figure II, the 
authorities believed that they were and hence they still contributed to the 
policy responses to the alleged sabotage, including the creation of the 
NPR. 
 
Table III. Number of Alleged Sabotage Incidents Recorded by CTS, July 
1950 to May 195186 
 Major Minor Total 
Acts against Allies and Japanese Police 41 141 182 
Railway and Railway Communication Sabotage 64 531 595 
Telephone and Power Line Sabotage 13 185 198 
Miscellaneous 11 44 55 
Total 129 901 1030 
Grand Total for 11 Months 1030 
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As can be seen in figure II, the number of alleged sabotage incidents 
recorded by CTS from July 1950 to May 1951 was quite significant, 
amounting to just over three incidents per day over an eleven month 
period. The majority of incidents were railway and communications 
sabotage, actions which ranged from damage to rolling stock to 
derailments. However, rail sabotage by placing objects on, or damaging of, 
the track (as was the case at Matsukawa) was one of the biggest crimes 
and the main areas of activity were Hokkaido and Tokyo.87 Combining the 
railway and power and telephone categories, shows that 77% of the 
alleged attacks were directed at the infrastructure of Japan. This 
overwhelming incidence of the supposed targeting of infrastructure would 
have helped substantiate the belief of the authorities that general orders 
from the JCP‟s upper echelons/command cells were issued for the 
deliberate obstruction of the war effort in Korea through attacks on 
Japan‟s ability to transport and manufacture material to support the UN 
war effort.88  
 
As has been demonstrated in this section, the Japanese state believed it 
faced a real threat from the JCP, especially after the Cominform criticism 
and the open adoption of violence by the JCP.89 It is important to make 
clear that although Yoshida and others did have genuine concerns over 
the threat from the JCP, historians such as Dower have highlighted the 
fact Yoshida occasionally employed the JCP and those he termed 
„Leftists‟ in GHQ as vehicles for blame or to hide his own failures and 
shortcomings, just as he had in pre-war and wartime Japan by blaming 
militarists and „red fascists‟.90 Indeed, the willingness of Yoshida to use 
the perceived JCP threat for his own political advantage is well illustrated 
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through his covert promotion of demonstrations during later peace 
negotiations, as detailed by Igarashi Takeshi.91 Despite this, it would be 
naïve to think that the JCP were seen as simply tools of, or a passive 
threat to, the Yoshida government.  
 
The JCP were also believed to be trying to exploit the Japanese elite‟s 
desire for a rigid anti-communist crackdown and perhaps sought to 
provoke one in order to win international sympathy and discredit the 
Yoshida government. The British Attaché to Japan, Esler Denning, argued 
that the Japanese leadership had an anachronistic conception of 
Communism which helped some in power advance their reactionary 
polices, but which if taken to extremes could might play into the hands of 
the JCP: 
 
There is no evidence the Government really understands the nature 
of communism to-day or appreciates its subtleties or its 
manoeuvres. In the past, the Japanese method of dealing with 
communism was police action and that being so the natural 
reaction of the government to any manifestations of violence is to 
give itself more powers to suppress them. It is apparently 
unconscious of the fact of doing so it is advancing the aims of the 
Japanese Communist Party [sic]. 92 
 
The events detailed in this section had a direct bearing upon the creation 
and initial direction of the NPR, as did the later, more serious stages of the 
JCP‟s military policy. These subsequent stages of the JCP „military turn‟, 
including the guerrilla campaign, „Bloody May Day‟, their origins, outcomes 
and influence on the NPR, will be discussed in Chapter Four. 
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Japanese Conceptions of Internal Security and the 
Desire for a Constabulary 
 
The concerns of the Japanese leadership about internal security and their 
resultant desire for the strengthening of Japan‟s police, including the 
creation of a constabulary, can be clearly demonstrated by examining 
three areas: the Japanese government‟s conceptions of internal security 
forces, the content of the Ashida memoranda, and the Higai/Yoshida push 
for police reform and the establishment of a constabulary. 
 
The conception of the role and capabilities of internal security forces in the 
thinking of the Japanese elite played a major role in their demands for the 
creation of a constabulary force. The role of the police forces from the 
Meiji period until 1945 was close to that of the army in relation to internal 
security duties, cooperating with the army to put down uprisings and 
suppress dissent.93 One could argue that the antecedents of this lack of 
distinction between internal and external security roles could be said to 
originate in pre-modern Japan where members of the warrior class 
performed both internal security/policing roles and participated in warfare 
as part of their duties. 94  In the pre-war Japanese state the Imperial 
Japanese army (IJA) formed a reserve force upon which the police could 
call in cases of rebellion, serious danger to public order, mass rioting or 
other violent confrontation where the use of deadly force could be required 
to restore order. Examples of this use of the army to suppress mass 
protests and uprisings included Saitama in 1884 and the nationwide riots 
of 1918.95 In the face of external and internal threats, the Japanese police 
system, like many of its continental European counterparts, was designed 
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primarily as a tool to ensure the internal security of the state, a first-line of 
defence against subversion, rather than a device for serving and 
protecting the people. Due to this role the Japanese police system 
possessed a centralized, government controlled structure, although this 
was broken up by Occupation reforms in 1947-1948. The removal of the 
Japanese military increased the dependence of the Japanese state upon 
the weakened and beleaguered police as the sole Japanese guarantors of 
the regime‟s survival.96  
 
It should be noted that in cases of serious unrest such as the 1948 Kobe 
riots and in numerous other smaller incidents throughout the Occupation 
the Japanese police required the intervention of US tactical troops to 
maintain order, a reliance which clearly demonstrated its weakness.97 
These troops were employed as a last resort and their use was both 
physically and politically hazardous, possibly resulting in both American 
and Japanese casualties, a fact which could be used by the JCP to stir the 
embers of Japanese nationalism and bring back uncomfortable memories 
of the Pacific War. This is exactly what the JCP sought to do during the 
military turn, as noted above by Denning, Goncharov, Lewis and Litai.98 
Moreover, American tactical troops could not be relied upon to act directly 
in the Japanese government‟s interests in an emergency and were not 
under the control of the Japanese government. This potential 
powerlessness in the face of serious unrest strengthened the traditional 
Japanese conceptions of the need for internal security forces. 99 For 
political, security and financial issues it was clearly desirable to create a 
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local force which could assume these internal security duties, and indeed 
it was a standard procedure in US occupied countries.100 The desire for 
such a force became a necessity with the hasty departure of US tactical 
troops for Korea in summer 1950, resulting in the creation of the NPR to 
fill their role.  
 
Events such as the 1948 Kobe riots, the Taira incident and the blatant 
weaknesses of the police they demonstrated, strengthened the belief of 
many in the Japanese government that there was a requirement for a 
Japanese force designed to assist the police in maintaining public 
order.101 The fact that the decentralised structure of the police also meant 
that the central government had no control over it was also deeply 
worrying to a Japanese elite used to having a strong centralised internal 
security forces at their disposal. This clear appreciation of the pathetic 
state of the civil police was stated by Yoshida in his memoirs: „The [civil] 
police had, in truth ceased to mean much as a force entrusted with the 
maintenance of law and order‟.102 He also put forward the same belief in a 
1949 letter to MacArthur complaining of the lack of influence the Japanese 
government had over the investigation of the Mitaka case and its inability 
to defend itself in case of insurrection:  
 
The country‟s police power has been split up into numerous units, 
large and small, each of which is independent, isolated and often 
helpless. Moreover the entire system is detached from the 
government . . . the government must be prepared for any 
contingency that may arise any day in these unsettled times.103 
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In his reply, unwilling to face or admit the shortcomings of SCAP policy, 
MacArthur argued that he did not believe that the police was inadequate, 
that he was committed to reform and that, in Social Darwinist tones, that 
with the development of „a full consciousness of individual responsibility‟ 
by the Japanese that the current system would work properly.104 
 
As Aldous states, the traditional line of thought on internal security also 
continued to play a significant role in postwar internal security 
conceptions:  
 
In the case of the Japanese police the distinction between military 
and non-military interests was blurred. Whilst there was a 
commitment to democratization of the civil police there was also a 
sense of Japan‟s vulnerability following the dismantling of her war 
machine, a feeling in certain circles that exceptional circumstances 
might justify a military-style police force.105  
 
These exceptional circumstances were judged by many in the Japanese 
elite to have arrived with the escalation of Communist violence, the 
adoption of a policy of revolution by force by the JCP, the outbreak of the 
Korean War and the dispatch of US tactical troops to Korea. In his 
memoirs Yoshida explicitly makes the link between internal security 
concerns and the creation of the NPR: 
 
Then came the most noteworthy event of the year 1950 – the 
outbreak of war in Korea – raising fears that Communist activity in 
Japan would increase still more . . . and giving further ground for 
anxiety regarding the ability of our enfeebled police force to 
maintain order in the country. In these circumstances the Supreme 
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Commander for the Allied Powers issued a directive calling into 
being a new organization to be called the National Police Reserve, 
thus providing our government with a police force taking orders 
directly from the Cabinet.106 
 
The concern amongst the Japanese elite over internal security and the 
possibility of Communist revolution predated the Japanese surrender. The 
most notable example of this was Prince Konoe Fumimaro request to the 
Emperor to begin peace talks with the Allies in February 1945, stating his 
fear that although the British and Americans were unlikely to end the 
Emperor system, a communist revolution was likely if the war continued 
and, under such conditions, Hirohito was likely to lose his throne. 107  
Yoshida also later acknowledged in his memoirs that the fear of revolution 
was a significant factor behind the termination of hostilities.108 
 
The concerns about the internal security of Japan in the wake of defeat 
intensified and the inability of the police to maintain order without the 
support of the military became increasingly apparent. Even Prince 
Higashikuni Naruhiko‟s reasons for resigning as Prime Minister in October 
1945 included his feeling of responsibility for the government‟s inability to 
maintain internal security. 109  The traditional Japanese conceptions of 
internal security forces, coupled with the pressure of defeat and the 
resuscitation of the JCP, led to a growing desire for the creation of a more 
heavily equipped force able to supplement the police in case of 
emergency. The initial Japanese desire was to retain a military of some 
kind and the Cabinet initially proposed on 28 October 1945 that they be 
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permitted a police force of 250,000 and an army of 227,000, demands 
which were later scaled down and eventually abandoned in the face of stiff 
opposition from SCAP.110 With the traditional military at an end, Japanese 
politicians across the political spectrum sought to establish strong police 
forces, including a constabulary of some kind, in order to ensure Japan‟s 
internal security. The Japanese elite wished to retain responsibility for 
their internal security in all but the most serious cases of unrest and not 
rely on GHQ for their survival in a crisis. As Drifte argues, „Japanese 
Cabinets – whether led by the conservative Yoshida or the liberal 
Katayama – always intended to take the question or responsibility for 
internal security into their own hands‟. 111  Two further quotations from 
Prime Minister Katayama from 1947 further underline the importance 
attached by the Japanese government to maintaining their own internal 
security and the implications this also had for regaining their national 
sovereignty:  
 
There is no doubt that the presence of Occupation forces is 
contributing to the preservation of stability, but the Japanese 
government realizes that it is the duty and responsibility of the 
Japanese government to supervise the enforcement of the national 
and local laws of Japan, except in extreme emergencies. 112   
 
In view of the fact that the public order in Japan without armed 
forces is solely dependant on the police force, and that we cannot 
expect and depend upon the situation of complete occupation by 
the Allied forces, especially when we think of a long future, it is 
deemed too hazardous for the central government to deprive itself 
of all its own resources to maintain the public safety [sic].113  
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With American demands for demilitarization rendering the maintenance of 
their own external security impossible, the Japanese elite realised that 
they could still possibly assume responsibility for their own internal 
security and with this a measure of sovereignty and leverage in the future 
peace negotiations. External security, for the foreseeable future, would 
have to be left in the hands of the UN or the Allied powers.114 With the 
increase in the JCP‟s profile and its creeping control over the unions , the 
concern amongst the Japanese political elite increased, and as Weinstein 
states: „the event that more than any other crystallized the suspicions and 
fears of the Japanese government over internal security was the [1 
February 1947] nationwide general strike‟.115 Although the general strike 
failed due to SCAP‟s intervention, the possibility of a strike was very real 
until just before its scheduled date. Without any police forces under its 
direct control the reality of the helpless position in which the Japanese 
government would have found itself if the demonstrations had turned 
violent became starkly obvious. Again Weinstein is useful here: „The 
Yoshida Government, with no police forces or military units at its disposal, 
believed that it was saved from insurrection and possible Communist 
takeover only by SCAP‟s intervention‟.116 Also of note in this regard is the 
second Ashida memorandum which acknowledged that MacArthur‟s 
intervention had halted the disorder, but argued that such measures would 
be impossible after a peace treaty, and hence, in Yoshitsu ‟s and Hata‟s 
opinion, implicitly stressed the need for a centrally controlled 
constabulary.117  
 
The general strike and the poor state of the civil police, coupled with the 
desire of the Japanese for a peace treaty and the return of sovereignty, 
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resulted in the drafting of a number of memoranda by the Japanese 
government which were passed to notable Americans as part of an effort 
to inform Washington of Japanese thinking on peace and security in 
Japan. The „Ashida Memoranda‟ were three messages delivered to 
members of GHQ and American diplomats from 1947 to 1948 by Ashida 
Hitoshi and his subordinates. The memoranda and the process of their 
production and dissemination are of interest as they reveal the central 
position the creation of a paramilitary constabulary played in Japanese 
thinking on internal security, the peace treaty and sovereignty. Ashida, 
Foreign Minister (in 1947) and later Prime Minister (in 1948), like Yoshida 
and many Japanese politicians, held a deep antipathy towards 
Communism, possibly stemming from his experiences whilst serving as a 
diplomat in Russia during the revolutions of 1917. Spurred on by the close 
call of the general strike and the desire not to allow Japan to be forced into 
a forthcoming treaty entirely on Allied terms, Ashida planned to indirectly 
approach the authorities in Washington, despite the fact that SCAP 
forbade any direct contact.118  
 
The first of the Ashida memoranda was presented to the State 
Department advisor to SCAP, George Atcheson Jnr. on 26 July 1947.119 
The memorandum presented Japanese government thinking on the terms 
of a possible peace treaty and of particular note was point five: „in the 
event of the withdrawal of Occupation forces from Japan following the 
peace treaty, the Japanese government should be permitted to have 
adequate police forces at its disposal to ensure law and order‟.120 In this 
memorandum Ashida cut back on the Japanese government‟s initial 
postwar demands for an army and compromised on other points in an 
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attempt to make its content acceptable to the US. Most significantly for 
this study, the memorandum distinguished between the internal and 
external security of Japan, suggesting that after a peace treaty the 
Japanese could be responsible for their own internal security through 
expanding the police, with external security being delegated to the UN.121 
On 28 July a further copy of the memorandum was presented to General 
Whitney, head of GS and a close aide of MacArthur, who said the 
Supreme Commander was thinking along similar lines, but warned the 
Japanese that leaks of the memorandum could result in „unfavourable 
consequences‟.122 However, later that day, in a blow to Ashida‟s plan, both 
Whitney and Atcheson returned their copies of the memorandum, both 
claiming that it was not in Japan‟s interest for them to receive it at that 
time.123 Yoshitsu argues that Atcheson feared leaks of the memorandum 
would have negative repercussions on a future peace treaty as they could 
have created the impression that the Japanese were trying to dictate 
terms to the Allies.124 Three weeks later, whilst on his way to Washington, 
Atcheson was killed in a plane crash, possibly carrying a further copy of 
the message. Nevertheless, the swift rejection of the memorandum 
illustrates the attitude held by many in the US administration who were, at 
least at that stage, unwilling to enter negotiations or accept even the 
diluted opinions of the Japanese. 125  The subsequent leak of these 
supposedly secret plans to the American press caused severe 
embarrassment to the Japanese and resulted in the resignation of 
Okazaki Katsuo, the head of the Central Liaison Office (CLO), and later a 
key figure in the creation of the NPR. Interestingly, by focusing on what it 
achieved in reaching the State Department and in bringing the Japanese 
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ideas into the open, Drifte hints that the leak of the memorandum could 
have been deliberate.126 
 
In September 1947, undeterred by the failure of the first memorandum, 
Ashida sought to contact General Eichelberger, the head of the Eighth 
Army, with whom Suzuki Tadakatsu had regular contact.127 Suzuki was 
head of the CLO at Yokohama, a regional office of former diplomats, set 
up within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) to liaise with the lower 
echelons of the Occupation.128 Eichelberger's anti-communist beliefs were 
well known to the Japanese as was his positive attitude towards rearming 
Japan and to having it become a non-communist ally of the US. With 
rumours circulating, that due to the possibility of a peace treaty, initial 
preparations for a withdrawal could be on the way, Eichelberger had 
become concerned over the future security of Japan in the face of recent 
events in Asia.129 Eichelberger had genuine concerns over the internal and 
external security of the country, as he stated in his diary entry of 27 June: 
„I can‟t see how they can take troops out of Japan until the Communist 
question is settled. We can‟t afford to let Russian or Japanese 
Communists get control of this country‟.130 Believing that using a Japanese 
opinion on the situation could prove highly useful in his arguments against 
withdrawal, in a meeting on 5 September Eichelberger asked Suzuki 
about how long the Japanese thought the US should remain in Japan.131 
Suzuki replied that they would give their answer at their next meeting. 
Over the intervening five days Eichelberger entered into discussion with 
MacArthur and others over the question of Japanese rearmament, asking 
if they should set up a Japanese army if things became „difficult‟ with the 
USSR, an idea which MacArthur firmly rejected, arguing that the UN would 
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assist Japan in the event of problems. Eichelberger, however, remained 
unconvinced and believed that the Cold War could rapidly escalate into 
war between the superpowers.  
 
Over the same period Ashida and Prime Minister Katayama, delighted at 
the opening Eichelberger had provided, decided to give the memorandum 
already rejected by Atcheson and Whitney to Eichelberger. Upon receiving 
it Eichelberger seemed interested in its content and suggested he take it 
with him to Washington. Suzuki also enquired whether he thought a 
constabulary force might be permitted under a peace settlement.132  
 
A second memorandum was also presented to the General three days 
later which outlined two possible courses of future events foreseen by the 
Japanese. First, if superpower relations improved, which seemed unlikely 
at the time, the UN could take responsibility for Japan‟s external defence, 
but if relations remained frosty or deteriorated further the US could take up 
this role. In either case the Japanese wanted to have exclusive control 
over their internal security, which would necessitate the creation of a 
constabulary. The second part of the memorandum stated this desire by 
Japan to take responsibility for its own internal security, and requested an 
American external security guarantee, offering Japanese bases for use „in 
the case of emergency‟ i.e. a serious threat to Japan‟s external security. In 
terms of internal security both parts of the memorandum stated that Japan 
would „build up its domestic police forces, on the ground and on the sea‟ 
to maintain domestic stability, including the establishment of a 
constabulary capable of dealing with threats to internal order.133 
 
Although bases in Japan were offered, it is important to note that Ashida 
believed at the time that the US would hold on to the Bonin and Ryukyu 
island chains and therefore would not need to base troops in mainland 
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Japan under ordinary circumstances. By offering these „emergency‟ base 
rights and through the implication that by doing so the Japanese were 
willing to side with the US in the Cold War, this memorandum attempted to 
make a separate peace more acceptable to the Americans.134 US support 
was seen as highly important as the Japanese, from as early as 1946, had 
built up a strong desire to maintain US influence in Asia to counterbalance 
the USSR.135 The decision to seek a separate peace would necessitate 
American external defence of Japan, as it was anticipated that the USSR 
would use its veto power at the UN to prevent Japanese membership and 
possibly to block UN efforts preventing a Soviet military intervention in 
Japan. Without the possibility of appeal to the UN in a crisis, the only 
realistic option that remained was for Japan to join the US bloc and seek 
explicit protection against external threats through recourse to US naval 
and air superiority. 136  Here Weinstein argues that the content of the 
memorandum represented a novel approach to security negotiations, as 
the Japanese proposed an „alliance‟ whilst only offering to maintain their 
own internal security rather than the normal reciprocal guarantee of 
external security alliances usually require.137 However, citing the fact that 
Weinstein did not have access to the complete text of the memorandum 
upon which he based his interpretation, Drifte criticises Weinstein for this 
interpretation, saying he is mistaken on the alleged Japanese belief in 
quasi-reciprocity of offering the internal/external compromise to the US.138  
 
This memorandum, unlike its predecessor, did reach Washington directly 
but at this stage the US administration was still not prepared to conclude a 
separate peace with Japan. It was feared that if a separate peace was 
concluded that would it prevent them reaching a general security 
settlement with the USSR, which some, including Kennan and Acheson 
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(leading figures in the US State Department), still thought was possible.139 
Ashida‟s efforts continued despite these setbacks, and in a conversation 
with Sir Alvery Gasgoine, Head of the British Liaison Mission, on 22 
September, he argued that, as the USSR could easily attack Hokkaido 
from the Kuriles, US troops should be stationed in Japan in the future, 
even in peacetime.140 Three months later Ashida also offered to hand over 
a Japanese study on the peace treaty to William Sebald, a senior US 
diplomat in Japan, but Ashida was once more rebuffed when Sebald 
refused to accept the documents, claiming that it was too early to discuss 
the issue and that the peace terms would be settled at a future great 
power conference.141 
 
By mid-1948 Ashida had become Prime Minister and the Cold War had 
chilled further. With his return to the United States approaching, Ashida 
decided to give both memoranda to General Eichelberger to take back 
with him on 9 July.142 This seems to have been a successful move as 
Eichelberger then proceeded to give a number of pro-rearmament 
speeches after his return to the US.143 Furthermore, events seemed to be 
going the Japanese Prime Minister's way even before his third effort, with 
the Japanese position converging with that of some highly influential 
Americans. During his early 1948 visit to Japan, Kennan had also told the 
Japanese leadership events might be leading to a more favourable US 
stance on their plans as relations were deteriorating between the 
superpowers.144 Evidence of Kennan‟s support for a constabulary force 
can be found in a summary of one of his reports from April that year which 
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stated that in order to best preserve security in Japan „a central, uniformed 
gendarmerie or central constabulary comparable to the French Guard 
Mobile . . . would seem both desirable and suitable‟.145 Furthermore, in 
NSC 13/2 of October 1948 Kennan advocated the strengthening of the 
Japanese internal security forces through „the re-enforcing and re-
equipping of the present forces, and by expanding the present centrally 
directed police organisation‟, an implied reference to the creation of a 
centrally directed internal security constabulary.146 Kennan had even noted 
in late 1947 that it was essential that „Japan should be permitted to 
maintain a civil police force, including a constabulary‟.147 It is notable that 
during this period the Japanese and American positions generally 
converged, especially over the creation of adequate internal security 
forces. As Drifte notes, „for Kennan, as much as the Japanese 
government, the prevention of communist subversion and the 
strengthening of police forces were among the principal concerns‟.148 In 
terms of the direct influence between the two policy-making processes, 
historians differ in their interpretations, Drifte arguing that the similarities 
between the second Ashida memorandum and the 14 October 1947 study 
by Kennan on the peace treaty are remarkable. The two documents are so 
similar that Drifte argues that Kennan may have been directly influenced 
by the Japanese draft. 149  In contrast, Yoshitsu argues that Japanese 
policymakers accurately predicted State Department thinking in their 
studies and, consequently, there was no direct link between the two 
drafts. 150  Whichever of these theories is more accurate is of little 
consequence as either way, the Japanese were clearly closer to getting 
what they desired from the US. 
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Ashida‟s efforts to participate in the drafting of the peace and to secure the 
internal security of Japan were continued by Yoshida after Ashida‟s 
resignation on 15 October 1948 in the wake of the Shōwa Denkō 
corruption scandal. The central theme of the Ashida approach to securing 
the internal security of Japan was the reliance on the US or UN for 
external security whilst „the Japanese government would handle the threat 
of an internal communist take-over by building national paramilitary 
[constabulary] forces‟. 151  This desire to assume the responsibility for 
internal security by the Japanese government, especially after the US 
withdrew, is supported by Weinstein: „following the conclusion of a peace 
treaty and the withdrawal of the Occupation forces, Japan would need an 
effective, centrally controlled police force if it were to prevent a Communist 
take-over‟.152  
 
It is important to state that with the outbreak of the Korean War and the 
dispatch of the US garrison to Korea an identical situation to the one 
envisaged was created, necessitating the creation of the NPR. This 
situation also provided the final impetus to overcome the reservations held 
by the principal opponent of a constabulary force, MacArthur.153 Finally, it 
is also significant that the Ashida proposals closely approximated the 
basis of the 1951 San Francisco peace and security treaties and could 
also be termed the „Ashida Doctrine‟ in that the focus by the Japanese on 
maintaining internal security whilst delegating external security to the US 
largely informed Japanese defence thinking well into the 1960s.154 
 
A further indication of the desire amongst the Japanese administration for 
more robust security forces was the Higai/Yoshida plan. From late 1948 
onwards, the Yoshida Cabinet was growing increasingly concerned about 
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the process of police decentralisation (which had come into force from 3 
March 1948) and appointed ministers Kimura Kozaemon and Higai Senzo 
to investigate the possibility of recentralising the police.155 The principal 
figure in subsequent events was Higai who had resigned from his position 
as Speaker of the House of Representatives in August 1946 over 
improper conduct during the framing of aspects of the new constitution 
relating to the Emperor‟s property. 156  Higai was also unpopular with 
Whitney and Government Section (GS) due to his close relationship with 
Harry S. Eaton, of G2‟s Public Safety Division (PSD).157 The two ministers 
proceeded to consult various Municipal and National Rural Police units 
and the prefectures within which they operated and their efforts resulted in 
thirty one of forty seven prefectures (66%) petitioning the Diet for 
recentralisation. 158  The results of the consultation led to Yoshida 
approaching MacArthur to voice his opinions on the prospect of 
recentralisation.159 Details of the meeting were leaked to the press, but 
even this did little to dampen the Cabinet‟s enthusiasm for reform.160 After 
a House of Representatives special committee also recommended 
recentralisation, the Japanese were so confident that reform was a distinct 
possibility that Higai announced the reform process was actually 
underway.161 Higai informed the press that under the proposed reform 
plans, which he claimed had been approved by Eaton, it was likely that the 
Municipal Police forces would be merged with the National Rural Police 
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and a 50,000 man paramilitary constabulary would be set up to bolster 
Japan‟s internal security and cope with serious riots and disturbances.162  
 
Higai‟s premature announcement about recentralisation and the leaks 
surrounding it had been preceded by staunch public condemnation of 
GHQ‟s programme of police reform by the Soviet member of the Allied 
Council for Japan Lieutenant General Kuzma Derevyanko.163 His attacks 
on police reform, despite containing Soviet propaganda, made some 
uncomfortable allegations about American desires for the remilitarization 
of Japan and infringement of Japanese civil liberties. His comments were 
revealed in the press and attracted public attention as well as agreement 
and support from the JCP.164 The combination of Higai‟s announcement 
and Derevyanko‟s condemnation prompted The Times to claim that the 
Japanese government was planning to resurrect the pre-1945 militarist 
Special Higher Police (Tokubetsu Kōtō Keisatsu, or Tokkō) and the article 
created such controversy, that the Yoshida Cabinet felt compelled to 
swiftly issue a complete denial.165 Higai also denied that recentralisation 
was imminent but followed this denial with a claim that „no concrete 
discussion had been made in the Cabinet‟ about plans to reform the police, 
a blatantly false remark.166 This quasi-public press campaign took place as 
the future internal security of Japan seemed increasingly at risk, with the 
simultaneous events of the „bloody summer‟ of 1949, demonstrating to the 
Japanese authorities that in the face of determined resistance the civil 
police were unable to cope.167  
 
Events prompted further demands made in private by Higai and other 
Japanese politicians for the creation of a constabulary force to guard 
against Communist unrest as well as more general police reform. Again 
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Higai‟s demands became public, with a major scandal ensuing and 
Yoshida suggesting his resignation. Higai claimed he was not the origin of 
the calls for reform and the creation of a constabulary force and that the 
information was leaked from private discussions between himself and 
Yoshida. Higai also claimed that his opinions on the subject were milder 
than those of the rest of the Cabinet, including Yoshida, but in the end 
offered his resignation anyway.168   
 
The controversy over this incident ran over into June 1950 when the 
Korean War created the circumstances within which the Japanese 
administration was granted its wish, the creation of a centrally directed 
paramilitary constabulary in the form of the NPR. Yoshida‟s role in this 
series of events is an interesting one and the leaks which led to Higai‟s 
downfall may have originated from Yoshida himself (a technique he had 
previously employed). Though supporting the policies Higai announced, 
Yoshida may have sought to remove him as a political rival, whilst 
simultaneously testing public support for the policies and distancing 
himself from any potentially embarrassing repercussions. 169  However, 
Yoshida‟s genuine desire to create, and later preserve, the constabulary 
force he deemed essential to enhance Japan‟s internal security can be 
seen through his repeated calls for the strengthening of the police, his 
later efforts to prevent the assumption by the NPR of greater responsibility 
for Japan‟s external defence and the efforts he made to preserve the 
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This chapter has been devoted to addressing the first principal aim of this 
study, revealing the domestic influences on the NPR. The chapter has 
also demonstrated that the Japanese government clearly and actively 
sought a constabulary force prior to the Korean War and the creation of 
the NPR. Two of the key influences on the NPR have also been explored 
in this chapter: the JCP and the Japanese government. In fulfilling its 
stated aim this chapter has analysed the domestic origins of the National 
Police Reserve and the importance of the perceived domestic threat in 
promoting and strengthening the desire amongst various groups for the 
creation of such a paramilitary constabulary. The first section dealt with 
the first stage of the JCP‟s overt moves towards violence and hence 
illustrated the threat the authorities believed required the establishment of 
a constabulary. The second section illustrated the motives and initiatives 
of the Japanese elite that were directed towards the establishment of that 
constabulary.  
 
Building on the traditional Japanese conceptions of internal security and 
the weakness of the civil police, the perceived JCP threat was seen to 
require stronger internal security forces to be adequately guarded against. 
It is clear that the Japanese government keenly felt that the JCP 
represented a threat to its survival and considered it essential to establish 
effective bulwarks against Communist insurrection or revolution, especially 
the establishment of a centrally directed paramilitary constabulary. As 
Weinstein notes, the fear of the JCP even eclipsed that of the USSR 
during the Korean War: „the danger of an internal communist take-over 
appeared at least comparable to, and probably greater than, the danger of 
a direct Soviet attack‟. 171  This concern prompted efforts to create a 
paramilitary constabulary, in the form of the Ashida memoranda and the 
Higai/Yoshida plan. As is revealed in the following chapter, this desire for 
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a constabulary before 1950 is significant as it shows there was no need 
for GHQ to force the Japanese government into creating the NPR, as is 
argued by some historians.172 In conclusion, it must be noted that unlike 
many historians of this period it is important not to marginalise nor ignore 
the threat the JCP was seen to present at the time through the application 
of the knowledge of the future failure of the JCP guerrilla campaign. From 
1949 to 1952 it was far from clear what the future held. As Jenkins notes: 
„it is essential to avoid hindsight when considering these years  . . . at the 
time it seemed very possible that the coming decade [the 1950s] would 
see a continuation of hardship, shortages, and the unrest and subversion 
that accompanied these conditions. In this context, police reconstruction 
might well be a prerequisite of political stability‟.173 
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The International Context of the 
Creation of the NPR: 1945-1950 
 
 
In keeping with the overall rationale of this study of providing a complete 
history of the NPR, the purpose of this chapter is to illuminate the 
international factors and events behind the decision to create the NPR. The 
chapter seeks to broaden the existing knowledge of the origins of the NPR, 
particularly by exploring the non-Japanese organisations which influenced its 
development. In this the chapter focuses on the neglected area of the 
American sponsored constabularies which preceded the NPR in Asia and 
elsewhere. The chapter also includes an examination of the influence of the 
outbreak of the Korean War on the final decisions behind the creation of the 
NPR including the influence of the Japanese government. Some attention is 
also paid, by way of brief summaries, to the international political situation 
and American attitudes towards strengthening Japan‟s security forces.  
 
This approach combines elements of original research with a synthesis of the 
best of the existing scholarship on the period. As much of the content centres 
on the international context of the force and has been covered elsewhere, 
this study seeks to focus on the key concepts which saw Japan become the 
central pillar of America‟s Asian policy. These include Schaller‟s‟ „great 
crescent‟, Iriye‟s observations on the failure of the Yalta system and 
Sarantakes‟ concept of „double containment‟.1 The examination presented 
here of these concepts also reveals that although Japan became central to 
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US Asia policy, no overall American consensus over Japanese security had 
been reached by 1950. The exploration of the origins of the constabulary 
structure offered here is an original contribution to the scholarship and 
reveals in full for the first time a significant influence on the character and 
creation of the NPR. Despite much of the chapter adopting an approach 
similar to that of many second generation US scholars in focusing on the 
international influences on the force, the final section details how these 
influences interacted with the Japanese government during the creation of 
the NPR in early July 1950. This analysis, whilst demonstrating the Japanese 
influence, also indicates that the Japanese government was not „ordered‟ to 
create the force, as is argued by many historians. 
 
 
The International Political Context 
 
The international political situation in the immediate postwar years 
contributed greatly towards the processes which eventually led to the creation 
of the NPR. The emergence of the Cold War, the threat of communism in 
Asia, the collapse of the Yalta system and the Korean War were all 
instrumental in the birth of the NPR. The history of the Cold War in Asia and 
its impact upon Japan have been effectively and exhaustively studied 
elsewhere by many historians, notably Schaller, Sarantakes and Iriye.2 In the 
interests of brevity, and in keeping with the aim of this study to focus on the 
relatively unexplored nature of the NPR rather than the well trodden path of 
the Cold War in Asia, this section comprises of a brief summary of some of 
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the major scholarly interpretations of the events that influenced Japan‟s 
security policy in this period to which this study ascribes.  
 
Schaller‟s work plants the roots of the Cold War in Asia firmly within the soil 
of Japan. Schaller argues that the rise of communism in Asia and the 
weakness of the European and Japanese economies resulted in American 
moves to integrate Japan and non-communist Southeast Asia into a 
trading/security bloc.3 This aim was somewhat ironic as it closely mirrored the 
'southern strategy' employed by the Japanese in their drive to create a 
„Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere‟ during the Pacific War. American 
action in Asia was seen as necessary to alleviate the „loss‟ of Japan‟s 
traditional markets and sources of raw materials in Manchuria and China and 
in doing so prevent Japan falling to communism. Schaller argues that the 
integration of the two areas also helped guarantee the pro-western, anti-
communist alignment of both Japan and many of the emerging nationalist 
movements in Southeast Asia. To bolster and defend this non-communist 
Asian containment sphere Schaller argues that a „Great Crescent‟ of 
defensive bases and American military outposts was established, running 
from the Aleutians through Japan, Formosa and the Philippines (see figure 
III).4 Japan, the only heavily industrialised state in East Asia and the location 
of major US military bases, was considered the key link in this offshore 
defence perimeter. Japan was vital and as Acheson warned: „were Japan 
added to the communist bloc the Soviets would acquire skilled manpower 
and industrial potential capable of significantly altering the balance of world 
power‟.5 In Schaller‟s opinion America had involved itself in a strategy which 
positioned Japan as the central tenet of its Asian policy. 6  Reference to 
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contemporary primary documents reveals the accuracy and incisiveness of 
Schaller‟s arguments; for example George Kennan‟s Policy Planning Staff 
Paper; Review of Current Trends: US Foreign Policy states that „Japan and 
the Philippines will be found to be the cornerstones of such a Pacific security 
system‟ i.e. the „Great Crescent‟.7 The „Great Crescent‟ concept also won 
over MacArthur, with the General telling Kennan that US defence required 
military bases in a „U-shaped area embracing the Aleutians, Midway, the 
former Japanese mandated islands, Clark field in the Philippines and above 
all Okinawa. Okinawa was the most advanced and vital point in this 
structure‟.8 MacArthur also repeated his thinking in an interview in Tokyo in 
early 1949 in which he stated „our line of defence runs through a chain of 
islands fringing the coast of Asia‟.9 A further demonstration of the centrality of 
the „Great Crescent‟ concept to American Asia policy was given in Dean 
Acheson‟s 12 January 1950 „defence perimeter‟ speech to the National Press 
Club, in which the same message was conveyed but with the explicit 
omission of Korea from the defence chain, a statement which some historians 
have since argued contributed to the outbreak of the Korean War.10 
 
Schaller‟s interpretation did have its detractors with Finn, for example, 
arguing that Schaller „detected in the voluminous staff papers on this subject 
a U.S. intention to build a “great crescent” of anti communist nations‟, and 
countering that „U.S. policy in that period was actually far less ambitious‟.11 
These criticisms have made Schaller step back somewhat from the „great 
crescent‟ theory in his more recent work, preferring instead to focus on the 
economic integration of the American sphere of influence in East Asia. 12 
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Despite these criticisms of the specifics of Schaller‟s approach, it remains 
clear that by 1950 Japan had become the mainstay US policy in Asia, 
intertwined with a semi-integrated trade and security framework connected to 
US Cold War strategy. 
 




Another historian who contributes greatly to understanding of the security 
environment in Northeast Asia after World War Two is Sarantakes. Focusing 
principally on Okinawa, Sarantakes argues that the US role in occupying 
Japan served both to contain communism in Northeast Asia and to allay the 
American and Allied fear that Japan might opt for neutrality, or worse, an 
independent or militarist foreign policy. To serve these ends Sarantakes 
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argues that the US retained bases on Okinawa and in Japan to underline the 
policy he defines as „double containment‟.14 With experience of working with 
the Japanese and the recognition by both sides that their interests lay in co-
operation, Sarantakes asserts that the wartime animosity between the two 
former foes, and the latter half of the dual containment idea, gradually lost 
some of its credence. With the onset of the Cold War in Asia Sarantakes 
states that the US opted to retain Okinawa and bases on the Japanese 
mainland as they were strategically important for the defence of the Pacific. 
Great value was placed on these bases in several military strategies including 
defence of a series of strongpoints in the Pacific and defence of a perimeter 
(i.e. the „Great Crescent‟), and they were also essential in controlling the sea 
lanes of Northeast Asia, to defend Japan, and simultaneously defend others 
from Japan.15 
 
Also of note is the work of Iriye Akira. Iriye‟s focus on the collapse of the Yalta 
system and the changes it wrought upon the position of Japan are also highly 
informative when considering the international origins of the NPR. Iriye 
argues that at the February 1945 Yalta meeting, the „Big Three‟ roughly 
defined their postwar spheres of influence, with the USA taking responsibility 
for the western hemisphere and Pacific and the USSR taking on eastern 
Europe, the Baltic and Northeast Asia.16 This „Yalta system‟ of continued co-
operation between the World War Two allies, with each „policing‟ its assigned 
regions, operated for a while after the end of hostilities but soon began to 
break down, in part over the role of China. The system envisaged China as 
one of the five „world policemen‟, that would, after economically and militarily 
recovering from its fifteen-year war with Japan, contribute to the collective 
security of its region. To reinforce its position as one of the pillars of the 
postwar order, China was also granted a permanent seat on the UN Security 
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Council, alongside the other victorious Allied powers and France. The powers 
at the Yalta conference agreed on a number of measures to help China 
recover and take its place in the postwar order. These included: the 
recognition of Chinese territorial sovereignty, agreements on non-intervention 
in China, recognition of the need for China to develop from its semi-colonial 
status and the recognition of Chiang Kai Shek as its leader. However, with 
the outbreak of civil war in China and the emergence of conflicting 
superpower polices, the Yalta system began to disintegrate.17 The victory of 
the communists in the Chinese civil war in late 1949 dealt American wartime 
visions of the security framework in Asia a fatal blow. With the „loss‟ of China 
to the communists the pre-Cold War Yalta system was swiftly abandoned by 
the US.18 With China under communist control, the United States required a 
new ally in Asia and, with the erosion of the relatively benign security 
environment in Northeast Asia, Japan concurrently found itself in peril. Japan 
moved from a state of secondary importance to China, on the path to 
unarmed neutrality (and which some Americans were considering 
deindustrialising), to the central focus of American policy in Asia. From 1949 
onwards, with the Democratic administration under intense criticism from the 
Republican dominated congress over the „loss‟ of China and with McCarthy‟s 
witch-hunts in progress, political pressure, and, in some cases, political 
survival, obliged many policymakers to adopt a harder and more hawkish 
approach to Asian affairs.19 Within this context came calls for a reinvigorated 
and rebuilt Japan, closely tied to the US, which contributed directly and/or 
indirectly to the security of the American sphere of influence. 
 
Due to a number of factors and polices, by the late forties, Japan had 
become the strategic, military, economic and psychological key to Asia in the 
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minds of most American policymakers. 20  Sharpening this focus were a 
number of further factors which heightened concerns over Japan's security. 
These included the Soviet capture of the Kurile Islands in the closing days of 
the Second World War, Article Nine of the 1947 Japanese constitution, the 
disarmament of Japan, the perceived Soviet threat to Japan‟s external 
security, the perceived domestic threat of the Japanese Communist Party 
(JCP), and finally the dire internal security situation in neighbouring Korea.21 
All of these events and concern over the intentions of the USSR prompted 
calls for the strengthening of the internal security forces of Japan. This move 
can be noted in the content of NSC 49 of June 1949: „Japan‟s internal 
security forces must be adequate not only for the maintenance of order but 
for protection against sabotage of vital installations. This may involve stronger 
security forces than were thought essential prior to the current overrunning of 
China‟.22 Much American policy also centred on the belief that all communism 
was Soviet directed and that once embedded in a society its success through 
violent revolution was almost inevitable. NSC 7 of March 1948 illustrates 
these beliefs well: 
 
The ultimate aim of Soviet-directed world communism is the 
domination of the world. To this end, Soviet-directed world 
communism employs against its victims in opportunistic coordination 
the complementary instruments of Soviet aggressive pressure from 
without and militant revolutionary subversion from within. Both 
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instruments are supported by the formidable material power of the 
USSR and their use is facilitated by the chaotic aftermath of the war.23 
 
Documents such as NSC 7 stressed the power of domestic communist 
movements such as the JCP to undermine US policy and friendly 
governments without directly involving the USSR. In the minds of the US 
administration communist parties across the globe, including the JCP, 
constituted a „world-wide fifth column directed at frustrating foreign policy, 
dividing and confusing the people of a country, planting the seeds of 
disruption in time of war, and subverting the freedom of democratic states‟.24 
 
With events both inside and outside Asia contributing to the further 
deterioration of relations between East and West, including the testing of the 
first Soviet atomic weapon in the summer of 1949 and Soviet policy in 
Eastern Europe and Berlin, US policy crystallised into the definitive statement 
of US Cold War strategy: NSC 68. This document identified the aim of the 
USSR and the „international communist movement‟ as the domination of the 
globe, starting with the Eurasian landmass, and the elimination of the United 
States, the principal opponent of this policy. 25  High amongst its 
recommendations to counter this alleged Soviet master plan was the rapid 
rearmament of the United States and its allies, both as a defence against a 
Soviet attack and to deter such an attack from taking place.26 This reversal of 
earlier policy was also deemed necessary due to the massive unilateral 
reduction in arms and men conducted by the US in the wake of World War 
Two, which had left the American military (especially the army) severely 
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overstretched and dwarfed in size by its Soviet counterpart. 27  This 
militarization of US policy from mid-1950 also influenced the internal security 
of Japan as it was hoped that in the future Japan would contribute in some 
way to its own defence.  
 
Although this universalistic interpretation was adopted by many, some such 
as George Kennan opposed what seemed an oversimplification of the 
motivations and intentions of the world‟s communist regimes.28 As Kennan 
later noted in his memoirs, the outbreak of the Korean War also served to 
strengthen these misplaced beliefs and marginalise views such as his own, 
which argued for a more nuanced analysis: 
 
The North Korean attack came soon to appear to a great many people 
in Washington as merely the first move in some “grand design” . . . to 
extend their [Soviet] power to other parts of the world by use of force. 
The unexpectedness of their attack . . . only stimulated the already 
existent preference of the military planners for drawing their 
conclusions only from the assessed capabilities of the adversary, 
dismissing his intentions, which could safely be assumed to be hostile. 
All this tended to heighten the militarization of thinking about the Cold 
War generally, and to press us into attitudes where any discriminate 
estimate of Soviet intentions was unwelcome and unacceptable. In 
addition, it encouraged the military planners in another tendency, 
against which I had fought long and bitterly but generally in vain: the 
tendency, namely, to view Soviet intentions as something existing 
quite independently from our own behaviour [Kennan‟s italics].29 
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As Kennan noted the outbreak of the Korean War in late June 1950 acted as 
a catalyst, accelerating and deepening the pace of the policy change started 
in the preceding months. With the outbreak of the first major „hot war‟ of the 
Cold War, Japan and Korea shifted from the periphery of US policy focus to 
closer to the centre. Japan did indeed move closer to the centre, but not 
become entirely central, as many policymakers and documents, such as NSC 
73, expressed fears that the attack on South Korea could be a feint preceding 
a major attack or probe in Europe, the Middle East, Pakistan or elsewhere in 
East Asia. 30  These concerns meant that the European theatre still took 
precedence in US planning, both in political and military terms.31 
 
There were also fears that the North Korean attack could possibly be 
indirectly directed at Japan and that, if South Korea were to fall, Japan would 
soon follow, and with it American prestige, policy, and plans for defence in 
the Pacific. Furthermore, with the possible loss of South Korea, the sole 
remaining „traditional market‟ of Japan's former empire and an important 
source of food imports, the concern over Japan's economic future and 
political orientation was grave. 32  This perception of Korea as a „dagger‟ 
pointing at the heart of Japan was nothing new, having existed for centuries 
in the Japanese consciousness and having been used to justify Japanese 
intervention in the peninsula during the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese war.33 
Some US policymakers also suspected that the Korean War was indirectly 
aimed at weakening the US position in Japan. As Acheson stated, the North 
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Korean attack „was an open, undisguised challenge to our internationally 
accepted position as the protector of South Korea, an area of importance to 
the security of American-occupied Japan‟.34 
 
The war also presented Japan with a great opportunity to rebuild its economy. 
Although in time „the special procurements‟ (Tokujū) of the UN forces helped 
set Japan on course for its postwar economic „miracle‟, at the time no one 
could tell what the future held.35 The fears that the North Korean attack would 
spark more violence from the JCP and their radical Korean allies, coupled 
with the internal security vacuum created by the departure of US tactical 
troops for Korea, created great concern amongst the Japanese and American 
authorities, and helped to prompt the creation of the NPR. Uyehara sums up 
this point well:  
 
A sense of anxiety, uncertainty and threat to internal stability, almost 
an air of national emergency pervaded the Japanese government and 
society due to the outbreak of the Korean War in mid-1950 and the 
continuing violent tactics of the Japanese Communists in the early 
1950s.36 
 
Furthermore, Yoshida stated to the Diet in August 1950: „The Korean War is 
not a fire across the river, Communist elements in this country are 
conspicuously baring their characteristics of fifth columnists as well as their 
traitorous plots. Accordingly, we are determined to take vigorous steps to 
prevent red disturbances‟ [sic].37 First and foremost amongst these efforts 
was the creation of the NPR three days later.  
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In the short term, the NPR‟s creation and evolution was highly influenced by 
the fortunes of the UN forces in Korea. With the pressing need for troops 
following the collapse of the South Korean Army (ROKA) in mid-1950, the US 
tactical troops in Japan were hastily dispatched. To replace them as an 
internal security force in Japan and to deal with the JCP, the NPR was 
created. With the Chinese entry into the war in the winter of 1950/1951 and 
the wholesale retreat of the UN forces from the Yalu fears of the fall of South 
Korea, and possibly Japan, again resurfaced and demands for a more heavily 
armed force for Japan influenced the direction of the NPR.38 
 
As demonstrated above, through the course of the 1940s and under the 
influence of various international pressures and American perceptions, Japan 
gradually shifted from a defeated enemy, whose international role, security 
apparatus and economy were to be constrained, to the mainstay of American 
policy and defence in Asia. The American government and GHQ clearly 
perceived a threat to the key „domino‟ in the region from the tide of 
communist revolution spreading across Asia. The strategic value placed on 
Japan‟s industrial plant, skilled workforce, and millions of veterans made 
even the remotest possibility of losing Japan to communism a major concern 
and made US policymakers hypersensitive to perceived internal and external 
threats. The efforts made to prevent this turn of events included economic 
restructuring to make the economy viable, the „Red Purge‟ and creating the 
NPR. 39  It could also be argued that the reduction of the authoritarian 
influences on the Japanese polity through the democratisation, disarmament, 
land, social and political reform programmes were all, in part and indirectly, 
also designed to reduce the appeal, influence and threat from the JCP.  
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With the outbreak of the Korean War, Asia became more central to overall 
US policy, and Japan became very much the keystone of US Asian strategy, 
or as Dower christened it, the „Superdomino‟ or „linchpin in an iron noose of 
American containment in Asia‟.40 Of vital importance to the security of this 
keystone was Japan‟s internal security, a fact well acknowledged by US 
policymakers at the time. As NSC 49 states, „this [communist economic and 
political pressure] makes the question of Japanese internal security more 
important than ever‟.41 The internal nature of the perceived threat to Japan 
was detailed further in NSC 49/1: „the denial of Japan to the USSR 
constitutes a problem of combating, not attack and invasion but concealed 
aggression. The threat to Japan comes from agitation, subversion and coup 
d’état‟.42 Thus, the necessity of an internal security force to secure Japan 
from this threat was long recognised and finally found form in the NPR.  
 
 
Competing American Visions of Japanese Security 
 
The attitudes towards Japan‟s security and what, if anything, should be done 
in order to bolster it were paralleled by, and interconnected with, the debate 
on American policy on Japan. Amongst the voices which called for the 
strengthening of Japan‟s security apparatus there were a range of opinions 
as to what was required to secure Japan against communism. Although 
broadly divisible along organisational lines there was great variation between 
individuals in the US administration, military and press over what was the 
best course to adopt in relation to Japan‟s security. The competing visions of 
                                                             
40
 J. Dower, „The Superdomino in Postwar Asia: Japan in and Out of the Pentagon Papers‟, 
In N. Chomsky and H. Zinn (eds), The Pentagon Papers, Vol. 5, Gravel Edition, Beacon 
Press, 1972, pp 101-103; J. Dower, „Occupied Japan and the American Lake, 1945-1950‟, in 
E. Friedman and M. Seldon (eds), America's Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian American 
Relations, Pantheon, New York, 1971, p 148. 
41
 NSC 49, Strategic Evaluation of United States Security Needs in Japan, 15/6/1949, FRUS, 
1949, Vol. VII part 2, p 776. 
42
 NSC 49/1 Department of State Comments on NSC 49, 15/6/1949, FRUS, 1949, Vol. VII 
part 2, p 871. 
108 
 
what various policy actors considered most suitable have been examined by 
a number of historians. One of the most recent, balanced and lucid accounts 
is that of Sugita Yoneyuki. Sugita argues that three principal interest groups 
existed among those concerned with Japan‟s security: „pro-rearmament‟, 
„anti-rearmament‟ and those who favoured „rearmament with some 
constraints‟. 43  Sugita‟s discussion of these groups is informative and his 
discussion does highlight some important trends and issues but also contains 
some flaws. Generally speaking, the military, particularly the Department of 
the Army (and its successor, the Department of Defense) supported the re-
establishment of a formal Japanese army i.e. rearmament.44 The US Army 
supported creation of a new Japanese army mainly in its pursuit of its own 
short-term aims, principally alleviating some of the burden on its own severly 
overstretched resources.45 In contrast, the majority of the State Department 
opposed rearmament due to its likely international, political and propaganda 
ramifications. However, these positions varied, with some individuals on 
either side adopting positions in opposition to their organisations. For 
example, Secretary of Defence Louis Johnson doubted Japan‟s commitment 
to the US camp and feared rearmament due to his memories of the Pacific 
War, instead favouring a long Occupation to guarantee Japan‟s political 
reorientation.46 An overall consensus on the issues was never really achieved 
either prior to the establishment of the NPR, or for years after.47 As Sugita 
notes, some of this confusion, and indeed some of his own inaccuracies, are 
due to the terminology employed by historians and some participants. 48  
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For the purposes of this study „rearmament‟ is defined as the complete 
political and organisational recreation of a military force, explicitly named an 
army and responsible for external security. 49  Sugita and some of the 
individuals he discusses used the term „rearmament‟ interchangeably in 
reference to both the creation of an internal security constabulary force and a 
full army. By effectively analysing this term, one can reveal errors in the 
classification of some individuals made by Sugita. For example, Kennan is 
cited as being pro-rearmament although the most he ever seriously 
advocated was the creation of a constabulary force coupled with a regional 
arrangement with the Soviets. Kennan characterised his as follows:  
 
I had taken the position, ever since I was sent to Japan by General 
Marshall in the spring of 1948 . . . that it would be better for us not to 
leave American forces in Japan and not to rearm the Japanese with 
conventional forces, but to give them a strong, smart, alert, well-armed 
military police force [a constabulary] which could cope with any 
attempts at infiltration from the mainland and let it go at that.50  
 
For Kennan as well as many others, the perceived internal threat far 
exceeded the external, and correspondingly, he believed that preparations for 
Japan‟s security should be made to reflect this: „I felt . . . that we should 
regard whatever danger there was to Japan from the communist side as a 
political danger primarily and limit the Japanese defense really to the internal 
political security of the Japanese islands including their protection against 
infiltration from the mainland‟.51  
 
Omar Bradley, the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) from 1949 to 1953, is 
also cited by Sugita as being in favour of rearmament, despite his opposition 
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to a full army and his opinion that the US should only reduce its occupation 
forces if the Japanese were allowed a strong constabulary or police force.52  
 
The hawkish pair of Willoughby, head of GHQ‟s G2, and Eichelberger, head 
of the Eighth Army, are correctly identified by Sugita as supporting 
rearmament.53  Willoughby‟s several attempts at creating an army on the 
basis of the NPR are examined in detail in the course of this study. 54 
Eichelberger‟s position in favour of a full Japanese Army is supported by 
documents reproduced by Ōtake in which he recommended a bilateral 
security treaty allowing Japan 200,000 troops and airpower.55 Eichelberger‟s 
states his position in various other documents including one from a 1949 
newspaper interview quoted in Halliday, where the General extols the virtues 
of rearmament and the Japanese fighting man:  
 
Dollar for dollar there is no cheaper fighting man in the world than the 
Japanese. He is already a veteran. His food is simple. His uniform can 
be manufactured in Japan . . . This man, if armed could defend his 
country from internal uprisings or in the last analysis his country from 
invasion . . . Japanese soldiers would be a commander‟s dream . They 
are the kind who stay on a ridge-top until they die.56  
 
This description is also instructive in reflecting that the appreciation of the 
principal threat to Japan‟s security, even amongst the more hawkish pro-
rearmament policymakers, was of internal communist subversion. 
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Although not included in Sugita‟s analysis, John Foster Dulles and President 
Truman, despite their differing political roots, also could be characterised as 
being in favour of Japanese rearmament, especially after 1950.57 However, in 
both men, this desire was, tempered to some extent by an awareness of the 
limitations placed on this approach by various factors. These factors included: 
the Japanese constitution; the scarcity of available resources due to both 
political and practical reasons; the potential negative influence on wider 
(particularly Australasian) alliance politics that Japanese rearmament would 
have; Yoshida‟s resistance; and the impact of being seen to force the 
Japanese into rearmament.58 Truman‟s successor, Eisenhower, displayed a 
greater awareness of these limitations, as evidenced through his 
administration‟s policies which de-emphasised the previous push for 
Japanese rearmament regardless of the political and economic 
consequences. 59  In July 1950 awareness of the seeming constraints on 
rearming Japan also prompted Dulles to briefly consider the creation of a 
constabulary force based on the civil police, or some sort of UN sponsored 
Japanese „volunteer‟ force.60 Despite their merits, these ideas were soon 
abandoned by Dulles in his efforts to convince Yoshida to contribute more 
definitively to Japan‟s external security. 
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In his examination of the anti-rearmament camp Sugita limits the 
effectiveness of his study by focusing principally on State Department officials 
and by looking mostly at documents created prior to 1948, a year after which 
positions began to change.61 John Emmerson, Assistant Chief of the Division 
of Japanese Affairs, Saltzman, Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied 
Areas, W.W. Butterworth and John Howard, are all cited as being anti-
rearmament due to their concerns over the economic feasibility and political 
wisdom of rearming Japan.62 MacArthur is also described as being opposed 
to rearmament. This is a reasonably accurate portrayal of MacArthur‟s 
resistance to creation of armies in both South Korea and Japan.63 In support 
of this, MacArthur did argue at various times that economically Japan could 
not rearm for twenty-five years, that he favoured complete disarmament and 
neutrality, and that maintenance of any force other than the civil police would 
jeopardise Japan‟s fragile economic recovery.64 However, what Sugita does 
not recognise is the fact that MacArthur's position vacillated over time, and to 
win over Defence Department support for a peace treaty, in June 1950 
MacArthur dropped his calls for neutrality, and agreed to an alliance, US 
bases, industrial reconstruction, and other measures, which Schaller argues 
implied „rebuilding at least modest armed forces‟.65 Indeed MacArthur, in late 
1949 discussions with Sebald, also said that the creation of a constabulary 
could be discussed during peace negotiations.66 Indeed for his time as SCAP, 
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MacArthur remained opposed to an army and favourable towards a 
constabulary, with the exception of a very brief period in which he supported 
the militarization of the NPR after the Chinese intervention in Korea.67  
 
The final group Sugita identifies are those he believes favoured rearmament 
with some qualifications although a more effective designation here would be 
those who favoured establishing an internal security constabulary force. As 
noted above, this division would have included many who Sugita depicts as 
pro-rearmament such as Kennan and Bradley as well as some labelled as 
anti-rearmament including MacArthur after June 1950. A figure which Sugita 
places in his third category, who fits perfectly in the constabulary bracket, is 
Harry F. Kern, journalist and head of an influential lobby group, the American 
Council on Japan (ACJ). In a policy paper for the ACJ, Kern argued explicitly 
for the need for „a well-armed and well-trained constabulary of at least 
150,000 men . . . entrusted with guarding tunnels bridges and similar 
installations‟ to protect against internal revolutionary sabotage, with recourse 
to rearmament only as a last resort, and then only under heavy US 
supervision. 68  This quotation again reinforces the largely internal threat 
communism was perceived to pose to Japan in the minds of many Americans 
and Japanese. 
 
Most other historians also falter in their analysis of US attitudes due to the 
inadequacy of their definitions of rearmament. A prominent example is John 
Dower, perhaps the most influential scholar of the Occupation working in 
English. In his principal work on the Cold War and the Occupation of Japan, 
Dower argues that: „The Pentagon and the State Department fell into a 
quarrel over policy toward Japan which was not resolved until September 
1950, although both sides were in general agreement before then on the 
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necessity of Japanese rearmament‟.69 Dower‟s argument is undermined by 
his inaccurate appreciation of the meaning of „rearmament‟ to the 
policymakers involved and his inclusion of US bases in his conception of 
Japanese rearmament.70 This is erroneous as the US bases were not owned 
by the Japanese state and that as they had effectively existed from the start 
of the Occupation the Japanese state was never actually disarmed under this 
definition. Also, as Dingman, Drifte and Welfield note, no consensus was 
reached by this stage and if anything was gaining acceptance, it was the 
creation of an internal security constabulary, not rearmament.71 In addition to 
the sources cited above, numerous others can be called upon to support this 
argument. For example, a late 1949 memorandum explaining the State 
Department‟s position to the Department of Defense contains the following 
statements: 
 
The purpose of this memorandum is to provide the Department of 
Defense . . . [with] some of the reasons why the Department of State 
does not regard it as feasible in the [peace] treaty to authorise the 
reactivation of Japanese armed forces. It is assumed . . . that Japan 
should be permitted to maintain a well equipped constabulary, 
including a coast guard, for the purpose of preserving internal order. 72 
 
                                                             
69
 J. Dower, „Occupied Japan and the Cold War in Asia‟, In J Dower, Japan in War and 
Peace, Essays on History, Race and Culture, Harper Collins, London, 1995, pp 180-181.  
70
 J. Dower, Empire and Aftermath, Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-
1954, Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University Press, London, 1988, pp 377, 400. 
Ironically, Dower shares the orthodox historian Dunn‟s definition of rearmament by including 
US bases. F.S. Dunn, Peace-Making and the Settlement with Japan, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1963, pp 78-80. 
71
 R. Drifte, The Security Factor in Japan’s Foreign Policy, 1945-52, Saltire Press, 
Brighton,1983, pp 46, 101; J. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, Japan in the Postwar American 
Alliance System, The Athlone Press, London, 1988, p 72; R. Dingman, „The U.S. Navy and 
the Cold War: The Japan Case‟, in C.L. Symonds (ed), New Aspects of Naval History, Naval 
Institute Press, Annapolis, 1981, p 302.  
72




Clearly this quotation illustrates the fact that, unlike the Defence Department, 
which largely supported rearmament, the State Department, whilst supporting 
the creation of an internal security constabulary, opposed rearmament for 
political reasons. The quotation also reveals that at the time, the creation of a 
paramilitary internal security constabulary was not considered to be 
rearmament, another distinction which Dower ignores. This demonstrates that 
by using definitions of „rearmament‟ and the „constabulary‟ which match the 
meanings used and understood at the time, a more accurate analysis of 
American attitudes is generated. The model of three groups, those in favour 
of rearmament, those opposed, and those in favour of a constabulary, 
provides the most effective depiction of the diverse and shifting range of 
opinion amongst policymakers. 
 
As mentioned above, these three conflicting groups did not really reconcile 
their differences before June 1950 or even afterwards. The necessity of 
speedily providing support for the faltering South Korean Army and the 
imperative of maintaining internal security against the perceived threat from 
the JCP, finally forced MacArthur‟s hand into opting for the latter group and 
prompting the creation of the NPR in August 1950.  
 
 
US Constabularies Before the NPR 
 
If the early Cold War context provided the impetus behind the designs for 
strengthening the security forces in Japan and if these designs were debated 
between several competing groups, the eventual design adopted, the NPR, 
was, at least in part, influenced by the historical antecedents of the NPR. 
There were a number of other contemporary paramilitary constabulary forces 
highly familiar to many of the American military officers and civilians involved 
in the struggle over Japanese rearmament. The principal forces which 
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provided a model for the NPR were the US Constabulary, the Philippines 
Constabulary (PC) and the Korean Constabulary (KC), also sometimes called 
the Korean National Police Reserve.  
 
The only Europe based American constabulary to influence the NPR was the 
US Constabulary.73 This force was a highly mobile and lightly armed unit of 
the US forces occupying Germany and Austria and served as a third tier force, 
operating between the civil police and US tactical troops. The force was 
designed to fulfil a range of internal security functions considered too 
dangerous for the civil police, but too small or police-like for the US regular 
forces, ranging from riot control and conducting large raids on organised 
crime, to use in suppressing insurgencies.74 Davis sums up this role well in 
stating that the US Constabulary was „designed to take quick and effective 
action to forestall and suppress riots, rebellion and other acts prejudicial to 
the security of the occupation forces‟.75 The US Constabulary, like the NPR, 
was organised in a constabulary structure, stationed in company size units 
throughout the US occupation zones, and principally concentrated near major 
population centres.76 The range of missions the constabulary was designed 
to fulfil was reflected in its broad array of equipment, which included 
motorcycles and horses for rural patrols, light aircraft for monitoring borders 
and the movement of refugees, and small numbers of light tanks, designed to 
be used to help quell rebellions or serious riots.77 
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Despite its similarities in organisation and mission to the other constabularies, 
the US constabulary had a major difference: it was staffed exclusively by 
American soldiers. The idea of using US officers and NCOs to lead German 
men was the original conception for the force, but through a series of debates 
within the US Army in late 1945, the idea was rejected due to its political 
ramifications.78 It was during this debate that General Marshall contacted 
MacArthur, his counterpart in the Far East, and a man plagued by the same 
pressing political and public demands for speedy demobilisation of much of 
his garrison.79 Marshall asked MacArthur for his thoughts on the idea of 
constabularies for Japan and Korea, staffed by US officers and with 
Japanese and Korean rank and file. 80  The following day, seemingly 
impressed by his idea, Marshall also asked Eisenhower for his opinion on 
adapting the plan for Germany. Eisenhower replied that he thought the plan 
was applicable to their theatre, but with appropriate adjustments to the local 
political situation. 81  The Generals in Europe eventually decided that this 
prohibited the employment of Germans in the force, principally on the 
grounds that the move could prove a propaganda disaster if the Soviets 
accused them of recreating the German army. This decision prompted the 
creation of an all American constabulary. 82  MacArthur also allowed the 
creation of an all Korean constabulary force but rejected the idea for Japan, 
until 1950 when changed circumstances required the resurrection of this idea, 
and the creation of the NPR. 
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Alongside this direct link, the middle and lower tiers of the US military also 
contributed to the passing of the knowledge of the constabulary model to 
Japan before 1950. As numerous officers had served in the US Constabulary 
the concept of a constabulary used to bolster the internal security of states 
facing internal and external communist pressure must have been familiar to 
many of them. The movement and social contact between American military 
officers must also have brought the idea to Japan before the establishment of 
the NPR in July 1950. Furthermore, The Small Wars Manual a widely read 
1940 US military publication on war and reconstruction operations contained 
almost an entire chapter on the creation, organisation and training of 
constabularies, and recommended their creation as a standard operating 
procedure in US occupied countries. 83  However, despite the possible 
influence of developments in Europe on the idea of creating a constabulary 
force for Japan, there were two other forces much closer at hand and far 
more prominent in the minds of American military officers in the Far East: the 
Korean and the Philippines constabularies.  
 
The Philippines constabulary (PC) (also briefly known in the postwar period 
as the Military Police Command) was the original model of all American 
constabularies. The force‟s character, almost identical to that of the NPR, 
was defined in 1955 by Thomas as follows: „The Philippine constabulary is a 
semi-military organization which functions as a national police force. It is 
equipped and trained to handle insurrections, mass disturbances, and large 
scale banditry. It is not trained for crime detection, traffic control, and other 
every day aspects of regular police work‟.84  
 
                                                             
83
 United States Marine Corps, Chapter XII „Armed Native Organisations‟, Small Wars 
Manual, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1940. 
84
 M.L. Thomas, „Philippine Police Systems‟, The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and 
Police Science, Vol. 46, No. 1, May-Jun 1955, p 116. 
119 
 
The PC was officially set up on 8 August 1901 by the US military in an 
attempt to win popular support amongst a disaffected Filipino population.85 
The actual creation of the PC was preceded by a number of units of Filipino 
police set up by General Elwell Otis in 1899, who believed their potential 
usefulness lay in their knowledge of the archipelago‟s culture, language and 
terrain and their potential to free up US soldiers for battle against the ongoing 
insurgency.86 Despite these potential benefits, Arthur MacArthur (father of 
Douglas), then military governor of the Philippines, doubted the loyalty of the 
islanders and vehemently opposed the establishment of the PC, principally 
on security grounds: „MacArthur was unalterably opposed to creating a 
Filipino constabulary that would be equal in size to several U.S. Regiments 
and armed in comparable fashion and to placing that constabulary under the 
[Philippine] commission‟s control‟.87 However, after a bruising and bitter battle 
between MacArthur and his civilian counterparts the General relented. In 
December 1900, under heavy pressure from the civilian Philippine 
commission and its head, Taft, MacArthur assented to a massive expansion 
of the Filipino auxiliaries including the creation of the PC. The reasons cited 
for the creation of the PC were very similar to those Otis had used, with the 
supporters of the force claiming that native police would be useful as 
auxiliaries for the US troops, as guides, police, intelligence gatherers and as 
a means of denying manpower to the insurgents.88 As Silbey notes, the PC 
was:  
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A force whose members instinctively understood the culture and 
behaviour of those they were fighting because they were usually from 
the same ethnic group. Native police and soldiers also had access to 
contacts and intelligence from the community that Americans, 
hamstrung by their lack of language skills and their racism could not 
match. In addition, recruiting men of military age for these bodies and 
paying them a reasonable wage drained the pool of possible recruits 
for the insurgents.89 
 




Aside from its practical uses, like the later KC and NPR, the PC also had 
political value in various spheres. For example, Young speculates that the PC 
played more than one role in the struggle between MacArthur and the 
Commission. In Young‟s view, Taft pushed for the creation of the PC to 
circumvent the power and influence of MacArthur and the US military, as he 
knew that the PC would be directly under the control of the Philippine 
Commission.91 The original PC handbook of 1901 and manual of 1922 both 
assert this civilian control of the PC, rendering it distinct from the US military 
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command structure. 92  Furthermore, as a local force manned largely by 
Filipinos, but acting in support of the government, the PC helped to 
undermine the racial and nationalist propaganda used by the guerrillas, from 
which they won much of their support.93 The internal role of the PC was also 
identical to its successors in Korea and Japan: „The object was a national, 
paramilitary force with primary responsibility for internal security and law 
enforcement‟, with the American armed forces responsible for external 
security.94 The constabulary character of the PC is confirmed through an 
examination of its original handbook, which illustrates its semi-military uniform, 
use of modified US Army drill and quasi-military legal position, subject to 
elements of both military and civil law.95 The PC also used a number of police 
techniques when performing its duties including surveillance, tracking, the 
use of disguises and of plain clothes officers.96  
 
In fulfilling this internal security role the PC was employed against the rising 
waves of rural unrest in the Philippines in the 1930s, was used by the 
occupying Japanese against guerrillas during the Pacific War, against the 
Huk guerrillas after the war and numerous riots, risings, bandit groups and 
other perceived threats to the state.97 Like the later KC and Republic of Korea 
Army, but unlike the NPR, the PC had a political role in suppressing dissent 
and perceived opponents of the ruling regime. This repressive function 
sometimes resulted in atrocities such the Bud Dajo and Mount Bangsak 
massacres and the widespread brutality against the Huk rebels in the early 
1950s. The PC were also involved other odious practices such as 
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extrajudicial detention and executions; instances of torture and numerous 
other human rights abuses.98 
 
In terms of structure and function the PC was stationed in small units 
throughout the country, and was charged with the responsibilities of 
controlling the population and maintaining peace and order. The training 
manual issued to the PC defined their role as follows: „Members of the 
constabulary are peace officers authorised and empowered to prevent and 
suppress brigandage, unlawful assemblies, riots, insurrections and other 
breaches of the peace and violations of the law‟. 99  The PC was also 
responsible for the training of the civil police, although in practice this training 
was mainly in military drill, skills not really useful for regular civil police work. 
Illustrative of its role as an internal security force, the PC had wide-ranging 
powers in relation to the civil police. When local police forces could not or 
would not deal with problems the PC could step in and assume control of the 
situation. To fulfil this role the PC had jurisdiction throughout the Philippines 
and could enter any area or city without permission of the local forces. The 
PC could assume direct control of any police unit at the request of local 
officials, senior PC members or the president, a power often abused for 
political purposes in later years.  
 
These extensive and intrusive powers often created friction, particularly 
between the PC and the more powerful civil police units. Chief amongst these 
was the Manila police department with which the PC came close to armed 
conflict on several occasions, most notably during the 1953 elections.100  
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The PC had limitations in its susceptibility to political influence, its brutality 
and the fact that the paramilitary character of its training made it unsuited to 
standard police work. Thomas argued that the PC was inadequate in some of 
its functions, as the training it provided to the Philippines police was of poor 
quality and it was unsuited for police work, noting that „the extremely military 
character of the constabulary qualifies that organisation only for the function 
of discouraging, or if need be crushing, insurrections and large scale 
banditry‟.101 This internal security role was the key mission of the PC, just like 
the KC and NPR which followed it, and any shortcomings the PC might have 
had in the civil policing arena were outweighed by its usefulness as internal 
security force. This fact is evidenced by its survival until 1991 (when it 
merged with the Integrated National Police to form the Philippine National 
Police) and its use by the US as a model for future constabulary forces, in the 
1910s to 1930s in Nicaragua, Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Panama.102  
 
Perhaps the most influential model for both the organisation and evolution of 
the NPR can be found in the Korean constabulary (KC), also sometimes 
called the Korean Police Reserve or by the name of its American advisory 
body, KMAG (US Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea). The 
geographical proximity and role of MacArthur in overseeing both South Korea 
and Japan make it certain that knowledge of the KC existed in the minds of 
those later involved in the creation of the NPR. MacArthur, the man ultimately 
responsible for the creation of the NPR, clearly had a deep knowledge of both 
the main forerunners of the NPR, a knowledge which was shared by many of 
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his subordinates. MacArthur‟s father was directly involved in the creation of 
the PC and MacArthur himself served for years in the Philippines alongside, 
and in command of, the PC, both before and during the Second World 
War.103 In his position as Commander in Chief of US forces in the Far East 
(CINCFE), MacArthur also oversaw both the occupations of Japan and South 
Korea and thus was involved in creating, and overseeing the operations of, 
the KC. 104  These facts alongside the evidence of the 2 October 1945 
Marshall letter, and MacArthur‟s later comparisons of the NPR and KC‟s 
constabulary nature, clearly show that MacArthur knew the model well.105 The 
transfer of the constabulary concept from the Philippines via Korea and 
Germany to Japan is also noted by some Japanese historians.106 A good 
example can be found in the multivolume work Nihon Dōjidaishi (Japanese 
Contemporary History) by the Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai (History Studies 
Society). The argument presented in this work asserts that the concept of the 
constabulary or „police reserve‟ was created by the Americans in their 
colonies and occupied nations in the early postwar period. The authors argue 
that the NPR and its precursors in the Philippines and Korea were set up as 
expeditious and economical adjuncts to US control in the territories. All were 
comprised of citizens of the state in which they served and were established 
during conflict to assist the US forces within the country by providing internal 
security. None of the police reserves were armed with tanks and heavy 
weapons and were designed to fight as light infantry only armed with rifles 
and carbines, although heavier weapons were adopted if the constabularies 
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evolved to take on an external security role.107 Despite some inaccuracies, for 
example the PC was established in 1901 and not in the postwar period, and 
the neglect of the influence of the US constabulary, the argument presented 
in the work is compelling and describes the transfer of the constabulary 
concept faithfully.  
 
As well as confirming the transfer of the constabulary concept, the KC was 
the second main antecedent of the NPR, and the closest one in terms of 
geography, time frame and organisational connections. The key factor in the 
background to the establishment of the KC was the disruption and unrest in 
South Korea in the aftermath of the Second World War. The rapid collapse of 
Japanese colonial rule, the ensuing chaos and poor American planning led to 
widespread lawlessness in southern Korea. This situation and the absence of 
any unified Korean political leadership led to the creation of a myriad of 
political groups, many with their own private militias.108 The increase in crime 
in the wake of defeat and the battles between these private armies created 
conditions which overwhelmed the Korean National Police (KNP).109 Much 
like the decentralised police in Japan, the KNP struggled to maintain order in 
the face of serious crime, unrest and corruption.110 The KNP had lost all its 
Japanese officers, was poorly equipped and motivated and American tactical 
troops had to accompany its officers on even the most simple patrols and 
activities. The KNP was likewise unable to cope with the internecine battles 
between the political parties‟ private armies and the simultaneous waves of 
strikes, demonstrations and sabotage. This weakness made them almost 
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entirely reliant on US soldiers for support in all but the most benign 
situations.111 As Millet notes, the need for a constabulary was pressing:  
 
So pervasive was theft, robbery, property destruction, and 
racketeering that in December 1945, Hodge received permission to 
form a second force, the „police reserve‟ or Korean constabulary, 
initially planned for 25,000 and trained as a mobile provincial force 
(nine regiments, one for each province) capable of quick reaction to 
mob violence or guerrilla attacks on KNP substations.112 
 
To make matters worse the KNP were widely despised amongst the general 
population with most officers having served in the hated Japanese colonial 
police. The KNP‟s wages were also so meagre that officers were often forced 
into systematic corruption and theft. This conduct earned the KNP a 
reputation for „nepotism, corruption, arrogance, brutality and theft‟.113 This 
popular hatred often escalated into violence, with the KNP and their families 
often being the target of guerrillas and civil disorder.114 In the face of such 
difficulties the KNP clearly needed support and with the US tactical troops 
likely to be withdrawn in the future a Korean force able to support the KNP in 
maintaining internal security was required.  
 
Despite General Hodge‟s consistent desire for an army, political constraints 
and the effect the establishment of an army would have on negotiations with 
the Soviet Union over the future of Korea, along with pressing internal 
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security problems, resulted in the creation of the KC.115 MacArthur, Hodge‟s 
superior had also resisted the creation of a Korean army, thinking it beyond 
his mandate, and opting for a constabulary instead.116 
 
The KC was thus created „to assist civilian police agencies in the 
maintenance of civil peace and security and the defence of the rights of the 
people against civil disorder‟. 117  Like the NPR and the PC, the KC 
strengthened the internal security of the government it served, both physically 
and politically. The KC gradually freed US forces from the potentially 
embarrassing and increasingly dangerous encounters with the Korean 
population, and deflecting nationalist attacks, and Korean and international 
accusations of imperialism.  
 
The KC was also intended to help defuse the arms race between the political 
parties‟ private armies by inducting their members into the KC. This 
recruitment across the political spectrum coupled with Hodge‟s decision not 
to allow vetting of recruits on political grounds, and the refusal of the KNP to 
do any investigation of its own, led to the establishment of large communist 
cells in many of the KC‟s regiments (see table IV below) and the eventual 
mutiny and rebellion of these same units.118  The refusal of the KNP to 
cooperate in the recruitment and screening of recruits of the KC was just one 
aspect of the bitter and often violent rivalry between the two organisations. 
The KNP saw the KC as a threat to its existence and pretentions to become 
the core of the future armed forces of Korea. The preferential treatment of the 
KNP in terms of having first access to arms and equipment further enhanced 
this delusion. With the expansion of the KC and its assumption, often without 
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authorisation, of many regular police powers, units found themselves in direct 
professional and social competition with surrounding KNP units for local 
favours, patronage and supplies from the Americans.119 The Leftwing politics 
of some of the units of the KC were also unacceptable to the reactionary KNP 
and the members of both forces often harassed, arrested, intimidated and 
physically assaulted each other both on and off duty.120 The most serious of 
these early clashes between the forces occurred in June 1947 in the town of 
Yongnam in southwest Korea. After the arrest of one of their number by the 
KNP, a whole KC company attacked a KNP police station to free their 
comrade, the ensuing gun battle left three dead, with the fighting only 
subsiding when the KC unit ran out of ammunition.121 Despite the waves of 
terrorism, murder and mob violence which forced them to grudgingly 
cooperate, the rivalry between the KNP and KC/Republic of Korea Army 
(ROKA) persisted even after the North Korean invasion of 1950.122 
 
Despite the Leftwing politics of some of its units, the KC was created as a 
weapon of the state and was used as such against many perceived and 
actual opponents of the regime. Although the force did officially eliminate the 
numerous political private armies which had mushroomed after the Japanese 
surrender, it effectively replaced them with a single private army in the hands 
of the Rightwing Rhee government. From 1948 to the official outbreak of the 
Korean War in 1950 the government proceeded to use the KC, alongside the 
KNP, against dissent and groups it considered a threat in what Millet and 
others have described as a brutal, undeclared South Korean „civil war‟.123 
These activities often comprised of genuine and necessary internal security 
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missions but also included the torture and arbitrary detention and execution 
of individuals judged, often without justification, to be threats to the regime.124 
This period represented a cycle of brutal violence and reprisals in which, as 
Merrill notes: „Atrocities were committed by both sides, the guerrilla as well as 
government forces were often indiscriminate in their use of violence‟. 125 
Although Merrill is correct in arguing that both sides were often equally 
appalling in their behaviour, and despite the complicating difficulties in 
distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants in the civilian figures, 
the death toll of 7,235 security personnel compared to the estimates of 
30,000 to 100,000 civilian deaths, seems to suggest the violence may have 
been somewhat one-sided.126 
 
The KC was officially established on 15 January 1946, the same date that all 
political paramilitary groups in southern Korea were formally abolished.127 
Recruitment began and applicants were accepted after filling in a 
questionnaire, having a medical examination and a brief interview with a US 
officer.128 With the US emphasis on the selection of „experienced‟ recruits, the 
character of the KC was coloured by the cultures of the foreign militaries of 
which many of the recruits were formerly members. Despite a few recruits 
coming from the former Nationalist Chinese army, Korean anti-Japanese 
guerrilla groups, and some being refugees from north of the 38th parallel, the 
overwhelming majority had served in the Japanese military. That the bias 
towards the „experienced‟ resulted in the selection of overwhelming numbers 
of veterans from the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and Imperial Manchukuo 
Army (IMA) is revealed by the fact that of the first 110 officers, 108 had IJA or 
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IMA backgrounds.129 This large number of recruits with a Japanese military 
background inevitably influenced the methods and ethos of the KC.  
 
The Japanese influence was further compounded by the tiny number of US 
advisors assigned to each KC unit; there were ten in total for the entire force 
by 1948, with some supervising several regiments, often hundreds of miles 
apart.130 Without adequate supervision, the former IJA and IMA officers and 
men reverted to many of their former methods and practices including 
corruption, the wearing of riding boots, the carrying of riding crops and 
swords, the routine brutalisation of their men, and the adoption of obsolete 
tactics such as „banzai‟ charges. 131  Some of these practices did prove 
effective in expediting the basic training of the KC but their brutality sparked 
many of the grievances both inside and outside the force which later flared 
into rebellion, encouraged the mistreatment of prisoners and civilians, and 
their anachronistic nature contributed to their lacklustre performance against 
the North Korean People‟s Army (NKPA) in June 1950.  
 
The KC was deployed throughout South Korea and its units were both 
recruited and based in the same region. A regiment was created for each 
province and local recruitment and local ties both made the KC more 
susceptible to infiltration but paradoxically more effective in defending their 
region. The local, dispersed deployment of the KC, with strength often 
concentrated in areas of domestic communist strength, was identical in 
concept to that of the NPR and shows the internal security role of both 
organisations. 132  As the KC evolved into the South Korean Army and 
assumed more external security responsibilities, if not the capabilities to fulfil 
them, the posture of the force was correspondingly adjusted, with many units 
being redeployed to the 38th parallel, South Korea‟s only land frontier.  
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Like the NPR would be, the KC was trained to fit the internal security role 
assigned to it. Weapons training did take place but the primary focus, 
especially in the early stages, as with the NPR, was riot control, public order 
training and internal security duties.133 As the South Korean official history 
states, „training focused on the maintenance of public security, and 
emphasised bayonet drills, rifle-handling exercises and riot control. It had little 
to do with combat training‟, a description, if deprived of its bayonet drill, which 
also accurately describes the training of the NPR.134  
 
Despite the collapse of the South Korean Army in 1950, the KC/ROKA 
achieved some successes in the internal security missions for which it was 
created in during the South Korean civil war of 1948-1950, battling guerrillas, 
rebels, mutineers and rioters, and in some cases brutality suppressing 
legitimate and peaceful civilian protest.135 Indeed, much like Frank Kowalski 
(a senior figure in the creation of the NPR) in his vigorous pronouncements 
on the NPR‟s efficacy, prior to its downfall in June 1950 many of those 
involved in the creation of the KC (and Republic of Korea Army) championed 
it as a highly effective fighting force.136 South Korean President Rhee claimed 
that the ROKA was „fully capable of meeting any challenge from the Soviet 
supported North Korean People‟s Army‟.137 Also of note are the words of the 
head of the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG), Brigadier General 
William L. Roberts given in an interview for TIME magazine just before the 
outbreak of war, which stated that he believed that the South Korean Army 
was „the best doggoned shooting Army outside the United States‟.138 William 
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Sebald, a senior political advisor to SCAP, also noted this „nauseating‟ 
overconfidence amongst US Army officers in the quality of the South Korean 
troops, men whom he felt had started to believe their own propaganda.139 
The virtual destruction of the ROKA at the hands of the NKPA proved the 
hollowness of these claims. 
 
Like the NPR, the role the KC played was that of an internal security 
constabulary acting in support of the civil police. As Cumings makes clear, 
„instead of training a force that could defend South Korea‟s borders, the 
Americans emphasised techniques of riot suppression. The Occupation 
feared internal disorder and viewed the constabulary as an essential police 
reserve‟. 140 Again identically to the NPR, in critical public order situations 
where the KNP could not cope, the KC would take up the role previously 
played by US tactical troops, acting as a mobile reserve, armed more heavily 
than the police but not to the extent of an army. These situations could be 
riots, demonstrations, sabotage incidents, insurrections, rebellions, minor 
border clashes or counter-guerrilla operations. In common with the other 
constabularies and the NPR, and unlike an Army, the KC was bound to the 
territory of the state it served and performed an internal security role, with the 
state‟s external security supposedly guaranteed by the United States. In 
addition to its active internal security duties, like the other constabularies, the 
KC had a passive or deterrent role in guarding key installations, infrastructure 
and government buildings against sabotage and attack.141 
 
The KC was initially equipped with captured Japanese infantry weapons, 
mainly the type 99 and 38 rifles and a few light machine guns. Over time 
some advisors to the KC took advantage of their units‟ geographical proximity 
to US bases to familiarise them with US weaponry and equipment. As US 
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units gradually withdrew from the Korean peninsula they left behind much of 
their equipment, which was inherited by the KC, the notable exception being 
the US tanks and artillery which left with the US forces.142 However, again 
like the NPR, much of the equipment the KC acquired was outmoded and 
indicative of its internal security role.143 The adoption of the entirely obsolete 
57mm anti-tank gun and 2.36 inch „bazooka‟, as well as the absence of anti-
aircraft artillery and any armour other than virtually unarmed light halftracks 
designed to move materials and men, further illustrate this point.144 When the 
ROKA did finally acquire some field artillery it was again obsolete and the 
crews were hardly trained to operate it prior to the outbreak of war in June 
1950.145 Like the NPR the heavy reliance by the KC on light weapons such as 
the M1 carbine (see figure V) is also indicative of the role assigned to the 
organisations. With an effective range and calibre far inferior to that of all 
comparable frontline infantry small arms, the use of this weapon 
demonstrates that the KC and NPR were not intended for (at least as long as 
they were armed with this weapon) frontline external security duties. As 
Ridgeway later noted, „the ROK forces were essentially equipped and 
prepared for internal security and many of them found no way of fighting the 
disciplined [North Korean] hordes that fanned out grimly through the 
countryside‟.146 Aside from the role assigned to the KC and the inability of the 
Republic of Korea‟s economy to support a more heavily armed security force, 
further factors limited the equipment given to the KC/ROKA. These included 
concerns about the ability of Korea‟s bridges and infrastructure to support 
armour and, in a move reminiscent of the strategy of double containment, 
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concerns stoked by private and public comments made by Rhee that he 
might use heavier weapons to attack the North.147  
 





An element of the KC that GHQ sought to avoid in the NPR was infiltration of 
communists into the force and the rebellions, mutinies and mass desertions 
which resulted.149 Due to the scant co-operation between the KNP and the 
unwillingness of the US forces to screen recruits, the KC was heavily 
infiltrated by communist agents and cells.150 The local recruitment of the KC 
regiments also contributed to the problem. The activities of the cells varied 
from covert support of local guerrilla units through to outright mutiny and 
rebellion. The two principal examples of the unreliability and infiltration of the 
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KC were the Cheju and Yosu rebellions. On Cheju, in the face of deeply 
entrenched resistance to the brutal rule of Rightist governor trying to 
eliminate all moderate opposition, KC units were involved in a number of 
incidents, including murdering their officers, purposefully avoiding and 
supporting the insurgents, and wholesale rebellion.151 In the Yosu rebellion 
(see figure VI) an entire regiment due to be sent to Cheju mutinied and linked 
up with local communists and elements of two other KC regiments to capture 
the towns of Yosu and Sunchon on the southern coast of Korea.152 Other KC 
units eventually brutally suppressed the rebellion and a large scale purge of 
the KC followed. However, the incidents continued, with a mutiny in the 6 th 
Regiment in November 1948 and the defection of most of the 8th Regiment to 
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Heavily Infiltrated  
1
st
 15/1/46 T‟aenung  
2
nd
 28/2/46 Taejon  
3
rd
 26/2/46 Iri  
4
th
 15/2/46 Kwangsan 




 29/1/46 Pusan 




 18/2/46 Taegu Yes. 11/48 small mutiny 
7
th
 7/2/46 Ch‟ongju  
8
th
 1/4/46 Ch‟unch,on 
Yes. 4/5/49 2 battalions cross 38
th
 
Parallel and join NKPA. 
9
th
 16/11/46 Mosul‟po (Cheju) 
Yes. Elements defect to guerrillas 
and assist rebels on Cheju. 
10
th
 1/5/48 Kangnung  
11
th
 4/5/48 Suwon  
12
th
 1/5/48 Kunsan  
13
th
 4/5/48 Onyang  
14
th
 4/5/48 Yosu Yes. Mutinies-Yosu Rebellion. 
15
th
 4/5/48 Masan Yes. 
 
The Cheju and Yosu rebellions, events judged by Millet to signify the 
beginning of a civil war in South Korea, also saw widespread atrocities 
committed by both sides.155 On Cheju government forces killed somewhere 
between 18,000 and 60,000 civilians and destroyed between a third and a 
half of all dwellings on the island. 156  The Yosu- Sunchon rebellion saw 
reprisals against the government and their supporters with at least 1,700 KNP, 
community leaders, rightist paramilitaries, their families and others executed, 
often with horrific levels of brutality.157 These incidents also prompted tens of 
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thousands of civilians to flee the area, becoming internally displaced within 
South Korea or escaping across the Tsushima Strait to Japan.158 
 




With the withdrawal by June 1949 of all the United States troops, except the 
US Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG) and an Army 
regimental combat team, and the ongoing drift towards separation of the two 
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Korean regimes, the KC‟s role began to change.160 With the departure of the 
US forces and their transfer to the KC of much of their hardware (less artillery 
and armour), the character and responsibilities of the KC began to expand 
into providing external security. Another step towards the transformation of 
the KC into an external security force was taken with the establishment of the 
Republic of Korea and the creation of the Republic of Korea Army on 15 
August 1948.161 In 1950 the South Korean Army consisted of eight divisions, 
and two separate regiments, of which four divisions and one regiment were 
stationed on the 38th parallel.162 The KC became an army in name but its 
duties and character did not alter overnight and it remained, despite its name 
change, a lightly armed force equipped and designed to deal with internal 
rather than external security. The shift of the ROKA to external security duties 
despite being underequipped and largely untrained to do so, particularly in 
the face of the highly mechanised and heavily armed Northern forces, largely 
accounts for its crushing defeat in mid-1950. 
 
The Korean War and the Birth of the NPR 
 
The final and most significant short-term international influence on the 
creation of the NPR was the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950. 
However, as is demonstrated throughout this work, numerous other 
processes influenced the creation of the NPR, and to argue, as some 
historians and official reports do, that the Korean War was the only cause of 
the creation of the NPR is to oversimplify the origins of the force.163 Recent 
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scholarship on the NPR has moved away from this position somewhat, with 
Weste, for example, citing the influence of the Cold War and the foundation of 
the PRC alongside the Korean War as major causes behind the creation of 
the NPR.164 Nevertheless, the outbreak of the Korean War and the collapse 
of the Republic of Korea Army which necessitated the dispatch of the 
American garrison in Japan to Korea was the immediate catalyst which 
prompted the creation of the NPR and hence deserves special attention in 
any study aiming to examine the origins and character of the force.  
 
The exact date upon which MacArthur decided to create a constabulary-type 
force for Japan is difficult to say, but it certainly occurred in the last week of 
June 1950.165 Maeda argues that MacArthur came up with the idea for the 
NPR on his brief visit to the collapsing Korean frontline on 28 June.166 This 
date could well be the point at which MacArthur decided on creating the NPR 
but he had been aware of the concept of a constabulary for many years, as 
noted above. It seems highly likely that the idea for the NPR was formed 
through MacArthur reflecting on his service in command of the PC in the 
Philippines, the Japanese constabulary force suggested in the 2 October 
1945 message from General Marshall, and his and his father‟s reluctant role 
overseeing the establishment of the KC and PC, respectively.167 Masuda 
argues that NSC 13/2 also influenced MacArthur at this point, with the 
strengthening of the internal security forces which it advocated forming a 
useful political and practical fallback position in the face of the North Korean 
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advance. 168  Using his knowledge of the constabulary model, MacArthur 
decided to create a force along those lines for Japan, which would allow him 
to commit the US tactical troops at his disposal in a last-ditch defence of 
South Korea.  
 
The decision to create the NPR must have proved something of a bitter pill to 
swallow for MacArthur, who Welfield argues, had been, to this point, „the 
most enthusiastic American exponent of unarmed neutrality [for Japan]‟.169 
MacArthur was reluctant to create the NPR but even more reluctant to have it 
become an army. 170  Indeed, this position is shown through his later 
opposition to the use of former Imperial officers in the force, to the massive 
expansion of the NPR called for by the Department of the Army, and his 
support of Yoshida‟s efforts to resist Dulles‟ demands for rearmament.171 
 
After MacArthur had made the decision to create the NPR, the process of 
initial planning for the force got under way. The planning was done by a 
group set up specifically for the purpose, consisting of A.P. Fox (SCAP 
Deputy Chief of Staff), Edwin K. Wright (head of G3) and Charles Willoughby 
(head of G2). The group, which was given the nondescript moniker „Ad Hoc 
Committee, GHQ/FEC‟ produced an initial plan for the creation of the NPR on 
6 July 1950 which went through several revisions over the following days, 
with the final version, entitled Increase in Japanese Security Agencies, being 
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completed on 10 July.172 This plan was the framework which later formed the 
basis for much of the actual NPR. For example, these plans contained the 
idea of using the National Rural Police facilities and personnel for recruitment 
and initial training and had a distinct emphasis on producing a usable force a 
speedily as possible, stating: „training and organisation from inception should 
be so formed and conducted as to permit immediate commitment of 
personnel in case of emergency‟.173 The plan also contained the choice of the 
M1 carbine as the principal armament of the NPR. The possibility of using 
available IJA arms for the force was considered but this was rejected as too 
politically risky by the planners.174 
 
These early plans also settled the size of the NPR. The size of the units was 
decided upon by taking the mid-point between the Imperial Japanese Army 
(IJA) battalion which numbered just over 1,000, men and the US battalion, 
which had slightly fewer. The plan envisaged 15,000 strong division style 
units based in the same military region system used by the IJA and the US 
Occupation forces, a system considered by the planners be „highly desirable 
for reasons of overall security‟, including its focus on internal security. The 
overall size of the force, 75,000 men, was decided upon due to two factors: 
the number roughly corresponded to the number of US troops leaving Japan 
for Korea, and, added to the 30,000 National Rural Police and 95,000 
Municipal Police, the additional 75,000 of the NPR totalled 200,000 men the 
maximum number of police permitted by the Occupation.175 
 
                                                             
172
 YF-A4, Far East, US Army Forces and Eight United States Army Military History Section, 
History of the National Police Reserve of Japan, July 1950- April 1952, 1955, Reel 14, p 43, 
Hereafter History of the National Police Reserve. 
173
 Ad Hoc Committee, GHQ/FEC, „Increase in Japanese Security Agencies‟, 10/7/50, printed 
in, Ōkurashō Zaiseishi Shitsuhen, Showa Zaiseishi, pp 256-258, 260, Hereafter, „Increase in 
Japanese Security Agencies‟, 10/7/50. 
174
Ibid, p 260. 
175
 Ibid, p 259; YF-A16, 1B-48, Webster to Adjutant General Department of Army, „Report on 
the Japanese National Police Reserve‟, 22/12/51, p 3. 
142 
 
Although the committee agreed much of what would become the reality of the 
NPR, some issues were heavily debated, particularly the position of the NPR 
and its relation to the National Rural Police. Initially it was decided to name 
the force the „National Rural Police Reserve‟ and have it be part of the 
National Rural Police.176 This position was abandoned at some point during 7 
or 8 July due to Willoughby‟s militarist designs for the force, its size (more 
than double that of the National Rural Police), the fact that it was to be under 
the Prime Minister‟s direct control, and its internal security role, all of which 
did not fit comfortably within the National Rural Police.177 The name „National 
Rural Police Reserve‟ was also used on a draft of the 8 July MacArthur letter, 
and despite the abandonment of the idea, the NPR retained strong ties with 
the National Rural Police.178  
 
As well as this idea to create a constabulary under the aegis of the National 
Rural Police, other large portions of these early plans did not survive in the 
actual NPR. Much of what was dropped from these plans were the hawkish 
designs of the committee which produced them. For example, that 
Willoughby sought an army from the start, staffed with his former IJA 
associates is clear through clauses in the plan stating that it would be „highly 
desirable that the NPR be officered by ex military personnel‟.179 The 10 July 
plan aimed to seek out suitable officers using the Japanese Demobilisation 
Bureau (a process which would have seen the introduction of many 
Rightwing officers as it was largely staffed by Willoughby‟s cronies) and did 
not even rule out the use of purged ultra-nationalists: „the employment of any 
questionable personality in this organisation should be permitted only upon 
the recommendation of the assistant chief of staff G-2‟.180 As the person 
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ultimately recommending these men would have been Willoughby, and 
judging by his future backing of Rightwingers for the leadership of the NPR, it 
seems certain that some highly „questionable‟ individuals would have made 
their way into the force.181 The plan also envisaged an even greater role for 
Willoughby‟s G2, with its Public Safety Division (PSD) running the force. This 
role was ultimately given to Civil Affairs Section (CAS) and in prising the 
control of the force from Willoughby‟s grip, the possibility of a return of the IJA 
was averted. The plans also reflected Shepard and Willoughby‟s desire for 
rearmament resulting in a fully equipped army, including tanks and 
howitzers.182 The fact that MacArthur and Yoshida resisted these plans as 
long as they were able illustrates that despite the planning of some hawks in 
GHQ, the concrete form of the NPR was not set in stone by this initial 
documents.183  
 
A final aspect of this preliminary planning undertaken by Willoughby and the 
committee was the intention to use the entire NPR project as a „cover plan‟ 
under which a new Japanese army could be created.184 As the plan of 10 July 
states: „any increase in Japanese government forces for any stated purpose, 
may be construed as military, or quasi military forces, will have internal as 
well as external implications and therefore must be instituted under a cover 
plan‟.185 The „cover plan‟ envisaged the use of Willoughby‟s G2 to oversee 
the force as it quickly became a heavily armed army staffed with IJA/IJN 
veterans specifically sourced by the Demobilisation Bureau, and hence, by 
Willoughby himself. 186  The „cover plan‟, which represented Willoughby‟s 
vision for the NPR as a transitional stage in the resurrection of the IJA, was 
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never realised, and lasted just a few days before being entirely rejected, 
despite his best efforts. 187  Willoughby‟s failure was the result of direct 
opposition from MacArthur and Yoshida, both of whom sought only an 
internal security force and abhorred the return of the Japanese army and the 
needless expense and political risk such a move represented.188 With regard 
to the NPR being a military from the start, as Dower argues, it is clear that 
even Willoughby realised that this was politically impossible, as evidenced 
through his rejection of the immediate issuing of clearly military former IJA 
weaponry to the NPR.189 The subject of the cover plan also reveals the 
inaccuracies in some of the other histories of the period. For example, the 
official US history of the force argues that Yoshida knew of the „cover plan‟ 
and agreed with the creation of a full military from the start, an obvious 
inaccuracy, shown through the initial Japanese government confusion over 
the nature of the NPR and the subsequent staunch opposition of the Prime 
Minister and his subordinates to the militarization of the force. 190  The 
presence of this „cover plan‟ coupled with the views of Frank Kowalski, a 
senior member of CAS, prompt many historians such as Dower, Ōtake and 
Takemae to conclude that the NPR was a military force from the start.191 
However, closer examination of the events occurring after the creation of the 
NPR and the character of the force do not support this argument. 
 
MacArthur informed the Japanese government of his intention to create the 
NPR through a letter to Yoshida on 8 July. 192  The letter made explicit 
reference to the internal security role of the NPR, stating that the Japanese 
police force needed to be „adequate to the maintenance of internal security 
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and order‟ and that the NPR would act in support of the civil police in 
maintaining that security and order. MacArthur was keen not to undermine or 
criticise the police reforms he and GHQ had pursued up to that point, 
claiming, oxymoronically, that the success of decentralisation necessitated 
the bolstering of the civil police with the NPR. Thinly veiled references to 
Korea and the threat of the JCP were also present in the letter, with 
MacArthur stating that „Japan stands out with a calmness and serenity which 
lends emphasis to the violence, confusion and disorder which exist in other 
nearby lands‟, and that: 
 
To insure that this favourable condition [relative domestic tranquillity] 
will continue unchallenged by lawless minorities [the JCP], here as 
elsewhere committed to the subversion of the due process of law and 
assaults of opportunity against the public welfare, I believe that the 
police system has reached that degree of efficiency in organisation 
and training which will permit its augmentation to a strength which will 
bring it within the limits experience has shown to be essential to the 
safeguard of the public welfare in a democratic society.193  
 
The letter created much confusion within a Japanese Cabinet caught in the 
midst of a reshuffle, not least over its wording which „authorized‟ the 
Japanese government to create the NPR, rather than taking the form of a 
direct order or instruction. 194  Most historians including Chai, Dower, the 
Harries, Maeda, Ōtake, Takemae, Welfield and Weste, view the letter, 
despite its content, as a direct order from MacArthur, forced upon a reluctant 
Yoshida.195 
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Indeed Yoshida himself, in his first major speech on the NPR in the Diet 
stated that the letter was an „order‟ rather than an authorisation, although this, 
alongside the measures taken by GHQ detailed below, were part of a ploy 
aimed at minimising the influence of the Diet on the force, through putting the 
organisation and control of the NPR beyond its reach.196 Furthermore, the 
closer examination of the context of the NPR conducted in the preceding 
chapter has revealed that far from being a reluctant „victim‟ of the whims of 
MacArthur and GHQ, the Japanese government were highly enthusiastic 
supporters of an internal security constabulary and hence a direct order was 
unnecessary, as was noted by Whitney at the time.197 Moreover, as Samuels 
and Mikuriya note, Yoshida privately admitted he was happy to create the 
force, and hence did not require „orders‟ from SCAP.198 In fact, an initial draft 
of the 8 July letter took the form of a directive but once the negative 
implications of such a move had been realised MacArthur selected the less 
formal form of a letter.199  
 
Furthermore, the argument presented by some of the historians cited above 
seems something of a paradox. The central theme of almost all recent 
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scholarship on the Occupation has been an effort to give greater weight to 
Japanese influence on policy and move the Japanese people and 
government away from the role of a passive recipient or „victim‟ of US 
policy.200 This approach seems not to extend to the discussion of the creation 
of the NPR where many historians seem more focused on criticising the US 
and portraying the Japanese as being forced to comply, rather than on 
illustrating the Japanese influence on the policy and their genuine support for 
the creation of the NPR. 
 
The letter was followed several weeks later with a Cabinet order based upon 
the SCAP‟s supra-constitutional authority.201 This measure was not a formal 
SCAP directive (SCAPIN) but a Cabinet order implementing „instructions‟ 
from SCAP. 202  As under the 1947 constitution Cabinet orders could be 
promulgated without consulting the Diet where they did not enact laws, this 
measure avoided both the Diet and the need for a formal SCAP directive.203 
This compromise itself shows the Cabinet‟s desire for the force as if they had 
opposed the move they could have refused to act and forced MacArthur to 
issue a SCAPIN, bypassing them entirely. 
 
Nevertheless, as the Cabinet order bypassed the Diet, it is another factor 
used by some of the above historians to criticise the creation of the NPR as 
an unlawful and unconstitutional move forced upon the Japanese. However, 
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more powerful ordinances such as SCAPINS which bypassed even the 
Cabinet, were far from uncommon and were used to implement many of the 
democratising measures the same historians praise as the successes of the 
Occupation.204 The same historians also fail to recognise that the NPR was 
created to defend the Japanese state and hence the liberal reforms instituted 
by SCAP in the face of Soviet backed JCP violence and so could be argued 
to have protected rather than undermined the constitution. Furthermore, 
despite the use of a Cabinet order invoking SCAP‟s authority, MacArthur and 
Whitney did not chose to avoid the Diet over fears that the measure would fail 
to pass into law as this was never in doubt due to the situation in Korea and 
Yoshida's Diet majority.205 The concern on the part of MacArthur and Whitney 
was that the Diet process would seriously delay the creation of a force which 
could be urgently required (especially if South Korea collapsed, as seemed 
very likely at the time), and that Diet and public debates would have given the 
JCP and USSR a huge propaganda opportunity and chances to interfere in 
the project.206 
 
In spite of the confusion which followed the creation of the NPR, Yoshida 
strongly supported the development of a capable internal security force whilst 
opposing „rearmament‟, a phrase taken by him, and this study, to mean the 
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resurrection of the Japanese military.207 In pursuance of this goal and in order 
to deflect criticism or charges of rearming Japan, Yoshida and his Cabinet 
consistently maintained in all public and private statements that the NPR was 
to be an internal security constabulary and not the nucleus of a future 
military.208 This policy began in earnest with Yoshida‟s first major speech to 
the Diet on the subject of the NPR on 14 July 1950 during which he argued 
that US action in Korea had effectively guaranteed the external security of 
Japan, hence implying that an externally focused military was unnecessary, 
undesirable, and that the NPR had been created solely to „maintain the 
internal peace and order of Japan‟.209 
 
Although these statements did receive some criticism in the Diet, the voices 
of some of the largest opposition parties were largely silent, mostly in support 
of the NPR programme but also because several of them had been 
effectively silenced by GHQ. 210  Justin Williams, the Parliamentary and 
Political Division Chief of Government Section (GS) and future Occupation 
historian, visited Asanuma Inejiro, secretary of the Socialist Party 
(assassinated in 1960) and Tomabechi Gizo, chair of the National Democratic 
Party on the morning of 12 July. Williams explained to the senior politicians 
that the detailed matters pertaining to the establishment of the NPR would be 
laid out in an Occupation directive and therefore the Diet would not discuss 
them, as this could be construed as opposing the Occupation. Both men 
agreed and in a final comment, often sidelined or ignored by historians critical 
of the NPR, the Diet members said that they were relieved that the issue had 
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been removed from the Diet‟s jurisdiction as they had not relished the idea of 
a political battles over NPR‟s control and form, and the chaos it could have 
created both inside and outside the Japanese parliament.211 It could also be 
argued that through this agreement not to make trouble, the men also tacitly 
approved of the project or at least did not oppose it strongly enough to invoke 
the wrath of GHQ. Furthermore, despite the criticism this move attracts from 
some historians, even harsher measures had often been employed in the 
earlier years to institute most of the measures the same historians praise as 
positive outcomes of the Occupation.212 
 
In the face of the seemingly imminent collapse of South Korea and an 
increasingly violent communist party, a large number of Diet members 
supported the Cabinet‟s position and the NPR, not least for the internal 
security benefits the force would provide. The enthusiasm the Japanese 
government held for the internal security boost the NPR represented is also 
evidenced through plans made for a large counterintelligence corps for the 
NPR. Masuhara Keikichi, the civilian Director General of the NPR, and former 
policeman, along with other senior Cabinet colleagues, planned to create a 
large intelligence arm aimed at hunting down underground JCP members and 
other subversives. To finance this and a huge slush fund for bankrolling 
informants, a secret allocation of ¥100 million was planned for by Finance 
Minister Ikdea.213 However, Whitney became aware of these plans in the first 
days of the existence of the NPR and swiftly passed the word to Masuhara 
that SCAP would not permit the recreation of a „secret police‟, or the creation 
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of any secret informer system.214 Thus the Japanese plans for a large internal 
security intelligence component of the NPR were thwarted, although the 
subsequent and sizable expansions of the Special Investigation Bureau (SIB) 
and its successor, the Public Security Investigation Agency (PSIA) gave the 
Japanese government what it sought in terms of domestic intelligence 
capability.215 Also of note is the clearly internal security, police-type function 
the Japanese sought for the NPR in this effort; few armies have a large 
domestic network of paid informers as they are useless in almost all non-





In seeking to contribute to the overall goal of producing the first complete 
picture of the NPR, this chapter has revealed the international factors behind 
the creation of the NPR and has examined the constabulary model as an 
influence on the origins of the NPR. The chapter highlighted the fact that 
Japan‟s security, particularly its internal security, gradually became a serious 
concern amongst US policymakers, directly influencing global Cold War 
strategy. Also explored were the debates which surrounded American 
attitudes to the future of Japan‟s security forces and the three groups (pro-
rearmament, anti-rearmament and constabulary) which failed to reach a 
consensus by 1950 despite helping to inform MacArthur‟s eventual decision 
to create the NPR. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 catalysed 
these processes and prompted MacArthur‟s final decision to create the NPR. 
MacArthur fell back on an idea suggested to him by Marshall in 1945, his 
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memories of the Philippines Constabulary, and experience overseeing the 
Korean Constabulary, and created a Japanese constabulary. The creation of 
the NPR also gave the Japanese what they sought, an effective centrally 
directed internal security force. In contrast to the arguments used by many, 
this chapter has shown that the Japanese government neither required nor 
received an „order‟ to create the NPR, but simply treated the authorisation to 
do so as an order for reasons of political expediency. 
 
The chapter also examined the organisational antecedents of the NPR and 
their character as internal security constabularies. Through examination of 
these predecessors of the NPR it was also possible to reveal that rather than 
an anomalous exception or sophist‟s ruse manufactured to conceal 
rearmament, constabularies were common in the time of the NPR.216 In Asia, 
North and South Korea, the USSR, the PRC and the Philippines, all had 
paramilitary police forces, as did almost all the European colonies in 
Southeast Asia. If anything, constabulary forces such as the NPR, a third tier 
of security force, situated between the civil police and the army, were the 
accepted norm in Asia, not the exception. This chapter has also illustrated 
that political, material and financial issues; the constabulary model; and the 
perceived need to address internal security concerns, defined the 
constabularies examined. Political compromise played a part in the 
development of the PC, KC and NPR with various actors such as local elites, 
the US military and State Department (in the case of the KC and NPR) 
arguing over rearmament, with a constabulary force selected as a 
compromise on all occasions.217  
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In spite of these similarities between the PC, KC and NPR in structure, 
internal security role and other factors, there was one area of operations in 
which the NPR did not mimic its predecessors. The NPR was never involved 
in the suppression of peaceful dissent or the type of state sponsored violence 
and brutality perpetrated by the KC and PC.218 Of course, as the NPR was 
never actually used in its original role the chance for such incidents to occur 
never presented itself. Nevertheless, even if such chance had presented itself, 
and in spite of plans for internment of communists in the case of a major 
uprising, factors such as: the planned supervision by US advisors of any NPR 
operation, the stress on „democratic‟ and non-authoritarian methods in the 
training of the NPR, and other influences such as the relatively free position 
of the Japanese press, would have almost certainly prevented misconduct by 
the NPR in any but the most desperate circumstances.219 Furthermore, the 
NPR, unlike its predecessors, served a democratic government run by men 
such as Yoshida, and elected by a population, of which many had had 
personal experience of the brutality of a police state and were determined to 
prevent its reappearance. Indeed, in Yoshida's case this concern was a 
central reason behind his later efforts to prevent the militarisation of the NPR 
and the induction of former Imperial veterans into its upper ranks.220   
 
A final point to note is that the constabularies which survived did so where 
they were seen to be required. In general, it seems that where states 
perceived or encountered serious threats to their internal security such as 
fears of infiltration and instability or actual insurgencies (the Philippines), 
constabularies survived. In the case of other states, where the internal 
security threat fizzled out, as in Japan with the damp squib of the JCP 
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guerrilla campaign, the forces developed to meet the other security 
requirements of their state, which were usually of an external security 
nature.221  
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Chapter Three: The Organisational 
Character of the NPR 
 
 
This chapter fulfils the second primary aim of this study by examining the 
nature and organisation of the NPR including its structure, posture, 
training, capabilities and internal security role and is the first to do so 
based on original primary research. The chapter is largely devoted to this 
aim and in doing so reveals the constabulary character of the force. The 
chapter demonstrates that elements of its internal security role, logistical 
and supply, training, deployments and links with the civil police all display 
this paramilitary character. 
 
The chapter also contributes to the first main aim of the study through 
demonstrating some of the Japanese influences on the force. In particular, 
this chapter looks at the attempts by Rightwing elements in GHQ and the 
former Imperial Japanese armed forces to take control of the force. The 
influence of the Japanese state and particularly the civil police on the force 
is also explored and these analyses expose further partially explored 
areas of the history of the NPR. This effort also demonstrates the efforts 
which MacArthur and the Japanese government made to preserve the 
NPR‟s constabulary character and contributes to the aim of many third 
generation scholars, in seeking to broaden the awareness of the 





Following the creation of the NPR on 8 July 1950 a recruiting programme 
was swiftly drawn up and advertisements for the force appeared on radio, 
in newspapers and in poster form.1 The force, with its attractive terms of 
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 For the standard poster used to advertise the NPR see: Figure XVIII. „NPR Recruitment 
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service, generous pay and substantial superannuity attracted many 
applicants. Following the serious debate over the best way to attract 
suitable candidates this was something of a success.2 So successful in 
fact that even application forms ran out several times over and generated 
lengthy queues at the police stations from which they were issued.3 The 
recruitment selection process which took place from 23 August to 12 
October was a vast undertaking.4 Of the 382,003 applicants (roughly 5 per 
place), 325,715 were screened and examined at eighteen recruitment 
centres throughout Japan, most of which were regional National Rural 
Police headquarters. 81,949 applicants passed the initial medical, 
interview and police checks and of these, 74,580 were inducted into the 
police reserve. 5  Their backgrounds varied, with previous occupations 
including carpenters, chauffeurs, civil servants, clerks, factory workers, 
farmers, fishermen, labourers, merchants, students and technicians.6 The 
greatest number, around 40%, were agricultural workers, a fact confirmed 
by the almost even spread of recruitment across Japan (see figure VIII), 
with the combined numbers coming from the rural and sparely populated 
Hokkaido and Tohoku almost equalling those from Tokyo. The importance 
rural areas held in providing recruits is also evidenced through the timing 
of a supplementary recruitment campaign which was planned for July 
1951, a date determined by the end of the rice planting season.7 Just over 
half of the recruits had also seen some service in the Imperial Japanese 
Army (IJA) or Navy (IJN) (see figure VII). However, this is unsurprising as 
almost all of Japan‟s male population over the age of twenty four would 
have been part of the Imperial Japanese armed forces in some capacity.8 
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Figure VII. Military Experience of Initial NPR Recruits9 
 
 
Figure VIII. Geographic Source of Initial NPR Recruits10 
 
 
In a demonstration of one of the police-type elements of the character of 
the force, the rules on those eligible for recruitment meant that many 
                                                             
9
 Based on charts found in, Fig.IX, U.S. Army Center of Military History Historical 
Manuscripts Collection: The Korean War, (YF-A4), Far East, US Army Forces and Eight 
United States Army Military History Section, History of the National Police Reserve of 
Japan, July 1950- April 1952, 1955, Reel 14. Hereafter History of the National Police 
Reserve.  
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 Based on Charts found in, fig. IX, History of the National Police Reserve. 
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barred from applying would have been acceptable in most armies of the 
world. Persons ineligible for service included those deemed „incompetent‟, 
those convicted of serious criminal offences, dismissed by disciplinary 
decision in the previous two years, and members of political parties „which 
advocate the overthrow by force of the constitution of Japan or the 
government existing there under‟, i.e. the JCP.11 Interestingly, and most 
indicative of the constabulary/police-type character of the force, criminality 
was a bar to recruitment, a situation which was not the case in IJA and 
most other armies. Moreover, in some countries during this period, notably 
the United States, criminals were forced to serve in the military as an 
alternative to imprisonment, with many of these convict-soldiers fighting at 
the time in Korea. Even Japan itself had employed those with criminal 
backgrounds in the IJA/IJN during the Pacific War, albeit in desperate 
circumstances. Nevertheless, these restrictions did not deter those with 
criminal histories from applying to the NPR, and during the recruitment 
process just less than 14,000 criminals were discovered and 
disqualified.12 
 
Following their selection from the pool of applicants, the successful 
candidates arrived on 23 August at six regional National Rural Police 
schools for initial induction.13 This use of National Rural Police personnel 
and facilities for the initial training and processing of the NPR recruits, 
instead of the similarly available alternatives of using US or IJA bases and 
instructors, again demonstrates the close connections between the two 
forces and the constabulary character of the NPR. After arrival, the 
recruits spent the following five days being processed and inducted into 
the force. The recruits were issued with what was available in the way of 
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 Economic and Scientific Section (ESS) (D) 13267, Enforcement Ordinance of National 
Police Reserve Order (Cabinet Order no. 271), 24/8/50. For more on the role of the NRP 
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uniforms and equipment, were given the necessary vaccinations, had their 
personal and service records prepared, were assigned to 200 man 
companies and elected temporary officers from within their ranks.14 This 
„democratic‟ and meritocratic method of selection of NCOs and officers is 
a further indication that the character of the NPR was closer to that of a 
police force than that of an army. Moreover, for the majority of the life of 
the NPR, in a system identical to a police force, all recruits joined at the 
lowest rank (Patrolman Second Class, see table V below for the full rank 
structure of the NPR) and had to work their way up through the ranks 
through being suitably qualified and through competitive examinations.15 
 
Table V. Rank Structure of the NPR16 
 
Senior Superintendant 
Assistant Senior Superintendant 
Superintendant 1st Class 
Superintendant 2nd Class 
Senior Inspector 
Inspector 1st Class 
Inspector 2nd Class 
Sergeant 1st Class 
Sergeant 2nd Class 
Sergeant 3rd Class 
Senior Patrolman 
Patrolman 1st Class 
Patrolman 2nd Class 
 
 
After completing their initial induction into the force two National Rural 
Policemen were assigned to each 200 man unit and went with them to 
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 G2 4777, Pulliam to Willoughby, 20/11/50. 
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their regional training centres. 17  These National Rural Police officers 
oversaw the initial weeks of training and acted as temporary leaders of the 
NPR units. The National Rural Police also provided most of the senior 
leadership of the force, at first on a loan basis and then through formal 
transfers. The finance section of National Rural Police made all contracts 
and procurements for the manufacture and supply of uniforms, bedding, 
canteens, equipment, logistics, transport, and food for the NPR, spending 
a total of ¥2.5 billion during the initial recruiting period. 18  These 
connections further underline the close links between the two forces and 
the paramilitary police character of the NPR. 
 
The initial recruiting programme, despite falling slightly behind schedule, 
was a resounding success, with just over 74,000 men being inducted, 
processed, dispatched to training centres and partially organised and 
equipped, all in three months.19 Two further public recruitment campaigns 
were undertaken by the authorities in order to keep the personnel of the 
force at full strength, the first from 13 to 16 December 1950 adding 419 
new men and the second from 10 July to 10 August 1951, recruiting 
8,463.20  
 
Training and Examinations 
 
Once inducted and assigned to their units the NPR recruits began their 
basic training. This lasted for thirteen weeks until 13 January 1951.21 
Training was conducted on the basis of a 48 hour week (six days of eight 
hours). The recruits rose at 5:30 am and trained until 5 pm, with breaks for 
breakfast and lunch, being allowed the evenings and all day Sunday as 
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free time.22 From the start the emphasis of the training programme was on 
producing a force usable for internal security duties as fast as possible. 
The 10 July plan sums up this aim well in stating: „training and 
organisation from inception should be so formed and conducted as to 
permit immediate commitment of personnel in case of emergency‟.23 This 
emphasis on the speedy development of a usable force is evident from the 
content of the training programme, with all the training in the use of the 
carbine taking place in week one (see table VI).  
 
Table VI. Thirteen Week Basic Training Programme in Order of 
Emphasis24 
 
Subject Hours % Notes 
Riot Training and Field 
Formations 129 20.7 
More hours per week than any other subject 
Guard Duty 90 14.4  
Physical Training 84 13.5  
Dismounted Drill 72 11.5 
With and without weapons, squad, platoon and 
company drill. Ceremonies.  
Road Marches 60 9.6  
Carbine 48 7.7 
All in week one, provided instant readiness, mostly 
theoretical. If available, 3 hours (1/16 of training time) 
of shooting practice was to be spent on a 1000” 
range. 
Inspections 48 7.7  
Scouting and Patrol, 
Cover and 
Concealment 
34 5.4  
Field Fortifications 24 3.8  
First Aid and 
Sanitation 
9 1.4  
Equipment and 
Clothing Maintenance 
7 1.1  
Field Cooking 7 1.1  
Map Reading 7 1.1  
Intelligence Training 5 0.8 
Production of combat and police intelligence, handling 
of prisoners, civilians and repatriates. The processing 
of seized documents and property. Safeguarding 
information. 
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Table VI and Figure IX also reveal the internal security focus of the basic 
training of the NPR and other notable aspects of its character and role. 
Riot training took up the largest part of the course, forming the biggest 
overall portion of the training programme and taking up more hours per 
week than any other subject. When combined with guard duty, another 
internal security task, these elements took up more than one third of the 
total programme. Other elements such as road marches, scouting and 
patrol, cover and concealment all provided the recruits with skills they 
would need if deployed to counter an insurrection or serious domestic 
disturbance. The content of the subjects taught to the recruits also helps 
show this internal security character of the force. For example, the recruits 
were taught how to set up and maintain police observation posts and 
gather information; and during riot training, they were taught to segregate 
and apprehend riot leaders. The recruits were also taught how to 
safeguard intelligence and confidential information on NPR matters, being 
instructed not to discuss police matters in public or with non-police 
personnel.25 Guard duty training also included training in how to deal with 
scenarios typical of the internal security duties for which the NPR were 
designed, for example, the recruits were taught how to respond if 
approached by suspicious groups of men whilst on duty or what to do if a 
prisoner under their charge escaped.26 The official training programme did 
not include formal lessons on crime detection, although very similar 
material was included in the intelligence training course. Nevertheless, 
some training in this subject appears to have taken place, for example, 
NPR recruits were observed being taught criminal investigation techniques 
during a visit to an NPR camp by a Japanese journalist. These lessons 
were likely to have been given by the National Rural Policemen assigned 
to the NPR companies in the early stages of the programme.27 
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Following the completion of the basic training programme and the testing 
of the recruits on its content and their physical fitness (see below), the 
NPR small unit training programme began. The programme again lasted 
for thirteen weeks, from 15 January to 19 May 1951, although the intensity 
of the training diminished slightly, with the NPR's working week being cut 
by four hours, on a Saturday. The programme built on the subjects 
introduced in the basic training programme and introduced elementary 
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tactical training from squad up to company level.28 As shown in table VII 
the training was split into three parts, 576 hours taken by all, 216 hours of 
specialist courses for medical personnel and engineers and 216 hours for 
all who were not medics and engineers.29 
 
Table VII. Small Unit Training Programme: January to May 195130 
 
Part One- Universal 
Subject Hours % Notes 
Physical Training 108 18.8  
Dismounted Drill 108 18.8  
Carbine 80 13.9 All in last month. 
Riot and Field Formations 80 13.9 
1/3 at night. All in first two 
months. 
Interior Guard 36 6.3  
Inspections 36 6.3  
Equipment and Clothing 
Maintenance 
36 6.3  
Marches and Bivouacs 32 5.6  
Map Reading 24 4.2  
Field Firing 16 2.8 
All in last month. Includes 
range estimation. 
Communication 10 1.7  
Police Regulations 10 1.7  
Part Two- For Non-Medical/Engineer 
Subject Hours % Notes 
Squad Operations 110 50.9 10-12 men. 
Platoon Operations 58 26.9 40 men. 
Company Operations 32 14.8 200 men. 
Battalion Operations 16 7.4 989 men. 
 
 
As can be seen in table VII and figure X the small unit training programme 
contained many subjects already covered in basic training. Physical 
training amounted to one hour per day, which gradually increased in 
intensity, and included activities such as five mile jogs and athletic games 
which were varied to prevent boredom. „Dismounted Drill‟ mostly consisted 
of learning to march and „square bashing‟ in groups from squad to 
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battalion level, with an emphasis on smartness and precision. This was 
assessed through a minimum of five parades or reviews during the 
programme. The NPR men also had to pass weekly clothing, equipment 
and quarters inspections. 31 
 
The emphasis on internal security duties continued, with riot training and 
guard duty making up a significant proportion of the course. Guard duty 
included theoretical and „on the job training‟, with NPR men routinely 
guarding their own barracks and facilities by this time. Riot training 
continued and became more sophisticated, including night training and 
„operations of controlling riots . . . offensive action [against 
insurgents/rioters] in a small town or sections of cities, street fighting, 
house to house fighting, control of demonstrations and restoration of 
order‟.32 Several new subjects were introduced but made up only a small 
fraction of the curriculum. These new subjects included: „Communication‟, 
which taught the procedures and language to be used over the telephone 
and with messengers; „Marches and Bivouacs‟, which took place in the 
countryside in a variety of terrain and continued training in establishing 
roadblocks, security and field fortifications; and „Police Regulations‟ which 


























The second part of the small unit training programme saw the NPR divide 
and undergo separate training. Medical and engineering specialists 
undertook an additional 216 hours learning their trades while the 
remainder of the NPR began training in small unit operations. As is shown 
in table VIII the majority of the training was at squad level, some was done 
at platoon and company level, but relatively little at battalion level. The 
content of these training exercises again shows the internal security 
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mission of the force. Up to company level the training included internal 
security training as well as the use of guards, outposts, defensive 
roadblocks and barricades. As detailed in the programme description; at 
platoon level the emphasis was „on the platoon‟s role in quelling riots and 
other disturbances in cities and villages‟. 33  At company level the 
programme description states that the aim was to train in „the control of 
domestic disturbances to include crowd and mob tactics, offensive actions 
[against rioters or insurgents] in cities, protection of the transportation and 
utilities system, use of barricades, mopping up and the restoration of 
order‟.34 The two days of battalion training included two simple problems: 
attacking an organised position and the defence of an area. Clearly, the 
emphasis was on internal security duties, particularly those relating to the 
quelling of uprisings or serious riots and the restoration of internal order. 
 
Following the completion of the small unit training programme a further 
four, thirteen week phases of training were undertaken during the life of 
the NPR. The third phase beginning on 4 June 1951 aimed at maintaining 
individual efficiency and fitness and included more battalion level and 
specialized technical training. This phase saw the introduction of mortar 
training, although most of it was theoretical at this stage.35 The fourth 
phase training programme began 8 October 1951 and provided additional 
weapons and common subject training, battalion level exercises and a 
basic training programme identical to the first for the intake of new 
recruits.36 The fifth and sixth phases (4 February to 13 June 1952 and 23 
June to September 1952 respectively) took the training level up to 
regimental level and aimed at integrating the specialised units of the NPR 
into regimental level field exercises.37 With the departure of MacArthur in 
April 1951 and his earlier moves to increase the hardware of the NPR 
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during the Chinese intervention of winter 1950/1951 the training of the 
NPR took on some external security related content from the third phase 
onwards, but the emphasis of the training and mission of the force 
remained one of maintaining the internal security of the Japanese 
islands.38  
 
Scholars such as Dower and Takemae have sought to characterise the 
NPR as a military force due to it training with heavier weapons such as 
bazookas.39 These authors neglect the fact that whilst the NPR was a 
capable internal security force, (that being the focus of most of their 
training), the training they undertook with heavier arms was of very limited 
value for a number of reasons. The training with these was mostly 
theoretical and included little practical use of the weapons. Meagre 
supplies of ammunition and the paucity of suitable ranges made anything 
but demonstrations by US personnel difficult. This shortage of suitable 
training facilities was particularly marked in the areas required for the 
demonstration of heavy weapons such as „Known Distance Ranges‟, 
„Tactical Training Areas‟ and „Regimental Tactical Training Areas‟ (see 
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Table VIII. NPR Training Facilities, December 195141 
 
Type Size Use 







































































Debate also exists amongst many historians over the dates of introduction 
of certain equipment to the NPR, for example, training in 1951 was meant 
to introduce the 2.36” „bazooka‟ and .50 calibre heavy machinegun and 
historians like Kuzuhara record this as the point the NPR received these 
weapons.42 However, during this training period the weapons were not 
fired by the NPR and the training was entirely theoretical or 
demonstrative.43 The fact that useful and practical training with most of 
them did not really occur until very close to, or even after, the end of the 
life of the NPR is omitted by most historians, as is the fact that actual 
issue of the weapons to the NPR as standard equipment lagged far 
behind their introduction and demonstration during training. 
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A further factor which reduced the quality and value of the NPR's training 
was the absence of adequate translated equipment manuals. This made 
effective training very difficult and time consuming, particularly in the later 
stages of the life of the NPR and amongst the more technical units, such 
as the engineers. The problems of a shortage of manuals, equipment and 
facilities had a negative effect on the morale and readiness of many NPR 
units and contributed to the non-operational nature of virtually all of the 
NPR‟s service and technical units in the first year of their existence.44 A 
final significant problem in the training of the NPR, especially with heavy 
weapons, was the relatively limited number of US advisors. CAS(A) 
recognised the key need for effective advisory supervision if training was 
to be successful, as the US training programme notes: „the quality and 
thoroughness of the training is directly proportional to the amount of 
effective and personal supervision, rendered by supervisors and their 
staffs‟.45 Provision of effective amounts of supervision proved difficult, as, 
in similar circumstances to the Korean constabulary, the number of US 
advisory personnel, especially in the early stages of the NPR's existence, 
was inadequate for the task (see table IX). 46  The numbers actually 
available as advisors and trainers of the NPR were in reality even more 
limited as a large proportion of the military staff of CAS were stationed in 
its HQ and not actually in the field with the NPR. The shortage of qualified 
and experienced advisory personnel was especially keenly felt during the 
training with the unfamiliar American heavy armaments and within more 
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Table IX. Military Staff of CAS (A) 47 
 
Date Officers Men Ratio CAS(A) : NPR Notes 
August 1950 20 0 1:3750 1 per 2 NPR Regiments 
June 1951 178 217 1:190 1 per Company 
April 1952 322 599 1:81 1 per 2 Platoons 
 
That the training given to the NPR did not effectively prepare it for 
anything other than internal security duties was widely recognised by even 
the most pro-rearmament elements within GHQ and CAS(A). 48 In mid-
1951 even Ridgeway, MacArthur‟s more hawkish successor, remarked 
that: 
 
The NPRJ is capable of quelling internal disorders and may be 
considered operational through company size units, is limited by 
weapons and equipment that can be issued. At present the NPRJ is 
neither prepared nor are the units equipped for tactical employment 
in the event of an external attack against Japan [sic].49 
 
Another chapter of the history of the NPR which helps to reveal its 
constabulary character is its system of examinations and tests. As noted 
in the previous section, recruits were tested and examined medically, 
physically and for political orientation during the initial selection process. 
This initial phase of testing was the first rung on a ladder of competitive 
examinations to be ascended by ambitious members of the NPR.  
 
The basic training test undertaken in January 1951, at the end of the 
thirteen-week basic training programme, was the first test taken by all 
members of the NPR. Following the conclusion of the basic training 
programme, the NPR recruits were given a week to revise and improve 
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their physical fitness before taking a series of written and physical tests.50 
The multiple choice written tests examined the recruits‟ knowledge of the 
M1 carbine, riot and field formations, guard duty, scouting and patrolling, 
field fortification, first aid and sanitation, maintenance of clothing and 
equipment and military intelligence. The physical test consisted of five 
aerobic and muscular exercises (see table X). Unlike military basic training 
tests, which are generally highly demanding and designed to eliminate the 
weaker recruits, neither the physical nor written parts of the test were 
particularly taxing, the pass marks being 65% and 50% respectively. 
Furthermore, if the recruits were not up to standard in either field they 
were not expelled or even punished, with their trainers merely being 
advised to „take corrective action as deemed necessary‟.51 
 
Table X. Basic Training Physical Test, January 195152 
 
Exercise Pass Requirement 
Pull up 8 
Squat jump 34 
Push up 27 
Sit up 34 
300 yard run 51.2 seconds 
 
However, very few recruits failed to meet the required standard. For 
example, within the Third Regiment of the NPR, 2,336 men took the 
written test and all passed, 2,293 took the physical test, and 2,235 passed 
(97%).53 Those who failed were given extra tuition and physical training 
during the subsequent small unit training programme. Furthermore, in the 
interests of efficiency, maintaining physical fitness and reminding recruits 
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of the basics, the test was repeated in the last half of the small unit 
training programme.54 
 
The constabulary character of the NPR is also evident in the use of the 
tests for promotion purposes. In the interests of discipline and for 
traditional reasons most armies have strictly delineated divisions between 
officers and the non-commissioned ranks, with both being recruited 
separately and at different starting ranks. Transition between the two is 
rare and usually only undertaken on the basis of lengthy professional 
experience and proven leadership potential. The same is true, although 
not to so great an extent, of the division between senior NCO ranks such 
as sergeant and the rank-and-file enlisted man. In contrast, police forces, 
and most constabularies, recruit all their personnel at the same base rank. 
The recruits then participate in competitive examinations for promotion on 
the basis of merit. This police style method of promotion was the one used 
in the NPR. 55  
 
In December 1950 the first round of competitive examinations for the rank 
of sergeant were held within the NPR. The nationwide tests consisted of 
three parts; a written test weighted at 30%, which examined the 
candidates‟ initiative and adaptability; an interview also worth 30% which 
was structured to demonstrate the character and NPR service history of 
the applicant; and a recommendation by the candidate‟s officers, worth 
40%. Following the results of these competitive examinations a total of 
9,500 NPR men were promoted: 1,000 to Sergeant First Class, 2,500 to 
Sergeant Second Class and 6,000 to Sergeant Third Class. Those who 
failed the test were reminded that future opportunities would arise, and 
subsequent identical tests for promotion to sergeant took place over the 
following two years.56 
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NPR recruits could also take part in competitive examinations to become 
officers. To be eligible to apply to take the written and oral examinations 
the recruits required one of the following special abilities: experience in the 
medical or legal professions, in finance, communications, engineering or 
chemistry. The recruits could also qualify through having one of the 
following attributes: to be a university or high school graduate, to have 
served one year or more as a second class official in the civil service, to 
have been a policeman for one or more years at the rank of Inspector or 
above (a fact which shows the police connections of the NPR), to have 
been an officer in the IJA/IJN, or have qualifications or experience 
considered to be equivalent to the above.57 
 
A final police-type form of testing took place within the NPR. Like a police 
force, and unlike an army, the officers of the NPR were subjected to 
annual reviews of their performance. These reviews were designed to 
maintain morale and efficiency, and aimed at promoting the best officers 
and demoting or dismissing those deemed incapable or incompetent. This 
is a practice common in many civilian occupations but one generally 
absent from the military.58 
 
 
Deployment and Logistics 
 
One of the most obvious and easily recognisable indicators of the internal 
security character of the NPR, and one which is cited by Weinstein, 
Katzenstein and the Harries, is the spatial distribution or posture of the 
force.59 The common and valid argument made by these historians is that 
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the NPR was positioned throughout Japan in a pattern which was 
designed to speed the suppression of insurrection or unrest. As the 
Harries note, „the troops were mainly deployed to counter domestic unrest 
- in or near the major industrial areas which were the heartland of the 
Japanese Communist Party‟.60 As can be seen in figure XI the bases of 
the NPR were concentrated in the centres of population and industry 
situated in the Kansai and Kanto regions as opposed to being 
concentrated in Hokkaido, the island closest to the USSR, and the logical 
route for Soviet invasion. 
 
Moreover, as can be seen in figure XII the number of NPR men stationed 
in Hokkaido (just over 9,000) was roughly the same as the number in and 
around Osaka, and 20% less than the number in the Kanto region, 
including Tokyo (just under 12,000). This deployment of only around one 
tenth of the force to Hokkaido, clearly illustrates the NPR was not 
designed as an external security force, i.e. it would not willingly directly 
confront an invading force. In relation to the domestic threat to Hokkaido, 
serious communist-related incidents did occur on the island, but it was 
believed that the NPR were stationed there in sufficient numbers to deal 
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Figure XII. Deployment of NPR Tactical Elements 31/12/195163 
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A further event which supports and validates the argument that the NPR 
was not deployed or designed as an external security force was the 
movement south of 20% of the force in the closing months of 1950. The 
redeployment of over 15,000 men began in early November with the 
relocation by road of the 214 men of the 504th Engineer Construction 
Company from Camp Schimmelpfennig in Sendai to Camp Utsunomiya, 
near Tokyo. This move was followed on 13 November with the movement 
of 199 men from the 20th Regiment south down the sea of Japan coast 
from Camp Younghans in Yamagata to Camp Takada in Niigata.64 These 
moves were followed a month later by the movement south of the vast 
majority of units stationed in northern Honshu to new homes in Kanto and 
Kansai, near the major urban and industrial conurbations which held the 
vast majority of JCP supporters.65 This redeployment, as detailed below, 
in table XI, consisted of shifting of over a fifth of the NPR to the industrial 
and population centres during the period in which the UN forces were 
retreating south of Seoul. As this occurred during a period where there 
was a pressing threat to Japan‟s external security, it clearly demonstrates 
that the NPR was not intended to serve as an external security force as it 
was being moved away from the likely area of operations, rather than 
towards it.66 It could be argued that this movement south represented 
preparations to repel a possible incursion from Southern Korea, following 
the evacuation of the UN forces in the face of the Chinese advance during 
this period.67 However, the total Anglo-American Naval superiority in the 
Sea of Japan, the inadequacy of the communist naval forces and the fact 
that none of the forces were redeployed to Kyushu or southern Honshu, 
the logical places for an invasion, refute this theory.68 
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Table XI. NPR Redeployment, December 195069 
 
From To Numbers Direction 
Schimmelpfennig 
(Sendai) 








Utsunomiya (Nr Tokyo) 1338 South 
Schimmelpfennig 
(Sendai) 
Mastsumoto (Nagano) 859 South 





Lanier (Sendai) Takada (Niigata) 989 South 
Younghans (Yamagata) Toyokawa (Nr Nagoya) 989 South 
Younghans (Yamagata) Takada (Niigata) 394 South 
Younghans (Yamagata) Mastsumoto (Nagano) 1973 South 
Matsushima (Miyagi) Takada (Niigata) 1338 South 
Matsushima (Miyagi) Mastsumoto (Nagano) 805 South 
Total  15,092  
 
A comparison of the later adjustments in the deployment of the NPR is 
also useful in illustrating the beginnings of its transformation into the 
National Safety Force (NSF) in 1952.70 The NPR's deployment in late 
December 1951 (see figure XII) shows a force almost entirely consisting of 
„Infantry‟ with a smaller number of „Artillery‟ units (something of a 
misnomer as the NPR possessed nothing heavier than light mortars at this 
stage), and one Engineer battalion per region.71 The deployment of the 
force exactly three months later, as shown in figure XIII, shows the 
addition of a medical battalion in Kyushu (again distant from Hokkaido and 
the USSR),and a troop of „Armour‟ at Maizuru, a seaport in Kyoto 
prefecture (again this must have been a training formation as tanks were 
not issued for a further five months, after the establishment of the National 
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Safety Agency and during the period of transition to the National Safety 
Force).72 
 
Figure XIII. Deployment of NPR Tactical Elements, 31/3/5273 
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Figure XIII also shows the small increase of the numbers of NPR men 
stationed in Hokkaido, a movement which signified a slightly greater 
assumption of external security duties by the NSF.74 Documents show that 
Kowalski had planned to deploy an additional 35,000 men in Hokkaido if 
the US plans for a massive increase of the NSF had taken place.75 
However, even if the Japanese opposition to the expansion had proved 
unsuccessful it would have been difficult to house such a large number of 
troops there without a great deal of new construction as sufficient housing 
and facilities for 35,000 additional men did not exist, even in 1952.76 The 
US push for the assumption of a greater external security role and a 
correspondingly larger deployment of men and resources to Hokkaido was 
frustrated for decades after the end of the NPR. Despite a greater 
emphasis on external defence, as late as the mid-1970s only four of the 
thirteen Ground Self Defence Force (GSDF) divisions were stationed in 
Hokkaido, with the remaining nine stationed, like their NPR predecessors, 
close to the major urban and industrial centres, reflecting, as Weinstein 
claimed, that even in 1974 „the maintenance of internal security remains 
the basic mission [of the GSDF]‟.77 
 
A further trait of the internal security character of the NPR was its logistical 
dependence on the Occupation authorities. Due to a dearth of suitably 
experienced advisory personnel, equipment and training facilities; 
unfamiliar Japanese regulations and laws; and difficulties in training 
personnel, all of the technical and service units of the NPR were not 
operational in the first year of its existence.78 As much as possible of the 
equipment and supplies required by the force were procured from inside 
Japan, although by March 1952 only just over a third of the total 
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equipment was supplied from domestic sources. 79 Most notable amongst 
the numerous deficiencies of the logistical organisation of the NPR was 
the weakness of its supply system. A system of depots designed to be 
capable of storing supplies, as opposed to solely distributing them, was 
still only in the planning stages when the force became the NSF.80 As a 
result of these deficiencies in trained personnel and adequate facilities the 
amount of supplies held by each NPR region were quite limited and were 
prioritised in a manner which again testifies to the internal security 
character of the force. Hokkaido, northern Honshu and Kyushu, the areas 
which saw the greatest external threat, were provisioned for only thirty 
days of operations, whereas the central, more urbanised regions, such as 
Kanto, had ninety days worth of supplies.81 A force so reliant on the US for 
its logistics and one with such a dysfunctional supply system and meagre 
supplies was clearly incapable of participating independently in external 
security duties, especially for extended periods, and the concentration of 
supplies (and troops) in the central, more densely populated areas, 
confirms the internal security mission of the NPR.  
 
 
The Capabilities of the NPR  
 
The capabilities of the NPR also help to show its constabulary character. 
These were of a light, constabulary nature for almost all of the life of the 
NPR, and certainly for the duration of the Occupation. Some heavier arms 
did find their way into the hands of the NPR but this mostly occurred 
during the period of transition to the NSF between 1 August 1952 (the 
establishment of the National Safety Agency) and 15 October 1952 (the 
official inauguration parade of the NSF). 
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The principal weapon of the NPR throughout its existence was the 
American M1 carbine (see figure XIV). The carbine was a short weapon, 
just less than three feet long and was designed for use by second-line 
soldiers such as officers, drivers, cooks, clerks, and others who did not 
fight on the front line but, in an emergency, might need a weapon more 
capable than a pistol.82 The weapon was the most produced personal 
weapon of the Second World War with over 6.3 million being 
manufactured and the carbine proved popular, being handy, light and easy 
to use. However this lightness and small size required the employment of 
a smaller pistol size bullet (see figure XV). This, when compared to any 
contemporary rifle, was deficient in range, stopping power and accuracy at 
anything other than short ranges of around one hundred yards. Clearly, 
the NPR, exclusively armed with carbines, would have been at a literally 
fatal disadvantage if it had faced opponents armed with rifles, a fact which 
illustrates that the NPR was not designed for use in frontline external 
security operations. A further supporting point which also helps to 
strengthen the case that the NPR was a constabulary is the wide use of 
the M1 carbine by constabulary, paramilitary and civil police forces around 
the world to this day. Most notable of these in the British Isles was the 
Royal Ulster Constabulary, which extensively employed the M1 for most of 
the postwar period, instead of a full size rifle, due to its light weight and 
less lethal and correspondingly „safer‟, smaller ammunition.83 
 
Figure XIV. M1 Carbine84 
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A force entirely armed with the M1 Carbine was clearly unsuitable for 
external security duties and a more suitable choice, if the NPR had been 
designed for these duties, would have been given the standard US rifle of 
the period, the M1 „Garand‟. This rifle was used by both the US Army and 
many of its allies, including the South Korean Army. A study was actually 
conducted by CAS at the end of July 1951 investigating whether this 
heavy and cumbersome weapon was suitable for issue to the NPR. In the 
study, a group of one hundred NPR men, who represented a cross-section 
of sizes and builds of the men in the force, practised firing and took a ten 
mile cross-country march with the weapon. Despite complaining about the 
excessive weight of the rifle the NPR men coped well, helping the US 
advisory staff conclude that it was suitable for Japanese use. However, 
the M1 Garand only began to be issued in late 1951 and typified the 
gradual increase in assumption of external security duties which 
accompanied the transformation into the NSF.86  
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Alongside the M1 carbine the NPR also used a number of support 
weapons. The heaviest weapon possessed by the NPR for all but the final 
four months of its existence was the American 60mm mortar. This weapon, 
which was not universally issued until 20 June 1951, had a maximum 
range of 1,985 yards and fired a range of 3lb shells, the most common 
being smoke or high explosive.87 This mortar was supplemented in the 
first quarter of 1952 with a number of 81mm mortars which had a 
maximum range of 3,290 yards and a 6.87lb shell.88 Both of the mortars 
used by the NPR were outranged by the standard Soviet 82mm mortar 
which had a maximum reach of 3,391 yards (around two miles) and a 
heavier 7.4lb shell. 89 In addition to being outclassed by the Soviet mortar, 
the NPR had no artillery at all for the vast majority of its existence, a 
deficiency even greater than that faced by the South Korean Army 
(ROKA) in June 1950 against the North Korean People‟s Army (NKPA).90 
 
Under American pressure the NPR also added some anti-tank armament 
to its armoury. It could be argued that the presence of these weapons 
support the argument that the NPR was an army from the start, however, 
a closer examination of the equipment issued challenges that 
oversimplified argument. The main anti-tank weapon given to the NPR 
was the 2.36” rocket launcher, commonly known as the „bazooka‟. This 
weapon was only issued in very limited numbers to the NPR initially and 
was entirely obsolete as an anti-tank weapon by the time the NPR 
received it in full.91 As with much of the NPR‟s equipment its unsuitability 
for external security duties had been clearly demonstrated in June 1950 
when, in the hands of the Republic of Korea Army, it proved incapable of 
penetrating the armour of the T-34 tanks of the NKPA.92 Aside from its 
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obsolescent nature relegating it to second line or internal security use, the 
2.36” bazooka had a number of other uses besides its original anti-tank 
role which indicate its potential usefulness in the kind of operations the 
NPR was envisaged to conduct. These included use against pill boxes or 
fixed defences, removal of obstacles or barbed wire, demolition of walls or 
buildings, use against area targets, the clearance of minefields or booby 
traps and a multitude of other uses. 93  Towards the very end of its 
existence, during the post August 1952 period of transition to the NSF, in 
the third quarter of fiscal year 1952, the NPR was issued a number of 
more effective 75mm recoilless rifles (although even these were of 
questionable value against Soviet tanks) and the 3.5” „super bazooka‟, 
although this was only used in limited numbers and in largely theoretical 
training before the creation of the NSF.94 
 
A further type of equipment that the NPR received in its final, transitional 
sixth phase training programme (June to September 1952) was artillery. 
The main piece of artillery issued to the NPR was the M2A1 105mm 
howitzer, a weapon still in use today with the US Army and many other 
forces. 154 of these guns were issued to the NPR/NSF in August 1952, 
less than two months before the end of the force and after the creation of 
the National Safety Agency (NSA) earlier that month.95  Although their 
presence again could be said to show that the NPR was an external 
security force, the fact that the gun could be used in a variety of roles such 
as firing teargas and propaganda leaflet shells, demonstrates that the 
weapon had uses other than that of conventional bombardment.96 Again, 
that this weapon was outranged by all of the comparable Soviet models 
showed the NPR, whilst able to deal with lightly armed rebels or guerrillas, 
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was incapable of engaging in direct combat on even terms with a Soviet 
modelled force.97 
 
In early 1952 the NPR was also given a number of anti-aircraft halftracks 
but these were for training purposes and were few in number, numbering 
sixty-four vehicles shared between the four divisions and 75,000 men of 
the force (roughly one vehicle for every 1,200 men).98 This tiny number 
and the fact that these vehicles had often been used in an antipersonnel 
role and were not generally employed on the frontline in wartime shows 
that their presence does not indicate that the NPR was an external 
security force.  
 
Many of the vehicles possessed by the force were used by the NPR's 
small number of „engineer‟ units and the presence of these units could be 
used by a historian seeking to argue that the NPR was an army from the 
start. However a number of factors undermine this argument. However, 
the remote interior of Japan, the poor condition of much of its 
infrastructure and the unsuitability of many of its bridges for heavy 
motorised transport made an engineering arm essential to any force 
seeking to maintain internal security.99 Furthermore, the vast amount of 
construction the NPR project required necessitated a dedicated 
construction force even before the US Army began its push for the rapid 
expansion of the force and its facilities from 1951.100 The engineer units 
also proved essential in disaster relief operations, although this was not 
originally envisaged as their main operational role.101  Nevertheless as 
these units, like the rest of the NPR's specialist and technical units, were 
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non-operational in the first year of their existence their value in any 
argument over the character of the NPR is limited. 102  
 
A piece of equipment which prompts many to argue that the NPR was an 
external security force is the tank. It is true that the NPR did receive forty 
M24 „Chaffee‟ light tanks (see figure XVI) (roughly one tank per 1,875 
men) in the final ninety days of its existence, and after the creation of the 
National Safety Agency.103 However, these were only for familiarisation 
and training purposes and the first operational tank unit, the 101st Tank 
Battalion based in Hokkaido, was not set up until 22 November 1952, one 
week after the inauguration of the NSF and almost four months after the 
creation of the NSA.104 Moreover, like so much of the equipment of the 
NPR, the „Chaffee‟ was highly unsuitable for state versus state combat, it 
having been destroyed in large numbers by North Korean T-34s in the 
early weeks of the Korean War. The „Chaffee‟ was a light tank primarily 
designed for reconnaissance or second line duties and was incapable of 
posing a threat to the T-34, the standard Soviet tank. The T-34 dwarfed 
the M24 in weight (26.5 tonnes vs. 18.4 tonnes) and outgunned the US 
tank, whose thin armour it could easily penetrate, and to which the 
Chaffee had no effective response due to its underpowered main gun.105 
Clearly, unless supported by heavier tanks, the M24 tank was not suitable 
for external security missions against adversaries armed with standard 
Soviet weaponry. An interesting final point which helps support the 
argument that the presence of tanks does not automatically indicate an 
external security force is the fact that tanks, mostly consisting of the 
„Chaffee‟ were used for internal security duties in Japan by the Occupation 
forces prior to June 1950. These tanks were used in internal security roles 
such as helping to break up the Tōhō studio strike in 1948, and were 
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employed in an identical role by the US constabulary in occupied 
Germany.106  
  





A useful exercise to help demonstrate the inadequacy of the NPR in 
comparison to any potential adversary, and hence also show its internal 
security role, is a direct comparison between the capabilities of the NPR 
and its potential opponents and comparable counterpart forces. This 
comparison is given below in table XII which contains data on the NPR, 
NSF, early Republic of Korea Army, Soviet, US and IJA divisions of 
various kinds. In his work on the NPR, Kuzuhara undertakes a similar 
exercise but only uses the light Soviet sniper division, IJA and US infantry 
divisions, a frame of reference which makes the NPR look stronger and 
ignores other heavier, and more likely, opposition. Kuzuhara also 
manipulates the figures somewhat by including light weapons such as 
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bazookas as antitank weapons and using the complete equipment of the 
NSF as that of the NPR.108 
 
When examining the figures it is clear that as it lacked any arms heavier 
than a carbine for most of its existence the NPR was obviously 
qualitatively and quantitatively deficient in terms of heavy equipment. Even 
the NSF appears very weak in comparison to everything except perhaps 
the IJA Infantry division. The NPR, without any heavy equipment would 
clearly have crumbled even more speedily than the ROKA in 1950 if faced 
with Soviet-style divisions. The NPR, like the KC/early ROKA was clearly 
designed for a different role: that of an internal security force.109 
 
Table XII. Comparison of NPR with Rival Forces110 
 
Division Nationality Personnel Artillery* Tanks 
AT 
Guns/RL+ 
NPR 1950-52 Japan 15,000 0 0 0 
NSF Japan 15,000 72 60L 36 
ROK 1950 (Average) ROK 8,087 11 0 17 
Sniper Soviet 11,943 60 52 60 







Tank 1947 Soviet/DPRK 11,541 24 208M,44H 84s 
Infantry 1950 DPRK 12,092 66** 0 42 




IJA Infantry 1938 Japan 14,640 36 0 0 
* Excludes mortars. 
** Includes 18 120mm heavy mortars. 
+
Excludes infantry weapons such as the bazooka 
and anti-tank rifles. 
L Light tank (M24 Chafee). 
M Medium tank (T34 / Sherman). 
H Heavy tank (IS-2 / M26 Pershing). 
s Self propelled guns. 
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Without doubt, it could be argued that the presence of even obsolete 
weapons of the nature possessed by the NPR could identify it merely as 
an underequipped force designed for an external security mission, i.e. an 
army. This argument greatly oversimplifies the situation and ignores the 
fact that for the vast majority of its life (until the first quarter of 1952) the 
NPR was only equipped with carbines and light mortars, and even after 
receiving what little other arms it did have in the final days of its existence, 
was not organised or trained to use them or even operate effectively 
above company level.  
 
The NPR was also clearly even weaker than the ROKA in June 1950 
which raises the question, why create a force for external security which 
was so inadequate? The answer is that the NPR was not originally 
designed for external security duties and was equipped and trained as an 
internal security force designed to deal with domestic communist 
insurrection, while the US handled Japan‟s external security. Even the 
pro-rearmament US Army official history, History of the National Police 
Reserve of Japan, which argues consistently that the NPR was an army, 
states that even by mid-1952, when the NPR had begun to receive some 
of the heavier arms for training purposes, it and Japan „depended heavily 
on the United States for external security‟ and oxymoronically „its army, 
the National Police Reserve, was only a quasi-military force‟.111 Heavier 
and more up-to-date arms were available and were being sent to Europe 
and nearby Korea in large numbers so availability of these was not really 
an issue affecting the capabilities of the NPR.112  International political 
constraints did play a role in the release of the heavier arms to the police 
reserve but these did not really have an effect until heavier arms were 
actively pushed for by the US Army from late 1951 onwards.113  
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Taking these factors into consideration it is clear that despite some 
erosion of its character and movement towards more of an external 
security role in 1952, the NPR was originally envisaged by MacArthur and 
Yoshida as an internal security force. Like the KC and its earlier 
constabulary predecessors, the NPR was deliberately not given heavy 
arms as it was intended for internal security.114 Even when sought by the 
US Army the resistance of Yoshida and MacArthur limited and delayed the 
assumption of heavy weapons. The fact that the NPR was neither initially 
equipped nor designed for external security was clearly stated by 
MacArthur when he briefly dropped his opposition to the NPR's adoption 
of heavier equipment in the wake of the Chinese intervention in Korea in 
the winter of 1950/51. MacArthur, seemingly facing defeat at the hands of 
the Chinese, clearly noted the weakness of the more powerfully equipped 
Republic of Korea Army in 1950: „Against such a force [designed on a 
Soviet model] an NPRJ lacking medium tanks and at least medium 
artillery would be utterly inadequate. A most recent and striking case in 
point was the complete inability of the light south Korean divisions to cope 
with the tank supported North Korean Forces‟.115 
 
 
The Internal Security Role Envisaged for the NPR 
 
It seems that after examining the recruitment, training and structure of the 
NPR a discussion of the role and intended purpose of the NPR is 
necessary to form a complete impression of its character. On the basis of 
the evidence presented in this study the character of the NPR was clearly 
that of an internal security force, but the specific roles and missions which 
the NPR was designed to perform require further examination. This 
section will attempt to reveal these roles.  
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As a result of undertaking the prime responsibility for the Occupation of 
Japan the United States also took on the mantle of Japan‟s external 
security from the vanquished Imperial Japanese forces. Throughout the 
Occupation, and in a move later formalised by the 1951 Security Treaty, 
the United States effectively guaranteed the external security of Japan.116 
The presence of US naval and air formations in Japan acted as a 
deterrent, thwarting any designs the Soviets might have had on the 
islands. Although many, including the CIA and US military, believed at 
times the USSR had the capabilities required, if the Soviets had actually 
attempted to invade Japan the overwhelming naval superiority of the 
United States would have meant that a seaborne invasion would have 
been, at best, a reckless gamble.117  The Soviet Pacific fleet in 1950 
consisted of one light and two heavy cruisers, around thirty destroyers and 
eighty or so submarines. The Chinese and North Korean Fleets were even 
weaker, consisting of a handful of patrol and torpedo boats and lacking a 
single capital ship between them.118 Even when compared to the scratch 
forces available to the UN command at the start of the Korean War, the 
Communists were helplessly outnumbered. US units available at that time 
consisted of one aircraft carrier (86 aircraft), two cruisers, twelve 
destroyers, and three submarines; Royal Navy ships present totalled one 
carrier (48 aircraft), two light cruisers, three frigates, and two 
destroyers.119 The weakness of their navy was a fact acknowledged by the 
Soviet leadership and the naval actions of the Korean War helped 
underline the need for Soviet naval expansion and modernisation, 
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although this only reached the planning stages during the life of the NPR. 
As Winkler notes: 
 
 American naval actions off Korea at the start of the Korean War 
only reinforced Stalin‟s conviction that the USSR needed a large 
ocean-going navy. The Soviet leader pushed forward a large 
construction programme that began producing cruisers and fast 
destroyers at about the time of his death in 1953.120 
 
In the unlikely event of a successful seaborne or airborne landing all 
American war plans of the period called for US troops to undertake the 
ground defence of Japan, which was to be coupled with an aerial and, 
depending on conditions, maritime, offensive.121 With the external defence 
of Japan in the air, at sea and on land comprehensively within the realm of 
the US military, it is clear that the NPR was designed to fill another role. 
Despite their differing ideas of what the NPR should become, both 
MacArthur and Ridgeway conceded that the NPR was unsuitable for 
frontline use in its original form.122 It was also recognised within GHQ that 
in the event of war for the NPR to be any use in combat a vast, and almost 
certainly unavailable, amount of tactical and logistical support and 
supplies would need to be speedily provided by US forces.123 As most war 
plans envisaged the US forces in Japan having to hold their own until 
additional help could be provided, it is extremely unlikely that the already 
undersupplied US forces in Japan would have been able to render any of 
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this material assistance to the NPR.124 The role that the NPR would have 
performed in wartime would have been concurrent with its capabilities and 
character i.e. an internal security force. These roles would have been 
identical to those performed by the KC/Republic of Korea Army before 
1950.125 The NPR would be operating behind the US lines, assisting the 
civilian population and refugees, guarding key installations and bases and 
preventing or subduing strikes, riots, partisans, paratroopers or guerrillas. 
The secondary support role the NPR would be likely to perform was 
highlighted in a December 1951 report on the NPR: „Responsibility of the 
defense of Japan against an external aggressor force, at present and for 
an indefinite future period, rests with the US military forces . . . It is 
envisaged that, in a national emergency involving Japan, the NPRJ could 
and would be utilized in support of the US forces‟.126  Katzenstein, a 
leading scholar on Japanese security, recognises the role of the force 
accurately: „in the face of a serious threat from the Soviet Union, and 
given the deterrent power of US forces, the primary purpose of Japan‟s 
armed forces was domestic policing against Communist insurrection‟.127 
 
This internal role was confirmed by the confinement of the NPR to 
Japanese territory. Like other constabularies the NPR's zone of 
responsibility ended at the borders of the Japanese state, hence making it 
incapable of undertaking external security duties, especially those 
requiring action outside the borders of Japan.128 The political constraints 
on external operations included the 1947 constitution and the explicitly 
internal remit of the NPR.129 This internal focus was strengthened and 
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confirmed through the absence of any power projection capabilities, sea 
transports or even an air force.  
 
Despite its internal security role plans did exist for the use of NPR in the 
case of war with the USSR, or a „general emergency‟ as World War Three 
was euphemistically referred to in the documents.130  Central amongst 
these plans was „Operation Plan CINCFE No. 4-51‟, of April 1951. As well 
as the immediate abandonment and evacuation of Korea in the event of 
Soviet intervention, the plan called for the use of the NPR as an external 
security stopgap only until US forces returned from the peninsula, a matter 
of days at most.131 Once the US troops had been deployed, the NPR 
would remain in reserve and would be tasked with maintaining internal 
security. Tellingly, the force would also be retained for internal security 
duties under the direct control of SCAP and the Japanese government 
and not the regional military commanders charged with the external 
defence of Japan. Furthermore, units of the NPR were not to be used in 
external security duties or be placed under the command of the defending 
US forces unless on specific orders from SCAP.132 Again its role was that 
of an internal security force, considered incapable of direct state versus 
state warfare, even in defence of the Japanese islands. 
 
Clearly this wartime role was very similar to the primary peacetime 
mission assigned to the NPR; supporting the civil police in suppressing 
uprisings or major domestic disturbances. One of the principal reasons 
behind the creation of the NPR was the perceived inability of the civil 
police to cope with organised civil violence or an uprising.133 Despite the 
abolition of Japan‟s armed forces the American and Allied planning prior to 
its surrender asserted Japan‟s right to maintain a police force in order to 
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safeguard law and order and protect vital installations from sabotage. The 
concern that the Japanese civil police were unable to do so in the face of 
war in Korea, the departure of the US tactical troops and the increasingly 
militant activities of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) led to the 
creation of the NPR, as cited in its initial planning:  
 
[The civil police] are inadequate to maintain law and order in Japan 
without the presence of four United States divisions or some back–
up force substituted therefor . . . the Japanese police, as now 
constituted, have little if any capability for protecting military 
installations against sabotage nor does any Japanese force exist 
which has the paramilitary qualifications to perform this function . . . 
There is an immediate requirement for the establishment of a 
National Police Reserve to reinforce the Japanese police in case of 
serious internal disorders or possible rebellion, and also fill the 
vacuum created by the deployment from Japan of U.S. Army forces 
[sic].134 
 
Prior to the creation of the NPR the role of the more heavily armed support 
of the Japanese civil police was performed by the United States tactical 
troops stationed in Japan. Many historians such as Swenson-Wright, 
quoting MacArthur‟s later comments to Congress, have argued that the 
departure of the US tactical troops created a military or security 
„vacuum‟.135 Certainly, a vacuum was created but it was not, as some 
argue, one of external security. As noted above, the external security of 
Japan was guaranteed through both the deterrent power and material 
superiority of US naval and air forces in Japan. This was firmly 
acknowledged by Yoshida and influenced his opposition to the 
resurrection of the Japanese military that Dulles and others desired.136 
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The vacuum created was in fact one of internal security, in which a 
replacement force for the Occupation tactical troops was required to 
ensure domestic tranquillity. As Weinstein and Uyehara note, the fear at 
the time of a domestic challenge to the security of Japan was generally 
greater than that of an external attack.137  
 
Some US Army personnel remained in Japan after June 1950 but they 
were mainly administrative staff as most combat elements had been 
rushed to Korea. Furthermore, at times over the next two years, numbers 
of US soldiers in Japan were very thin, there being less than two thousand 
in Hokkaido in late August 1950.138 Many United States Army units did 
rotate through Japan on the way into and out of Korea during the life of the 
NPR, but despite their presence they were largely unsuitable for 
performing the internal security role of the NPR for a number of reasons. 
First, Japan served as a staging post for Korea and as a result many of 
the soldiers moving in and out of Japan were in small groups and virtually 
all arrived without their weapons and equipment, which were sent directly 
to, or were left in, Korea. Furthermore, aside from the recuperating, or 
replacement frontline troops, many of the army personnel stationed in 
Japan were second line or support troops, who were not useful for internal 
security or any kind of active duty. 139  
 
In addition, the political constraints on the use of the US military for 
internal security during this period were more restrictive than ever. Any 
use of the US tactical troops against the Japanese population, particularly 
one which resulted in civilian casualties, could have had very serious 
political repercussions. 140  The use of US tactical troops could have 
handed a propaganda coup to the JCP and Soviets, reopened the fresh 
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scars of the memory of the Second World War and convinced many 
Japanese there was some truth in the communist propaganda about 
„American Imperialism‟ colonising Japan.141 Any internal intervention by 
the US also infringed upon Japan‟s already embattled sovereignty and 
would have weakened the Japanese government and harmed relations 
between it and the US. 142  Considerations of sovereignty and their 
importance to the Japanese public and government were paramount in 
this period as a peace treaty became an increasingly pressing issue and 
any perceived infringement could have ultimately weakened support for 
the Japanese government and benefited the JCP. 143  A study by the 
headquarters of the Far Eastern Command on the security of Japan 
produced after the Occupation candidly sums up the dangers of 
intervention or even the appearance of US advisors during NPR 
operations:  
 
Riots and civil disturbances are internal problems of the Japanese 
government and any public appearance of U.S. advisory personnel 
with their counterparts on occasions when the NPR is quelling riots 
or other civil disturbances would not only be embarrassing to the 
governments of Japan and the United States, but might endanger 
friendly relations between them.144 
 
Despite their differences over many matters pertaining to the NPR, the 
Americans in Japan and Washington were almost universal in their 
opposition to any role for the United States in interfering directly in the 
internal security of Japan. For example, in a memorandum circulated just 
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prior to the outbreak of the war in Korea MacArthur argued that the United 
States „should have neither responsibility nor authority to intervene in the 
internal affairs of Japan . . . the Japanese police forces would have to be 
increased to a size and character adequate for internal security‟, i.e. by 
possibly creating a constabulary.145 On the basis of this memorandum 
Assistant Secretary of State Allison argued during the drafting of the 
peace treaty, that the NPR and Japanese police should handle Japan‟s 
internal security and that „the United States shall not have, except in time 
of hostilities or imminently threatened hostilities [war with the USSR], any 
responsibility or authority to interfere in the internal affairs of Japan‟.146 
The position over the non-involvement of the US in the internal security of 
Japan, except on the express instruction of the Japanese government (a 
move which would help minimise the damage to both Japanese 
sovereignty and America‟s reputation) persisted, but the text of the 
agreement moved from the peace treaty to the Security Treaty.147 The 
policy found its final form in article one of the Security Treaty, which stated 
that US forces could provide assistance „at the express request of the 
Japanese government to put down large-scale internal riots and 
disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an 
outside Power or Powers‟.148 The allusions here to the JCP, the threat it 
was perceived to represent and the US belief that its military policy was 
backed by the USSR/People‟s Republic of China are clear. 
 
The role, character and capabilities of the NPR situated it in a third, middle 
tier between the civil police and the US military. As argued above this 
character reflected its internal security mission, but what sort of duties 
would the NPR have undertaken if it had been used? A system of routine 
patrols and the guarding of US and NPR bases, key infrastructure and 
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installations would have been the likely principal „passive‟ uses of the NPR 
in the event of serious disturbances.149 The main „active‟ employment of 
the NPR would have been in suppressing riots, civil disorders, guerrillas or 
insurgents.150  
 
The reasons why the NPR was never used even against serious incidents 
such as „Bloody May Day‟ (during which it was held in reserve by Yoshida 
in case the rioting got out of hand) were complex and were largely a result 
of political considerations and the ultimate failure of the JCP military 
campaign to pose a significantly serious threat to the Japanese 
government.151 However, detailed plans for the use of the NPR in such 
situations did exist and they are very useful in examining the character of 
the NPR.152 The main basis of these plans for the use of the NPR was the 
document entitled „Standard Operation Procedures for Riots and Civil 
Disturbances‟.153 This plan was the final version of several on the subject 
and formally established the procedures for using the NPR for dealing with 
serious public unrest. The plan envisaged five potential situations, each 
identified with codenames taken from famous generals of the American 
civil war. Situation „Sherman‟ designated a riot being forecast which could 
require deployment of the NPR to support the civil police, „Thomas‟ 
described a riot which required the use of the NPR as being in progress, 
„Custer‟ was defined as a riot predicted or in progress which required use 
of the NPR and coordination between the NPR and US Security forces, 
„Grant‟ was an emergency which was forecast or in progress which 
required coordinated employment of it and US Security forces, and „Lee‟ 
was the „all clear‟ signal. The plan envisaged the use of the NPR to quell 
the disturbances with US advisors assisting through maintaining liaison 
with the NPR command, coordinating the supply and issue procedures for 
all equipment necessary, and making coordinated tactical plans with the 
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NPR in the event of situation „Grant‟ (which was likely to be a major 
incident or rebellion, beyond even the control of the NPR).154  
 
The central document governing the exact role played by the NPR in the 
event of major internal unrest was „Operation Order No. 1‟ of March 1951. 
The plan was designed to deal with „mass protests, insidious propaganda, 
strikes or open conflict‟ within Japan in the event of a crisis or after the 
signing of the peace treaty. The plan broke down this range of possibilities 
into three categories of „minor‟, „limited‟ and „major‟ emergencies, roughly 
analogous to situations „Sherman‟, „Thomas‟, „Custer‟ and „Grant‟. In the 
event of a „minor emergency‟ the civil police would deal with all incidents, 
with the NPR supporting if required, and US forces would remain in 
reserve, dealing only with direct attacks upon them.  A „limited emergency‟ 
was seen as an incident in which the Japanese government, police and 
NPR were so weakened as to be ineffective. Direct US military 
government would be imposed and SCAP would declare a state of limited 
emergency. A „major emergency‟ was defined as the outbreak of large 
scale rebellion and/or guerrilla warfare. If this situation proved beyond the 
capacity of SCAP and the Japanese government, SCAP would declare 
that the situation was beyond his control and would initiate full-scale US 
military operations against the rebels/guerrillas.155  
 
All of the scenarios saw the gradual, phased increase in the application of 
force, and the employment of the police and NPR „to the limit of their 
capabilities‟.156 This approach consisted of initial use of the civil police, 
followed by the NPR and then, and only if events overtook the Japanese 
government, US forces. Tactics such as curfews were to be imposed and 
the minimum amount of force and offensive action was to be used at all 
times, with even the use of tear gas requiring central approval. Occupation 
forces, in all but the most serious situations were largely to be employed in 
defending their own bases and installations, including the establishment of 
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roadblocks, checkpoints and defensive positions. Nevertheless, 
Occupation forces were expected to perform surveillance on all 
disturbances, a part of this plan which was actually employed during the 
„Bloody May Day‟ demonstrations.157 
 
The fact that the NPR was created to resist the JCP was also clearly 
stated in the Annexes of „Operation Order No. 1‟, with the creation of the 
force being cited as a „serious blow to the power of the JCP‟.158 The 
concerns over the capacity of the JCP to create chaos requiring a 
Japanese force more powerful than the civil police were also clearly 
described: „the Japanese Communist Party, and the Koreans, in the Kanto 
area, particularly the metropolitan Tokyo area, are capable of expanding 
civil disturbances beyond the capability of local Japanese police 
control‟.159  
 
A final and more repressive possible „active‟ use of the NPR in the case of 
serious threats to internal security would have been supporting the civil 
police in rounding up „subversives‟ for imprisonment. Under a plan named 
„Toll Booth‟, those to be detained included Communists, Socialists, labour 
leaders and Leftwing Koreans. This move although drastic, heavy handed, 
very politically risky and probably a measure of last resort, was aimed at 
imprisoning potential insurgents and denying existing guerrillas or rebels 
material and political support.160 
 
Despite their firm character the measures detailed above fell far short of 
those employed by the Philippines and Korean Constabularies.161 The 
methods designed to be employed by the NPR were of those of a security 
force of a democratic state defending itself and its citizens with a minimum 
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amount of force against illegal armed unrest or insurrection. This clearly 
contrasts with the active and often unprovoked oppression and brutality 
visited upon opponents, or perceived threats to, the Korean and Filipino 
regimes by the KC and PC. 
 
 
The NPR's Links with the Civil Police  
 
The final parts of the history of the NPR which will be examined in this 
chapter are the close connections between the NPR and the Japanese 
civil police. These connections are important in several ways: first, as 
Mawby argues, close links with the civil police and particularly the 
presence of personnel transfers are one of the defining characteristics of a 
paramilitary police/constabulary.162  
 
The connections between the NPR and the civil police were strong, far 
more so than is typical of an Army. The links between the NPR and 
National Rural Police were especially significant. Despite being separated 
from the National Rural Police during the planning stages and having its 
name changed from the „National Rural Police Reserve‟ to the National 
Police Reserve, the connections between the forces persisted throughout 
the life of the force.163 The examination of these links between the NPR 
and civil police also provides an interesting case study by which to 
compare the NPR to its constabulary predecessors such as the Korean 
constabulary (KC).164 This examination helps to demonstrate the common 
origins of the KC and NPR and the lessons members of GHQ took from 
the creation and operations of the KC. 
 
The first area in which the civil police was closely connected to the NPR 
was during the creation and recruitment of the force. The National Rural 
                                                             
162
 R.I. Mawby, „Approaches to Comparative Analysis: the Impossibility of Becoming an 
Expert on Everywhere‟, p 18. For more on Mawby and definitions  see: Introduction, pp 
43-48. 
163
 History of the National Police Reserve, p43; TS 301, Willoughby to Whitney, 7/8/50. 
164
 For more on the Korean Constabulary see: Chapter 2, pp 125-138. 
205 
 
Police ran the entire recruiting campaign, investigated applicants for 
communist, disreputable, criminal or subversive backgrounds, and even 
the National Rural Police‟s physical standards were used to judge whether 
applicants were suitable for service. 165  This close, indeed dominant, 
involvement by the National Rural Police in the creation of the NPR marks 
a clear indication that the lessons learned from the creation of the Korean 
Constabulary had been taken to heart by GHQ. Thus the institutional 
rivalries and disunity between the Korean National Police and KC, which 
had allowed vast numbers of communists to easily infiltrate the KC, were 
not repeated.166  
 
As detailed in the section on training and examinations above, the central 
role of the civil police also extended into the training of the NPR. 
Immediately after their induction and processing, 200 man companies of 
NPR recruits were assigned two or three National Rural Policemen who 
acted as temporary officers and began the training of the recruits at the six 
regional National Rural Police schools across Japan.167 
 
This sharing of facilities was replicated several further times during the 
history of the NPR. During its early life the NPR actually had its 
headquarters within National Rural Police headquarters, and National 
Rural Police facilities were often used to house and train NPR men 
(especially during its early phases).168 
 
The National Rural Police also actually ran significant portions of the NPR. 
The finance section of the National Rural Police organised and signed all 
contracts and procurements for equipment, supply, transport, food and 
clothing, for the NPR, spending over ¥2.5 billion in the first three months of 
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the NPR's existence.169 The financial involvement of the National Rural 
Police went even further than this, and included the authority to: „negotiate 
contracts and assist in the supply of material, labour etc at camps, training 
areas, and National Rural Police schools, or wherever needed‟.170 The fact 
that the logistical and technical branches of the NPR did not function 
during the first year of existence meant that this financial and 
organisational dependence on the National Rural Police extended for most 
of the life of the NPR.171 
 
In addition to the other close connections between the civil police and the 
NPR, and significantly for Mawby‟s definition, the forces shared large 
numbers of personnel.172 Most of the senior leadership of the NPR was 
made up of police officers transferred in from the National Rural Police 
and Municipal Police and almost all the senior leadership of the financial 
and logistical sections were also drawn from the civil police. These 
transfers were initially on a temporary basis but effectively became 
permanent over time.173 A large number of policemen or former policemen 
also served in the middle and lower strata of the NPR, where a police 
background was a valuable asset, with those having served one year in 
the police at the rank of Inspector or above being eligible to take the 
examination to enter officer training.174 
 
These personnel transfers, although significant, were not as great as they 
could have been due to the fears of the leadership of the civil police of a 
mass exodus to the NPR, the resistance of pro-rearmament elements of 
GHQ and the role of the NPR as a support force for the civil police. One of 
the groups most attracted to service in the NPR were serving members of 
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the civil police, many swayed by the superior pay and conditions and the 
generous bonuses on offer. 175  The clamour for transfers to the NPR, 
particularly from unmarried men and the lower ranks of the police, became 
so vociferous that several high level meetings occurred between senior 
police chiefs and members of G2. At one of these, Chief Tanaka, 
president of Municipal Police Chiefs Association and Head of the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Police Department, visited Harrison, a G2/PSD police 
administrator. Tanaka voiced his concern that the „propaganda‟ campaign 
to which his men were being subjected could see the police stripped of its 
brightest and best if they were allowed to transfer en-masse to the NPR. 
Harrison reassured Tanaka that G2 would not support the „raiding‟ of the 
civil police.176 Despite this assurance the problem persisted and Pulliam, 
the head of the Public Safety Division of G2, eventually informed a 
conference of senior Japanese police officials and the leadership of the 
NPR, that members of the Municipal Police and National Rural Police 
would not be eligible for direct transfer. However, Pulliam did say that if 
policemen did want to join the NPR they could resign and do so, and could 
even return to the police if they failed to qualify or did not like service in 
the NPR, but would do so at the lowest rank. Pulliam argued that this 
policy sought to preserve the integrity of the civil police and that they had 
„worked too hard and too long to let these forces be prostituted to go into 
something [the NPR] that will be of no value to us for a long time to come 
[sic]‟.177 Although ostensibly in the interests of the Japanese civil police, 
this refusal to transfer large numbers of policemen into the NPR, which 
was opposed by the leadership of the NPR, also served G2 and 
Willoughby‟s aim to create an NPR which was closer to an army than a 
police force.178 
 
Despite the political manoeuvring, the argument that the NPR should not 
denude the civil police of its best men was a valid one as the NPR was 
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designed and established to support rather than replace the civil police. As 
G2‟s Bratton remarked to Okazaki Katsuo, Chief Cabinet Secretary, „it is 
undesirable to weaken the present police forces while this new force is 
being organized and trained‟.179 The Japanese press also recognised that 
strengthening the NPR to the detriment of the civil police was a mistake in 
terms of preserving internal security, as even without the potential loss of 
personnel the civil police was „too weak to maintain the national security‟ 
[sic].180 
 
From the start the NPR had been designed to support the civil police in 
maintaining internal security and as this and the other chapters of this 
study reveal, it was equipped and deployed to do so.181 As mentioned 
above the NPR did receive some informal training in crime detection 
methods and even in traffic control, but the force never sought to encroach 
on the everyday role of the civil police.182 Its ethos, training and equipment 
were all focused on internal security and public order missions. The force 
was also often reminded of this role as guarantor of internal security and 
supporter of the civil police, as in this speech made by a senior US advisor 
to new recruits in 1950:  
 
As supporters of the National Rural Police you not only strengthen 
their authority and insure that the rights guaranteed to each and 
every Japanese citizen under Japan‟s new constitution remain 
inviolate, but you also renew the confidence in your nation‟s 
security and ability to defend itself against internal sabotage, 
revolution, and lawless depredation. The maintenance of law and 
order is a prime requisite to the security of a nation.183 
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Other links between the civil police and NPR did exist, such as the basis 
of the NPR pay structure on that of the National Rural Police, and the role 
of the National Rural Police in the NPR disciplinary system, and these are 
examined in more detail in the following chapter.184 
 
These connections between the civil police and NPR, as well as helping to 
show the constabulary character of the NPR, also contest the argument 
made by many historians, such as Hertrich, that the NPR's closest 
organisational relative was the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA).185 On the 
strength of the evidence presented above, it can be shown that that the 
National Rural Police had a much greater influence on the NPR than any 
other organisation, except perhaps GHQ‟s Civil Affairs Section (CAS). 
 
 
The NPR and Former Imperial Officers I 
 
 
A further highly significant and partially explored dimension of the history 
of the NPR is its relationship with former Imperial military officers. The 
battles over the inclusion of high ranking veterans of the IJA and IJN in the 
force were one of the clearest clashes between the conflicting visions of 
the NPR‟s character. During a series of struggles, which first pitted 
MacArthur and the Japanese government against Willoughby and his 
stable of former IJA officers, and later the Japanese government against 
the US Army, key decisions (and concessions) were made which 
influenced the future direction and role of the NPR.186 The fact that only 
one of the three key chapters in this saga (the second, surreptitious 
attempt by Willoughby to install purgees in the NPR) has thus far been 
examined in scholarly literature makes an investigation of these events all 
                                                             
184
 CAS(A) 1811, Kowalski to chief, Tohoku civil affairs division, „Processing Adverse 
Reports on NPR Personnel‟, 28/11/50; Economic and Scientific Section (ESS) (C) 133, 
„NPR Pay‟, 17/10/50; ESS (F) 2382, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, „Outline of Policy 
Concerning Recruitment of the National Police Reserve‟, 31/7/50. For more on the Civil 
police and the NPR pay structure and discipline see: Chapter 4, pp 224-229, 242-250. 
185
 R.I. Mawby, „Approaches to Comparative Analysis‟, p 18 ; A. Hertrich, „A Useable 
Past? Historical Museums of the Self-Defence Forces and the Construction of 
Continuities‟, in S. Saaler and W. Schwentker (eds), The Power of Memory in Modern 
Japan, Global Oriental, Folkestone, 2008, p 185. 
186
 For more on the later battles over the NPR's character see: Chapter 5, pp 287-330. 
210 
 
the more important when examining the NPR. 187  The first two of the 
incidents are detailed below and the third is examined in chapter five due 
to its significance in the evolution of the NPR. This examination of the „top 
down‟ attempts to seize control of the force by the former Imperial 
Japanese officers also contributes towards the success of the first of the 
aim this study in exploring another domestic influence on the force. 
 
The struggles over the inclusion of former high level imperial military men 
in the NPR began prior even to the creation of the NPR itself. The 
meetings held from 6 July 1950 onwards laid out the rough plans for the 
creation of the NPR, including initial views on its structure, posture and 
character.188 During this period a series of discussions between Okazaki 
Katsuo, Chief Cabinet Secretary, Willoughby, and other senior members 
of GHQ took place.189 These examined and rejected the use of former 
Imperial military men in the NPR, a result bitterly resented by Willoughby 
as it blocked his plans for the extensive use of IJA officers and purgees.190 
Following the meeting, on the day of the announcement of the 
authorisation to create the NPR, Willoughby wrote to Whitney, his arch 
rival and head of Government Section (GS), in an attempt to „clear up any 
misunderstanding, apparently prevailing now‟ over what he considered the 
„essential principles‟ in selecting personnel for the NPR. 191  These 
„essential principles‟ consisted of the necessity of us ing purged former IJA 
officers as the officer corps of the NPR. Willoughby claimed he sought to 
prevent the infiltration of communists into the force by excluding what he 
viewed as the „heavily indoctrinated‟ former members of the Kwangtung 
army, but all other repatriated IJA officers were to be given top priority 
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within the force. This use of the former military officers was also 
considered vital by Willoughby „in order to expedite the training, formation 
and internal cohesion of this unit [the NPR]‟. 192  Later the same day 
Willoughby also wrote to Shepard, head of Civil Affairs Section, soon to be 
head of the NPR‟s advisors, and a fellow supporter of a new Japanese 
military. In this letter Willoughby argued that former IJA purgees were 
essential for all command positions in the NPR if its training and 
organisation were to be effective. Willoughby stated that, as those officers 
who had escaped the purge were of junior rank and had no staff level 
experience (around half of all captains and all higher ranks had been 
purged), it was impossible to create „units of the character desired by us‟ 
under the purge restrictions. 193  Citing his fear of JCP infiltration and 
creating a clear link between the Korean constabulary (KC) and NPR, 
Willoughby also remarked to Shepard that „there is a great potential of 
creating a mob of unqualified jobless without cohesion or to indulge in a 
training fiction, analogous to that of the South Korean Army‟.194 In a further 
letter to Whitney of 7 August the connection between the KC and NPR 
was again stressed in support of the inclusion of purgees in the NPR: 
„General Shepard asked my comments on the procurement of trained 
individuals for the National Rural Police Reserve. You are familiar that the 
C-in-C [MacArthur] desires trained individuals; we cannot afford to waste 
time in the type of abortive American training which produced KMAG [the 
Korean Constabulary]‟ [Willoughby‟s emphasis].195 Despite Willoughby‟s 
barrage of messages, Whitney issued a curt, one line response: 
MacArthur had already decided not to use any purgees, with „considerable 
emphasis by the General‟.196 In spite of his claims that efficiency, security 
and defence against the JCP required purgees, it remains that the central 
aim of these appeals by Willoughby was to resurrect the IJA. 
 








 TS 301, Willoughby to Whitney, 7/8/50. 
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 Despite this rebuttal Willoughby remained committed to what he saw as 
the necessity of including purgees in the NPR. To help provide him with 
more ammunition in this battle, Willoughby commissioned a study on the 
reasons why their use was desirable. The threat of the JCP was central to 
the arguments put forward in this study. Citing recent evidence that the 
National Rural Police, Tokyo Metropolitan Police (MPD) and Special 
Investigations Bureau (SIB) had all allegedly been heavily infiltrated by the 
JCP, the study argued that without the „patriotic‟ and „disciplined‟ 
leadership of purgees the NPR would also become „a mob filled with such 
elements [JCP members]‟.197 The study claimed: „it has been a definitive 
fact in the annals of the Japanese army for the past several decades that 
the regular army officers, graduates of the military academy (now purged), 
always constituted, without exception, the strongest bulwark against 
communism in Japan‟.198 This rather sweeping claim was supported by 
the ludicrous argument that their patriotism granted the purgees a special 
ability to spot communists, who were allegedly numerous in the former 
junior ranks of the IJA. The fact that the ultra-nationalist leadership of the 
IJA was a guarantor against communism in the past was beyond doubt 
but the claims of purgees‟ abilities to spot communists and the alleged 
communism of much of the IJA were ill-informed fantasy. Furthermore, the 
desire expressed in the study to appoint purgees to positions of power in 
the NPR näively, or deliberately, ignores any concern that appointing such 
a nationalistic group to head an armed security force could prove to be the 
undoing of Japanese democracy, as it had in the 1930s. The study also 
manipulated information from the Japanese press in an attempt to show 
that the Japanese government also supported the use of purgees by 
misquoting an alleged statement by Okazaki in which he had supposedly 
claimed he wanted the NPR to be as „strong as possible‟.199 In reality 
Okazaki had made no public references to the use of purgees and the 
Cabinet was bitterly opposed to giving them access to power which might 
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be used to topple the government. Furthermore, Yoshida and his Cabinet 
and did not seek anything other than an internal security constabulary and 
hence swiftly and completely rejected and suggestions of resurrecting the 
IJA.200 
 
Nevertheless, Willoughby was determined to get his way and took his 
campaign directly to MacArthur, writing to him on 10 August 1950. 
Willoughby warned that: 
 
With the colossal success of communism in the Far East those 
concerned with the creation of an expanded police body, must 
exercise the greatest care in the selection of personnel to 
command these units. It is essential that commanders and staff 
from the lowest to the highest have the moral and patriotic stamina 
to resist communism and become a real force for law and order. 
They are not found in the „non purged categories‟.201  
 
The letter proceeded to argue against what Willoughby saw as the invalid 
and arbitrary nature of the purge restrictions and again claimed that 
without a core of professional officers the NPR would be of low quality and 
would attract the unemployed and uneducated, who Willoughby judged to 
be „wide open to subversive influences‟.202 This attempt had no more 
success than the preceding one but it is highly significant in revealing that 
the language employed by even the most hawkish in GHQ centred on the 
perceived threat from the JCP and the internal security character of the 
NPR. The failure of Willoughby‟s campaign was an initial defeat for those 
aiming for the NPR to be a military force and the NPR‟s constabulary 
character was preserved through MacArthur‟s influence, supported by the 
Japanese government.  
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Despite his failure, Willoughby‟s desire for the inclusion of purgees in the 
NPR was not slaked and he continued to grumble for weeks about the 
dangers of not employing them.203 Nevertheless, it was clear to him that 
nothing could be achieved through the normal bureaucratic channels of 
GHQ and a more surreptitious approach was required.204 There followed 
an incident which is detailed in works by Welfield and Weste in which 
Willoughby and Shepard attempted to install Hattori Takushiro, a 
nationalistic former IJA Colonel, as head on the NPR (see figure XVII). In 
late July 1950 Shepard, at Willoughby‟s suggestion, introduced Hattori to 
Frank Kowalski, the deputy head of CAS, as „the man Willoughby intends 
to be NPR chief of staff‟. Shepard also ordered Kowalski to calculate the 
number of IJA officers needed to staff the NPR. Kowalski later replied that 
training would run more smoothly if roughly nine hundred former officers 
could be recruited. Soon after Kowalski was again visited by Hattori, this 
time accompanied by Colonel Priam of G2 and six other former IJA staff 
officers, Priam explained to Kowalski that the six IJA officers expected to 
be appointed to the six vacancies then available in NPR HQ. Hattori also 
provided Kowalski with a list of four hundred former officers to lead the 
NPR (including Hattori as the head) which had clearly been produced in 
advance of Shepard‟s original approach. Surprised at the speed and 
thoroughness of the attempt to install Hattori and his followers into the 
higher ranks of the NPR, Kowalski contacted an aide of MacArthur, who 
informed him that neither MacArthur nor GS had any knowledge of the 
move. 205 
 
Despite Kowalski uncovering the origins of the plot, Willoughby‟s plan 
continued. In early August, through Shepard, Hattori met with Masuhara 
Keikichi, a former policeman and the civilian Director General of the NPR. 
Hattori offered Masuhara his services but during the course of their 
meeting and subsequent discussion with Attorney General Ohashi, 
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Masuhara uncovered the detail of the subsequent stages of Willoughby‟s 
plans: that Hattori was to take control of the NPR and marginalise or 
remove him, his civilian/police staff and the civilian control and 
constabulary character of the NPR they represented. Masuhara had 
already been suspicious about Shepard and Willoughby‟s repeated 
requests not to inform Yoshida about Hattori, and the discovery of the 
plans to remove him confirmed his fears that the approach was not 
legitimate or even in the interests of the Japanese government. 206 
Masuhara quickly told Yoshida of the plot and the Prime Minister promptly 
refused to use Hattori in the NPR or even deal with him on any level. 
Yoshida also sought and won MacArthur‟s support in his opposition to the 
appointment of IJA officers, and the change in the character of the NPR it 
would have represented. Shepard was promptly ordered to inform Hattori 
that his services were not, and would not, be required and with Hattori‟s 
marginalisation Willoughby‟s second plan thus came to nought.  
 
Figure XVII. Hattori Takushiro in IJA Uniform 207 
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It could be argued that only the second plot directly involved Hattori but it 
is almost certain he would have been one of the first chosen if 
Willoughby‟s initial effort at inducting former military men into the NPR 
through overt means had been successful. This argument is backed up by 
Weste‟s claim that Willoughby actually offered the leadership of the NPR 
to Hattori in early July 1950, during the first plot.208 A further indication of 
the involvement of Hattori in the first plot is Willoughby‟s plan to use 
Japanese demobilisation bureau records to find suitable candidates to fill 
the NPR‟s company and division staffs.209 As Hattori was close friends 
with Willoughby, had worked for this organisation, and had his own private 
catalogue of officers he considered suitable, this would have made him 
the central figure in such a selection and no doubt his own name would 
have appeared high on any list produced. 210 
 
When examining these plots a central question is: who was Hattori, and 
why was his failure significant to the character of the NPR? Hattori 
Takushiro was a former IJA colonel whose glittering military career 
included acting as a military attaché to Mussolini‟s army, a role as a senior 
operations officer of the Kwangtung army in the 1939 Nomonhan border 
incidents with the USSR, and vast experience both in command in China 
and in administrative roles, such as his role as private secretary to Tojo 
Hideki. Throughout his military career Hattori was highly influenced by the 
ultra-nationalist views of his superiors and mentors, men such as the ultra 
nationalists Ishiwara Kanji, Tsuji Masanobu and Tojo.211 With the collapse 
of Japan in 1945 Hattori‟s hitherto distinguished military career lay in ruins 
and he feared for his safety and freedom in the face of the Allied war 
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crimes tribunals and purges. However, Hattori‟s fears were ultimately 
unwarranted as he soon found employment with Willoughby in G2‟s 
historical section, followed by appointments to the Demobilisation and 
Repatriation Bureaus. This employment protected Hattori from the purge 
and war crimes proceedings and allowed him to extend his contacts 
throughout the former military.  
 
Despite Japan‟s defeat Hattori‟s hawkish attitude had not mellowed and 
he was described in a 1952 issue of Pacific Affairs as „probably the most 
vigorous proponent of a new Japanese army‟.212 Through these years the 
Rightwing political views of Hattori became more acute as he grew 
increasingly impatient at the absence of rearmament. Hattori believed that 
full-scale rearmament was necessary as he thought war between the 
superpowers was imminent and a strong Japanese military would be 
essential if Japan was not to be overtaken by events.213 Hattori‟s views on 
the subject are quoted by Weste as follows: „[his] rearmament plans were 
informed by the imminence of war between the capitalist and communist 
camps. Complicating this threat, they maintained the Japanese 
communists sought to wreak havoc within‟.214 This inclusion of the JCP 
threat is interesting as it indicates the appreciation of the threat across the 
political spectrum, even amongst the staunchest advocates of rearmament. 
Usefully, Hattori and his compatriots found a „kindred spirit‟ in the form of 
Willoughby, their employer and a fellow supporter of the re-creation of the 
IJA.215 
 
As well as engaging in their overt work, the group of retained Japanese 
military men employed by Willoughby also performed other covert work. 
Takemae argues convincingly that the principal reason behind the 
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retention of Hattori and his colleagues was an attempt by Willoughby to 
preserve a cadre of officers ready for the recreation of the IJA and IJN at 
some point in the near future.216 Planning for this eventuality and creating 
the network of contacts it necessitated was the principal employment of 
Hattori during these years, and it is almost certain that the list of four 
hundred officers for the NPR which Hattori presented to Kowalski in 1950 
was produced during this period.  
 
Alongside their preparations for rearmament, Hattori and his associates 
undertook intelligence work for Willoughby. In recently released CIA 
records, it has been confirmed that Willoughby employed many members 
of the former Japanese military as covert intelligence agents, working 
across East Asia and even inside Japan, albeit to a lesser extent. 217 
Evidence of their employment does exist in the GHQ archives but it is 
scant and hard to find as much of the work was conducted informally with 
few records kept and an even greater proportion proved fruitless. 218 
According to its rival, the CIA, the Japanese employed by G2 often just 
took the cash and equipment they were given and fabricated the results of 
their „operations‟, principally using their position and income to advance 
their standing amongst the squabbling factions of IJA/IJN veterans.  
 
It is also evident that some of this work was certainly not undertaken in the 
interests of the Japanese government. Hattori managed to infiltrate some 
of his followers into the NSF and recently declassified documents reveal 
that he was also allegedly involved in planning a coup d‟état in mid-
1952.219 The coup, uncovered by the CIA, was allegedly planned in early 
July 1952 under Hattori‟s overall control but using his friend and mentor 
Tsuji Masanobu as its front man. The plotters envisaged using members 
of their group both inside and outside the NSF to assassinate Yoshida and 
replace him with Hatoyama Ichirō (Prime Minister 1954-1956) or Ogata 
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Taketora (a future head of the Liberal Party).220 These two men, both 
purgees, were perceived as more sympathetic to the group‟s aims of rapid 
rearmament and the return of members of the former regime to power. 
The plot also reflected Hattori‟s loathing for Yoshida, initially bred from 
what he perceived as the Prime Minister‟s hostility to purgees and 
nationalists and fed by Yoshida‟s veto of his leadership of the NPR in 
1950.221 Despite planning reaching an advanced stage, the plotters, under 
Tsuji‟s influence, decided to postpone their actions until after the 
forthcoming election and then only to act if a socialist government were 
elected. Later the plotters considering murdering other senior government 
figures to warn and intimidate Yoshida, but again this plan was also 
postponed and then dropped. 222  Whether these postponements were 
designed to serve Tsuji‟s interests in the forthcoming election campaign is 
difficult to determine, but his election to the Diet in October 1952 sunk the 
final nail in the plot‟s coffin. This plot, which made front page news in the 
Japanese press in 2007, clearly illustrates the reactionary politics of 
Hattori and the threat to the Japanese state and the character of the NPR 
he represented.223 
 
The nadir of Hattori‟s fortunes came with his connection with the Kaji affair 
of 1951-1952. Kaji Wataru, a novelist, JCP supporter and suspected 
Soviet spy was kidnapped by G2 on 25 January 1951 and handed over to 
the CIA, in the first documented case of direct co-operation between the 
two organisations. Kaji was held incommunicado and allegedly tortured 
over an eleven month period. The affair only became public after the 
author‟s wife protested to the Japanese authorities, eventually securing 
her husband‟s release on 7 December 1952. Press ire over this 
extrajudicial detention and alleged torture was further stoked by the fact 
that he had been detained by the Americans for eight months after the 
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supposed restoration of Japanese sovereignty at the end of the 
Occupation in April 1952. Resulting press investigations alleged a link 
between Hattori‟s clique of former officers and the kidnapping and Hattori 
was vilified in the press and his organisation disbanded.  224 
 
Despite this seemingly politically fatal incident, Hattori was once again 
involved in controversy in the mid-1950s. In 1956 the Self Defence Forces‟ 
Defence Council required a new member and Hattori‟s friends Tsuji 
Masanobu (now a Diet member) and Hatoyama (now Prime Minister) 
nominated him for the position. However, the proposal was met with swift 
and firm opposition, both from the bureaucracy and from SDF officers who 
still questioned Hattori‟s commitment to civilian control. Also, in a move 
reminiscent of their pre-1945 inter-service rivalry, the former IJN officers of 
the Maritime Self Defence Force balked at having an IJA veteran in the 
post.225 
 
Clearly the appointment of such an ultra-nationalist as head of the NPR 
could have been a serious threat to Japanese democracy. With the failure 
of the Hattori-Willoughby plot the NPR ducked a potential coup de grâce, 
and the Japanese government dodged a potential coup d‟état. General 
Willoughby‟s role in the plots clearly shows the seemingly logical, but 
politically näive, if not dangerous, commitment to a new Japanese army 
he shared with many members of the US Army. This commitment is 
admirably explained by Kowalski:  
 
From a military point of view General Willoughby‟s position was 
correct. It was logical. An effective military force, he contented, 
could not be organised by civilians. A military establishment 
required professionals, men of military training, experienced career 
officers.226  
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As well as revealing the battles over the NPR‟s role and character, the 
episodes detailed above show the lengths to which individuals such as 
Willoughby could influence Occupation policy: „His actions demonstrate 
the extremes to which an influential, determined staff officer can go in an 
American military headquarters to circumvent his government ‟s directives 
and even international directives‟.227 The blocking of Willoughby‟s plans 
for the NPR by MacArthur and Yoshida underlines their commitment to a 
NPR of a constabulary character. The plot also indicates MacArthur‟s 
weakened, but still present, commitment to earlier Occupation policies 
through his support of the purge restrictions and disarmament ordinances. 
Yoshida‟s opposition also shows his fear of the old military making a 
political comeback and his determination to prevent the erosion of the 
civilian supremacy over the security services.228 The defeat of the purgees 
preserved the constabulary character and police leadership of the NPR for 
a time, although these were to come under a more sustained assault 
later. 229  The failure also thwarted an attempt to eliminate the civilian 
control of the NPR, a principle which survives to this day and remains a 





In support of the second main aim of the study of revealing the nature of 
the NPR, this chapter has argued that the force was a constabulary and 
conducted an in-depth examination of the character of the organisation. 
The recruitment, training, examinations, deployment, logistics, capabilities, 
internal security role and civil police links of the NPR were all explored and 
all pointed toward the constabulary character of the force. These 
examinations also represented an original, primary source based 
contribution to a field where there is much debate. The chapter also 
argued that recruitment of the NPR was heavily influenced by and 
connected to the civil police, another defining characteristic of a 
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constabulary. The training and examinations of the force were also shown 
to be of an internal security/constabulary nature. The NPR was clearly 
shown to be intended, equipped and deployed for internal security duties 
and was so poorly supplied and logistically dependent on the US that it 
was highly unsuitable for external security duties.  
 
The capabilities of the NPR, while evolving late in the life of the force, 
were, for the greatest portion of its existence, similarly inadequate for 
preserving Japan‟s external security. The chapter has argued that the 
NPR was clearly designed for an internal security role and to fill an internal, 
not external, security vacuum. The NPR had wide-ranging and deep-
seated ties to the civil police, especially the National Rural Police, which 
again reveal its constabulary character. This analysis challenges the 
opinions of many historians who argue that the NPR was an army from the 
start.230 
 
The chapter also contributed to achieving the first main aim of the study, 
by providing evidence of Japanese influence on the force. Those explored 
in this chapter represented „top-down‟ attempts to influence the NPR by 
both Japanese government and former imperial officers. The unsuccessful 
attempts by Willoughby and Hattori to induct Imperial officers into the NPR 
and hence convert it into an army revealed the constabulary character of 
the force and the determination of MacArthur, Yoshida and others to 
preserve that character. The defeat of these attempts and the reactionary 
Rightwing perspectives they represent also marked a significant victory for 
democracy and civilian control over the security services. 
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Chapter Four: The Operational 
Aspects of the NPR 
 
 
As this study seeks to produce the first complete history of the NPR an 
examination of the intended role and use of the force is essential. This 
chapter again contributes to fulfilling the second key aim of this work by 
building on the analysis of the preceding chapter in exploring the 
operational aspects of the NPR's character. This exploration is required as 
the subject has not been approached elsewhere and is one which has 
major implications for any analysis of the character of the force. The 
chapter illustrates the constabulary character of the force, the battles over 
its direction, and the influence of the JCP on the NPR. The chapter 
provides a survey of the living conditions and legal position of the NPR's 
members, and an examination of the JCP‟s „military campaign‟ of the 
period. This analysis of the JCP contributes to the first main aim of the 
study in revealing Japanese perspectives and influences on the force and 
the examination of the „bottom up‟ attempts by the JCP to seize control of 
the force and turn it into a tool of the Left, provides another new domestic 
perspective on the force. The key question as to why the NPR was never 
used in its original internal security role is also examined in detail, with the 
use of „Bloody May Day‟ as a case study. Furthermore, the relations 
between the JCP and the NPR and the development of the NPR's role in 
disaster relief operations are also examined in pursuit of both the primary 









The Living Conditions of Members of the NPR 
 
As we have seen in preceding chapters there was a range of opinions 
existed over the proposed character of Japan‟s security forces and these 
debates did not cease with the creation of the NPR. Like most aspects of 
the Occupation, even when faced with a unified front by GHQ (which was 
a rarity), the Japanese government could still resist demands placed upon 
it through manipulation of information and the lack of GHQ oversight. As 
noted by Schaller: „this lack of oversight allowed the Japanese to ignore or 
defy many unpleasant demands or, more important, to distort the 
information on which SCAP relied‟.1 In the case of the debates following 
the creation of the Police Reserve, members of the Japanese government 
did practise these obstructive techniques as well as foot dragging and 
playing the various concerned elements of GHQ off against each other in 
order to pursue individual political goals and the overall Japanese 
government goal of maintaining the constabulary character of the NPR.2 
 
One of the first successes of the Japanese in this struggle was over the 
pay of the NPR. The final monthly wage agreed upon for enlisted 
members of the NPR was ¥5,000, more than the ¥3,750 given to standard 
police recruits, and supplemented after two years service with a ¥60,000 
superannuity.3 In addition recruits received free medical care, dental care, 
clothing, accommodation and meals.4 These terms featured prominently in 
the NPR recruitment campaign, being prominently displayed on the main 
recruiting poster (see figure XVIII). The generous pay and conditions 
compared to similar kinds of employment (see table XIII), coupled with the 
superannuation payment which exceeded many recruits‟ annual salary, 
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made enlistment in the NPR seem a very attractive proposition to many 
young men.5  
 






As noted in the previous chapter, this was the exact effect desired by both 
the US and Japanese planners. The package was so attractive as to 
cause major concern amongst the Tokyo Metropolitan Police (MPD) and 
National Rural Police that masses of their men might transfer into the NPR. 
Chief Tanaka, head of the MPD, was so concerned that he protested to 
G2 that in the first eight days of the existence of the NPR over seven 
hundred of his officers had already applied to transfer and he expected 
more. This was an unintended consequence of the NPR‟s pay and 
conditions (even the National Rural Police itself had recommended that 
the NPR get a salary of ¥5,128 per month plus allowances) and Tanaka 
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was assured by Mulbar, a senior figure in G2‟s Public Safety Division, that 
GHQ would not „rob Peter to pay Paul‟ as the transfers were 
counterproductive and would only further weaken the police that the 
National Rural Police was set up to bolster.7  
 
Table XIII. Daily Pay of NPR Personnel and Other Comparable 
Professions8 
 
Rank/Profession Daily Pay 
Range/Average (¥) 
NPR inc Benefits 
(¥) 
NPR Sergeant 1st Class 245-280^* 328-363+ 
NPR Sergeant 2nd Class 220-240^* 303-323+ 
NPR Sergeant 3rd Class 200-220^* 283-303+ 
NPR Senior Patrolman 180-200^ 263-283+ 
NPR Patrolman 1st Class 165-185^ 248-268+ 
NPR Patrolman 2nd Class 150-170^ 233-253+ 
National Rural Police Patrolman 125 - 
Navvy 227 - 
Stevedore (on ship) 423 - 
Carpenter 326 - 
Clerk 382 - 
Nurse 220  
^Excludes value of meals, clothing, medical/dental care, billet and bonus. 
*Excludes ¥45 provided for mess and billet if living off base. 
+Approximate (base daily pay plus 33 for bonus, 45 of mess and billet, 5 for 
medical and dental). 
 
 
The final pay and conditions offered to NPR recruits, including the bonus 
were the result of compromise stemming from a dispute between the 
NPR‟s US advisors and the NPR leadership under Masuhara Keikichi, the 
force‟s civilian Director General. The Japanese wanted fairly low pay to 
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discourage men choosing long-term employment with the force, and 
hence the formation of a „career‟ military. In contrast, the US Army 
advisors and their pro-military leadership wanted a high wage to attract 
men to a potential „career in arms‟ and to form a cadre of highly trained 
men for the future expansion which the US Army desired. After a struggle 
between the two authorities a compromise was reached: a relatively high 
base salary as sought by the US advisors, but with a fixed term of 
employment and bonus, both pushed for by the Japanese.9 The Japanese 
gave three reasons for the use of the bonus: to assure the success of the 
recruitment campaign, to obtain the maximum number of applicants and 
thereby increase the quality of the force, and to discourage the creation of 
a career military, through the temporary contracts and the likelihood that 
most would take the bonus and leave - the exact opposite of US advisors‟ 
wishes. 10  The Japanese actually pushed for an even more generous 
bonus structure, with ¥70,000 for those leaving after a two year term, or 
¥100,000 for three years. The Japanese planned to give those who stayed 
on after three years the chance to compete for a very limited number of 
staff positions. 11  Again this structure and the fact that a „chance to 
compete‟, as opposed to a guaranteed ¥100,000, was unlikely to be taken 
by many, underscores the Japanese desire to avoid the creation of a 
professional army.12 In early August in front of the Diet‟s upper house local 
administration committee, Attorney General Ohashi further detailed the 
Japanese plans for this system stating that service with the NPR would be 
limited to a maximum of ten years, a condition which necessitated 
payment of the retirement bonus.13 Although the sum of ¥60,000 was 
decided upon after a compromise between the Japanese government and 
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GHQ, details of the former Japanese plan appeared during the initial 
recruiting period in the Nippon Times which quoted the bonuses to be paid 
as ¥80,000 for two years and ¥100,000 for three. 14  This and other 
contradictory announcements, rumours and the lengthy debates over the 
wages and the terms and conditions to be offered resulted in some 
confusion and the resignation of some recruits before they were even 
inducted into the NPR.15 Nevertheless, the overall success of the bonus 
scheme was not in doubt, with many recruits citing it as the main reason 
they had applied to join.16 Despite the success in attracting recruits, the 
wrangling over pay and conditions led to some delays in the payment of 
the NPR‟s salary which as noted in the section below on the influence of 
the JCP, caused some discontent within the force. 
 
It seemed that the encouragement away from forming a career in the NPR 
by the Japanese government did not extend to the higher ranks, who were 
awarded high salaries which were justified by claims that they needed to 
compete with the private sector. 17  Given that all the high ranks were 
former policemen and home ministry bureaucrats whose loyalty and 
control of the force was necessary to prevent the NPR from becoming an 
army, or the force becoming a threat to the Japanese government, this 
attitude on the part of the Japanese is entirely understandable. The official 
US history of the NPR, History of the National Police Reserve of Japan, 
July 1950- April 1952, with its heavily pro-military and pro-US Army bias 
argues that through this obstruction of US policy and his later battles 
against the recruitment of purgees Masuhara sought to preserve the NPR 
as his personal fiefdom in which officer commissions would serve as 
plums for his loyal friends from the police service and former home 
ministry.18 There may be a grain of truth in this analysis but the fact that 




 History of the National Police Reserve, p140; H. Masuda (ed), Rearmament of Japan, 
Part 1: 1947-1952, Congressional Information Service and Maruzen, Tokyo, 1998, 
(hereafter YF-A16), 1D-190, Conference: Authority of the National Police Reserve, 
21/10/50. 
16
 Nippon Times, 7/10/50. 
17
 ESS(D) 13267, „Reasons for the Necessity of High Salary Schedule for NPR HQ staff‟, 
8/50. 
18
 History of the National Police Reserve, p174. 
229 
 
his actions were also in defence of the constabulary character of the NPR 
are glossed over, in one of the earliest examples of the hindsight and 
overemphasis on the US role colouring the analysis of the character of the 
NPR.  
 
Aside from his remuneration a NPR member also received his uniform and 
equipment free of charge. The procurement process of the NPR‟s 
uniforms and the type of equipment issued are other facets of the NPR 
which reflect its constabulary character. From the start, and indicative of 
the paramilitary character of the NPR, senior National Rural Policemen 
were involved at every stage of the procurement process, initially as 
temporary appointees, and later permanently, once transferred into the 
NPR. As noted in the preceding chapter the NPR and National Rural 
Police were closely connected in a number of ways, especially at senior 
level. For example, the heads of the service divisions of the National Rural 
Police along with most of the senior leadership of the National Rural 
Police were directly involved in the running and command of the 
equivalent sections of the NPR. 19  The National Rural Police paid for 
equipment, food and clothing, and signed contracts for the NPR until it 
was properly staffed by transferring personnel into it from the National 
Rural Police, Municipal Police and bureaucracy. The National Rural Police 
also arranged the manufacture of the uniforms, bedding and equipment for 
the NPR. 20  These exchanges represent the close connection and 
exchange of personnel with the civil police which is one of the defining 
characteristics of a constabulary.21 
 
An examination of the items of equipment issued to the NPR is also 
indicative of its constabulary character. The official Japanese government 
document detailing the equipment of the NPR lists the complete set of 
equipment all members was expected to possess. This included items of a 
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military character such as fatigues and boots, but many more of a police 
character such as a notebook, arrest rope, alarm whistle and police 
baton.22 Even the provision of military style boots was partially curtailed 
and replaced with shoes when it was revealed that Japanese industry 
would be unable to supply a sufficient number.23  
 
The NPR‟s members were provided with three uniforms, a summer 
uniform of light tan coloured hemp or cotton, a fatigue or work uniform to 
be worn on „dirty duty‟, and a deep navy woollen winter uniform with 
matching raincoat. The complete impracticability of either of these colours 
as battlefield camouflage illustrates that the NPR was not intended to 
operate on the frontline and hence indicates the constabulary character of 
the force. These uniforms were not obviously military in design and bore a 
closer resemblance in terms of style to police uniforms, or even, in the 
case of the light tan variant, the uniforms of factory workers (see figures 
XIX and XX). The lack of any military-style ceremonial uniform further 
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Furthermore, the lack of steel helmets, until 1952 (and then their all white 
paint scheme) again shows the constabulary character of the force.25 
Aside from the constraints of practicality and supply, fashion also played 
its part in influencing the NPRs kit, with recruits overwhelmingly preferring 
the old style Japanese armed forces cap as they claimed it possessed 
more „sex appeal‟ than the US style „garrison cap‟ they were meant to 
wear when off base (see figures XIX and XX for examples of the rival 
pieces of headgear).26  
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Alongside this free clothing, a further significant benefit awarded to NPR 
members was that of free housing. All single officers and men were 
billeted on base but those ranked sergeant or above could live off base if 
they wished, receiving an additional mess and billeting allowance for 
housing costs and the purchase of meals.28 Nevertheless, conditions on 
NPR bases were cramped, especially in the early stages, with most men 
living in a highly confined fifty square feet, the minimum space deemed 
healthy and hygienic by the US advisors.29 Even for more senior ranks 
conditions were not much better, with a sixteen by sixteen foot room 
considered sufficient for eight Inspectors, or six Senior Inspectors in 
double bunks, or four Superintendents in single bunks. 30  Despite the 
seemingly military connotations of having staff live on base, this is a 
feature shared with many of the preceding US constabularies and 
contemporary paramilitary police forces of the era.31 
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In addition to the barracks given over to the NPR, most of which were 
former IJA/IJN depots or bases, a number of other items belonging to the 
former regime found their way into the hands of the NPR. Interestingly 
SCAP, not the Japanese government, authorised the transfer of significant 
amounts of reparations material to the NPR from late 1950 onwards.33 In 
September 1950 an NPR base in Kyushu received a number of former 
Japanese military water pumps, boilers, pipes and transformers to provide 
adequate heating and electricity for the mothballed buildings it occupied.34 
Other former IJA/IJN assets such as twenty large rice cookers formerly 
employed at Sasebo naval base were transferred to the NPR and 
eventually used in the NPR base in Fukuoka, Kyushu.35 In March 1951 the 
NPR supply depot in Uji, south of Kyoto received around two miles of rail 
track and 176 meters of rail points for use in the repair and distribution of 
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vehicles and supplies.36  The following month a large cache of former 
IJA/IJN building supplies, medical respirators, kettles, motors, sirens and 
whetstones were distributed to various bases in Kyushu. 37  Alongside 
these larger items, numerous smaller items such as office furniture and 
stationery were widely reassigned to the NPR across Japan.38  
 
The transfer of reparations material to organisations other than the NPR 
also resulted from the force‟s creation. Due to a shortage of space to 
house the NPR and its equipment there are several recorded incidents of 
base space formerly used as storage for industrial plant held as 
reparations, being transferred to the NPR and plant being returned to its 
original owners. Some plant was also given to, or returned to, Japanese 
firms to help them manufacture equipment for the NPR or construct its 
bases.39 All of this material had been earmarked as reparations for the 
former Allies and areas invaded by the Japanese during the Pacific War. 
Despite the various flaws in the „reverse course‟ concept, this transfer of 
reparations material back to its original owners or directly to the NPR does 
represent a direct reversal of US policy. It is indicative of Japan‟s postwar 
international position and also somewhat ironic that some of the same 
men as during wartime, were again in the service of Japan, on the same 
bases, eating from the same kitchens, but now in the defence of their 
homeland against communism and in support of a US led war defending 
part of their former empire. 
 
A further example of the poor conditions faced by the NPR can be found in 
its food supply. Despite a heavy training schedule, especially in the first 
few weeks where physical fitness was the focus, the diet provided to the 
NPR was inadequate for their needs. The need for extra staple foods in 
order to give the men of the NPR the extra calories necessary for training 
had been noted from the inception of the force. Special authorisation was 
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given by GHQ to circumvent the normal rationing regulations as it was 
seen as too time consuming and bureaucratic to use ration cards for each 
individual NPR member. Initial plans also detailed the recommended daily 
amount of food the NPR should receive. This consisted of the standard 
ration of 2.7 go of rice with one go extra (around 560g) plus additional 
staple goods, sugars, fats and oils.40 Even though the standards were 
above average, within weeks they were shown to be insufficient and the 
daily rice portion was increased substantially in October 1950 to 4.7 go 
(about 700g/2,300kcals), still a meagre amount for a physically demanding 
job.41 As can be seen in table XIV around this time the Japanese Ministry 
of Finance released detailed regulations over the costs and content of the 
NPR‟s diet. For a daily cost of ¥66.6 per man (a monthly cost of ¥2,000 
each) the NPR was meant to provide a suitable diet for its members.42 
 





Cost per kg 
(¥) 
Cost (¥) Approx Calories 
Clean Rice 0.60 45.82 27.49 1,950 
Clean Barley 0.19 36.58 6.80 658 
Side Dish 0.31 100.00 30.90 618 
Total 1.10 182.40 65.20 3,226 
 
 
If provided exactly as specified, the diet probably would have been 
sufficient for most NPR members but the small budget provided for 
purchasing food added to local ad-hoc procurement and highly variable 
standards of cookery led to many NPR members being undernourished. 
The problem was seen as so significant that Doctor Pegg of the Public 
Health Section of GHQ‟s Kanto Civil Affairs Region, was dispatched to 
conduct a detailed survey of the diet provided to the NPR in camp Takada 
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in Niigata prefecture and Camp Utsunomiya in Tochigi prefecture. Dr 
Pegg‟s findings (shown in table XV below) were far from positive. His 
study concluded that the amount of calories, fats, vitamins and 
carbohydrate in the NPR diet were all inadequate. The diet of the NPR 
was inferior when measured against that of the recommended Japanese 
guidelines for heavy work and was even less than the spartan standards 
of the IJA and IJN during the 1937-1945 Sino-Japanese war. Pegg also 
noted that as his calculations of the NPR diet were based upon the 
nutritional content of raw food and that as up to a fifth of this could be lost 
during cooking, the deficiencies in the NPR diet were likely to be even 
greater than he had reported.44 
 
Table XV. Daily Nutrition in two NPR Camps in late 1950 in Comparison45 
 
 Calories Protein (g) Carbohydrate (g) Fat (g) 
Camp Utsunomiya 2,818.6 108.5 484.5 34.5 
Camp Takada 2,900 134 529 27 
Heavy Work¹ 3,500 110 677.5 39 
IJA² 3,197 127 738 28 
IJN² 3,600 135 650 50 
¹ According to National Nutritional Basic Regulations. 
² According to 1938 Basic Regulations. 
 
In order to rectify this situation Pegg recommended new nutritional 
standards, longer and more frequent surveys of the NPR‟s diet and the 
procurement and provision of more calorific foods.46 In the light of these 
figures press reports of NPR members buying up all the cakes and bread 
in shops are not surprising, and neither are the accounts of many sleeping 
through their afternoon leisure time, a measure necessary for men who 
were not getting enough food to do a full day‟s work.47 Their diet gradually 
improved but even in 1951 the food provided to the NPR was plain in 
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nature, small in quantity and contained little other than staples of bread, 
rice and barley.48  
 
The poor diet of the NPR was also a common feature in JCP propaganda 
directed at winning over members of the force and probably resulted in the 
resignation of some members of the force.49 Food also played a role in 
some of the efforts of the JCP to infiltrate the force. In one incident an 
NPR camp recruited its cooks from the local area and the NPR man 
placed in charge of hiring the men was a JCP member. He apparently 
recruited twenty fellow JCP members as cooks, who proceeded to give 
out propaganda leaflets and urge members to eat and waste as much 
food as possible, thus creating shortages resulting in dissatisfaction which 
could be used to their advantage. There were also reports in the Japanese 
press of local JCP officials inviting NPR members out for dinner and to 
other evening entertainments in order to try and glean information from 
them, spread dissatisfaction, propaganda and attempt to win them over to 
the side of the JCP.50  
 
The diet of the force could also be argued to show the constabulary 
character of the NPR. Unlike all armies, the NPR had few facilities, and 
even less training, for cooking in the field, revealing its locally based area 
of operations and hence internal security character. 51  Furthermore, it 
could be argued that as the NPR were fed less than the wartime level of 
the IJA and IJN (see tables XIV and XV above) that the Japanese 
bureaucrats who set the nutritional level may not have envisaged the NPR 
undertaking prolonged periods of physically demanding work, perhaps 
including the participation in external security duties. 
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The meagre diet its members consumed also contributed to ill health in 
the NPR. However, NPR members were allowed free medical and dental 
care as part of their employment and a number of precautionary measures 
were undertaken by the authorities overseeing the NPR in order to 
minimise the risk of disease amongst its members. These included 
quarantine, generous use of antibiotics regardless of cost in order to 
reduce the risk of infection as fast as possible, the free distribution of 
prophylactics and oral penicillin, and close co-operation with civil 
authorities to contain or control incidents of disease.52 Perhaps the most 
significant of the measures undertaken to ensure the health of the NPR 
was the administration of a massive catch-up programme of 
immunizations against major diseases. According to Japanese 
government policy all Japanese subjects should have received 
immunisations against smallpox, typhoid, paratyphoid A and B and 
tuberculosis before their eighteenth birthday. However, due to the 
devastation of war and the rural background of many of the recruits of the 
NPR the status of completion of immunisations amongst the recruits was 
way below the average for the rest of the population. In order to bring the 
immunisations of all the NPR up to the required standard a special 
immunisation programme was instituted and all NPR members received 
the required immunisations by 1 November 1950.53 Even canine members 
of the NPR could not escape the immunisation campaign and all dogs 
living in barracks were immunised against rabies.54  
 
Like the rest of Japanese society one of the principal disease which 
afflicted members of the NPR was tuberculosis, the „number one killer‟ 
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disease in Japan at the time.55 A recent work has estimated that in 1950 a 
significant proportion of the population was infected with TB, and that the 
disease resulted in around 80,000 deaths per year, partially as a result of 
the collapse of effective public health provision and immunisations 
programmes during the war and its aftermath.56 This prevalence of TB was 
reflected in the personnel of the NPR. Despite demanding physical 
standards and following the creation of a treatment programme in 1951, 
1.3% or 1 in 75 of the NPR had medically confirmed cases of TB, and as 
the discovery of the disease could result in their discharge, many more 
undisclosed cases are likely to have been present (see table XVI).57 The 
scale of the problem of TB, as illustrated in figures XXII to XXV was 
significant, dwarfing sexually transmitted diseases and usually exceeding 
the incidence of sexually transmitted disease and injury combined. 
 
Table XVI. Tuberculosis in the NPR on the 31 July 195158 
 
Status of NPR Member Number  
At Home 631 
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Figures XXII to XXV. Breakdown of Percentages of NPR Hospital Patients 
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With such a large number of ill men, the very limited number of NPR 
medical officers struggled to cope.60 The problem was so serious that in 
early November 1950 the NPR began to discharge all men and officers 
afflicted with TB.61 This move, pushed for largely by the Japanese, was 
opposed by the US advisors to the NPR, and senior members of GHQ 
contacted all the NPR base commanders to demand triplicate copies of all 
the discharge papers of those dismissed due to TB.62 To the Japanese 
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bureaucracy discharging those with TB seemed a wise move due to 
several factors: the cost of treating what could be thousands of men was 
an expense the strained public purse could ill afford, infected men could 
spread the disease throughout the NPR, and the presence of so many 
invalids men could reflect poorly on both the NPR and the government. In 
pursuit of their ambitions for a career military force, and in the interest of 
morale, Civil Affairs Section (CAS) tried to convince the Japanese 
government to re-enlist those who recovered, also proposing limiting 
treatment expenses to ¥6,000 per month per man, and defining more 
explicitly the pay and allowances the sick men should receive. 63 After 
some debate the Japanese agreed to the American proposals and the 
NPR Chief of General Affairs, Senior Superintendant Hayase Yoshitaka, 
wrote to all those who had been discharged due to TB to inform them that 
they could be reinstated, effective from their date of discharge if they 
applied by 20 December 1950 and met the specified requirements.64 
These requirements stated that the recruits would receive treatment at 
home and would return to duty only after two doctors or NPR medical 
officers confirmed they were cured. In a manner typical of a police force 
rather than an army the sick were treated as civil servants, receiving 
benefits under article thirty of the National Public Employee Mutual Aid 
Association Law. The sick men were awarded up to ¥6,000 a month to 
cover examinations, medicine, treatments, operations and hospital 
accommodation as necessary, plus nursing and transport if approved by 
NPR HQ. These benefits were awarded on top of their normal full salary, 
less mess and billet allowances, and were payable for eight months, at 
which time if they were not cured the men were again discharged from the 
NPR.65 
 
Aside from the incidents described in the previous paragraphs, two other 
medical aspects of the character of the NPR help to reveal its 
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constabulary character. First, in a move showing another of the numerous 
links between the NPR and National Rural Police, the physical standards 
of the National Rural Police were used to judge whether recruits were 
suitable for service in the NPR. As well as illustrating that the duties which 
the NPR was intended to perform were close to that of the National Rural 
Police, the fact that US military fitness standards (which were well known 
to men like Shepard who had served as head of training at Fort Benning in 
the United States), or a bespoke, and more martial, programme were not 
adopted illustrates the constabulary role of the NPR. 66  Secondly, the 
medical service of NPR was provided by a mix of medical officers within 
the organisation and civilian doctors, and this mix of military and civilian 
practices again shows the constabulary character of the NPR.67  
 
 
The Legal Position of the NPR 
 
One of the most useful areas in demonstrating the constabulary character 
of the NPR is the legal position it occupied. The men of the NPR were 
required to sign an oath of office immediately after being processed and 
assigned to their units.68 This pledge was also recited daily at 6 am by the 
entire force. 69  The oath was seen as a legally and morally binding 
agreement between the men and the Japanese state and is quoted in full 
as follows: 
 
I esteem it a great honour to have been appointed the personnel of the 
National Police Reserve which maintains peace and order of our 
country and guarantees the public welfare, and I solemnly swear as 
follows: 
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1. I will faithfully protect and defend the constitution of Japan and 
laws, and observe orders. 
2. I will observe fidelity; hold sincerity in high esteem; and with 
courage, I will perform my duties. 
3. I will obey faithfully the command on duty of a superior official. 
4. I will not join any public body, organisation, principles of which 
require me to follow the same in priority to my duties. [sic]70  
 
No doubt those who argue that the NPR was a military force from the 
moment of its creation will find the first point ironic, but a more detailed 
examination of the oath reveals the true character of the NPR. The 
confinement of the NPR to Japanese territory meant that the maintenance 
of „peace and order‟ and the guarantee of „public welfare‟ were clear 
references to an internal security role. The fourth point is also useful, 
revealing the threat the JCP and JCP infiltration (secret JCP members 
were made to sign similar oaths of loyalty to the JCP) were seen to 
present. Officers and sergeants were also required to take additional 
oaths, the principal additional content of which was a promise not to resign 
without good reason. This freedom to resign at anytime contrasts sharply 
to a binding army-style contract.71 The constabulary character of the NPR 
is clearly noticeable in these oaths and even the hawkish and pro-military 
Shepard recognised the police character of the force in this dimension: 
„service is similar to that of rural police with no definite term of enlistment 
and the right to resign at any time, all on a voluntary basis, therefore, with 
no compulsion involved or a minimum term of enlistment, they are handled 
like civilians more than like military personnel‟.72 
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Aside from the oaths of office, NPR members were subject to a civilian 
code of justice which closely mirrored that of a civil police force. Before the 
formal system of standard operating procedures was drafted, if criminal 
charges were brought against NPR members, they were be forwarded to 
the local National Rural Police HQ for investigation, who then decided 
upon disciplinary action if necessary. 73  This again indicates the close 
connections between the NPR and the National Rural Police and hence 
the constabulary character of the force. In a further instance which 
underlines these connections, during the early stages of the NPR‟s 
existence its officers were instructed to hand over any NPR member to the 
civil police, if the police had a warrant for his arrest.74 During the initial 
months of the NPR,  the civilian character of its disciplinary structure was 
further displayed through the fact that being absent without leave for up to 
ten days went unpunished and that the most serious punishment, aside 
from discharge, was a fifteen day suspension on full pay.75 
 
The most significant document in defining the responsibilities and 
disciplinary process of the NPR was the Prime Minister‟s Ordinance No.34, 
„Regulations for Discipline and Punishment of the Personnel of the 
National Police Reserve‟. The document is also important in 
demonstrating the constabulary character of the force through its various 
clauses and its creation of a civilian legal position far closer to that of a 
police force than a military. The ordinance contains clear indications of the 
NPR‟s constabulary character, for example, the men of the NPR are 
defined as „servants of the people‟, i.e. civilian civil servants or pol ice 
officers.76 Also, like a police force the NPR members were barred from 
drinking on duty and to excess when off duty. The clause: „he shall be 
quiet, civil and orderly in the performance of duties, he shall be of even 
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temper, patience and discretion to persons and he shall refrain from the 
use of course, profane or insolent language or manner‟ is again typical of 
a civilian/police-type organisation.77 Another clause which clearly shows 
the organisation‟s police connections was the rule instructing the NPR 
members to „refrain from keeping company with persons of questionable 
character and entering places of ill repute unless necessary in the 
performance of his duties‟.78 Aside from these clearly constabulary-type 
regulations, the ordinance also contained some regulations aimed at 
preventing the force becoming a threat to the civilian government. 
Foremost amongst these was the instruction that an NPR man „shall never 
abuse his authority in any way, nor shall he interfere with the civil liberties 
and rights of the individual as guaranteed in the constitution of Japan‟.79 
Provisions against the perceived threat from the JCP were also contained 
in the ordinance. NPR men were permitted to be members of groups 
allowed by the 1947 National Public Service Law but were prohibited from 
engaging in political campaigns, and in a direct prohibition of JCP 
membership: „any police official who is now a member or becomes a 
member of or affiliates with any group which promotes, advocates, or 
takes part in unlawful strikes, lawlessness, or illegal overthrow of local or 
national government will be dismissed‟.80  
 
In the event of disciplinary procedures being taken against an NPR 
member, Prime Minister‟s Ordinance No. 34 also details the procedures 
which were to be followed. An alleged disciplinary breach required the 
establishment of a form of quasi-court, at which the local NPR 
Commanding Officer, acting as judge and jury, called witnesses and 
evidence for the defence and prosecution and at which the accused could 
request an officer to act as his counsel. If convicted, the guilty party was 
allowed thirty days to appeal to the national NPR appeals board. The 
powers to pronounce certain punishments were restricted below the rank 
of Senior Superintendant but the full range of punishments available were 











as follows: for „minor‟ offences NPR men could be docked a maximum of 
one third of their pay for one month, be suspended for a maximum of 
fifteen days, or given a reprimand. For „major‟ offences an NPR man found 
guilty could expect dismissal, to be docked two-thirds of his pay for up to 
one year, or be suspended (with pay) for up to six months. Clearly these 
punishments and the structure of the tribunals are much closer to those 
administered by police disciplinary boards than those of military courts 
which have much harsher sentences at their disposal, including lengthy 
imprisonment and death. Perhaps most significantly in illustrating the 
constabulary character of the NPR, these courts and their punishments 
were entirely separate from, and subordinate to, civil criminal proceedings, 
although, at his Commanding Officer‟s discretion, the accused could be 
tried for same offence at an additional NPR tribunal following a civil trial.81 
In a subsequent document: „Regulation for the Disposition of Persons 
Accused of Criminal Offences in the National Police Reserve‟ clear 
procedures relating to this point were defined. When prosecuted for a 
criminal offence NPR members were suspended pending the result of 
their trial. If they were found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment or a 
suspended sentence they were automatically dismissed.82 Interestingly, 
the same document gave the civilian Director General the right to veto all 
disciplinary procedures against any officer of the rank of Inspector or 
above, a policy which could have had ominous results if Rightwing 
militarists such as Hattori Takushiro had seized control of the NPR.83 
These constabulary/police-type legal procedures continue in the SDF of 
today. Indeed, if a crime is committed by a member of the SDF, either on 
or off duty, he or she is subject to civil law and faces a civilian criminal trial, 
not a court martial as is typical of militaries the world over.84 Even hawkish 
members of the US military recognised that this police-type legal system 
identified the NPR as a constabulary and its reform and reconfiguration to 
a more military system was necessary if they were to succeed in 
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„[changing] the character of the force from a police force to a military-type 
armed defence force‟.85 
 
The arrest powers the force possessed are a further feature of the NPR 
which clearly indicates its constabulary character. As arrest powers are an 
integral part of a police force, are present in most constabularies, and 
absent from all armies, this facet of the NPR has a major bearing on the 
accurate appreciation of its character. Furthermore, this aspect of the NPR 
is one which had eluded all previous studies on the topic, mostly due to 
the thin source base employed by most historians.86 Like the other issues 
related to the character of the NPR, such as pay and the inclusion of 
former officers, the award of arrest powers to the NPR was pressed for by 
the Japanese police officials running the NPR, and resisted by 
conservative pro-military elements in GHQ.87 This battle, like the others, 
was one over the character of the force, with the Japanese pushing for an 
internal security force and the hawkish members of GHQ trying to move 
the NPR towards becoming the army they desired. In this round of the 
contest Masuhara, the civilian director of the NPR, a former police chief 
and home ministry bureaucrat, clashed with Pulliam, chief of G2/PSD, a 
subordinate of Willoughby and a supporter of a new Japanese army. The 
principal confrontation between the two took place at a meeting in late 
October 1950, also attended by senior PSD officials, Chief Tanaka of the 
Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), Director General Saito of the 
National Rural Police, NPR Chief of Staff Hayashi and several other senior 
police officials.88 At the opening of the meeting Pulliam stated that he had 
called it to clarify a „misunderstanding‟ about the NPR. He continued to 
argue that the ordinance setting up the NPR did not give it arrest powers, 
that it was not part of the police and had no authority over the civil police. 
Pulliam stated, incorrectly, that the NPR only had power over its own 
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members, could not arrest civilians and that the civil police could arrest 
NPR members if required. Masuhara retorted that the NPR did have 
limited police power, as this was stated in the ordinance establishing the 
NPR. Masuhara continued to stress that crimes committed by NPR 
members, and by others against the NPR or involving NPR property were 
under the criminal jurisdiction of NPR.89 The remainder of the lengthy 
debate centred on Pulliam denying that such functions were possessed by 
the police reserve, but eventually, grudgingly conceding that in an 
emergency they could be granted by the Prime Minister. Much of the 
debate also centred around the competing visions for the force, with 
Pulliam stating that „the military does not handle civilians‟ and Masuhara 
responding, in a clear expression of the Japanese view of the NPR, that: 
„we do not believe that the police reserve is a military force. We believe it 
is a police force‟.90 Pulliam also tried to claim that the assumption of arrest 
powers by the NPR would encroach on the civil police but Masuhara, 
supported by the heads of the National Rural Police and MPD, stated that 
it did not, and that GHQ had agreed to arrest powers in the ordinance 
which created the NPR. 
 
The meeting itself ended in stalemate with the issues unresolved. Due to 
this and the pivotal influence that arrest powers have in demonstrating the 
constabulary character of the NPR, a further examination of the 
documents is necessary to clarify this issue. Under the „Enforcement 
Ordinance of National Police Reserve Order‟ (Cabinet Order No. 271) 
referred to by Masuhara, the NPR were given power to police their own 
ranks and to arrest civilians provided they turned them over to the 
Municipal Police and National Rural Police as soon as possible after 
apprehension. 91  The specific circumstances in which the NPR could 
exercise their police powers were: offences committed by the personnel of 
the NPR, against the personnel of the NPR and concerning the police 
reserve by others, offences committed within the facilities of the NPR, and 






 ESS(D) 13267, Enforcement Ordinance of National Police Reserve Order (Cabinet 
Order No. 271), 24/8/50. 
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offences against the property of the NPR.92 However, in the course of their 
duties the NPR were also permitted to arrest „flagrant‟ offenders or 
suspects, but had to produce an arrest warrant as soon as possible 
afterwards and then hand over the arrested persons to the Municipal 
Police or National Rural Police. If this transfer proved impossible, the NPR 
were able to process and imprison suspects in accordance with normal 
civil police procedures. The ordinance also defined members of the NPR 
at the rank of senior patrolman or above as „judicial police officials‟ and the 
rest as „judicial policemen‟. 93  The legal significance of this was 
unambiguous: „the [NPR] police officials may arrest, as judicial police 
officials, besides a flagrant offender, the suspect in accordance with the 
provision of article 210 of the Code of Criminal Procedure‟.94 Article 210 of 
the code of criminal procedure (Act No. 131 of 1948), covered emergency 
arrest and applies to persons fleeing the police, emergencies and 
situations where there was sufficient reason to suspect them of serious 
crime, or when persons were armed, in possession of stolen goods, or 
there was distinct evidence of a crime.95 The code of criminal procedure 
itself states:  
 
 When there are sufficient grounds to suspect the commission of an 
offense punishable by death, or life imprisonment with or without 
work or for a maximum period of three years or more, and in 
addition, because of urgency an arrest warrant from a judge cannot 
be obtained, a public prosecutor, a public prosecutor's assistant 
officer or a judicial police official may arrest the suspect after 
notifying the suspect of the reasons therefor. In such cases, the 
procedure of obtaining an arrest warrant from a judge shall be 
taken immediately. Where an arrest warrant is not issued, the 
suspect shall be released immediately.96 








 C.F. Goodman, The Rule of Law in Japan: A Comparative Analysis, Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 2003, pp 288-299. 
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This article highlights the usual requirement for a pre-existing arrest 
warrant in Japan and has been argued by some to be inconsistent with 
Article 33 of the constitution which states: „No person shall be 
apprehended except upon warrant issued by a competent judicial officer 
which specifies the offense with which the person is charged, unless he is 
apprehended, [whilst] the offense [is] being committed‟.97  
 
In reference to the above we can see that the NPR did legally possess the 
powers of arrest in a number of different circumstances. In practice these 
included all criminals they encountered in conducting their duties, those 
who committed crimes against NPR bases or personnel, and NPR men 
who had committed crimes. The majority of these arrests would have been 
under article 210 of the 1948 criminal code and would have resulted in the 
handing over of the arrested persons to the civil police who then would 
have produced an arrest warrant. This, however, was a legal technicality 
and the NPR did legally possess the right to arrest. Masuhara was correct 
in his argument with Pulliam and the NPR did clearly possess arrest 
powers, a feature common to all police forces, most constabularies and 
absent from armies. The „confusion‟, as the official US reports on NPR 
called it, over the NPR's arrest powers persisted throughout its 
existence.98 Although, as the NPR was never used in a situation where its 
arrest powers were required, the „confusion‟ over them was only ultimately 
resolved with the elimination of the powers with the creation of the 





                                                             
97
 Article 33, The Constitution of Japan, 1947, printed in, G.D. Hook and G. McCormack, 
Japan’s Contested Constitution, Routledge, London, 2001, p 193. 
98
 „Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve‟, p 26. 
99
Hoanchōhō (National Safety Agency Law), 31/7/1952, printed in, H. Ōtake (ed), Sengo 
Nihon Bōeimondai Shiryōshū (Postwar Japan Defence Problem Materials Collection), 
Dainikan, Kōwa to Saigunbi no Honkakuka (Volume 2, The Realisation of The Peace 
Treaty and Rearmament), Sanichishobo, 1992, pp 391-407. 
251 
 
The JCP 1950-1952: The ‘Military Policy’ in Action, 
Attempts at Violent Revolution in Japan 
 
Following the Cominform criticism of January 1950 the JCP adopted a 
policy of violent revolution.100 This section details this policy during the life 
of the NPR, upon which it formed a significant influence. The importance 
of this policy to the history and development of the NPR should not be 
understated: the JCP campaign was perceived as the main security threat 
to Japan in this period and the sight of people being killed regularly on the 
streets, thousands demonstrating and fighting the police, throwing petrol 
bombs and trying, albeit ultimately unsuccessfully, to start a guerrilla war 
influenced policymakers significantly.  
 
The description of events provided here is given in order to contextualise 
the creation and evolution of the NPR by describing the events ascribed to, 
or actually conducted by, the JCP at the time. As such, the material 
presented here is not intended to present a case over the extent to which 
the JCP represented a genuine threat to the Japanese government in this 
period, an endeavour which would require much more research and more 
space than that which is available in this study. Therefore, the purpose of 
this section is to present the information which Japanese and American 
policymakers had to hand during the life of the NPR and which influenced 
their perceptions of the JCP „threat‟ and their responses to it, including the 
creation of the NPR. 
 
The „military‟ aspect of the JCP‟s post 1950 programme centred on 
attacking parts of the Japanese state and making a violent bid for power, 
but also linked back to the nationalist and anti-militarist themes of its 
propaganda campaign by attempting to provoke a heavy-handed 
Japanese government or GHQ response. This section deals with the 
JCP‟s attempts at violent revolution in Japan including their campaign of 
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violent demonstrations, sabotage and attempts at guerrilla warfare. This 
analysis concludes with an examination of the reasons why the NPR was 
not used to help quell these disturbances through the use of „Bloody May 
Day‟ as a case study. 
 
Like the NPR, The JCP military campaign is also a highly neglected area 
of the history of Occupation Japan. This is the result of a number of 
influences. First is the subject matter. The study of the JCP during this 
period is the examination of an atomized, semi-covert organisation, with a 
centre in hiding, issuing policy directives, and regional cells following them 
to a varying extent depending on their internal politics, capabilities and 
membership. Moreover, almost the entire organisation was hunted, 
hounded and monitored by the police, GHQ, and the Special Investigation 
Bureau (SIB). Internal political struggles within the leadership of the JCP 
and the flight of much of it to China and the USSR further complicate 
matters.101 Such an organisation records little of its day-to-day operations 
and this necessitates the use of other more peripheral materials such as 
American, British and Japanese intelligence material, press articles and 
secondary sources. Each of these has its weaknesses and there is a 
constant need to be sceptical of claims made in the sources and look for 
common factors, corroborating evidence and patterns in the documents. 
 
Secondary material is also limited as the topic is currently something of an 
embarrassment to both the Right and Left in Japan, and the American 
scholarly community.102 The Right are unwilling to examine the potentially 
embarrassing police repression and unrest of the period, and the official 
JCP line condemns the years 1950 to 1955 as a period of „ultra Left 
adventurism‟ during which the party fell victim to Soviet pressure and 
sacrificed years of gains at the ballot box through a totally unsuitable 
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policy of violence.103 There are a number of somewhat dusty works with 
material on the subject from the 1950s and 1960s, such as Swearingen 
and Langer‟s, Red Flag in Japan, International Communism in Action 
1919-1951, and until very recently these formed virtually the only material 
available in English on the subject.104 Even amongst recent studies of the 
Occupation and on Leftwing Koreans (who made up some of the JCP 
„guerrillas‟), many works contain no mention of the subject.105 This paucity 
of relevant secondary material recently has been addressed somewhat 
through the work of Hasegawa and a major work by Wakita, a former 
participant, which bears the fitting subtitle: Sensōshi no Kuhaku wo Umeru 
(Filling The Gaps in Postwar History).106 
 
Objective analysis of the primary sources employed when examining a 
subject so influenced by ideology, propaganda, rumour and speculation, 
both informed and otherwise, is essential. To this end the materials of the 
British Foreign Office form a useful counterweight to the sometimes 
politicised content of the Japanese and GHQ intelligence material. The 
changing opinions of British diplomats are also useful in illustrating the 
seriousness with which policymakers came to view the threat of the JCP 
to the Japanese state. Despite being highly sceptical at first the diplomats 
of the Foreign Office rapidly developed a keen interest in, and serious 
concerns over, the JCP after „Bloody May Day‟.107 British fears grew to 
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such a level that they prompted greater co-operation and information 
sharing on the subject with the US.108 British Attaché to Tokyo, Esler 
Denning, became so worried that he even viewed Yoshida as not taking 
the issues seriously enough, claiming that the Japanese Prime Minister 
was „incapable of appreciating the reality of the communist menace‟ and 
stating that „in our view there can be no doubt about the danger which 
communism constitutes in Japan or about the necessity for bringing Mr 
Yoshida to a more realistic frame of mind‟.109 That the normally mild and 
balanced Foreign Office assessments of the JCP had become very 
concerned in their tone is very useful in illustrating the seriousness with 
which the JCP threat was perceived at the time.  
 
The JCP‟s policy of violent seizure of power in Japan constituted an 
interconnected two prong strategy, a „carrot and stick‟ approach of a co-
ordinated military and propaganda campaign. Both the military and 
propaganda elements of the programme were highly influenced by the 
theories of Mao and the recent victory of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP).  
 
The propaganda strand of the campaign attempted to appeal to the people 
of Japan and turn them against the state. This aim was to be achieved 
through a combination of Japanese nationalism, calls for land reform and 
through claims to support „peace and independence‟ as opposed to 
alleged US „imperialism‟.110 Direct propaganda attacks were also made 
upon the NPR and these are dealt with separately in the following section 
of this chapter.  
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As well as being the title of one of the JCP‟s principal underground 
newspapers, „peace and independence‟ served as a slogan across much 
of the JCP propaganda output during this period. 111  In the literature 
produced by the JCP, „peace‟ referred to both a rejection of „rearmament‟ 
in the form of the NPR, and of the San Francisco peace settlement in 
favour of a comprehensive peace treaty including the USSR and PRC. 
„Independence‟ was a term used to express the JCP‟s desire to eliminate 
the „American Imperialism and Japanese reactionary forces‟ ranged 
against it and re-orientate Japan towards the communist bloc.112  This 
centred on the overthrow of the Yoshida government, which was usually 
depicted as an American puppet, exploiting Japan and preparing it for war 
in Asia.113 Both of these terms are highly ironic in that whilst calling for 
„peace‟ the JCP were seemingly attacking the security services, 
conducting sabotage and planning a full-scale guerrilla war; and were 
demanding „independence‟ whilst clearly acting in the interests, and under 
the influence, the USSR and PRC. 
 
The JCP‟s propaganda also called for a united front with all „patriotic 
elements‟.114 In language and theory very closely connected to that of the 
CCP, the JCP argued that the creation of the „united, national-liberation 
democratic front‟ allowed the use of members of the bourgeoisie for a time 
as long as they supported the JCP‟s goal of violent revolution.115 However, 
any realistic chance of a united front with the Socialists and others had 
long passed and the adoption of a policy of violence had further alienated 
the JCP from the mainstream of Japanese society and politics. However, 
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this form of rhetoric is interesting as it was common to almost all post-
colonial Marxist movements and shows the altered position and 
philosophy of the JCP in this era. 
 
Perhaps the most astute and potentially effective part of the JCP‟s 
propaganda strategy was its appeal to Japanese nationalism. Key JCP 
documents of this period such as the New Programme and How to Raise 
Flower Bulbs contained repeated use of phrases such as the „liberation of 
our race‟, „racial emancipation‟ and armed struggle serving as the „means 
of solving racial and class oppositions‟. 116  Furthermore, one of the 
principal methods devised by the JCP to convince members of the NPR to 
join their cause was by heightening their ethnic consciousness. 117 
Although efforts to employ Japanese nationalism to aid the JCP ultimately 
failed, this aspect of the propaganda campaign aroused serious concern 
amongst the Japanese, British and American authorities. Officials in the 
British Foreign Office clearly noted that the skilful use of nationalist 
rhetoric over situations where the US clearly influenced Japanese policy 
could win support for the JCP.118 The concern with which this policy was 
viewed at the time should also not be underestimated, with Denning 
arguing that the policy was „potentially extremely dangerous‟ and that „the 
capture of Japanese nationalism by communism would be wholly 
unfavourable to us‟.119 
 
Another important part of the JCP‟s propaganda campaign, and one which 
further demonstrates the connections between the JCP and the USSR 
was Stalin‟s New Year Message of 1951. The message was delivered to 
                                                             
116
 FO 371/99393, „BBC Reports that “Nippon Times” of March 1 Carried Translation of 
Communist Party Pamphlet Entitled “How to Raise Flower Bulbs”, 10/3/1952; Japan 
Times, 1/3/52; FO 371/99392, Waterfield, „New Programme of the Japanese Communist 
Party, Analysis of Documents‟,1/52; FO 371/99392, „We Must Prepare to Arm and Initiate 
Action‟, 3/10/51; Dower, Embracing Defeat, p 554. 
117
 FO 371/99392, „We Must Prepare to Arm and Initiate Action‟, 3/10/51. 
118
 Yoshida to Dulles, 24/12/51, Printed in Ōkurashō Zaiseishi Shitsuhen, Showa 
Zaiseishi, pp 263-264; FO 371/99392, Denning to His Majesty‟s Principal Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, 19/1/52.  
119
 FO 371/99392, Denning to His Majesty‟s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, 19/1/52. For more on the Matsukawa incident, see: Appendix I. The Shimoyama, 
Taira, Mitaka and Matsukawa Incidents. 
257 
 
the Japanese people through Kyodo news editor Iwamoto Kishii on New 
Year‟s Eve 1951. The message was unprecedented in that a Soviet leader 
had never before directly addressed the people of another state and the 
content of the message also reveals the connections between the USSR 
and the JCP. The rhetoric and subject matter of the message exactly 
matched the JCP‟s propaganda in attempting to harness Japanese 
nationalism, calling for land reform, criticising the Occupation and focusing 
on „peasant landlessness‟.120 The message was also coupled with other 
efforts within the PRC and USSR to influence the Japanese population 
and generate support for the JCP. These included „demonstrations‟ in 
China and the USSR and press articles criticising Japanese „rearmament‟, 
the Occupation, and events such as the sentencing of the JCP members 
tried for the Matsukawa incident.121 Ultimately, despite a concerted effort, 
the Soviet attempts to assist the JCP‟s propaganda effort failed and most 
Japanese still resented Russia. This was hardly surprising with the 
memories of the August 1945 Soviet land grab and the thousands of 
„missing‟ POWs still fresh in many minds. If anything, the interference by 
the USSR in internal Japanese affairs actually turned more people against 
communism, and coloured Japanese government policy towards the 
USSR for years.122 
 
The final central thrust of the propaganda campaign, and the one which 
most reveals its Maoist influence, was the position of the JCP on land 
reform. The JCP argued that SCAP had pursed „pseudo agrarian reform‟ 
as a result of which „the peasants have been reduced to a position which 
leads inevitably to loss of their land‟.123 In their literature the JCP stated 
that GHQ‟s land reform was a deception and that little had actually altered, 
and the peasants, still oppressed and over burdened with taxes, were 
                                                             
120
 Appendix VIII. „Stalin‟s New Year‟s Message to the Japanese People, 31 December 
1951‟. 
121
 FO 371/92523, Hutchinson to Bevin, „Information Regarding Protests Against the 
Sentences in the “Matsukawa Incident”‟, 28/2/51.  
122
 E.J. Lewe Van Aduard, Japan from Surrender to Peace, Praeger, New York, 1954, pp 
245-247; Jain, The USSR and Japan 1945-1980, pp 20-28. 
123
 For a Lasting Peace, For a People’s Democracy, Bucharest, Organ of the Information 
Bureau of the Communist and Workers’ Parties, No. 7 (171), 15/2/52. 
258 
 
ready for revolution. As Dore states: „it followed that the business of the 
communist party was to organise the depressed lower strata of peasant 
communities which should prepare for violent revolutionary action and 
[would] take over control of the villages after the revolution‟.124 The JCP 
attempted to win over the peasants through claiming they supported 
further land redistribution although this argument was weak as virtually all 
the agricultural land in Japan had already changed hands under SCAP‟s 
early reforms.125 
 
The JCP military campaign encompassed a number of aims but central to 
all was the ultimate aim of overthrowing the Japanese government and 
seizing power. In order to achieve this goal the „military campaign‟ aimed 
at weakening the Japanese security forces through both propaganda and 
direct conflict. This conflict with the security services was envisaged as 
taking the form of violent unrest and attempts at the creation of rural 
guerrilla forces. A further connected aim of the JCP in this regard was the 
arousal of nationalism through provoking a US response, by attacking 
Occupation personnel and installations. Notable examples of this include 
the attacks on Americans during the „Imperial plaza incident‟, Bloody May 
Day, the attack on Itami airbase, the acid bomb attack on Brigadier 
General Carter Clarke and the placing of bombs under US military 
vehicles in Yokohama.126  
 
Attempts at infrastructural and industrial sabotage were another key 
dimension of the JCP campaign and as discussed in chapter one, this 
formed the most widespread incidence of JCP resistance. The sabotage 
attempts were aimed mainly at Japan‟s infrastructure and arms production 
facilities, key to Japan‟s role as a staging post and supply route for the UN 
                                                             
124
 R.P. Dore, Land Reform in Japan, Athlone, London, 1984, p 461. 
125
 FO 371/99392, Denning to His Majesty‟s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, 19/1/52.  
126
 FO 371/99393, Denning, „Japan Communist Party‟s Violence Campaign‟, 3/4/52; 
Toledo Blade, 25/6/52; The Age, 25/6/52; FO 371/99393, Acting Secretary, Department of 
State Bruce to Speaker of the House of Representatives Rayburn, 3/7/52; K. Wakita, 
Chōsen Sensō to Sugita-Hirakata Jiken, p 271. For more on JCP incidents from 1951-
1952 see: Appendix IX. „Major JCP Related Incidents 1951-1952‟. 
259 
 
forces in Korea.127 Some sources argue that no such sabotage existed 
and that the damage and thefts were just „pranks‟ or thefts unrelated to the 
JCP.128 However, the large number of such incidents, the subsequent 
reversal of the opinions of many of those who had argued for this position 
and the JCP‟s previous involvement in similar events seem to undermine 
this theory. Whatever actually occurred the authorities clearly believed the 
JCP was responsible and hence these events contributed towards the 
perception if the JCP as a threat, whoever conducted them. 129 
Furthermore, two of the most significant and well documented events in 
the JCP military campaign, the Hirakata and Suita incidents (see figure 
XXVI), both involved attacks on targets of the same type: a rail yard used 
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The JCP produced a number of „manuals‟ on terrorist and guerrilla action 
during this period to both direct and encourage such activities. Perhaps 
the most influential of these was the innocuously titled How to Raise 
Flower Bulbs. This document, dated 23 January 1952 contained two 
theses entitled, Organisation and Tactics of Nuclear Self Defence Corps, 
which dealt with the practical elements of „nuclear self-defence units‟, and, 
Let the Entire Party Deliberate upon the National Organizational Council, 
which provided the theoretical basis for the policy.132 How to Raise Flower 
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Bulbs argued that the masses were the basis of the „nuclear self-defence 
forces‟, which were to be the first units created for armed struggle. The 
document described the method of organising units of nine or ten JCP 
members in the factories, rural communities, towns and schools they were 
to use as bases. Two to three of these units combined to make a 
„company‟ and two to three companies made a „battalion‟.133 All of these 
units were to be independently organised and capable of independent 
action, with one leader and one political commissar. The leader was to be 
in overall command and the commissar co-ordinated relations with the 
masses and the political aspects of military action.134 As well as again 
showing the Maoist influence on the JCP‟s military campaign, this dual 
structure also reflected the combined politico-military strategy of the JCP 
in this period. These nuclear self-defence units, alongside radical Leftwing 
Koreans and members of the JCP‟s „Youth Action Corps‟ took part in 
action against the Japanese and American security forces in a series of 
violent riots and attacks on installations and individuals.135  
 
A detailed description of all the events of this period is beyond the scope 
of this study but the key incidents are detailed in Appendix IX „Major JCP 
Related Incidents 1951-1952‟.136 These events consisted of riots ranging 
from minor skirmishes to major battles between thousands of police and 
JCP supporters, such as Bloody May Day. Attacks on the civil police also 
took place ranging from minor assaults, to mass attacks on police boxes 
and planned assassinations of senior officers.137 The principal weapons 
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used by the JCP during this period were clubs, bamboo spears, acid or 
„lemonade‟ bombs, and the ubiquitous Molotov cocktail, which christened 
the period in Japanese consciousness as „the era of the Molotov 
cocktail‟.138 Lee admirably sums up the violence of this period as follows: 
the JCP undertook mostly „hit-and-run terrorist attacks, not only throwing 
fire bombs at police stations but sabotaging factories and American 
military bases‟.139 
 
The JCP campaign also sought to create guerrilla forces and „liberated 
areas‟ again on a Maoist model. 140  The documented attempts at this 
occurred mostly in the Kanto mountain villages of Ogouchi, Kori, Hikawa, 
Ongata, situated to the west of Tokyo, although other attempts at the 
creation of „liberated areas‟ allegedly occurred in Yamagata, Niigata and 
Hokkaido. 141  Following a Maoist guerrilla approach, the JCP first 
dispatched Sanson Kōsakutai („mountain village mobilisation corps‟) to the 
areas to attempt to win over the local population to the JCP cause through 
political „education‟ and cultural activities (see figure XXVII).142 These units 
later developed into guerrilla forces although the transformation was 
largely a name change as the personnel altered little.143 Police raids and 
the inability of the guerrillas to convince the locals to support their cause 
resulted in the failure of this policy but isolated units maintained their 
squalid „mountain bases‟ until 1955 when the JCP finally abandoned its 
policy of violent revolution.144 
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Alongside the indirect and theoretical influence of Chinese communist 
thought and documents such as the Stalin letter on the JCP, there is 
evidence which points towards a more direct Soviet role in the guerrilla 
campaign.146 One of the most obvious of these is Cominform directive, No 
172, which was intercepted by GHQ, and is quoted by Masumi and 
Takemae. This Soviet authored policy document contains a list of 
objectives and tasks for the JCP military campaign. The aims of 
sabotaging Japan‟s infrastructure, preventing the shipment of military 
supplies to Korea, the assassination of „reactionary individuals‟ and the 
desire to overthrow the Japanese government were all common to JCP 
policy, but the extent to which the document was a series of suggestions 
or a list or orders is hard to ascertain although as the document is a 
„directive‟, the latter seems more likely.147 Nevertheless, the evidence that 
the Soviets were bankrolling at least some of the espionage activities of 
the JCP in this period became clear following the defection of the Yuri 
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Rastarov in January 1954.148 Rastarov, a KGB officer working out of the 
Soviet embassy in Tokyo revealed that the Soviet Union had given the 
JCP almost half a million dollars between 1952 and 1953, some of which 
was almost certainly intended to fund espionage activities against the US 
forces in Japan.149 
 
During the JCP military campaign significant amounts of activity occurred 
in Hokkaido. Rumour circulated of Soviet and North Korean agents 
operating on the island, alongside reports that the USSR was planning to 
occupy the island. 150  Press reports and intelligence material also 
appeared alleging that plans had been developed by the JCP and USSR 
for the establishment of the „Northern Japanese People‟s Republic‟ after 
the seizure of Hokkaido by a JCP uprising and/or Soviet intervention.151 
The validity of these reports is difficult to judge and they may have been 
produced to aid the JCP propaganda effort and indirectly encourage the 
JCP guerrillas. 152  However, the presence of large numbers of Soviet 
military units in the region, repeated over-flights of Hokkaido by Soviet 
aircraft, frequent Soviet military exercises and spotlight sweeps of the 
Japanese coast and the numerous seizures of Japanese fishing craft 
reveal the tension around this frontier.153 The island also hosted some of 
the best equipped and most radical JCP „guerrilla‟ units. A police raid on 
JCP headquarters in Sapporo uncovered a detailed intelligence operation 
being conducted by JCP members targeting US units in Hokkaido, 
including reports on their strengths, organisation, morale and 
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equipment. 154  Another JCP guerrilla unit, armed with pistols and in 
possession of sophisticated explosive devices, assassinated police chief 
Shiratori Kazuo, head of the Security Division of Sapporo City Police, on 
21 January 1952.155 
 
In the face of these serious, although ultimately unsuccessful, attempts at 
violent revolution in Japan, why the NPR was not deployed remains a key 
question. Although the force certainly would have been used if the JCP 
guerrilla campaign or public unrest had escalated beyond the control of 
the civil police, the use of the NPR against minor riots and demonstrations 
was politically risky and the Japanese authorities proved reluctant to do so. 
The principal reason behind this reluctance was that any use of the force 
against demonstrators or unarmed civilians would have played into the 
hands of the JCP. The sight of a constabulary roaming the streets or 
breaking up demonstrations would have been a perfect piece of 
propaganda that the JCP and communist powers could have used to back 
up their accusations of renewed Japanese militarism and a return to the 
days of a Japanese police state. The international impact of this could 
possibly have made the conclusion of a peace treaty much more 
difficult.156 This in turn could have further strengthened the position of the 
JCP amongst a people weary after more than six years of occupation. 
Weinstein also notes that the use of the NPR to settle a domestic crisis 
during this period was risky and, if badly mishandled, could have caused 
an insurrection itself. He also states that the use of the NPR/SDF against 
mass demonstrations could also have been seen as an open admission of 
the loss of authority by the government, who would have been viewed as 
reliant on paramilitary forces to stay in power.157 A further interesting point 
to note on this issue is the possibly fatal public relations blow the NPR 
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could have been dealt if it had been used against demonstrators, 
especially if high numbers of casualties had resulted, as Brendle claims 
when describing the GSDF:  
 
The GSDF engages in public security training with far more 
conviction [than external security training], yet the reservation of the 
government to commit SDF troops to riot control duty is well 
known . . . The government has expended too much public 
relations effort on behalf of the SDF to jeopardise public support by 
committing the SDF against fellow countrymen.158 
 
The final and perhaps most obvious reason why the NPR was not used 
was that the activities of the JCP never reached a scale and seriousness 
which would have justified its use. If the Korean War had continued or 
expanded, or if the communist powers had extended further support to the 
JCP in the form of more arms, the situation might have proved different, 
but ultimately the NPR was never actually used for its original purpose. 
Clearly, the NPR and its successors, the NSF and GSDF, were the last 
line of defence against domestic threats to the government, whose 
possibly risky deployment against public demonstrations could only be 
considered as a last resort. However, despite these risks, use of the NPR 
was preferred over the intervention of US troops, which presented greater 
political risks and also infringed upon Japanese sovereignty.159 It could 
also be argued, as it is by Maeda, that the restraint exercised during the 
protests of this era prevented Japan turning to the Right and further 
radicalising its student and labour activists, as was the case in South 
Korea.160 
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Building on the arguments presented here, the following case study 
examines the factors behind the non-use of the NPR during the „Bloody 
May Day‟ crisis of 1952. „Bloody May Day‟ was certainly the largest violent 
incident of the JCP military campaign and could be said to be the high-
watermark of the communists‟ attempt at violent revolution in Japan. The 
traditional labour demonstrations and marches of May Day fell just three 
days after the restoration of full sovereignty to Japan, following the formal 
end of the Occupation. The event drew huge crowds, numbering around 
400,000, mostly in celebration of the return of Japan‟s independence.161 
However, during the day around 6,000 radical protesters forced their way 
into the „People‟s Plaza‟, an area in front of the Imperial palace formerly 
known as the Imperial plaza. The invasion and occupation of this area was 
a highly symbolic defiance of Imperial authority, the old order and GHQ, 
which, in concert with the Japanese government, had barred the 
demonstrators from using the area. The demonstration exploded into a 
pitched battle between the Tokyo Metropolitan Police (MPD) and the 
protestors (see figures XXIX and XXX). American cars and symbols of the 
US were destroyed in direct defiance of the US.162 Egged on and led by 
JCP „military units‟ and armed with clubs, bamboo spears and petrol 
bombs, the crowd put the police under such pressure that they had to 
resort to tear gas and then firing their pistols into the crowds to break up 
the demonstration.163 During the fighting the MPD killed two protestors, 
shot twenty-two more and arrested over one thousand people, including 
large numbers of JCP members. Around 2,300 people, including 800 of 
the 5,000 police present, were also injured in what seemed a very 
inauspicious birth of post-Occupation Japan.164  
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The Japanese government viewed the incident as a „terroristic case‟, 
clearly pointing the finger at the JCP.166 The obvious difficulty the MPD 
had in controlling the crowd, and the lack of direct control he had over the 
force even during such a major crisis was noted by a nervous Prime 
Minister Yoshida.167 The Prime Minister did however have the NPR at his 
disposal, and the force was on alert, prepared, and waiting for orders to go 
into action until 2 am of 2 May.168 The principal reason why the NPR was 
not used in this case was that the MPD ultimately contained the violence, 
despite having to use their firearms. However, the highly symbolic nature 
of the occasion and the location, and possible consequences of the use of 
the NPR must have also played a role in Yoshida‟s decision not to commit 
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the force. The possibly bloody results of the use of a constabulary force in 
defence of the Imperial palace and old order as soon as Japan began to 
run its own affairs would have again provided perfect propaganda for the 
JCP. Also, as noted above, the international ramifications and implications 
for Japan‟s attempts to return to full membership of the international 
community could have been dealt a serious blow. The reluctance to 
commit his „final reserve‟ to the fighting could also have been a concern of 
Yoshida who may have feared the outbreak of violence elsewhere or the 
JCP seizing the opportunity of distracted police force to mount more 
serious attacks or acts of sabotage. 
 




The boon that the JCP could have won from the use of the NPR on Bloody 
May Day can be seen through the support some parts of the socialist 
movement offered to the JCP in their subsequent (but ultimately 
unsuccessful) legal battle against the state in defence of the protesters‟ 
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rights to freedom of assembly.170 If the NPR had been used and more 
deaths had resulted, it is possible that many in the Left wing of the 
Socialist party could have been radicalised and a united front of the kind 
pursued by the JCP in the early Occupation could have been a 
possibility.171 These factors clearly show that the use of the NPR against 
demonstrations, as opposed to guerrillas or rebels, had the possibility of 
resulting in a major negative public relations impact. Alongside the fact 
that the JCP military campaign never reached a level of intensity or public 
support which triggered mass protest or guerrilla war, this potential impact 
helps to explain why the NPR were never used in their original role. The 
role of the GSDF in the 1960 security treaty (ANPO) crisis is another 
interesting and very similar example relating to the reluctance of the 
Japanese government to employ its security services against mass 
demonstrations. Although it is beyond the scope of a work examining the 




The JCP and the NPR 
 
Further significant and unexplored aspects of the history of the NPR are 
the relations between the JCP and NPR, and the attempts by the JCP to 
infiltrate the force. Initially, after the creation of the National Police 
Reserve, the organisation was praised by the JCP as a tool the people 
could use to throw off their „class enemies‟ and the JCP undertook an 
organised campaign of infiltration in order to achieve this.173 The JCP 
employed secret and associate members to join the NPR and seek to win 
control over elements of it and ultimately turn the force against the 
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state.174 This aim is clearly voiced in the JCP policy document We Must 
Prepare to Arm and Initiate Action: 
 
Particularly in the National Police Reserves, it is necessary to have 
them surrender, rebel, in order to have the entire body, excluding a 
small number of traitorous leaders, to come over to our side at a 
critical point . . . in addition to fomenting daily insubordination within 
their ranks. In order to attain this, we must preserve the 
organization and must enforce systematic guidance over the 
organisation.175 
 
A secret pamphlet detailing the JCP‟s instructions for those about to 
infiltrate the NPR entitled The Police Reservists’ Struggle, was delivered 
to each of the regional committees under the name of the central 
chairman, and somehow found its way to the Yomiuri Shinbun which 
reprinted it in full. Its contents were as follows:  
    
1. Obey orders in training and try to win positions of leadership. 
2. Inform us of the name of your base, its strength, equipment 
and other details 
3. Immediate mission:  
a. No direct action, but seek out complaints and 
disaffection. 
b. Instigate complaints and disaffection. 
c. Try to ferment confrontation between officers and 
men. Try to involve the majority. Translate in action 
after grasping situation. 
d. Get close to the Municipal Police and National Rural 
Police. 
4. Reservists who were former officers and university 
graduates will be the future leaders so get close to them. 
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To Each Party Organ: Present Mission 
 
a. Inform regional committees of all information gained from 
infiltrators. 
b. List all incoming NPR recruits in your area and appoint a 
leader amongst them from party members in their midst. 
c. All business/liaison/reports/instructions are to be verbal. 
d. Avoid liaison etc in JCP offices, meet on the street or outside. 
e. Form an NPR resistance committee in each prefecture and 
appoint its leader. 
f. Instruct and lead the infiltrators actively and often. 
g. Investigate thoroughly the strength, staff, attitudes and 
equipment of the NPR. 
h. Work actively outside and covertly inside the NPR. 
 
5. Precautions: The government is planning to make the NPR 
the cornerstone of its suppression of the JCP and is very 
watchful against the saturation of our influences. The plan 
must be framed very carefully as this struggle will extend 
over a long period of time.176 
 
This document shows the espionage style practices which were used by 
the JCP in its attempts to infiltrate the NPR and reveals the intelligence 
gathering and subversive role which was to be played by the infiltrators. 
The fact that the piece appeared in the politically conservative Yomiuri 
Shinbun could be used to question its reliability but the later appearance 
of accurate copies of other key JCP underground literature in the press, 
such as the guerrilla manual How to Raise Flower Bulbs, seems to show 
that Japanese journalists had contacts within either, or both, the Japanese 
police and the JCP.177 Furthermore, the contents of this document were 
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substantiated by JCP documents seized during Japanese police raids 
which contained directions to prefectural committees of the JCP to ensure 
infiltration of JCP members or sympathisers into units being recruited in 
their local area.178 G2 subsequently uncovered that almost seven hundred 
JCP members had tried to join the force, with some applying in different 
localities several times.179 The prefectural committees apparently selected 
ideologically committed secret members or sympathisers to join the force 
and principally focused on former soldiers from rural areas, the group they 
correctly assumed would make up the bulk on the NPR‟s personnel.180 
Those selected were also allegedly made to swear an oath of loyalty to 
the JCP before entry to the NPR. Aside from these covert JCP recruits, 
many known communists also applied to join, possibly to distract attention 
away from the secret members. Even some notable party members such 
as the JCP Tokushima Regional Committee Chairman applied to join.181  
 
This process had an ominous precedent in the Korean constabulary (KC). 
In the late 1940s, due to its confrontation and direct competition with the 
Korea National Police (KNP), the KC received no co-operation from the 
KNP in vetting its recruits and was so effectively and deeply infiltrated by 
communists that entire regiments mutinied, killed their officers and seized 
cities or became guerrillas.182 Unwilling to repeat these errors, and again 
indicative of the close connections between the National Rural Police and 
NPR, GHQ involved the Japanese National Rural Police heavily from the 
start, investigating the backgrounds of all the NPR recruits.183 That the 
screening process was designed to remove communists from the force 
was never in doubt, with Attorney General Ohashi announcing it to the 
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Diet on 11 August.184 The focus on the JCP was confirmed when an 
official report described the screening process as „designed to eliminate 
individuals with communistic, disreputable, criminal or subversive 
backgrounds‟.185 As a result of the National Rural Police‟s background 
investigations hundreds of the most obvious JCP applicants were rejected 
during the selection process, but at least one hundred made it through and 
were recruited into the NPR. However, most of these were also 
subsequently detected (see figures XXXI and XXXII below) and dismissed 
from the force.  
 




It is interesting to note that in the official 1955 US Army history of the NPR 
the dismissal statistics in the first months of the NPR, when most of the 
recruitment and the JCP infiltration campaign took place, are omitted (see 
figure XXXI). This period up 15 October 1950 saw the largest numbers of 
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communists being caught and expelled, a number which exceeded all 
other dismissals of any kind at the time (see figure XXXII). The omission 
of this period from the US statistics may have been due to the reluctance 
of the US Army to acknowledge their failings in this regard or an 
unwillingness to link their history of the NPR to the internal security of 
Japan at a time when they were still campaigning for the Self Defence 
Forces (SDF) to undertake a greater external security role.187 
 




The JCP‟s attempts to influence the NPR also included a propaganda 
offensive. Originally this consisted of attempts to win over members of the 
Police Reserve and foment dissent in its ranks. Later once this effort and 
the attempts at infiltration had failed, it returned to the standard JCP 
propaganda of the era, direct and increasingly radical statements 
condemning the NPR as enemies of the people and pawns of the „fascist‟ 
regime and American Imperialism. 189 Figure XXXIII represents a good 
example of this kind of illegal directly critical propaganda.  
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Figure XXXIII. Illegal JCP Propaganda Hand Bill, Summer 1950190 
 
 
Caption: NPR Recruitment: Yoshida: „You‟ve been in the grave for quite a 
while. Welcome back!‟ 
 
The JCP propaganda campaign lost little time once the creation of the 
NPR was made public, with reports of communist demonstrations and 
agitation speeches even given in NPR recruiting halls. The main method 
used to attempt to influence members of the NPR by the JCP was through 
pamphlets and propaganda handbills. Most of these were locally produced 
and distributed as swiftly and discreetly as possible. This was due to the 
restrictions on communist publications resulting from the „Red Purge‟  and 
the fact that the often radical and anti-American slant of much of the 
propaganda would usually result in a prison sentence for anyone caught 
distributing it.191 Although most of those distributing the material were JCP 
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cell members operating near the bases of the Police Reserve, some of the 
JCP members within the NPR also used their position inside the 
organisation to distribute communist propaganda.192 This distribution of 
JCP material was not limited just to the rank and file of the NPR as even a 
platoon commander of 17th Company in Camp Bofu, was caught 
spreading communist ideology and pamphlets amongst his men.193 As this 
open distribution of JCP material often resulted in detection and dismissal 
it is curious why the JCP members adopted the tactic and may indicate 
the difficulty they had in winning converts to their cause. 
 
Examples of early propaganda aimed at winning over members of the 
NPR are numerous in number but quite similar in content, with much of it 
attempting to show recruits that their „fundamental human rights‟ were 
being ignored.194  The following leaflet was given to NPR members in 
Sapporo on 17 September 1950 and later a copy was handed over to the 
National Rural Police: 
 
1. The following is a question and answer given to us from your 
colleagues.  
 The person interviewed is from „Y‟ prefecture: 
1. Q: Would you tell us about your daily life? 
A: The life is not like the reports in the 
newspapers. If I were you I wouldn‟t enlist. 
2. Q: How is the clothing and food situation? 
A: These are the only clothes I have and I 
am not getting my pay until the end of this 
month. The food is not good either. 
3. Q: How is the training? 
A: We have gotten as far as handling the 
rifle. 
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4. Q: Do you think you will get your retirement 
allowance? 
A: Certainly! If not, there will be a riot 
throughout the country. 
5. Q: Do you think they will send you to 
Korea? 
A: No. if they do, about half of the 
personnel will resign. 
2. It was still raining and the figure of the personnel 
appeared forlorn and helpless as he walked back to 
the barracks. 
3. Those who are intending to enlist, consider the above 
words, and those who are already enlisted, demand 




JCP Sapporo Committee. [sic]195 
 
As can be seen above, much of the content of this document was not far 
from the truth and tied in with JCP efforts to stir up discontent within the 
NPR over issues close to the men‟s hearts, such as food and pay. Indeed, 
the emphasis on the difficulties in supplying clothing, the uncertainties 
over pay and especially the bonus which had attracted many recruits, and 
the inadequate supply of food all seem uncannily well targeted and 
indicates the successful infiltration of some JCP members into the force. 
These themes and the idea of the dispatch of the NPR to Korea are 
repeated in the following handbill, again passed secretly to members of 
the NPR, who then surrendered it to the Japanese police: 
 
Follow members of the National Police Reserve: 
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Demand that they pay you immediately 
Make a request for better food 
You're not slaves 
Make a request for another uniform 
Tell them you don‟t want to go to Korea 
Defy them and tell them emphatically that you don‟t want to kill 
people 
 
Even now the treatment is bad - - - you haven‟t been paid 
Do you think they‟ll give you 60,000 for retirement? 
Your officials and Prime Minister Yoshida are treating you just like 
the former Japanese soldier 
Yoshida and the capitalists of Japan and America are trying to send 
you all to Korea by saying “you‟re going to protect Japan from 
invasion by communism” 
 
They want to make cannon fodder out of you 
They‟re trying to start another war 
We don‟t want war again 
Demand your rights 
Let‟s not repeat war again 
 
Slogan: 
1. We won‟t go to Korea 
2. No war! 
3. Give us plenty food! 
4. Give us our salary immediately‟ [sic].196 
 
The Korean theme is particularly significant in this document but despite 
playing on some NPR members‟ fears, the ideas expressed ignore the 
domestic and international political impossibility of dispatching Japanese 
security forces to Korea.  
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With the limited success of the JCP‟s attempts to directly turn the NPR 
against the Japanese state and the American Occupation, the propaganda 
campaign shifted tack, and audience, focussing more on direct criticism of 
the NPR as pawns of the Japanese elite and on their poor conditions of 
service (see figure XXXIII). It seems the biggest success of the JCP 
propaganda campaigns against the NPR was in serving to demoralise 
many of the NPR members to the point of resigning from the force. 
Although the men (other than the officers and sergeants) did not have to 
give a reason when they resigned and were unlikely to cite JCP 
propaganda if they did, the US Army official history seems justified in 
claiming that: „communist propaganda no doubt influenced many police 
reservists to resign, though it is impossible to determine how many‟.197 
When considering this point it is interesting to mention that the biggest 
number of NPR men resigned from late November 1950 to early April 
1951. 198  This period saw the Chinese volunteers enter the conflict in 
Korea and many from MacArthur downwards feared defeat or an 
expansion of the war, which could have resulted in the deployment of the 
NPR to help maintain the internal security of Japan or, at worst, 
temporarily in support of the US in guaranteeing its external security.199 
This period also saw a simultaneous intensification of the JCP 
propaganda campaign, with much of the material justifying the Chinese 
intervention against „American Imperialism‟ and its „puppet‟, the NPR. 
 
Other than the propaganda and infiltration campaigns of the JCP, the NPR 
was involved in several other incidents connected to the JCP policy of 
armed struggle. The campaign of rail and infrastructure sabotage 
conducted by the JCP also extended to NPR bases.200 A well documented 
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example of this occurred at a NPR base at Funaoka in Miyagi, northern 
Honshu. The base, which contained a power station as well as a battalion 
of the NPR, was the victim of sabotage, with the power lines leading out of 
the base to a nearby water pumping station being severed and having 
multiple sections removed.201 No one was caught but the small quantity of 
wire removed and the risk involved makes it unlikely the sabotage was 
undertaken for financial motives. 
 
A further, more serious incident involving two NPR members occurred in 
Ichikawa in late November 1950. Whilst having dinner in a small 
restaurant two off duty NPR men plotted to kill General MacArthur with 
one apparently claiming “I came into the Police Reserve in order to kill one 
or two American soldiers. I would like to kill MacArthur first”. The men 
were swiftly arrested and jailed and during the subsequent investigation 
the influence of JCP propaganda and lingering nationalism is notable in 
the list of grievances the men had mentioned. These included a belief that 
America was using Japan to make war on communism, complaints about 
pay, their commanders (the men considered it a slight to their national 
pride that they were being advised by Americans) and the death of one 
man‟s brother during the Pacific War at the hands of the Americans.202 
 
 
Disaster Relief  
 
The final major operational use of the NPR and the one for which its 
successor, the GSDF is most frequently used and known for, was disaster 
relief. In a country as afflicted by natural disasters as Japan it seems 
logical that a force such as the NPR would be highly useful in disaster 
recovery and that plans would have been drawn up at the creation of the 
force for its possible use in such a role. A Department of the Army memo 
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to MacArthur about the implementation of NSC 13/2 in early October 1948 
actually alluded to this role for a future constabulary in suggesting the 
„creation of adequate mobile national police reserves for handling disaster 
and civil violence‟.203 However, no detailed planning was drawn up in mid-
1950 for the use of the NPR in a disaster relief role and this responsibility 
evolved and grew over time. Initially individual NPR bases and 
installations developed their own disaster plans which mainly dealt with 
how the base would deal with damage to itself, with efforts to assist the 
civilian population outside the base being a secondary concern. A good 
example of this type of plan is the Camp Schimmelpfennig disaster plan 
produced in October 1950.204 The plan envisaged the designation of the 
camp dispensary as the central distribution centre for medical relief, the 
dispatch of around a quarter of the garrison to the surrounding area to act 
as fire fighters, and a further tenth for search, rescue and medical duties. 
The document also contained plans for the supply by the NPR of 
emergency shelter, food, water, power and transportation to the local 
population if the normal civilian provision failed. 205 
 
The NPR was first used for disaster relief temporarily and on an informal 
basis in September and August 1951 in Fukuchiyama and Zentsuji, but 
the first formal use of the NPR occurred in the wake of typhoon Ruth 
which struck Japan on 14-15 October 1951. Most of the damage caused 
occurred in Yamaguchi prefecture with 943 killed and 3,400 buildings 
destroyed. At sea twelve ships were lost and the aircraft carrier HMAS 
Sydney, sailing near Sasebo naval base, suffered serious damage. 206 
Between 20-21 October the NPR was officially deployed for the first time 
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on a rescue and relief operation to Kita Kawachi village, Yamaguchi 
prefecture (see table XVII).207 
 
Table XVII. Use of the NPR/NSF/SDF in Disaster Relief Operations 1950-
1955208 
 















1950 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1951 0 0 1 2,700 0 0 1 2,700 
1952 6 3,298 2 710 1 2,250 9 6,258 
1953 27 5,824 27 283,768 5 3,699 59 293,291 
1954 34 5,705 44 21,261 10 31,325 88 58,291 
1955 54 4,267 15 13,741 10 9,089 79 27,097 
 
The NPR was employed again soon after assisting in the rescue operation 
during a hospital fire at Kushiro, Hokkaido.209 Due to these deployments 
the rules over use of the NPR in natural disasters were examined 
extensively. On 3 March 1952, standard guidelines for deployment for 
disaster relief were released. These guidelines were tested six week later 
when the NPR was again deployed in fighting the Tottori city fire. 
Coincidentally the Chief of Staff of the NPR Hayashi Keizo was in the area 
at the time, on a tour of the third NPR region (Kansai, Chugoku and 
Shikoku). The fire broke out on 17 April around one hour after Hayashi 
had left the city. Hayashi promptly called NPR HQ to request the 
necessary authorisation for use of the NPR from Prime Minister Yoshida. 
Having received this, around three hundred NPR men were dispatched 
from the nearby Yonago camp, all arriving by train within three hours. The 
NPR men proceeded to fight the fire and assist in the rescue and recovery 
operations. The majority of the men stayed for two days but some 
communications, logistics and engineering specialists stayed longer to 
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help the city begin reconstruction. 210 In the remainder of its life the NPR 
was used a further five times for disaster relief, including following the 
1952 Tokachi-Oki earthquake (see table XVII). The NPR's disaster relief 
role was further formalised and clarified in the law which created the 
NSF.211 Even today the Ground Self Defence Force is most often seen 
and recognised by much of Japanese the public during disaster relief 
operations.212 This use and the public relations boost it provides to the 
SDF were first recognised during the life of the NPR. In a similar way to 
which public relations concerns prevented the use of the NPR for its 
original internal security mission, the public relations boost the NPR won 
by participating in disaster relief helped much of its leadership realise the 
value of such operations in winning support for the force from a largely 
pacifist population.213 This, in part, was prompted by what Ashida Hitoshi 
saw as the possible alienation of the NPR and its successors from the 
Japanese people that the avoidance of Diet control of the force had 
generated.214 However, as demonstrated by the criticism of the GSDF 
following the 1995 Kobe earthquake, the public relations impact of disaster 





The aim of this chapter was to fulfil the second primary aim of the study by 
further revealing the character of the NPR through exploring its 
operational aspects. In looking at the human dimension of the NPR this 
chapter revealed previously unexplored elements about the character of 
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the force. In doing so the chapter demonstrated the constabulary 
character of the NPR, the battles over its direction and character, and the 
influence of the JCP on the NPR. This effort both helped achieve the 
second main aim of the study and argue that the NPR was a constabulary 
and not an army. The pay and conditions, housing, food, uniforms, 
equipment, medical care and legal position of the NPR are all previously 
unexplored areas and all contain evidence that the NPR was a 
constabulary. The struggles over pay and arrest powers contributed to the 
first primary aim of this study in showing the Japanese influence on the 
direction and character of the NPR and the Japanese desire for a 
constabulary and not an army. The examination of the role of the NPR in 
disaster relief revealed the only actual operational use of the force and the 
influence on the public image of the force such operations had.  
 
The JCP‟s military campaign and propaganda which supported it were 
also examined in order to contextualise the creation and evolution of the 
NPR as well as to highlight a highly significant and under examined area 
of emerging historiography. This effort helped in attempting to rebalance 
the historiography of the force in showing the domestic influences upon it 
and, in particular, a major domestic influence originating from outside the 
Japanese government. The interaction between the JCP and the NPR is 
another unexplored area to which the content of this chapter makes an 
original contribution. This contextualisation also reveals the constabulary 
character of the NPR by showing the internal security threats ranged 
against it and the threat the JCP was seen to pose to the Japanese state. 
Supported in through reference to the events of May Day 1952, the 
chapter also presented the argument that the risks that the use of the NPR 
carried, and the fact that the JCP military policy never became serious 
enough, lay behind the fact the NPR was not used in its original role. 
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In seeking to fulfil the overall purpose of this study in providing the first 
complete history of the NPR this chapter explores the end of the force and 
its evolution into the National Safety Force (NSF) and Ground Self 
Defence Force (GSDF). The chapter demonstrates that the gradual 
evolution into the NSF and GSDF represented a partial departure from the 
constabulary nature of the NPR. Nevertheless, these moves towards a 
more externally focused force did not eliminate the entirety of the NPR's 
constabulary structure and some elements of it survive to this day. The 
examination of these vestiges of the NPR in the modern GSDF and the 
other commonalities between the forces forms the secondary aim of this 
chapter. This analysis helps both in achieving the second primary aim of 
this study, of defining the character of the NPR, in clearly distinguishing 
the NPR from its successors, an approach not taken by most scholars 
who examine the forces. This approach helps both clarify the character of 
the individual forces and highlights their common characteristics, 
particularly across the elements of the NSF and GSDF which survived 
from the NPR.  
 
The transition of the NPR to a more external security focused force took 
place through two processes: the acquisition of heavier armament and the 
incorporation of former military officers. These processes, intended to 
make the NPR capable of dealing with external threats to Japan‟s security, 
also had external origins. The moves toward the transformation of the 
NPR into something closer to an army took place in the face of mounting 
pressure from parts of the US government, coupled with the diminishing 
influence of opponents of the processes, including MacArthur, Yoshida 
and Masuhara (the civilian head of the NPR). The examination of these 
struggles reveals the limitations of the domestic influences on the NPR in 
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the face of concerted and concentrated American pressure coupled with 
external factors such as the dismissal of MacArthur and the Chinese 
intervention in Korea. The confluence of the external pressures with 
domestic factors also played a role in limiting the effectiveness of 
domestic influences on the NPR and its successors, with the weakness of 
Yoshida after 1952 and the combination of GHQ, the US government and 
of Yoshida‟s conservative rivals being good examples of this. These 
influences and limitations are examined here as are their contributions to 
the evolution of the force. 
 
 
The Chinese Intervention and The Fall of MacArthur 
 
The first event which significantly challenged the constabulary character of 
the NPR was the intervention of the Chinese Peoples‟ Volunteer Forces 
(CPVF) in the Korean conflict in the winter of 1950-1951.  
 
In October 1950, following the collapse of the North Korean People‟s Army 
(NKPA) after MacArthur‟s daring landing at Inchon, it seemed that the UN 
and South Korean forces were on the brink of victory. However, 
unbeknownst to the UN command around 410,000 Chinese troops had 
crossed into North Korea. 1  These forces took the overextended and 
dispersed UN and South Korean forces by surprise and threw them back 
from the Yalu river in confusion (see figure XXXIV). General Walton 
Walker ordered the Eighth Army to retreat on 28 November but in the face 
of bitter winter conditions and overwhelming odds the retreat soon turned 
into a rout and within a week the Chinese forces had taken back 
Pyongyang. The situation became so desperate that the UN called for a 
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ceasefire ten days later, and a state of emergency was declared in the US 
on 16 December. 2 
 
The real possibility of defeat in Korea, the first appearance of Soviet jet 
fighters over the peninsula and the perceived threat to Indochina and 
Europe, saw many in the US administration and military fear Soviet 
aggression elsewhere in the region, or general war with the USSR.3 This 
threat of a wider conflict and the buckling of his forces under the 
overwhelming Chinese pressure made MacArthur seesaw from deep 
depression to „near panic‟.4 In order to shore up his position and to stem 
the deluge of Chinese troops into Korea, MacArthur began to advocate 
desperate measures. Over the following weeks three interconnected plans 
were recommended by the supreme commander: a widening of the air war, 
planning for the possible evacuation of Korea, and urgent requests for 
more troops.  
 
The first of the measures recommended by MacArthur was the bombing of 
the bridges and dams on the Yalu, the main Chinese supply route, a plan 
which almost came to fruition, being blocked only at the last minute by the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who were determined to prevent the expansion 
of the war. This plan added to MacArthur‟s demands for a naval blockade 
and bombardment of China, brought MacArthur into direct conflict with 
Washington and eventually, when repeated, resulted in his dismissal a few 
months later. 5  Chillingly MacArthur also recommended using atomic 
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weapons against North Korea, evidence of the gravity with which he saw 
the threats confronting him.6 
 
The second measure supported by MacArthur, and, in this case, backed 
by the JCS and the State Department, was planning for an evacuation of 
Korea if the situation worsened. With his troops routed, MacArthur actively 
recommended planning for a complete withdrawal from Korea, and some 
air squadrons were actually evacuated to Japan in this period.7 The JCS 
agreed with MacArthur‟s assessment and instructed MacArthur to defend 
Korea to the fullest extent possible, but also to work out when evacuation 
might be necessary, suggesting that if he found his troops south of the 
Kum river, near Pusan (see figure XXXIV), with large CPVF units still in 
pursuit then he should flee the peninsula. The JCS also reminded 
MacArthur that his primary mission was the defence of Japan, „for which 
only the troops of the Eighth Army are adequate‟ [Joint Chiefs‟ emphasis].8 
The stress here by the JCS on the preservation of the Eighth Army is very 
useful in demonstrating that even in the largely hawkish JCS‟s opinion, the 
NPR was unsuitable for external security duties. Despite an improvement 
in the situation from February 1951 onwards, the evacuation and 
abandonment of South Korea remained firmly on the table, agreed as the 
first measure to be taken in the event of a general war with the USSR.9 
 
The final action which MacArthur requested was a vast increase in the 
numbers of troops in Korea. After a request for reinforcements on 29 
November 1950, MacArthur was informed that he would have to cope with 
what he had as no new units would be available until at least April 1951 
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(and these were likely to go to Europe), and even replacements for his 
heavy losses would take until the new year to begin to arrive.10 
 
Unable to broaden the war and not yet ready to evacuate to Japan, 
increased numbers of troops had been essential in MacArthur‟s eyes, yet 
even this had been frustrated. In desperate need of troops but with none 
available MacArthur foresaw difficulties in simultaneously maintaining the 
security of Japan and effectively resisting the CPVF. The concerns 
became even more acute with the opening of the CPVF third phase 
offensive (1-15 January 1951) which pushed the UN/ROK forces fifty miles 
south of the 38th Parallel, captured Seoul and thus brought the possibility 
of evacuation closer even (see figure XXXIV). In the face of this redoubled 
pressure and in order to remedy both the problems of the security of 
Japan, and the need for more combat-effective troops, MacArthur decided 
to partially depart from the constabulary model for the NPR and give the 
force some heavier armament.11 He believed that this measure would free 
the remaining reserve US tactical troops in Japan for use on the front in 
Korea and would also contribute to the external security of Japan. With the 
CPVF successes, the external security threats to Japan had temporarily 
become greater than the internal, and even outweighed the political capital 
MacArthur had invested in creating and preserving the NPR as a 
constabulary. Furthermore, with the possibility of retreat from Korea, the 
NPR became more important as it could soon be essential in providing 
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These conclusions prompted MacArthur to ask the Department of the 
Army on 3 January 1951 to equip the NPR with a vast array of heavy 
equipment, including 399 medium tanks, 2,480 machine guns, 155 4.2” 
mortars, 816 recoilless rifles and 304 howitzers.13 Indicative of his concern 
about possibly having to evacuate to Japan, MacArthur also insisted that 
from then on the NPR be considered „co-equal‟ to the South Korean forces 
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in priority for arms.14 These substantial requests were clearly unrealistic in 
the face of overwhelming demands for American hardware for the ongoing 
global expansion of the US and allied ground forces. As a result the NPR 
(and even the NSF) only ever received a tiny fraction of this material 
during its life. Even some of the pro-rearmament heads of the Department 
of the Army were surprised at the level of armament MacArthur suddenly 
sought, and informed him that the continuation of the constabulary style 
organisation might be better for the NPR. Senior army officials expressed 
doubt that the level of armament would be available, and that for the 
internal security role of the NPR, a lighter organisation would be more 
operationally and cost effective, linking it to the Korean Constabulary and 
stating: „Analysis here of Korean experiences indicates that possibly a 
light division . . . would be preferable to divisional organisation you are 
considering for NPRJ‟.15 MacArthur, focused on the immediate external 
security threat he faced, defended his request for heavy arms, making 
explicit reference to the current constabulary structure of the NPR and the 
failure of the constabulary model of the South Korean military to preserve 
the external security of South Korea in 1950: 
 
[The] planned NPRJ divisional structure [is] considered sound and 
entirely suitable for any eventuality including even the all-out 
aggression against Japan proper by foreign forces equipped and 
trained with Communist tactical doctrine which experience has 
demonstrated invariably includes the extensive deployment of tanks 
and artillery. Against such a force an NPRJ lacking medium tanks 
and at least medium artillery would be utterly inadequate. A most 
recent and striking case in point was the complete inability of the 
light south Korean divisions to cope with the tank supported North 
Korean Forces.16 
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How convincing MacArthur‟s argument was is hard to gauge but senior 
figures in the US military soon saw the opportunity to rearm Japan that 
this reversal of position by its principal American opponent represented. 
For example, the head of the US Army General J. Lawton Collins, stated 
to the JCS that he considered that „the security of Japan is of such 
overriding importance that immediate steps must be taken to equip as 
General MacArthur has recommended‟ and requested that the NPR 
should simultaneously be expanded as rapidly as possible to a ten division 
force (around 300,000 men).17 This demand for a quadrupling in size of 
the NPR plus the provision of heavy weapons became central to the 
Department of the Army‟s policy towards the NPR from this point 
onwards.18  
 
Despite some of the equipment being supplied under the guise of a 
„Special Far East Command Reserve‟, the Defence Department‟s thrust 
was parried by State Department opposition due to the move‟s 
international and Japanese domestic political ramifications, coupled with 
Japanese opposition, and the stabilization of the front in Korea. 
Furthermore, once the Chinese advance had been halted, MacArthur soon 
reversed his position, once again helping Yoshida resist Dulles‟ demands 
for an army and collective security.19 As a result, only a tiny fraction of the 
material was ever delivered to the NPR and the American military never 
achieved the size and character of force it desired.20 Nevertheless, those 
opposing the militarization of the NPR had been permanently weakened 
through these events. 
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The Push for Heavier Armament and Expansion 
 
Those defending the constabulary character of the NPR were further 
weakened in April 1951 by the removal of MacArthur. Despite his calls for 
heavier armament for the NPR in January 1951 MacArthur, realising that 
the external threat to Japan had waned, softened his stance, even helping 
Yoshida oppose an expansion of the NPR during talks with Dulles. 
However, MacArthur‟s departure, the result of renewed public demands 
for the expansion of the war in the face of another major Chinese 
offensive, removed a key barrier to Japanese rearmament. 21 His 
replacement as SCAP was Mathew B. Ridgeway, a pragmatic, 
businesslike and down-to-earth character, a sharp contrast with the 
grandiose and occasionally vacillating MacArthur.22 Ridgeway‟s term as 
Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) also saw the end of 
the semi-autonomous status of the office. This was partly to do with 
greater scrutiny from Washington due to the Korean War and moves 
towards a peace treaty, and partly due to Ridgeway‟s personality as both 
a team player and what Takemae describes as his comparative lack of 
„panache and overarching vision‟.23 Career considerations may also have 
played their part with the 56 year old Ridgeway possibly conscious of the 
impact of his actions on his future opportunities in a way his 
septuagenarian predecessor was not. 
 
The appointment of Ridgeway had a major impact on the direction and 
organisational character of the NPR. Unlike MacArthur, as well as being 
loyal to the Department of the Army, Ridgeway had no political capital at 
stake, having taken no part in the drafting of the 1947 Japanese 
constitution or the creation of the NPR. Elements of Ridgeway‟s 
background may also have influenced the direction of his pro-military 
policy. Ridgeway had served in Nicaragua, overseeing the elections of 
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1928 and the formation of the Guardia Nacional, a constabulary force. 
During this period Ridgeway probably formed a dim view of the 
Nicaraguan constabulary due to its lacklustre performance against the 
Sandinista rebels.24 Ridgeway also served as governor of the Philippines 
in 1930 and hence was also familiar with the Philippines Constabulary. 
Nevertheless, whatever his opinion of other constabulary forces, 
Ridgeway certainly did not hold the Korean Constabulary or early South 
Korean Army in high regard, claiming that they were: 
  
A rather sorry force that we did not even dare call an army. So 
obsessed was the United States with its aim of disengagement that 
our people in South Korea were not permitted to use the word 
“army” in referring to the police force we were endeavouring to build 
to keep order after our withdrawal.25 
 
Ridgeway had also not seen service in the Far East during the Second 
World War, which may have resulted in him having a less punitive and 
more forgiving attitude towards Japanese purgees, hundreds of thousands 
of whom he swiftly rehabilitated, and several hundred of which he later 
installed into the upper echelons of the NPR.26 
 
The departure of MacArthur also precipitated other changes in GHQ which 
had an influence on the future course of the NPR. For example, Whitney, 
the head of Government Section (GS), retired with MacArthur, being 
replaced by Frank Rizzo, a former banker with less of the interest Whitney 
had shown in opposing Willoughby and G2 in preventing a militarization of 
the NPR.27 Despite these moves towards a pro-military staff in GHQ, two 
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months after MacArthur‟s departure General Shepard, one of the most 
hawkish supporters of Japanese rearmament and the head of Civil Affairs 
Section (CAS), the GHQ body which oversaw the NPR, became Deputy 
Chief of Staff of FEC/UNC in Korea, being replaced in Japan by Brigadier 
General Leroy Watson.28 These changes at GHQ also took place against 
the backdrop of the huge rearmament programme and the global 
militarization of US policy that NSC 68 had put in motion, moves which 
resulted in the expansion of the influence of the US military over foreign 
policy.29 Within this context and the US military‟s focus on the possibility of 
a third world war, the desire for a new, sizable Japanese army became 
acute. The attraction of a rearmed Japan was further reinforced by the 
relatively low cost of equipping and training Japanese soldiers, an 
argument made by Ridgeway to Congress in 1952 and previously by 
Eichelberger, the former head of the Eighth Army, in 1949.30  
 
As described above, these demands for transformation of the NPR into a 
new Japanese army centred on quadrupling its size to a force of 300,000 
men with a full complement of heavy equipment, tanks and artillery. The 
pace at which the US Army planned to achieve this expansion was highly 
ambitious, seeking an expansion to a force of eight infantry divisions 
(121,600 men), and an additional 34,400 HQ and service troops by 
December 1952. This sizable force was to be doubled again in another 
year to a 300,000 man army consisting of ten infantry divisions, thirty-
seven artillery battalions, forty anti-aircraft battalions, three combat 
engineer groups, three chemical mortar batteries, three armoured cavalry 
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regiments and three medium tank battalions. 31  The clearly military 
character to which the Department of the Army sought to change the NPR 
was also demonstrated in the type of reforms to the structure of the 
organisation which were proposed in an October 1951 report on the 
problem. The report argued that there was a need for new Diet legislation 
and organisational regulations authorising the existence of the NPR and 
defining its position in the Japanese government structure. These extra 
regulations would ideally; create a system of military law with definite 
terms of enlistment and judicial punishment in case of desertion; provide 
for conscription if the numbers of volunteers were not adequate; and 
finally, and again indicative of the original constabulary character of the 
force, reforms to „change the character of the force from a police force to a 
military type armed defence force‟.32 
 
However, these grand and wide-ranging plans quickly ran into obstacles 
as an initial hurdle appeared over the release of heavy armament to the 
NPR. Some confusion occurred as the terms 'heavy armament' and 
'Special FECOM Reserve' were often used synonymously. When the 
State Department agreed that items from the Special FECOM Reserve 
could be given to the NPR in May 1951, Ridgeway and likeminded officials 
thought that permission to give the NPR tanks and artillery had finally 
been granted.33 However, the State Department had specified that only 
small arms, communications equipment and transportation could be given 
to the NPR, and Ridgeway had only been given authorisation to give the 
NPR equipment other than „heavy arms‟. The term „heavy arms‟ was also 
quickly clarified, with the term defined from then on as including: tanks, 
artillery, recoilless rifles, mortars larger than 81mm, and rocket launchers 
larger than 3.5 inches.34 This restriction of the type of equipment the NPR 
was allowed to receive was based largely upon the State Department‟s 
belief that transforming the NPR into a military prior to the conclusion of a 
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peace treaty could seriously undermine support for such a treaty, both 
within the United States and amongst the former Allies, especially 
Australia and New Zealand. Despite it delaying their plans, many of the 
US Army hawks grudgingly agreed and even Ridgeway considered that 
public discussion of the army‟s plans for the NPR could prejudice the 
chances of a peace treaty. 35  Thus the plans of Ridgeway and the 
Department of the Army for a militarized NPR had to be put on hold until 
after the conclusion of a peace treaty, at which point they expected that 
permission to transfer the heavy arms would be forthcoming.36 
 
These restrictions preserved the constabulary character of the NPR for the 
life of the Occupation through limiting its armament and role to that of an 
internal security force. Several further factors prevented this realisation of 
the Department of the Army‟s plans. A shortage of suitable training 
materials translated into Japanese and training facilities seriously 
hampered the introduction of new equipment and training in general.37 
Japanese opposition, led by Yoshida and Masuhara, also resisted the 
expansion and militarization for a number of reasons explained in the final 
section of this chapter. Despite MacArthur and his successor‟s requests, 
the shortage of arms from American sources also impacted upon the 
army‟s plans, with the US units in Korea, the South Korean Army, and the 
global build up of US military units all taking precedence over the NPR.38 
The decision to source as much of the NPR's equipment as possible from 
inside Japan also delayed matters, due to delivery and manufacturing 
delays which were compounded by serious power shortages (resulting 
from undersupply and industrial action).39 Nevertheless, if the US had fully 
prioritised the NPR, it could have been easily equipped in whatever 
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fashion within a matter of months, but as this study has shown a 
combination of divisions within the US authorities, Japanese resistance 
and outside events effectively prevented this. 
 
The NPR and Former Imperial Officers II 
 
Alongside the campaigns for the assumption of heavier arms and the 
expansion of the NPR a simultaneous push was made by Ridgeway and 
hawkish elements of GHQ for the induction into the NPR of a number of 
veterans of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and Navy (IJN). Ridgeway 
and his backers in the Department of the Army saw the introduction of 
large numbers of former Imperial officers as an essential step if their plans 
for the quadrupling and simultaneous militarization of the NPR were to 
come to fruition. As the official US history of the NPR notes, „such 
expansion was feasible only if long-experienced, highly trained career 
officers could be secured to occupy higher echelon command and staff 
positions‟.40 Many American officers had desired a military force from the 
start and had long resented the constabulary character of the NPR and its 
civilian and police leadership. This is evidenced by reports into the NPR 
stating that „the appointment of former police and civilian personnel to 
key . . . line and staff positions has been a constant block to progress‟, 
and that „the lack of qualified officers for staff and command positions has 
been a primary factor militating against tactical efficiency‟.41 These officers, 
led by men such as Willoughby (head of G2) and Shepard (head of CAS), 
had already attempted to install IJA veterans into the top tier of the force 
three times in 1950, only to be thwarted by MacArthur and Yoshida‟s 
defence of the constabulary character of the NPR.42 
 
With the departure of MacArthur, his replacement with the less 
independent Ridgeway, and the Department of the Army‟s push for rapid 
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expansion and militarization of the NPR, the attempt to turn the NPR over 
to former IJA/IJN officers was renewed. 43  Just over a month after 
MacArthur‟s dismissal, Ridgeway contacted the Department of the Army, 
informing them that he intended to release all purgees from their 
restrictions except „former career officers‟, war criminals and members of 
extremist organisations. In this Ridgeway sought the release of thousands 
of IJA/IJN officers commissioned on, or after, 7 July 1937 (the date of the 
„Marco Polo Bridge Incident‟ which triggered the 1937-1945 Sino-
Japanese War).44 However, even this release of around 200,000 purgees 
was not enough for Ridgeway, who regarded the men, few of whom 
ranked above Major, as useful but under-qualified to take charge of the 
NPR and transform it into the large army he had been ordered to prepare 
for. Correspondingly, Ridgeway argued for a further dramatic relaxation of 
the purge restrictions to allow him to induct former high ranking Imperial 
officers into the NPR. Thus, Ridgeway clearly informed the Department of 
the Army of his support for a militarized NPR, whilst simultaneously 
expressing his low opinion of the constabulary type model and police 
leadership of the NPR: 
 
Lacking these [high rank purgees], the ability of the present 
National Police Reserve units to attain combat effectiveness as 
divisions as rapidly as our need for them may urgently demand, will 
be seriously hampered and the expansion envisaged . . . will not be 
feasible . . . The lack of competent high-level command and staff 
officers in the army of the Republic of Korea is daily costing the 
lives of US soldiers. This cost would be paid again and at still 
higher rates, if within the next two years or so, we should be 
required to place reliance on forces improperly led and served by 
incompetent high-level staffs; in other words, if the Soviets attack.45 
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Ridgeway, using an identical phrase to Willoughby, argued that the purge 
was of an excessively strict and „anomalous character‟ and that high 
ranking purgees were essential if the NPR was to be an effective 
military.46 Ridgeway also proceeded to paint a benign picture of those war 
criminals and purgees remaining under the restrictions of the purge 
ordinance (SCAPIN 550), claiming many were not actually ultra-nationalist 
and asking for the release of select high ranking purgees in accordance 
with his and his staffs‟ wishes.47 However, despite his wishes and the 
seemingly essential nature of higher rank Imperial veterans for the 
expansion plans, international political concerns relating to the peace 
treaty again interfered. Despite anticipating this and arguing that any 
negative reactions by other governments were of secondary importance to 
the external security mission to which he sought to turn the NPR, the 
release of the high rank purgees that Ridgeway desired was not achieved 
until the final months of the Occupation.48 The mass depurges of February 
to April 1952 released almost all of the remaining purgees and many 
returned to public life, with 42% of the members of the first post-
Occupation Diet being former purgees. 49  Nevertheless, around 5,500 
purgees remained under restrictions and were hence ineligible for service 
in the NPR right until the end of the Occupation, and many of these were 
the generals and admirals Ridgeway sought.50  
 
Despite not being able to secure the release of all the individuals he 
wanted from the purge restrictions, Ridgeway and members of GHQ still 
attempted to install as many former IJA/IJN officers in the NPR as 
possible. This move was bitterly opposed by Yoshida and the civilian head 
of the NPR, Masuhara Keikichi. Foot-dragging, delaying tactics and 
attempts to play off various members of GHQ against each other stalled 
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Ridgeway‟s plans for months and eventually won Masuhara a grudging 
role in the eventual selection those to be appointed. However, in spite of 
these successes Masuhara continued to oppose any inclusion of purgees 
into the force, attempting to delay the process until after the end of the 
Occupation, from which point he assumed he would have a greater ability 
to resist, and could possibly even cancel the policy. In fact, Masuhara‟s 
resistance was so dogged that it almost cost him his career, with several 
senior figures in CAS questioning his „commitment‟ and „reliability‟. 51 
Nevertheless, Masuhara persisted even until the dying days of the 
Occupation, pushing for administrative independence from CAS two days 
before its formal end. 52  These battles again represented Masuhara‟s 
attempt to preserve the constabulary character of the force and its 
civilian/police leadership. The distinctly pro-military US official history 
attempts to brush off his resistance as a selfish attempt to protect his 
„position and influence and to cater to the desires of his own previous 
appointees from other walks of life [mostly policemen], who were loyal to 
him and who may be displaced or subordinated in influence by the new 
appointees‟. 53  This is an argument it employs whenever it describes 
Japanese resistance to the expansion or militarization of the NPR. 54 
Despite the official history‟s misguided claims, what Masuhara and 
Yoshida really feared, alongside the loss of the internal security force they 
desired, were four things: the unaffordable expansion of the NPR into a 
military, the risk of that military being drawn into conflicts against the 
wishes of the Japanese government, the political and internal security 
repercussions of full-scale rearmament and the risk of a military coup or 
seizure of power by a resurrected Japanese military.55 
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Regardless of Masuhara‟s concerns, resistance and obstructionism, he 
was unable to entirely or indefinitely defer the influx of IJA/IJN veterans 
that the US Army desired.56 The first of two groups of four hundred former 
officers entered the NPR's officer training course at Eta Jima, near 
Yokosuka, on 1 October 1951.57 These 402 recruits of „field grade‟ (high 
rank) undertook short courses in military staff skills and the nature of the 
NPR (including classes on the „democratic‟ nature of the force) and were 
assigned throughout the force at ranks of Senior Inspector and above 
based on their previous military education and experience (see figure 
XXXV).  
 
Figure XXXV. Purgee Appointments to „Field Grade‟ Positions in the NPR 
by Origin and NPR Rank58 
 
A further four hundred and ten „company grade‟ (middle rank) former 
officers were inducted on 5 December 1951. Again, they were enrolled on 
a two-month staff and orientation course and were then integrated into the 
NPR at ranks of Senior Inspector and below (see figure XXXVI).59 
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Figure XXXVI. NPR Purgee Appointments to „Company Grade‟ Positions 
in the NPR by Origin and NPR Rank 60 
Despite the induction of these 812 former purgees, the new arrivals 
represented only a relatively small fraction of the officer corps of the NPR, 
with a total of 4,481 being appointed prior to their appointment (see figure 
XXXVI).61 In addition, the highest rank awarded to any of the purgees 
transplanted into the force was that of Superintendant Class one, the third 
highest rank in the NPR. This left the two highest ranks (Assistant Senior 
Superintendent and Senior Superintendant) and the overall authority, 
command and constabulary character they represented intact and in the 
hands of the civilians and former policemen Masuhara had helped to 
appoint.62  
 
Figure XXXVII. Purgees as a Percentage of NPR Officers  
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This limitation of the number and hence influence of the purgees was a 
qualified victory for Masuhara and Yoshida, one of a number which would 
be fought and won over the size and character of the NSF and GSDF in 
the coming years. The delays achieved by Masuhara helped to postpone 
the induction of the purgees for as long as possible, severely hampering 
the US Army‟s plans for the rapid expansion and militarization of the force. 
These delays also pushed back much of a process Yoshida and 
Masuhara opposed until after the end of the Occupation, by which time 
they knew their powers to resist the Americans would be greatly enhanced. 
Furthermore, the induction of this small number of men prior to the mass 
depurges of early 1952 also prevented the later inclusion of some of the 
most reactionary elements of the former Imperial forces. 63  The 
commitment by the Japanese leadership to limit the power and influence 
of the former military both inside and outside the NPR is also evidenced 
through the Japanese initiative undertaken in early 1952 to establish a 
Japanese Security Academy. This school was designed to provide an 
educational curriculum, approved by the Japanese government, which 
would best inform the training of future generations of the NPR officers. 
This would ensure they were educated with in a manner which helped 
ensure their loyalty under a curriculum approved of by the Japanese 
government. This would reduce the need for Imperial veterans, would 
educate future officers in democratic principles and would help to 
guarantee that the NPR and its successor organisations would not 
become a threat to the state.64 
 
 
The NSF, SDF and Japanese Resistance 
 
The peace treaty negotiations which had taken place sporadically and 
unofficially for years finally found a more concrete and official form in the 
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Dulles negotiations of mid-1950 onwards.65 These talks, led by hawkish 
Republican senator John Foster Dulles, are the subject of major scholarly 
attention, with notable contributions in English made by Schaller, 
Takemae and Yoshitsu.66  Due to this a complete assessment of the 
negotiations is beyond the scope of this work. The most significant 
development in the talks in relation to the NPR was the eventual 
commitment an embattled Japanese government was forced to make to 
„increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and 
indirect aggression‟, a clause eventually enshrined in the 8 September 
1951 Security Treaty.67 As noted below Yoshida swallowed this bitter and 
unnecessary pill in order to regain Japan‟s sovereignty, his primary 
objective in the negotiations. However, recent discoveries have shown 
that Yoshida may also have been playing his diplomatic hand from a 
marked deck as Waseda University‟s Arima Tetsuo recently revealed that 
one of his senior advisors, former IJA General Tatsumi Eiichi, was a paid 
agent of the CIA, subtly pushing Yoshida towards rearmament and 
passing secret Japanese policy documents to the Americans.68 
 
In the course of the negotiations leading up to the peace treaty Yoshida 
made one final effort to save the NPR, once more illustrating its value for 
him and his opposition to its militarization, although perhaps hinting at 
Yoshida's appreciation that some sort of compromise was becoming 
necessary in the face of concerted pressure from Dulles.69 This took the 
form of an proposal entitled „Initial Steps for Re-armament Program‟ 
presented to the Americans on 3 February 1951. The note proposed 
retaining the Maritime Safety Agency and the NPR, in its constabulary 
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form, alongside a combined army, navy and air force totalling 50,000 
men. 70  The proposal, reflecting Yoshida‟s concerns over sovereignty, 
proposed the creation a new Japanese defence command structure, an 
implicit reference to the recent Japanese rejection of US wartime 
command of their armed forces.71 Despite putting forward what Tatsumi 
called a tiny and „useless number‟ of 50,000 troops, according to 
Shibayama and the Japanese minutes of a later meeting, the plan was 
apparently approved by both Dulles and MacArthur.72 If it did actually 
occur, this agreement must have collapsed or been abandoned at some 
point as ultimately the NPR did not survive. Nevertheless, this document is 
important as it represents Yoshida's final effort to preserve the NPR and 
reveals that he saw the continuing need for an internal security force. The 
relative strengths of the forces proposed also shows his greater concern 
over the internal security of Japan, as illustrated in the suggested 50,000 
man combined military forces compared to the 75,000 strong NPR.  
 
Although mentioned by many historians such as Finn, Herzog (who uses 
the incorrect title „First Phase of Rearmament Programme‟), Hosoya, 
Miyazawa, Schaller, Shibayama and Yoshitsu, all actually fail to cite the 
original document. 73  These historians all employ a description of the 
document found in a 1977 edition of the Tokyo Shinbun, or even use a 
very brief editorial note from FRUS as their only sources.74 The document 
itself was released in 2002 as part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Series, 
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Nihon Gaikō Bunsho (Japanese Foreign Relations) and this study is the 
first to employ the original document.75 
 
Despite this final effort to preserve the NPR, Yoshida was eventually 
forced to concede to Dulles‟ demands for a more externally focused force 
and the „aspiration‟ towards the assumption of some of the burden of 
external security this necessitated was expressed in the Security Treaty 
and found form in the Hoantai, or National Safety Force (NSF).76 The NSF 
was formed through the amalgamation of the NPR and the Maritime 
Safety Agency, coupled with the creation of a unified command structure, 
the National Safety Agency (NSA). The NSA was established on 1 August 
1952 and the NSF inaugurated at a parade in Tokyo on 15 October 1952 
(see figure XXXVIII).77 The capabilities of the NSF were more suitable for 
external security and the numbers of its ground arm were increased to 
110,000, moves which prompt Welfield to argue that: „whatever its 
purpose the NSF was clearly an army‟.78  The NSF did have a more 
external focus but, as noted in preceding chapters and below, the NSF 
was still no match for its potential Soviet adversaries, lacked the air arm 
the US considered essential for state on state warfare, and retained many 
of the constabulary features of the NPR.79 The NSF also lacked any way 
of dispatching troops overseas without substantial US support, having no 
transport aircraft and a maritime arm consisting mostly of ageing 
minesweepers and patrol boats. Furthermore, the security treaty itself also 
limited the extent to which the NSF could assume power projection 
capabilities in stating that Japan would avoid: „any armament which could 
be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security 
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The concessions made by Yoshida to Dulles during the peace talks 
weakened him politically, both within the context of the negotiations and 
within Japanese domestic politics. Yoshida had been placed in a difficult 
position, principally due to the secret nature of the negotiations. Due to 
this the opposition did not know of, or appreciate, his dogged resistance, 
and his mild concessions in the creation of the NSF infuriated both the Left 
and Right, who respectively accused him of going too far, and not going 
far enough. 82 This unenviable situation was further exacerbated by the 
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difficult position in which he found himself in the Diet. The Prime Minister, 
due to the initially secret commitment made to the Americans to create the 
NSF, was forced to publicly defend the conversion of the NPR into the 
NSF, a measure he did not want or feel Japan needed, resulting in what 
Ōtake terms „confusing, contradictory and tricky‟ public statements on the 
subject.83  
 
The House of Representatives elections held on 1 October 1952, fought 
partially over the issue of rearmament, demonstrated just how much 
political capital Yoshida had expended to secure a peace treaty. Yoshida's 
Liberals lost 24 seats, and the Socialists more than doubled their 
representation, with their Left and Right wings winning 54 and 57 seats 
respectively.84 However, Yoshida did have some good news with which to 
console himself, the JCP, lost all 35 of the seats it won in 1949, mainly 
due to its „Military Policy‟ and the violence of events such as Bloody May 
Day.85 Despite this cold comfort, the election and the loss of credibility 
Yoshida had suffered, alongside the return of powerful rivals such as 
Hatoyama Ichiro meant that, as Miyazawa states, the Yoshida Cabinet 
had contracted a „terminal illness‟.86  
 
This „terminal illness‟ was principally induced by the strength of opposition 
confronting Yoshida after the depurges of 1952. The individual policies of 
those opposing Yoshida varied but Soeya aptly argues that Yoshida and 
his opposition in this period fell into three distinct groups: Yoshida and his 
supporters favoured „Collaboration‟, others such as Hatoyama sought 
„Autonomy‟, and finally some desired „Independence‟, inc luding many 
members of the Socialist and Communist Parties.  
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Soeya defines Yoshida's position as one of seeking economic 
regeneration with minimum security forces within both the 1947 
constitution and the United States‟ sphere of influence. As this work has 
argued, Yoshida resisted rearmament for as long as possible, due to his 
desire for internal security and fear of the return of militarism, alongside 
other reasons cited below. Yoshida pursued a pragmatic policy aimed at 
what he believed were Japan‟s national interests, through cooperation 
with United States where it matched his goals, and the prevailing 
circumstances. Soeya argues that despite his occasionally intractable 
resistance to their policies, American policymakers were actually more 
concerned in this period by the nationalism of his rivals than by Yoshida's 
occasionally uncooperative attitude.87 
 
The rivals which worried the US included Yoshida's major opponents such 
as Ashida Hitoshi, Shigemitsu Mamoru and Hatoyama Ichiro. These 
individuals are characterised by Soeya as supporters of an „Autonomous‟ 
approach to Japanese diplomacy and the interconnected issue of 
rearmament. Broadly, this approach centred on a desire for autonomy in 
foreign relations (including the freedom to deal with the PRC and USSR 
as they wished) in order to avoid becoming a passive pawn of US policy, 
but not to the extent of seeking to withdraw Japan from America‟s sphere 
of influence. Some of those put into this bracket by Soeya, particularly 
Hatoyama and a youthful Nakasone Yasuhiro, also sought to satisfy their 
nationalist beliefs by rejecting US influence on Japanese domestic policy, 
and through the pursuit of full rearmament and constitutional revision. 
However, as Prime Minister, despite unsuccessful efforts towards 
constitutional revision, Hatoyama made little progress in his push for 
greater autonomy, with his October 1956 normalisation of relations with 
USSR being his only notable success in this regard.88 
 
Soeya‟s model is broadly accurate, but the positions of most of the 
individuals it identifies varied somewhat during the 1950 to 1954, a good 
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example of this being Ashida Hitoshi, the former Prime Minister behind 
some of the early attempts at creating a constabulary force in the late 
1940s.89 Ashida, leader of the Democratic Party until 1952, and hence 
Yoshida's principal conservative rival during the life of the NPR, adjusted 
his position on a number of rearmament related policies during the period, 
especially after the outbreak of the Korean War. Despite being 
consistently opposed to neutrality, the North Korean invasion forced 
Ashida to abandon his policy of seeking an overall peace treaty including 
the Soviet Union and communist China.90 Ashida‟s stance on rearmament 
also changed over time. Although originally favouring a constabulary force, 
the Korean War again caused Ashida to alter his position, arguing in an 
early 1951 policy paper that the NPR was unable to defend Japan as its 
character and personnel rendered it unsuitable for external security 
duties.91 Ashida instead advocated the immediate creation of an additional 
fifteen division force of 200,000 men armed with 4,000 armoured 
personnel carriers, 5,000 tanks and an unspecified number of combat 
aircraft.92 These demands later strengthened to include advocacy of the 
creation of units of „volunteers‟ to serve in Korea under UN command, a 
form of conscription, a system of reservists, and the creation of provisions 
for the overseas use of the security forces.93 These demands and the 
influence of the Korean conflict also shifted Ashida‟s stance on the 
constitution, with his initial belief that rearmament could be achieved within 
it, changing into a rejection of article nine and hence the advocacy of 
constitutional revision.94 Clearly Ashida‟s position shifted over time, but his 
consistent opposition to neutrality or alignment with the Soviet Union and 
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his support of a heavily armed Japan able to use its military power to its 
own advantage, but firmly within the US sphere of influence, place him in 
the „Autonomous‟ group, especially after the outbreak of the Korean War.  
 
Shigemitsu Mamoru (Foreign Minister 1943-1945 and 1954-1956) 
succeeded Ashida as leader of the Democratic Party after the 1952 
depurge and, like his predecessor, can also be placed in the „Autonomous 
Nationalist‟ camp. 95  Shigemitsu believed that Japan should not be 
exclusively tied to the United States and that rearmament would give 
Japan a degree of autonomy from the US, providing a way of normalising 
relations with the communist powers from a position of strength. This 
belief probably lay behind his unenthusiastic attitude to Hatoyama‟s later 
efforts at normalisation, which took place without what he considered to be 
an adequate level of prior rearmament. Despite these differences, like 
Hatoyama, Shigemitsu was also advised on defence issues by Hattori 
Takushiro and this may have influenced his positive attitude to 
rearmament and his perception of its value in relations with both the 
superpowers. 96  Having strong convictions on the importance of 
rearmament did not, however, preclude Shigemitsu from compromising 
over key issues when necessary. For example in the months preceding 
his eventual agreement with Yoshida, Shigemitsu moved away from 
Ashida‟s policies of immediate full-scale rearmament, de-facto 
conscription, the creation of reservists, and possible overseas use of the 
NSF. He abandoned these principals in favour of Yoshida's more 
moderate package of balanced autonomous forces based on the 
principles of voluntary, and strictly internal, service. These concessions 
helped him and Yoshida reach their key compromise on security issues in 
late 1953.97 
 
A final figure who could safely be placed in the „Autonomous Nationalist‟ 
group is the former admiral and diplomat, Nomura Kichisaburō. Nomura, 
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who also served as an advisor to Yoshida, certainly expressed some pro-
rearmament sentiments, was involved in rearmament planning and argued 
against neutrality. Despite his clear commitment to the rebuilding of 
Japanese naval forces some of his statements in favour of strengthened 
internal security forces, and close cooperation with the US, could also be 
shown to illustrate some affinity with Yoshida's „collaborative‟ approach. 
The fact that Nomura also later declined the post of Defense Agency 
Director General in order to preserve the principle of civilian control, 
despite having been a civilian for over twenty years, could also be cited as 
another example of this.98 
 
The final bracket into which Soeya groups the opposition to Yoshida are 
those he terms as favouring an „Independent‟ foreign policy, including 
many in the Socialist and Communist Parties. This position, championed 
by men such as the Socialist leader Asanuma Inejiro, was broadly 
characterised by support of the 1947 constitution and unarmed neutrality, 
a resistance to the later Occupation reforms, and a belief in that the 
creation of any type of security forces was likely to result in the return of 
militarism.99 Soeya argues that those who belonged to this group did not 
see approaching the communist powers as contradictory to neutrality, but 
as a necessary to free Japan from the American sphere of influence. This 
contradiction, and what Hata would term its unrealistic, or even utopian, 
conception of the Cold War made this policy position one which had 
virtually no chance of being implemented. 100  Soeya summaries this 
weakness well:  
 
Neutrality was not a well thought-out diplomatic strategy, but just a 
slogan that allowed them [its supporters] to escape from the 
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contradiction between their refusal to deal with the United States 
and the reality that the United States was almost omnipotent in 
directing the future of Japan. The independence line, therefore, had 
no chance of becoming a central diplomatic orientation of postwar 
Japan.101 
 
These weaknesses did not, however, dampen the appeal of this position, 
with it forming the future basis for the 1960 security treaty protests, and 
the principal opposition to Hatoyama, Ishibashi Tanzan and Kishi‟s 
„Autonomous Nationalism‟ in the late 1950s.102 This rivalry between the 
„Independent‟ and „Autonomous‟ approaches is interesting and hints at the 
divisions and differences in Japan‟s postwar nationalism, when compared 
with the relatively unified pre-1945 state sponsored variety. 103 
 
Soeya‟s approach to defining the state of Japanese politics in the 1950s 
seems an effective characterisation of the three dominant schools of 
thought in existence at the time although it does suffer some weaknesses. 
For example, Soeya‟s account does suffer from some factual errors, such 
as giving the date of the postwar constitution as 1946 rather than 1947.  104 
Furthermore, as highlighted above, his interpretation does paint a range of 
positions which varied over time in rather broad brush strokes, although 
this is excusable in a study such as his own, and in this work, neither of 
which aim to provide an exhaustive analysis of post 1952 Japanese 
domestic politics. Finally, it seems Soeya‟s final group of „Independence 
Nationalists‟ is rather too broad and could benefit from the addition of a 
fourth group, perhaps entitled „Pro-Soviet‟, which included many members 
of the JCP, who favoured explicit alignment with the Soviet Union.  
 
Despite the growing influence of the „Autonomous Nationalists‟ from 1952 
onwards, Yoshida struggled on, believing that with the creation of the NSF 
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the issue of rearmament was closed and that the Americans were unlikely 
to ask for more, and that even if they did he would be able to resist their 
demands more effectively now that Japanese sovereignty had been 
restored, ideas which Ōtake says were serious errors of judgement on the 
part of the Prime Minister. 105 
 
Ultimately, Yoshida was indeed mistaken and US pressure for 
rearmament persisted. Despite a ceasefire in Korea, most American 
thinking on communism and the threat of the Soviet Union had changed 
little. In an attempt towards the practical realisation of the policy goals of 
NSC 68, the US sought to rearm its allies to bolster their capacity to resist 
and deter Soviet aggression.106  
 
The concrete form of this effort was Mutual Security Assistance (MSA), 
also sometimes referred to as Mutual Defense Assistance. This 
programme of aid made economic support for America‟s allies conditional 
on their military contribution, which was explicitly expressed in terms of 
possessing and expanding a military through reference to „self-defense‟, 
„military assistance‟, „armed forces‟ and „defensive armed strength‟.107 The 
1949 act aimed to provide „equipment, materials and services‟ to 
America‟s allies and in doing so sought to enhance their, and America‟s, 
defence industries and military power.108 Another, concealed aim was to 
stifle „nationalistic tendencies‟ in the recipient countries, and hence the 
policy embodied Sarantakes‟ theory of double containment; the 
simultaneous containment of communism and resurgent nationalism 
within America‟s allies (especially the former Axis powers).109 
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Although originally designed to support NATO, Greece and Turkey, by 
1953 the US also sought to use the act to push Japan further towards 
rearmament. Although supported by some major Japanese industrialists 
who saw the opportunities for export and modernisation that MSA 
presented, Yoshida remained sceptical.110 The Prime Minister did see the 
benefits of the vast amounts of aid he could win for Japan but remained 
opposed to further militarization of the NSF, and hence sought to make 
the minimum commitment permissible for the maximum amount of aid 
possible.111 
 
MSA also represented the formal assumption of more of the mantle of 
external security from the United States.112 Despite the agreements made 
in the 1951 security treaty to assume more of the burden for external 
defence, the rationale and mission of the NSF was still largely internal; as 
Masuhara states, its role was „to maintain peace and order in our country‟ 
[author‟s emphasis].113 In order to meet the criteria for MSA Japan needed 
to reform the NSF to give it an even greater role in external security, or 
replace it with another force. Either of these options would require new 
legislation or major reform of the NSA/NSF laws.114  
  
An often cited example of the negotiations over the extent of the external 
security contribution to be made by Japan at this time are the Ikeda 
Robertson talks of 1953. The talks began in Washington in July, headed 
by Assistant Secretary of State Walter S Robertson and Ikeda Hayato, a 
former finance minister and future Prime Minister (1960-1964).115 In an 
early meeting on 15 July the US delegation made it clear to the Japanese 
that in order to qualify for MSA, a full army and navy were required, i.e. 
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rearmament.116 The Americans also renewed their push for a ground force 
of between 325,000 to 350,000 men. 117  In response Ikeda and his 
colleagues claimed that a gradual expansion over five years to 210,000 
was the maximum obtainable without bringing in conscription or new 
taxes.118 
 
Despite being unable to fully resolve these differences a joint declaration 
was issued at the end of October and in the final agreement Japan 
accepted military aid and orders for US offshore procurement and was 
obliged to increase its „military‟ as far as its economy permitted. Japanese 
business was also allowed to sell raw materials and semi-finished goods 
to the US and the Japanese government also agreed to a trade embargo 
on the communist bloc.119 The agreement was signed on 8 March 1954 
and helped in paving the way for the creation of the SDF on 1 July 1954, 
almost four years to the day after the creation of the NPR.120 
 
The importance of the Ikeda-Robertson talks are stressed by some 
historians, particularly Miyazawa Kiichi, (Prime Minister 1991-1993), a 
junior participant in the talks at the time, but others challenge the central 
position given by him to the negotiations. For example, whilst Miyazawa 
argues that the talks were: „interpreted by the public as deciding the 
basics of Japan-U.S. relations for the future, and indeed, we believed this 
to be the case as well‟, Uemura characterises the talks as merely a 
„comma‟ in a series of larger negotiations. 121  Like Uemura, Swenson-
Wright argues that the Yoshida-Shigemitsu negotiations of 1953 were far 
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more significant in determining the eventual form of the Japanese security 
forces, arguing that: „the [Ikeda-Robertson] talks were neither an 
unambiguous diplomatic victory for the Japanese side nor a decisive 
turning-point in the defence negotiations . . . a September 27 arrangement 
between Yoshida and Shigemitsu – not the Ikdea mission to Washington – 
was the critical event in the development of Japan‟s early post war 
defense policy‟.122  
 
The Yoshida-Shigemitsu negotiations were indeed highly significant, 
eventually resulting in a compromise between the differing priorities of 
both men. The agreement can be said to be the point at which Yoshida's 
„Collaborative‟ policy fused with the „Autonomous Nationalism‟ of 
Shigemitsu. This new found cooperation is evidenced in the content of the 
agreement, with Shigemitsu‟s desire for a new force (ultimately the SDF) 
based on new legislation, winning over Yoshida's preference for a 
reformed NSF, and Yoshida's opposition to a full defence ministry and his 
commitment to an internal security role and civilian control being 
maintained in the new force.123 This arrangement could also be said to be 
the starting point of the relatively heavily armed, but still dependent, 
Japanese defence policy which persists to this day. The importance of 
these negotiations also extended beyond defence policy, helping to create 
the basis for future conservative unity and success, in the face of the 
electoral gains, and simultaneous, albeit unsuccessful, merger talks of the 
two wings of the Socialist party.124 
 
Both the Yoshida-Shigemitsu and Ikeda-Robertson talks took place during 
a period in which a large range of official and unofficial discussions took 
place between groups of Japanese politicians, diplomats and NSF officers 
and their American counterparts. The opinions expressed in these 
discussions by the Japanese on the desirable size and character of their 
future armed forces also varied widely, even within the government, 
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leading Swenson-Wright to correctly surmise that the „the Japanese 
authorities, were not, it seems, speaking with one voice‟.125 
 
This plurality of discussions continued after the Ikeda-Robertson talks, 
causing some confusion on both sides but eventually also settling key 
issues such the exact troop levels to which the Japanese were willing to 
commit (an expansion from four divisions to six, entailing the addition of 
31,000 uniformed, and 10,000 civilian staff).126 Furthermore, other events, 
such as the assumption of the US presidency by Eisenhower and his 
recognition of more realistic limits to what the US could expect from Japan 
also contributed to the reduction of US demands. 127  Thus, it can be 
argued that the Ikeda-Robertson were not as important as claimed by 
Miyazawa, being overshadowed by the Yoshida-Shigemitsu agreement 
and supplemented and amended by later agreements. However, the 
substantial amounts of aid and investment that the agreement won for 
Japan should not be discounted, and proved were instrumental in 
bolstering Japan‟s defence industry and economy, helping to facilitate the 
transformation of the NSF into the SDF. 
  
In his struggles with the Americans and his compromises with Shigemitsu, 
Yoshida had preserved most of his key positions on Japanese security 
and had won substantial amounts of aid for Japan, but the fact that he did 
not divulge the details of MSA agreement to the Diet for months resulted 
in bruising political battles with the opposition and factions within his own 
party.128 The growing unpopularity of Yoshida was evidenced by the loss 
of more seats to the Socialists and Hatoyama‟s splinter Liberal Party in the 
April 1953 elections.129 These developments, together with an economic 
recession for almost all of 1954 and bitter factional battles with political 
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rivals such as Hatoyama, eventually cost Yoshida his premiership on 10 
December 1954.130 
 
Throughout these negotiations Yoshida and the Japanese government 
employed a number of stratagems and arguments to resist the American 
economic, political and diplomatic pressure brought to bear upon them. 131 
Some were new but many of these moves were common to those used 
during the life of the NPR. The arguments advanced to resist the 
American demands included worries over the impact on Japan‟s economy 
and international trade, concerns over sovereignty, fear of involvement in 
US military adventures, the belief that an external security force was 
unnecessary, worries over the impact on domestic security and politics, 
and doubts over the legal and physical practicality of the vast expansion 
and remilitarization sought by the US. These complex and often 
interconnected arguments are given different weights of importance by 
various participants and historians but one aspect of the negotiations is 
clear: the Japanese government attempted to oppose the plans of the US 
as far as possible and sought whatever benefits it could when forced to 
make concessions.132 As Nakanishi notes, this approach was the result of 
the astute recognition by Yoshida of what powers Japan had left to 
negotiate with, and his keen appreciation of the realities of the postwar 
international environment, particularly of the Cold War and the 
opportunities and challenges it presented for Japan.133 
 
Perhaps the most often cited argument employed by Yoshida and his 
successors, and that seen by most to underpin the „Yoshida Doctrine‟ (see 
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below), was a rejection of extensive rearmament on the grounds of 
economic impact.134 The impossibility of rearmament due to the fragile 
state of Japan‟s economy was repeatedly stressed by Yoshida during the 
Dulles talks (1950-1953) and other variants of this argument were 
employed over the years. For example, during the Mutual Security Aid 
(MSA) negotiations, the argument was made that Japan was unable to 
afford the proposed expansion of the NSF due to the excessive economic 
impact of a number of natural disasters which had occurred that year.135 
The potentially negative political and economic impact of rearmament on 
Japan‟s trade and diplomatic relations with its Asian and Australasian 
neighbours was also linked to this argument.136  
 
Economic considerations also played a central part in the MSA 
negotiations. Seeing there were few direct political or security benefits to 
be gained in conceding to the US demands for further rearmament, the 
Japanese government primarily sought MSA in order to secure food aid, 
US investment in Japan‟s infrastructure, and arms industry, and the 
sizeable orders the US intended to place in Japan‟s arms factories.137 The 
economic argument became deeply ingrained in the Japanese 
government‟s attitude to the SDF and even found its way into the official 
canons of the force, with Masuhara stating in 1956 that „every possible 
effort must, of course, be made to increase the defensive strength within a 
reasonable balance with the nation‟s resources and people‟s livelihood‟.138 
 
A further, and sometimes neglected, issue used by the Japanese 
government were their concerns over sovereignty. 139 Nakanishi argues 
that sovereignty formed the key element of Japan‟s postwar diplomatic 
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strategy, with the ultimate objective of Yoshida and his successors up until 
1972 being the reinstatement of Japan‟s position as a full, legitimate 
member of the international community. 140  The return of Japanese 
sovereignty through the conclusion of a peace treaty was the principal 
concern of Yoshida during the Dulles negotiations and was the reason 
behind the limited concessions he made which resulted in the creation of 
the NSF. Japan‟s resistance to combined defence planning with the 
United States and its reluctance to place the SDF under US command in 
the case of a crisis also had their origins in Japanese concerns over 
sovereignty, but also owed something to Yoshida's determination not to 
become embroiled in another war. 141  Moreover, this fear of becoming 
involved in future conflicts was also linked to the concern held by Yoshida 
about the revival of militarism and the possible danger of a coup d‟état 
from a more powerful military, or one too close to the United States.142 
 
Herzog makes an interesting link between the economic and sovereignty 
issues. He argues that the two issues were directly linked in the minds of 
Yoshida and his successors, in that they were concerned about the 
economic impact of large-scale rearmament on Japan‟s „economic 
sovereignty‟. The excessive cost of which could have made the country a 
permanent economic ward of the United States and hence susceptible to 
US pressure due to Japan‟s dependence on aid.143 This opinion, although 
ultimately unjustified, was also shared by some US policymakers, who 
feared that a Japan stripped of its former empire might not be 
economically viable.144 
 
Another major argument made by the Japanese government was that 
expanded and more muscular security forces were unnecessary from an 
external security point of view. Unlike some Americans, Yoshida and most 
of his close associates had long believed that the US military presence in 
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Japan alone was enough to deter direct Soviet aggression.145 Many of the 
Japanese population also shared this view and this fact was also used to 
strengthen Japan‟s hand during the Ikeda-Robertson talks in 1953.146 
Yoshida and his advisors had always been circumspect on the need for an 
external security force, even questioning the need for one during the 
height of the Chinese offensive in Korea.147 However, Yoshida and his 
subordinates were unified in their wish for a strong internal security force, 
believing serious communist aggression against Japan, if it ever occurred, 
would be in the form of Soviet sponsored guerrillas, linked with the 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP).148 
 
These internal security concerns also influenced Japanese opposition to 
the US push for rearmament in other ways. Ōtake argues that Yoshida 
worried that if he consented to full-scale rearmament, the resulting boost 
for the Left could threaten his leadership and even result in widespread 
demonstrations and escalating internal security problems.149 Nevertheless, 
Yoshida demonstrated his skill as a negotiator by exploiting the same 
fears in the Americans by covertly encouraging some Socialist protests 
during the Dulles talks.150 As predicted by the CIA in 1951, the concern 
over the potential public reaction was widely used by the Japanese 
government to argue against rearmament. However, despite the 
negotiating tactics it supported, these fears were based on the genuine 
pacifist sentiment amongst much of the population, and the fact that in 
conceding further Yoshida could not make political gains and could only 
lose support and respect, from both the Right and Left.151 
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On numerous occasions the 1947 constitution and its „no war‟ clause were 
also cited in opposition to the US plans. 152  Despite its frequent 
employment and even being termed „the perfect excuse‟ by Yoshida, this 
argument had been weakened by the content of the UN Charter and 1951 
Security Treaty, both of which affirmed states‟ right to self defence.153 This 
position was reinforced by repeated pronouncements by MacArthur, 
Yoshida himself and others that article nine of the constitution did not 
preclude Japan‟s right to self defence.154  
 
Finally, specific arguments over the feasibility on the practicalities of 
rearmament on the scale advocated by the United States were fielded. 
These were especially prominent during the MSA negotiations and 
included fears that the rapid and sizeable recruitment sought by the US 
could result in JCP infiltration and possible mutiny or rebellion (in a similar 
fashion to the Korean Constabulary) and over the legal impossibility of 
introducing conscription to facilitate rapid expansion.155 
 
An original and interesting approach to the subject of Japanese resistance 
is taken by Ōtake Hideo. In opposition to most other historiography on the 
subject, Ōtake argues that Yoshida‟s long-term objective was actually 
rearmament and the return to full sovereignty that it represented, claiming, 
in common with Dower, that these beliefs stemmed from Yoshida's 
position and mindset as political survivor of the Imperial Japanese 
polity. 156  According to Ōtake, Yoshida sought to attain his aim of a 
rearmed Japan through the preservation and promotion of Japanese 
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culture and an emphasis on nationalist education, designed to gradually 
obscure the pacifism instilled by Occupation reforms and psychologically 
re-equip the Japanese people for a return to international power politics. 
 
Again in opposition to the prevailing view, Ōtake views the arguments 
Yoshida made as merely temporary delaying tactics and claims that he 
secretly supported rearmament all along. For example, Ōtake claims that 
Yoshida knew that: the economic arguments would eventually become 
invalid as the Japanese economy grew, neighbouring countries‟ objections 
would decline over time as trust was rebuilt, political and popular 
opposition to rearmament could be eliminated over time through reforming 
education, and likewise the threat from the military could be removed 
through „democratic education‟.157 
 
Dower also argues that Yoshida always secretly planned to rearm 
Japan. 158  Dower claims Yoshida's opposition was merely a politically 
expedient way to return Japan to great power status as swiftly as possible 
through the removal of barriers and opposition to Japan‟s return to the 
international community and by ensuring her economic recovery. 
Extending this theory, Dower believes that for Yoshida the disarmament 
enshrined in the 1947 constitution was never „eternal‟ and that the Prime 
Minister‟s policies were a web of lies which resulted in „moderate . . . 
creeping rearmament, mendacity in the Diet and a perversion of the 
constitution‟, and ultimately in the rearmament which Dower alleges 
Yoshida sought.159 An examination of the efforts by Yoshida to preserve 
the NPR and resist US demands for rearmament, and the political capital 
he expended in doing so, which certainly contributed heavily to his own 
downfall, expose some limitations in Dower‟s interpretation, at least when 
applied to the period in which the NPR existed. 160  Furthermore, 
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weaknesses in Dower‟s definitions of rearmament and his limited source 
base limit his usefulness on this issue.161 
 
Swenson-Wright is more balanced in his position on Yoshida's long-term 
intentions, arguing that Yoshida may well have eventually planned to 
rearm, but aptly noting the difficulty of judging the true stance of Yoshida 
through his cloak of often opaque and sometimes contradictory 
statements. 162  The „black box‟ (or perhaps „mirror‟) which seems to 
confront historians examining Yoshida's long-term thinking on rearmament 
is further complicated by both the secrecy of Yoshida and the 
inaccessibility of much of the Japanese source material, as is also noted 
by Swenson-Wright: „[Yoshida‟s] independent style and a tendency to 
keep close council has made it difficult to interpret his thinking on certain 
critical diplomatic issues, a problem compounded by the Japanese 
government‟s reluctance to open its diplomatic records‟. 163 
Notwithstanding these complications, it seems that Yoshida's shifting 
political fortunes probably influenced his opinions after 1952. Faced with 
the considerable political challenges detailed above, Yoshida‟s 
pragmatism and deft political skill would never have allowed him to entirely 
rule out any option or any potential future compromise, in order to 
maintain his grip on power. Examples of Yoshida „hedging his bets‟ in this 
way could be said to be demonstrated through actions such as: his 
indirect support for groups which were planning for rearmament at the 
time including one headed by Nomura, and the output of official policy 
research such as that of the NSA‟s „Systems Research Committee‟ (Seido 
Chōsa Iinkai).164  
 
Despite this hints at Yoshida considering having to make concessions to 
stay in power some of his actions after 1952 do hint at continued 
opposition to the more traditional type of rearmament favoured by his 
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„Autonomous Nationalist‟ opposition, and a possible continued preference 
for constabulary type security forces.165 A good examples of this can be 
found in the 1953 security negotiations between Yoshida and Shigemitsu, 
in which the Prime Minister won concessions over civilian control (aimed 
at preventing the growth of influence of men like Hattori), and over the 
placing of the internal security at an equal priority to external security.166 
While these compromises could be said to indicate that after 1952 
Yoshida still sought to maintain armed forces rooted in the constabulary 
model of the NPR, it is difficult to make a definitive judgement, especially 
without either the full Japanese diplomatic records, or an obviously 
unobtainable, truthful disposition from Yoshida himself. However, what is 
not in doubt is the commitment of Yoshida to the constabulary model 
during the life of the NPR for the reasons cited above, supported by the 
evidence provided throughout this work, and as recognised by other 
historians such as Swenson-Wright who also note the pronounced 
reluctance of Yoshida to rearm in 1950-1951.167 
 
The above arguments were eventually characterised as elements of the 
concept known as the „Yoshida Doctrine‟, a policy in which postwar Japan 
deliberately eschewed rearmament and participation in traditional great 
power diplomacy in favour of an emphasis on economic growth.168 Clearly 
the economic arguments cited above formed the core of this policy, 
especially after 1952, but recent studies have shown that the political and 
security issues noted above also played their part. Furthermore, prior to 
the 1951 peace treaty, the return of sovereignty was certainly Yoshida's 
principal concern, even outweighing economic considerations.169 
 
Although, through using the above arguments, the Japanese resisted 
American demands for greater rearmament and a more substantial 
contribution to Japan‟s external security as far as they could, some 
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concessions to the Americans were necessary in order to remain on good 
terms with their former occupiers. Clear examples of these concessions 
can be found in the 1951 Peace and Security Treaties in which the 
Japanese government affirmed its right to self defence and committed 
itself to an increasing contribution to its own defence.  170 This commitment 
to contribute towards external security was further strengthened by the 
absence of an explicit reciprocal American commitment to defend Japan 
and measures such as the 1954 withdrawal of the US 1st Cavalry division 
from Hokkaido and the corresponding assumption of ground defence of 
the island by the GSDF.171 The content of Masuhara‟s 1956 Review of 
Japan’s Defense Strength also demonstrates this assumption of external 
security duties by the NSF and GSDF, in claiming that: „we must establish 
a self-sustaining defensive system able to bear up against both direct and 
indirect aggression‟.172  
 
Perhaps most indicative of the GSDF‟s assumption of a greater role in the 
external security of Japan was the creation of the Air Self Defence Forces 
in 1954. Clearly, jet fighters such as the American F-86 „Sabre‟ (see figure 
XXXIX) were of little value for internal security duties.173 However, the 
absence of aerial refuelling capabilities, aircraft carriers and heavy 
bombers from the ASDF for many years also demonstrate the defensive 
nature of the force. This is due to both the lack of power projection the 
absence of these capabilities reveals, and the post-Korean War American 
conception of any future major war as being one centring on aerial nuclear 
bombardment of enemy territory, in which any state lacking a nuclear 
bomber fleet would play a purely defensive role. 174 The knockout blow 
dealt to Japan by America‟s strategic bomber force during the Second 
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World War served as a direct reminder of this, and was also occasionally 
employed by the Americans to remind the Japanese of their subordinate 
role, most notably by Whitney during negotiations over the constitution in 
his comment about „atomic sunshine‟ made to Japanese ministers during 
a flypast by a B-29.175 
 




Continuities in the NSF and GSDF  
 
With the transformation of the NPR into the NSF on 15 October 1952 and 
the creation of the Self Defence Forces two years later, much of the 
constabulary character of the NPR gradually eroded. Nevertheless, some 
elements of the NPR‟s character still survive in the current GSDF. 
Furthermore, many of the concepts and trends which have been examined 
in this study of the NPR continued through the life of the NSF and into the 
GSDF.  
 
Despite the gradual increase in the external security role of the NSF and 
GSDF the internal security role for which the NPR was created persisted 
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in the new forces. The emphasis on external security duties pressed for by 
the „Autonomous Nationalist‟ Hatoyama (1954-1956) and Kishi (1957-60) 
governments was reflected in the heavier armament and equipment given 
to the GSDF during the 1958-1960 defence build up plan.177 However, the 
events of 1960 renewed the importance of the internal security role of the 
GSDF. The street protests and rioting surrounding the 1960 Security 
Treaty and the trouble the civil police had in controlling them clearly 
demonstrated the GSDF still had a role in maintaining internal security.178 
This is clearly shown as Kishi, worried by the level of protest on the streets, 
attempted, ultimately unsuccessfully to amend the Police Duties Execution 
Law, aiming to widening the police powers of the GSDF and its abilities to 
deal with civil disorder.179 
 
The 1960 Security Treaty itself also altered Japan‟s security 
responsibilities, both internally and externally. The treaty increased the 
Japanese and the American commitment to the defence of Japan, with 
both states pledging to „maintain and develop . . . their capacities to resist 
armed attack‟.180 The United States, in contrast to the vague assurances 
that force might be used to defend Japan in the 1951 Security Treaty, 
explicitly guaranteed Japan‟s external security, stating its commitment to 
meeting an attack on Japan with force and an article 51 UN resolution.181 
However, these changes in the US-Japan security relationship created a 
paradox; Japan was to take more of a role in its external security but, 
simultaneously, that external security was to be guaranteed by the United 
States, a supreme deterrent, the power of which effectively removed the 
need for a Japanese external security build up. The treaty also removed 
the highly controversial 1951 Security Treaty clause which gave the US 
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military a role in guaranteeing the internal security of Japan. 182  This 
change gave the GSDF ultimate responsibility for preserving the internal 
security of Japan. The assumption of the entire burden of internal security, 
the external security paradox, and the major domestic disturbances which 
accompanied the treaty, reinvigorated and refocused the GSDF‟s 
approach to internal security.  
  
This renewed regard for internal security was a return to the original basis 
of the GSDF and indeed NPR. The 1954 Self Defence Forces law, which 
founded the organisation and laid out its responsibilities, was clear in 
expressing the internal security role of the force:  
 
The Self-Defense Forces, in order to protect the peace and 
independence of our country and safeguard its security, shall have 
as its principal mission to defend our country against both direct 
and indirect aggression (which includes large-scale internal 
disturbances and sedition breaking out as a result of instigation or 
intervention of a foreign country), and to take steps whenever 
necessary to maintain public order.183  
 
The internal security responsibilities of the GSDF laid down in the Self 
Defence Law were further stressed and clarified through a 1954 
agreement with the civil police in which the use of the GSDF to breakup 
large scale rioting or unrest was formally authorised. 184  The internal 
security role of the GSDF in the event of insurrection was further clarified 
in the 1956 Review of Japan’s Defense Strength: 
  
                                                             
182
 Treaty between the United States of America and Japan, 8/9/51, printed in Lu, Japan, 
A Documentary History, p 500; D.V.V. Hickey, The Armies of East Asia: China, Taiwan, 
Japan & the Koreas, Lynne Rienner, London, 2001, p38. For more on internal security 
and sovereignty see: Chapter 1, pp 74-92; Chapter 3, pp 192-203. 
183
 H. Masuda (ed), Rearmament of Japan, Part 2: 1953-1963, Congressional Information 
Service and Maruzen, Tokyo, 1998, (YF-A17) 1B-307, Self Defense Forces Law, 7/31/55. 
184




In the event of an indirect aggression or other emergencies when it 
is recognised that law and order cannot be maintained by the civil 
police, the prime minister can, upon his own judgement or when 
requested by prefectural governors, order the operation of the Self 
defence forces.185 
 
This statement also highlights the identical ways in which the SDF and 
NPR were under the direct control of the Prime Minister and formed the 
second, and last, Japanese line of defence against civil disorder or armed 
insurrection, behind the civil police. Despite the moves of the late 1950s 
towards a greater external security role, Weinstein also argues that the 
internal security mission remained foremost in the thinking of much of the 
leadership of the SDF who saw the possibility of a guerrilla war supported 
by USSR/PRC or major internal unrest, probably in connection with the 
outbreak of a second Korean war as the most likely future combat role for 
the GSDF.186 Certain elements of the GSDF‟s preparations during this 
period seem to verify this, with training above battalion level being rare, 
even into the 1970s, and the value of much external security training being 
very limited due to its extreme safety consciousness, a watchdog press 
and limited popular support. The contrast with the much more effective 
and committed approach to internal security and riot training undertaken 
during this period seems to support Weinstein‟s argument. 187  The 
deployment and posture of the GSDF during this period also reflect its 
enduring internal security mission and the continuity with the NPR, which 
shared a very similar deployment pattern, as argued by Katzenstein: 
 
Given the deterrent power of U.S. forces, the primary purpose of 
Japan‟s armed forces was domestic policing against Communist 
insurrection . . . Throughout the first two postwar decades the 
domestic mission of the GSDF was reflected in its deployment. Of 
the thirteen GSDF divisions, only four were stationed in Hokkaido, 
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the most likely point of attack by the Soviet Union. The other nine 
were deployed quite evenly throughout Japan, close to major 
metropolitan areas and industrial complexes.188 
 
It could be argued that stationing 30% of the force in Hokkaido 
represented adequate provision for the defence of the island but, this is 
shown to be inaccurate when compared to the catastrophically inadequate 
deployment of 50% of the strength of the South Korean Army to the 38th 
Parallel in 1950.189 Nevertheless, this shift to a deployment of around a 
third of the force to Hokkaido helps illustrate the assumption of more of the 
burden of external security when compared to the 10-20% of the force 
stationed there during the life of the NPR.190 
 
Whether even this proportion of the force would have been adequate in 
the face of a Soviet invasion is questionable. Clearly the leadership of the 
SDF did not think so, as in late 1974 it began calling for an increase in the 
defence budget in order to make the force capable of independently 
defending Japan. The extent to which US demands were successfully 
resisted can also be seen from the fact that the preceding year the GSDF 
announced its aim to expand to 180,000 men, roughly half of what the US 
pushed for 23 years before and even 30,000 less than the figure Ikeda 
had suggested in 1953.191 This is not to say that the result was entirely 
due to Japanese resistance. Playing a supporting role was the realisation 
by Eisenhower and Dulles that the pursuit of rearmament at all costs could 
actually severely harm US-Japan relations, the Japanese economy and 
even threaten Japan‟s political stability, and hence the entire rationale for 
rearmament in the first place. This appreciation of the limits to which 
Japanese rearmament could be pursued, and the shift in priority to 
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ensuring long term stability, is highlighted in documents such as NSC 
5516/1 which stated that the United States should aim to: 
 
Encourage and assist Japan to develop military forces which will 
eventually be capable of assuming primary responsibility for the 
defence of Japan. The amount and timing of the build-up of 
Japanese military forces should be related to the necessity for 
developing political and economic stability, as well as military 
strength, in Japan. The United States should avoid pressing the 
Japanese to increase their military forces to the prejudice of 
political and economic stability.192 
 
Despite the clear dominance of the external security mission in today‟s 
GSDF, the internal security mission of the force has seen something of a 
revival in recent years. With concern over terrorism intensifying, the 
Defence Agency and the National Police Agency concluded an 
arrangement in 2000 under which the GSDF would take a greater role in 
the internal security of Japan in the event of a serious incident, such as 
guerrilla or large scale terrorist operations. 193  The „Agreement on the 
Maintenance of Public Order in the Event of Public Security Operations‟ 
allows the GSDF to take the primary role in dealing with a serious internal 
security crisis, rather than having to wait until the civil police admitted it 
was unable to cope, as had previously been required.194 The agreement 
and the planning which accompanied it centred on preventing the 
infiltration of either irregular or Special Forces into Japan, and their 
containment and neutralisation by the GSDF, if able to land. The planning 
and agreement allowed the SDF to take the lead in eliminating the threat, 
with the police taking the secondary role of securing surrounding areas, 
providing road blocks and other non-combat roles. In such a crisis, and in 
a similar fashion to the plans made by the NPR, the GSDF would also 
take on the role of providing armed guards for Japan‟s critical 
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infrastructure, such as nuclear power stations, airports and other key 
facilities. 195  From July 2005 onwards various participating police 
departments and regional GSDF commands took part in tabletop 
exercises designed to build mutual understanding of the respective 
agencies‟ roles and responsibilities, and from October 2005 onwards joint 
field exercises were held in Fukuoka, Hokkaido, Ibaraki, Kansai, Saitama 
and Shikoku (see figure XXXX).196 
 





 A number of further elements of the character and structure of the NPR 
survived into the NSF and GSDF. The police-style legal system of the 
NPR survives to this day, and if a crime is committed by a member of the 
SDF, either on or off duty, he or she is subject to civil law and faces a 
civilian criminal trial, not a court martial as is typical of an army or navy.198 
Civilian control and the primacy of the civilian government over the SDF 
also remained central to the identity of the NSF and SDF. The system, 
much like the resistance by the Japanese to the inclusion of former 
Imperial officers in the NPR, was designed to prevent a return of militarism 
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and the military‟s political influence and the coup d‟états of the pre-1945 
era.  
 
The system of civilian leadership and civilian control over personnel, 
budget and operational matters which started in the NPR continued in the 
NSF and GSDF. The fact that many of the senior officers of the SDF are 
still former policemen also attests to the survival of another vestige of the 
constabulary character of the NPR in the GSDF.199 The reins of the SDF 
also, like the NPR, remained firmly in the hands of the Prime Minister with 
the National Safety Agency or Hōan Cho (NSA) and its successor the 
Defense Agency (Bōeichō) being external organs of the Prime Minister‟s 
office, with the organisation only becoming a full Ministry of Defense  
(Bōeishō) in 2007.200 Again, as with the NPR, the Prime Minister also 
solely holds the power to deploy the GSDF domestically, and although 
Diet approval is now required, in emergencies it can be sought after 
deployment, if necessary.201 
 
Although civilian control remained in place during the transitions into the 
NSF and GSDF, the evolution of the force also saw the gradual return of a 
number of high ranking Imperial officers. Ridgeway‟s relaxation of the 
purge restrictions and their removal with the end of the Occupation 
allowed all the former purgees to return to public life. Furthermore, with 
high profile purgees returning to power, above all Prime Minister 
Hatoyama Ichiro, the attitude of the government to the return of all but the 
most reactionary former officers grew more lenient. The moves towards a 
more external focus within the SDF (again under Hatoyama and his 
successor Kishi) also prompted a re-examination of the inclusion of 
Imperial veterans in the forces. Even Okazaki Katsuo, Chief Cabinet 
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Secretary during most of the life of the NPR, Foreign Minister from 1952-
1954 and initially an opponent of the inclusion of IJA/IJN officers, reversed 
his position. Okazaki explained in a 1964 interview that with the external 
mission of the SDF becoming more prominent in the late 1950s, the use of 
the high ranking former officers, most with battlefield experience, became 
essential. Okazaki stated: „gradually we found that we couldn‟t do without 
the experience of old military people, if we want[ed] this force to be 
effective. And gradually we included those professional military people in 
the forces‟.202 As a result of this policy by August 1955 all of the Chiefs of 
Staff of the three SDF branches were former IJA or IJN officers. 203 
Veterans of the Pacific and Sino-Japanese wars continued to play a major 
role in the leadership of the SDF for many years. For example GSDF 
Chief of Staff Sugita Ichiji, a former IJA Colonel, played a major role in 
pushing for GSDF use in suppressing the demonstrations surrounding the 
1960 Security Treaty. 204  However, with the passage of time and the 
passing of their generation, the numbers of Imperial veterans in the SDF 
declined, being replaced by graduates of the Defence Academy, men well 
schooled in the democratic ways of the SDF and loyal to the postwar 
Japanese state. 
 
Despite this waxing and waning of the influence of Imperial officers, the 
constabulary model still influenced the SDF‟s officer corps. Like the NPR, 
police officers continued to staff the intelligence arms of the SDF, and the 
civilian bureau which controls the SDF has almost always been headed by 
police officers.205 The continuing presence of police officers in these roles 
also illustrates the enduring internal security mission of the GSDF. 
 
Alongside this continuing internal mission, many of the restrictions on the 
external use of the SDF have been relaxed, with the force now often 
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contributing to peace keeping operations under the aegis of the UN and 
recently providing support to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, 
almost all these operations are designed so that the SDF has little or no 
chance of being drawn into combat and usually have a lot more in 
common with disaster relief operations than external security.206 
 
Following on from the first informal and ad-hoc use of the NPR in disaster 
relief roles, the use of the NSF and GSDF to provide disaster relief 
became a central mission in the NPR's successor forces.207 The role of 
the NSF/GSDF in disaster relief was clarified and strengthened in their 
founding legislation and was defined for the SDF as follows: „in the event 
of natural calamities and other disasters, the director general may 
dispatch units to protect life and property when requested by the 
prefectural governors or without waiting for such requests in the case of 
emergency‟.208  
 
The role of providing disaster relief has become the one which much of 
the Japanese population most closely associates with the SDF due to the 
relatively rare appearance of uniformed SDF members in public except in 
this role. Aside from the humanitarian relief and rescue these operations 
provide, they also give the SDF a public image boost, a fact first 
recognised and employed during the life of the NPR.209 The role that these 
positive images have in increasing the support for the SDF amongst a still 
largely pacifist Japanese population and an occasionally sceptical 
international community, is significant. However, the potential public 
relations impact of disaster relief operations was shown to be something 
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of a two-way street following the resounding public criticism heaped upon 
the SDF for their allegedly sluggish and uncoordinated response to the 
1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake.210 
 
Many other opportunities to promote the SDF have been taken over the 
years and one of the most prominent of these occurred with the use of the 
SDF at the 1964 Tokyo Olympics. The SDF, in a role more suited to police 
or a constabulary, were charged with providing guides to the event and 
unarmed, visible, police-type security for the event. The SDF also 
participated in ceremonial duties, even carrying flags into the Olympic 





The primary aim of this chapter was to demonstrate that the gradual 
evolution of the NPR into the NSF and GSDF represented the partial, but 
not complete, erosion of its constabulary character. This aim was 
achieved through reference to three processes; the decline of opposition 
strength, principally the removal of MacArthur; the increase in US 
pressure to rearm, especially after the arrival of Ridgeway; and the limited 
assumption of more equipment and influx of former IJA/IJN purgees, a 
result of the first two processes.  
 
This chapter also sought to examine the remnants of the NPR‟s structure 
and character which still exist in the GSDF. This was done by highlighting 
the methods of resistance to US pressure employed by the Japanese 
government which eventually became defined as the „Yoshida Doctrine‟, 
the cornerstone of postwar Japanese security policy. Alongside these 
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methods of resistance which outlived the NPR, other continuities such as 
the survival of the concept of civilian control, the legal position of the 
GSDF and its members, and the internal security and disaster relief roles 
of the GSDF were also examined. The exploration of these commonalities 
and differences between three often poorly differentiated forces has 
helped to show their distinct and separate nature and has thus also 
contributed to the second primary aim of the study by further revealing the 
character of the NPR. 
 
The chapter also contributed to the first aim of this study, the desire to 
reveal Japanese influences on the force  by both highlighting some of the 
efforts made by Japanese actors to influence the NPR, NSF and GSDF 
and through indicating the limits of these domestic influences. The chapter 
has illustrated that despite its best efforts the Yoshida government found it 
hard to entirely resist American demands when faced with a combination 
focused and unified external pressure coupled with unfavourable internal 
and external events such as the loss of MacArthur, the Chinese 
intervention and the weakness of Yoshida after 1952. It is perhaps, in part, 
due to these limitations on the domestic influences which lead many 
historians to ignore them entirely.212  
 
Another common tendency amongst many historians is to treat the NPR, 
NSF and GSDF as almost a single, continuous organisation, with little or 
nothing to distinguish each, except further „sophistic‟ name changes.213 
This combination of the three forces tends to lead to the overemphasis of 
international influences on the force at the expense of the domestic. Seen 
as a single organisation the NPR and successors seem to be defined by 
the reverses suffered by Yoshida in being unable to resist the Americans 
as effectively after 1952. This naturally leads to an emphasis on the 
strength of the Americans and the weakness of the Japanese government. 
However, this approach is itself weak as it ignores the successes the 
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Japanese government had up until that point in resisting American 
pressure and fighting to retain a constabulary force. Furthermore, this 
conclusion entirely omits the roles and influence of non-governmental 
actors such as the JCP and former Imperial Officers. These weaknesses 
of this combined approach validate both the main aims of this study, in 
seeking to restore the influence of the Japanese on the force and in 
aiming to reveal the actual character of the NPR, unclouded by hindsight 
and its future evolution. 
 
In revealing the character of the NPR, the chapter highlighted the 
continuities and differences between the NPR and its successor 
organisations. This survival of aspects of the NPR, the failure to give the 
control of the NPR to former IJA purgees, and the problems transferring 
heavy armament to the NPR also reveal that the US military never really 
got everything it wanted from the NPR and its successors. The NSF and 
GSDF were the hybrid descendants of the NPR, a mix of constabulary and 
army, with the emphasis shifting from the former to the latter in each 
successive organisation. This is evidenced by the often cited survival of 
the 1947 constitution and the forces‟ non-military nomenclature, such as 
the use of „Self Defence Force‟ instead of „army‟. This hybrid structure also 
manifests itself in the actual structure of the organisations, such as their 
internal security roles, command structures employing large numbers of 
policemen, and the civilian legal position of their members. 
 
This survival of elements of the character of the NPR in the GSDF 
naturally leads us to the question, is the SDF itself a constabulary or 
army? With reference to the original definitions employed in this study a 
answer can be approached.214 Like a constabulary, the GSDF has an 
internal security mission, is generally confined to the territory of Japan, is 
subject to civilian and not military law and has some personnel transfers 
between it and the civil police, although not on the large scale of the NPR. 
However, unlike a constabulary the GSDF does not occupy a middle tier in 
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the security apparatus of Japan, it being at the top; is not equipped with 
light weapons;  and does not possess arrest powers or clearly police-type 
characteristics. The SDF is generally, but not universally, recognised 
domestically and internationally as providing the external security of Japan 
and is equipped to do so but cannot easily undertake offensive operations 
due to political considerations. The force‟s members are also subject to 
civilian, not military, law. Thus even the GSDF falls a little short of the full 
definition of an army as detailed in this study, representing, in the words of 
and SDF officer, a force which is neither entirely „a police nor an army‟.215 
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The central purpose of this study has been to provide the first complete 
history of the National Police Reserve. In achieving this, the study has 
fulfilled its two principal aims of revealing the domestic context of the force, 
and fully exploring its organisational character. These aims were 
successfully achieved, but not at the expense of the examination of the 
other, better known, influences on the force, such as the international 
factors, which were also investigated. This approach sought to rebalance 
the analysis of the force and included neglected areas of the scholarship 
but not at the expense of the more widely explored aspects, such as the 
international context of the force. 
 
The first aim was achieved through analysing the three principal domestic 
groups which influenced the creation and evolution of the NPR: the centre-
Right Japanese government led by Yoshida Shigeru, the Japanese 
Communist Party (JCP), and Rightwing former Imperial officers such as 
Hattori Takushiro. All three groups influenced the force in different ways, 
sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly, and their conflicts and 
confrontations also contextualised and affected the force. The perceived 
threat from the JCP, especially after it openly adopted a policy of violence 
from 1950 onwards, and the longstanding hostility of the Japanese elite to 
communism helped create and sustain a desire for an internal security 
force adequate to tackle this perceived threat. However, as this study has 
shown, this pursuit of a constabulary is not to be confused with that of full 
rearmament, as much of the Japanese leadership, especially Yoshida, 
opposed any moves towards creating a new Japanese army. Initiatives 
made prior to 1950 by Ashida and Yoshida confirm this desire for a 
constabulary, as do the Yoshida Cabinet and the NPR leadership’s efforts 
to preserve the force in the face of pressure from the US military and 
Rightwing Imperial veterans. The exploration of the JCP’s ‘military’ 
campaign assisted in contextualising the adoption of this attitude by the 
Japanese elite as well as the creation and evolution of the NPR. This 
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analysis of the JCP also highlighted a highly significant and neglected 
area of the history of the period which could have a significant impact on 
many other areas of research on the Occupation if pursued in future 
studies.  
 
The various attempts to install Imperial army officers into the NPR and 
convert it into an army also revealed the constabulary character of the 
force and the determination of MacArthur, Yoshida and others to preserve 
that character. The defeat of these attempts by the Right marked a 
significant victory for democracy and civilian control by the Occupation 
and Japanese government. The struggles over the character of the force 
and the constant Japanese government opposition to its militarization 
show the Japanese influence on the direction and character of the NPR 
and the Japanese desire for a constabulary, and not an army.  
 
The second main aim of revealing the character of the force was achieved 
through exploration of the organisational character and operational 
aspects of the NPR. The detailed examination of the force’s constabulary 
character represented an original approach to the history and origins of 
the force. This full examination of the constabulary character of the force 
would not have been possible without reference to both the domestic and 
international  influences on the force, such the perceived threat of the JCP 
and the American constabulary model. This unification of all influences on 
the force strengthens and supports the study’s central effort of creating the 
first compete history of the force. 
 
In fulfilling this aim of producing the first true picture of the character of the 
force various aspects of the NPR were examined, including: its 
recruitment, training, examinations, deployment, logistics, capabilities, civil 
police links, pay, conditions, housing, food, uniforms, equipment, medical 
care, and legal position. The internal security and disaster relief roles of 
the NPR were also explored as were their evolution and political and 
public relations impact. Of these previously unexplored areas all contained 
evidence that the NPR was a constabulary. This included the 
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demonstration of: the NPR’s internal security training, role and 
deployment; close ties to the civil police; the civilian legal position of its 
members; the presence of arrest powers; and the force’s light armament. 
That the NPR was deployed for internal security and was so lightly armed 
and poorly supplied as to be close to useless in external security duties 
was also revealed. This external security burden, including acting as a 
significant external deterrent, fell on the US forces in Japan, with the NPR 
occupying the typical constabulary role of providing internal security in 
support of the civil police and existing in a middle tier between the police 
and the US forces. Despite intensive training and preparations the 
reasons why the NPR was never used in its original role were also 
revealed. These and centred upon the political risks of using the NPR 
against mass demonstrations and the failure of the Japanese Communist 
Party’s strategy of violent revolution before it escalated to a level of unrest 
requiring the use of the NPR in its anti-guerrilla, or more controversial, 
anti-riot role. 
 
Both of these key aims and the research they generated, illuminate 
previously neglected or marginalised areas of the history of the force. 
Whilst some scholarship on the force did exist prior to this study no 
comprehensive attempt had been made to chronicle the force since the 
US Army’s partial official history of the mid 1950s.1 To date historians 
have produced various perspectives on the force, but none attempted to 
examine the force comprehensively and most remained constrained by 
their ideological or methodological ties. For example, within the English 
language scholarship of the force the first generation of scholars generally 
emphasised that the NPR was a continuation of US policy in defence of 
the already successfully completed reform programme, the second 
generation linked the force to the Cold War context of the Occupation, and 
the third generation, although largely avoiding the NPR, offered new 
methodological approaches to the study of the Occupation through 
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focusing on Japanese perceptions and influences.2 This study has sought 
to take the best from all three approaches in attempting to produce the 
first complete history of the force. For example, this approach extended to 
the inclusion of an examination of the force within both its international 
(largely Cold War), and domestic contexts. This unifying approach also 
extended to examining the ‘top-down’ influences on the force, such as 
GHQ and the Japanese government, alongside the ‘bottom-up’ influences, 
such as that of the JCP.  
 
Alongside taking the best elements from previous scholarship, the study 
contributed original work in a number of areas. The examination of the 
domestic angle of the force was one of the most significant of these, and 
whilst hinted at by some, it is largely ignored by most scholarship.3 The 
reasons for this neglect included the initial unavailability of many of the 
sources until the 1970s, and some later historians’ unawareness of them, 
alongside a reluctance by some to explore the subject at all.4 Furthermore, 
some historians lean towards portraying the JCP as victims of GHQ’s 
unjustified political purges, and the Japanese government itself as the 
beleaguered victim of GHQ ‘orders’ which forced it to create the NPR.5 
This study has argued that these assumptions are not really borne out by 
the evidence, despite having been used in the past to help support 
allegations about the retrogressive aspects of GHQ policy during the latter 
Occupation. 6 
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The examination of the character of the NPR based upon primary 
documentary evidence was another original contribution of this work. The 
need for this was especially acute due to the fact that whilst the character 
of the force is often remarked upon by historians, very few of them back 
up their assumptions with any primary evidence. This requirement for a 
primary evidence based study to clarify the character of the force was 
further highlighted by Dower and others who argue that the 
characterisation of the force often involves the deliberately disingenuous 
use of language.7 Most studies also characterise the NPR as an army 
from the start and this misplaced belief was shown to be principally due to 
the very thin source base employed, with most historians relying on a 
single secondary source, the Kowalski memoir.8  
 
Again, that the creation of an ‘army’ perfidiously disguised as a ‘police 
force’ this juncture fits well with many historians arguments about the 
retrenchment and reaction of GHQ at this time, also seems to have 
influenced some characterisations of the force. The influence of 
retrospection also seems to cloud the vision of historians, some of whom 
lump the NPR in with its successors, the more militarised National Safety 
Force (NSF) and Ground Self Defence Force (GSDF), often treating them 
as almost the same continuous organisation.9  The fact that the NPR 
evolved into the SDF, a largely military force (albeit with some 
constabulary elements) seems to have tainted the NPR by association, 
and it seems that the portrayal of the NPR as an army is highly influenced 
by this influence of hindsight. All of these shortcomings further reinforce 
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the need for this study and validate its second principal aim of providing 
the first primary evidence based examination of the character of the force.  
 
The independent analysis of the force, grounded in the era in which it 
existed has also been central to this study. In this efforts have been made 
to employ the terminology commonly used in the period, alongside an 
attempt to detail the fears and perceptions of the policymaking elites in 
Japan and the US. This research has revealed, contrary to many 
historians’ arguments, the force was a constabulary, a term understood as 
a paramilitary police force at the time.10 The origins of this constabulary 
model were also traced across Europe and Asia, with particular attention 
being paid to the Philippines Constabulary, the original American 
constabulary, and the Korean Constabulary, the NPR's closest 
organisational relative. This examination revealed that forces of this type 
were common in the period, especially in Asia where they were the 
accepted norm, rather than an anomalous exception. 
 
The study concluded with an exploration of the general movement, with 
several notable exceptions, away from the constabulary model, with the 
metamorphosis of the NPR into the NSF and GSDF. This gradual erosion 
of the constabulary character of the force began with MacArthur’s brief 
push for heavier armament following the Chinese intervention in Korea, 
and continued with the push by the US Army for heavier arms and the 
induction of former Imperial army officers into the force. These moves 
were opposed by the Yoshida Cabinet and NPR leadership for a number 
of reasons, including their opposition to an army, their concerns over 
sovereignty and over the economic impact of rearmament. Their efforts 
managed to stall and mitigate many of the US Army’s moves and 
succeeded in preserving some elements of the NPR's character in the 
NSF and GSDF. These included its civilian legal structure, internal 
security mission and some of its ties with the civil police. Although the 
character of the NPR did evolve over time, the exploration of this process 
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showed the commonalities and differences between it and its successors 
and illustrated that the three forces were distinct in both character and 
mission. 
 
The study also attempted to demonstrate the full range of influences on 
the NPR and whilst seeking to rebalance these to better reflect the 
domestic influences on the force the study has recognised the limitations 
of the Japanese influences on the force. When faced with unified US 
pressure coupled with pressing external events such as the Chinese 
intervention in Korea, and without sympathetic powerful American voices 
such as MacArthur, the Japanese struggled to entirely resist American 
demands. Nevertheless, when not faced with entirely unfavourable 
circumstances the Japanese government could, and did, influence the 
direction of the NPR to serve their interests and meet their objectives for 
the force. The study also highlighted that the weakness of the Japanese in 
the face of concerted US pressure coupled with unfavourable international 
events prompted many historians to minimise or even ignore the domestic 
influences on the force. This shortcoming is especially acute in studies 
which combine the NPR with its successors the NSF and GSDF and 
retrospectively, and incorrectly, assume that the ultimate failure of Yoshida 
to resist US pressure from 1952 inwards also applied to the NPR between 
1950 and 1952.  
 
This study has also revealed a number of intertwining narratives around 
the NPR. Central amongst these was the battle over its character, lasting 
from before its birth until its evolution into the NSF/GSDF. Actors in this 
struggle included American policymakers both in Washington and Tokyo, 
elements of GHQ, (especially Willoughby’s G2), the JCP, MacArthur, 
Yoshida, Hattori and numerous other less significant Japanese and 
American individuals and groups. These battles frequently pitted the Right 
against the centre-Right, for example in the form of Willoughby and Hattori 
versus MacArthur and Yoshida, or the Left against the centre-Right, as in 
the case of the JCP against the Japanese government. These struggles, 
which took place against the background of the Cold War and Korean War, 
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also reflect the internal Japanese extension and reflection of the same 
polarised politics, in what Dower and Yoshida call the ‘internal’ Japanese 
Cold War.11  
 
Much like a ship at anchor in a storm, despite being buffeted by the 
competing winds of the Left and Right the NPR remained anchored in the 
constabulary model throughout its life. This stability was principally due to 
Japanese resistance, occasionally aided by MacArthur and others. The 
continuous pursuit and defence of the constabulary model by the 
Japanese in the face of largely American pressure to rearm is a central 
theme of this work and the active pursuit of a constabulary by the 
Japanese government even prior to 1950 challenge notions that the NPR 
was ‘forced’ upon the Japanese government in 1950.  
 
The skill and persistence of the Japanese resistance to US pressure are 
reminiscent of a man swimming in a tidal river, the flow often changes 
direction and within it there are counter currents, eddies and holes. If the 
swimmer remains passive, or the current becomes too powerful, he is at 
its mercy, but through skilful navigation of the eddies and shallows and 
through his own exertions he can navigate a course towards his own goal 
or just stay still. This was the case with the NPR and its successors, the 
NSF and GSDF.  
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The ‘Taira incident’ was the first major event of the ‘bloody summer’ of 1949. 
It occurred just prior to the announcement of the first round of mass sackings 
and demonstrated to the authorities, more than any other event, the 
weakness of the Japanese police in the face of organised resistance and the 
need for a constabulary force to support them in times of crisis. The incident 
itself was one in a series of events in the area and across the Tohoku region 
(northern Honshu) which also included the Matsukawa incident. Problems 
began in late 1948 when the local coal mines, one of the principal employers 
of the region, began to sack workers, triggering clashes between the police 
and members of the coal miners union (Tanrō). These clashes were so 
serious that frequent interventions by the local American Military Government 
Team (MGT) were necessary and local police were given special powers 
under the Kōan Jōrei (Public Peace Ordinance). Incidents involving the 
communist dominated unions in the area escalated both in terms of scale 
and seriousness, with union members seizing and ‘trying’ a senior manager 
at a local industrial plant on 27 June 1949. Two days later a mob of over 
three hundred occupied the prefectural assembly and hung six large red 
flags from its exterior.1  
 
The following day the most serious incident occurred, an event described by 
Chalmers Johnson as the; ‘closest thing to actual insurrection that occurred 
in Japan in 1949’.2 Ostensibly triggered by a dispute over the removal of a 
communist bulletin board in the economically depressed and restive city of 
Taira, a group of fifty to sixty communist activists gathered outside the local 
police station, waving red flags and chanting slogans such as ‘all police 
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officials who oppress labourers should be killed!’. 3 The demonstration 
degenerated into a general brawl between the communists and the thirty 
policemen present inside. Despite some initial success the police were 
quickly overcome after the arrival of around four hundred miners who sided 
with the communists.4 The mob occupied the police station, adorned it with 
communist banners, released two communists held inside, locked up the 
police in their own cells and stole a pistol, the only firearm on the premises.5 
After capturing the police station the mob held it for over seven hours without 
any attempt by the police to recapture it and free their colleagues. Eventually 
at around 10 pm, the rioters, becoming restless, abandoned the police 
station after vandalising it and breaking all its windows.6  
 
Upon hearing of the fall of the police station, the Fukushima Military 
Government Team sent urgent requests to Sendai, Fukushima and other 
cities demanding armed National Rural Police officers recapture Taira. 7 
Possibly through military style staff planning, as was suspected by some in 
G2, and / or intelligence provided and acted on at the time, Communists set 
out to obstruct the police effort to recapture Taira. At Nihonmatsu, a town 
leading to Taira, rail points were opened in an attempt to divert passing 
trains; at Koriyama four hundred workers surrounded the police station, 
trapping its occupants inside; and in Sendai where two hundred armed 
National Rural Police cadets boarded a train bound for Taira, workers pelted 
the train with stones and later removed the driver and locked the cadets 
inside.8 After breaking out of the train the cadets were transferred to trucks 
and set off for Taira only to find all the gates and level crossings along the 
route closed, blocking road traffic.9 Other documents show the communists 
planned to go even further and sever communications across the region with 
union members planning to cut telephone lines between the major cities, 
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other prefectures and police units, stop all traffic by rail and road, and 
‘paralyse and disperse police power‘.10 The seriousness with which the JCP 
members took the plan was clear, as those with knowledge of the plan were 
threatened with death if they disclosed its details to the police.11  
 
The gravity of this incident and the weakness of the police it demonstrated to 
the Japanese elite and GHQ should not be underestimated. The Chief of the 
Fukushima National Rural Police seriously considered declaring a state of 
emergency across the whole prefecture and, in the face of further violence, 
retained significant police reinforcements in the area long after the events of 
30 June. Yoshida also threatened to declare a nationwide state of 
emergency and later cited the incident as a clear demonstration of the 
weakness of the decentralised police system and its powerlessness to deal 
with serious threats to public order.12 The parallel with the capture of several 
towns in South Korea in 1948 by communists and mutinying constabulary 
forces and their bloody and lengthy recapture must have been noticed by 
members of GHQ and the Japanese government and strengthened their 
desire for adequate internal security forces to prevent this kind of incident 
happening again.13 Indeed, it is surprising that there were no deaths during 
the incident and that the quasi-insurrection fizzled out, but this was probably 
only due to the lack of firearms by the demonstrators. Supplies of guns would 
have made the incident much more serious and could have resulted in 
numerous deaths. 
 
The second major incident of the summer occurred on 6 July, two days after 
the first round of sackings was announced. Shimoyama Sadanori, the 
president of the JNR, disappeared from his office. Shimoyama was probably 
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kidnapped and subsequently murdered by communists, or badly beaten and 
left on the tracks to be killed by his own trains. Shimoyama’s previous 
dismissal of protesting tram conductors in Yokohama and his announcement 
of 37,000 sackings two days previously may have marked him out as a target 
and the police were so convinced that he had been assassinated that they 
announced he had been murdered on the same day he died.14 Shimoyama 
could have committed suicide but conservative opinion, SCAP, the police, 
the non-communist press and the public at large all thought he was 
murdered by vengeful communists.15 GHQ’s intelligence arms, the Japanese 
police and the JNR all believed he was assassinated, his widow and others 
claimed he did not appear suicidal on the day of his death and he left no 
suicide note, as is generally customary in Japan.16 
 
The third and fourth major incidents of 1949 were two attacks on trains, 
termed the Mitaka and Matsukawa incidents. On 15 July, a driverless train 
crashed into the platform at Mitaka Station in the western suburbs of Tokyo, 
killing six people.17 Ten people were arrested and charged with rail sabotage. 
All ten were radical railway union members and nine were prominent 
communists. However, nine were released following a disorderly trial ending 
in August 1950 which the communists disrupted with numerous protests and 
which had been routinely observed by G2 and Counter Intelligence Corps 
(CIC) officers. Despite all but one of the accused walking free, during the 
year up to their release the incident was seen as a case of communist 
perpetrated terrorism and even afterwards much of the public still considered 
the accused responsible for the arrack.18  
 
Just over a month later, on 18 August, the final major incident of the summer 
of 1949 took place with the derailing of a commuter train near Matsukawa in 
northern Honshu and the deaths of three of its crew.19 The train was derailed 
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between stations due to a section of rail and a number of sleepers having 
been removed. Twenty communist union members were apprehended and 
tried, but were eventually acquitted, despite the prosecutor calling for the 
death penalty.20 Nonetheless, the sabotage triggered a series of police raids 
on union offices across Fukushima, which led to the arrests of suspects in 
this case and many also suspected of involvement in the Taira incident.21  
 
Whatever the actual turn of events, the Japanese authorities and press 
believed that the JCP was responsible for both incidents, with the Asahi 
Shinbun openly accusing the Communist party of responsibility.22 In retort, 
Akahata (Red Flag), the JCP’s newspaper, and its sister publications claimed 
the incidents were a conspiracy hatched to discredit the Communists.23 
Akahata also contested whether Shimoyama was murdered and questioned 
the opinions of the scientists and pathologists involved in examining the 
evidence. However, in later communist pamphlets such as The Truth of the 
Shimoyama-Mitaka Incidents the JCP did not explicitly deny that communists 
were responsible for the incidents, and added to the suspicion existing over 
their motives through simultaneously calling for the overthrow of the 
government.24 The manipulation of the incidents by the Left continued for 
years with writers such as the Leftwing crime author Matsumoto Seichō 
arguing that Shimoyama was murdered and the Matsukawa sabotage was 
conducted by CIC, possibly in co-operation with the local Japanese 
authorities in an effort to discredit the JCP.25 Labour movement scholar and 
JCP member Shiota Shobei also manipulated the case in a similar fashion to 
suit Marxist rhetoric:  
 
The Matsukawa case was a part of the oppression of the labour 
unions by American Imperialism in the face of great change in the 
situation in Asia following the Chinese revolution. American 
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Imperialism wanted to build an anti-communist military base in Japan 
by encouraging the revival of Japanese monopoly capitalism and by 
aiding the militarist reorganisation of the Japanese economy; it 
regarded the labour unions as a great obstacle to this purpose.26  
 
The incidents resulted in new waves of raids on JCP and union offices and 
many additions were made to the three hundred arrests made in the wake of 
the Taira incident. The Diet created a special investigation committee chaired 
by Hanamura Shirō, which concluded in late July that the incidents had been 
instigated by the communists and were a field test for new violent tactics 
aimed at seizing power. The impact on the Japanese government of the 
incidents of the summer of 1949 was significant in a number of ways; first 
they highlighted the weakness of the police in the face of organised 
resistance; and second, they cast serious doubt in the minds of the 
authorities over whether the JCP could be trusted to continue to operate 
within the law, or whether it was probing the state’s defences in preparation 
for an armed uprising or revolution.27 It should also be mentioned that the 
psychological impact of railway terrorism, as Johnson notes, was far more 
significant then than it is now and could be equated with the airline terrorism 
of later years, in that the attacks struck at innocent travellers in the principal 
form of mass transportation of the day.28 These incidents demonstrated the 
vulnerability of the Japanese infrastructure to sabotage and of the Japanese 
elite to assassination or attack and these conclusions reinforced the 
perceived need for a strong, adequately armed and sufficiently mobile 
constabulary.  
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The origins and reasons for the forced change of policy thrust upon the 
JCP by Stalin are debated by historians. There are two main clusters of 
arguments as to why the JCP was ordered to openly commit to a policy of 
violence: the first relates to the plans for the war in Korea, and the second 
focuses on relations between the PRC and USSR. The Korean War theory 
is advocated by Stockwin as follows:  
 
It is probably true to say that it [the Cominform criticism] was 
connected to the coming offensive in Korea and motivated by the 
desire to tie up American forces in Japan by a series of domestic 
disturbances. If this was the motive, however, it misfired. The 
Americans directed the Japanese government to take strong action 
against the JCP, which was driven underground. The party’s 
attempts to create domestic chaos had little result, except to 
alienate three-quarters of those who had voted for it in 1949.1  
 
Packard also briefly mentions this theory in his work on the treaty crisis of 
1960: ‘Stalin ordered the JCP to adopt a strategy of terrorism and violence, 
sending guerrilla squads to the hills and causing Molotov cocktails to be 
hurled at police stations’.2 As too does Stueck in his 2002 work on the 
Korean War:  
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Japan, of course, was part of the U.S. defence perimeter in the 
Pacific, and Stalin had no intention of openly contesting the 
American position there. Nonetheless, the communists could create 
internal turmoil in Japan, which might give Washington further 
pause in using that country as a forward base for strong action 
elsewhere in Asia.3  
 
Thornton also argues along similar lines in claiming that the military policy 
of the JCP only made sense within the context of the Korean War and 
American use of Japan as a forward base for operations in Korea and that 
due to this: ‘regarding Japan, war in Korea would logically call for an 
attempt to disrupt American response capability, at least initially, behind 
the lines’. 4  Goncharov, Lewis and Litai argue that the JCP military 
campaign also aimed to drive a wedge between Japan and the US. This 
was to be achieved through attacks designed to raise tensions within the 
country and through new propaganda which sought to enflame Japanese 
nationalism, attacked US ‘imperialism’ and which portrayed the JCP as the 
champions of peace, as only they supported a comprehensive (i.e. 
including the USSR and PRC) peace settlement.5 
 
The second main argument for the origin of Cominform criticism is that it 
was a result of a struggle for power and influence between the USSR and 
PRC. Goncharov, Lewis and Litai argue that in issuing the criticism Stalin 
was testing Mao’s loyalty to ‘communism’ (or himself) at a tense time with 
the US by forcing him to choose sides, and was also examining whether 
Mao’s commitment to communist solidarity was greater than his Chinese 
nationalism.6 Goncharov, Lewis and Litai also cite the Mao telegram which 
stated the need to support the criticism in the CCP press and the article in 
Bulletin on 27 January 1950 praising Mao, as indicators of Mao’s 
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compliance and Stalin’s gratitude.7 Gittings, however, argues that the PRC 
and USSR were involved in a struggle over control of both the Indian 
Communist Party (ICP) and the JCP. The battle eventually resulted in a 
trade-off in late 1949 of a reduction of Soviet support for the anti-Mao ICP 
in exchange for the use of the Chinese influence over the JCP to help foist 
the military policy onto it. According to Gittings the deal was successfully 
concluded, with the ICP being brought into line and the PRC accepting, 
although in less explicit terminology, the Soviet criticism of the JCP.8 
 
It seems that a combination of both of these approaches offers the 
clearest picture of Stalin’s actions. In his relations with Mao, Kim and other 
communist leaders Stalin was pursuing the dual goals of expanding the 
Soviet sphere of influence through efforts such as the Korean War, whilst 
simultaneously seeking to preserve the USSR’s dominant position 
amongst the world’s communist parties. 
 
The criticism is also interesting as it represented a number of departures 
from the previous direction of the JCP. The document and the 
philosophies it rejected marked a change in the theoretical conception of 
the application of Marxism to Japan, and not one created within the JCP 
itself but forced upon it from outside. The longstanding JCP philosophy of 
gradual revolution within an advanced capitalist society against a domestic 
enemy changed to one of violent national liberation from foreign 
imperialism in a ‘semi-colonial area’, a philosophy identical to that of the 
Chinese Maoist model.9 These rhetorical changes were replicated and 
further propagated through the ‘1951 New Line’ and ‘military policy’ which, 
taking many cues from communist Chinese thought and tactics, continued 
the portrayal of Japan as a semi-colonial area whose path to communist 
liberation, like that of China, lay through guerrilla war.10 The criticism also 
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marked the formal transition from ‘peaceful revolution’ to the open and 
official adoption of military tactics and armed revolution in place of 
democratic methods. This formal adoption of military tactics and the 
revolutionary rhetoric which underpinned them caused great concern 
amongst the authorities in Japan and greatly strengthened the perceived 
requirement for a constabulary capable of meeting the threat. However, 
the submission of the JCP to international pressure and the rejection of 
the previously successful tactics severely damaged the JCP. The 
Communists had also moved into the ironic position of decrying and 
resisting US ‘imperialism’ whilst simultaneously being a puppet of Soviet 
sponsored aggression in Korea. Moreover, the JCP, which had previously 
sought to largely avoid Cold War connections, was now entangled within 
them and increasingly defined by them in its relations with the 
authorities.11 It is also important to note that the early warning given by the 
Cominform criticism and the time wasted by the JCP in squabbling over 
factional disputes actually gave the Japanese and American authorities 
the opportunity to take precautions against the policy of violent revolution, 
including the deepening of the Red Purge, the expansion of the Special 
Investigations Bureau (SIB) and the establishment of the National Police 
Reserve.12 
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Yoshida to MacArthur, Letter on 
Police Reform/Recentralisation 
6 August 1949 
 
 
Letter                                                                                     August 6, 1949 
To: Gen. MacArthur  
From: PM Yoshida 
 
 
The ineptitude of our police as has been demonstrated during these past 
uneventful months is a source of grave concern to my government, with 
which, after all, rests the ultimate responsibly for public security. 
 
For one thing, the country’s police power has been split up into 
numerous units, large and small, each of which is independent, isolated 
and often helpless. Moreover, the entire system is detached from the 
government. 
 
To take the Mitaka runaway train case, the government must keep 
its hands off. We are kept in the dark as to the progress of investigations 
by the police, to say nothing of their plans for the future. The national 
public safety commission takes the position that it is none of my business, 
although they are ready to let the final responsibility for an occurrence 
affecting the public peace to fall upon me as the Prime minister. 
 
Clearly something ought to be done. The government is working on 
the revision of the police law, but this will take time. 
 
Meanwhile the government must be prepared for any contingency 





What can be done to bring the police into closer liaison with 
government; to coordinate the various police branches and units, and to 
place them under unified control and direction, as occasion may demand, 
for swift, vigorous, effective action? Here is an urgent question which 
confronts me and my government. 
 
I should be very grateful if you would be good enough to consider 
the matter and give me your advice or suggestion. 1 
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The Weakness of the Japanese 
Civil Police in Occupied Japan 
 
 
The severe levels of crime, corruption and gang violence added to the 
poor state of Japan’s infrastructure and a critical lack of equipment made 
the Japanese civil police struggle to perform even its basic duties from 
1945 onwards.1 The conditions faced by the police, now operating without 
their military backup, were far worse both in terms of political and non-
political crime than anything faced before 1945. Added to these woes of 
the Occupation introduced a controversial reform programme which even 
elements of GHQ opposed.  
 
With the end of the Pacific War the Allied authorities sought to thoroughly 
democratise and demilitarise the Axis powers to prevent their re-
emergence as threats to world peace. The role and character of the civil 
police was seen as crucial to the democratic remodelling of the former 
Axis powers, almost on a par with the connected issue of rearmament.2 
Through reform it was hoped that the Japanese police system could be 
transformed into an independent, responsible and publicly accountable 
force rather than the pawn of the elite it had been.3 Despite concerns from 
G2 (intelligence) and parts of the Japanese government over the wisdom 
of sweeping reform and the diffusion of police power during a time of 
social unrest, the liberal ‘new dealers’ in GS (Government Section) 
pressed on with reform and the decentralisation the civil police was carried 
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out in March 1948.4  The reforms reduced police powers, stripped the 
police of much of their economic and administrative role, and overall 
supervision of the police moved from centralised government control to a 
diffuse network of local Public Safety Commissions (PSC).5 Through the 
reform process the police also lost many of their specialist units and this 
loss of the internal security agencies assigned to prevent espionage and 
subversion were particularly galling to the Japanese elite and G2, due to 
their concerns about internal security.6 The police also lost their cabinet 
representation and decentralised Municipal Police forces totalling 95,000 
men were created in all towns with more than 5,000 people. Rural areas 
and towns with less than 5,000 inhabitants were served by the National 
Rural Police, which numbered around 30,000 and which was monitored by 
both national and prefectural PSCs.7 The ‘democratic’ reform of the police 
filtered down thorough the entire institution, from a purge of much of the 
pre-war leadership, to a focus on the American-style patrol system rather 
than the more passive, traditional Kōban (police box) based approach to 
policing.8 
 
Far from improving the operations of the police system of Japan, GHQ’s 
reforms actually weakened the police, a feature common to police 
decentralisation programmes encouraged by the allies in the other former 
Axis powers.9 The purges of individuals judged to have been associated 
with the wartime regime also hit the police hard with the loss of many 
experienced and effective officers. From October 1945 to early 1946 the 
force lost 49 out of 51 prefectural police chiefs, 12% of Superintendents 
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and 11% of Inspectors; and the overall number of officers removed by the 
purge totalled 5.7% of the civil police’s total strength.10 Reductions in shift 
length reduced the living standards of officers, the force was very under 
strength, and due to the unpleasant and dangerous character of its work, 
was seen by many as a job of last resort.11 These difficult conditions led to 
a high turnover of staff and critically low morale, which further undermined 
the capabilities of the police and resulted in the loss of many more 
experienced officers and their replacement by less effective and 
inexperienced recruits. 12  Police duties were stretching the force to 
breaking point and with new restrictions on its activities and conduct, it 
struggled to maintain order, being characterised by Yoshida as ‘feeble’ 
and frequently having to rely on American tactical troops to maintain 
order. 13  Two incidents which helped to illustrate the inability of the 
Japanese police to cope without more heavily armed back up were the 
1948 Kobe riots and the Taira incident, which clearly demonstrated the 
weakness of police and its powerlessness to deal with organised, 
motivated and even partially armed resistance.14 
 
New regulations and a lack of equipment also reduced the efficacy of the 
police force. The ‘democratisation’ of the police had stripped them of many 
of their pre-1945 powers, some of which were excessive but many of 
which were common to most police forces across the world. A good 
example of this, which proved a serious problem in measures to control 
unrest and rioting, were the rules governing the use of tear gas and the 
control of demonstrations. The Occupation authorities issued edicts 
stating that no orderly protest was to be broken up and legally forbade the 
police from intervening in demonstrations until they erupted into 
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violence. 15  This deprived the police of the right to pre-emptively stop 
protests to protect their own and the public’s safety and these restrictions 
were exploited by the radical left during events such as ‘Bloody May 
Day’.16 These restrictions and their impairment of the Japanese police’s 
ability to control demonstrators were added to by the restrictions placed 
upon the use and possession of tear gas. Only the police forces of the six 
largest cities in Japan were allowed to posses and use tear gas, leaving 
many of the large industrial centres and much of the critical infrastructure 
of Japan without police forces fully capable of protecting them against 
mass demonstrations, sabotage or attack. 17  These legal and technical 
restraints on the police further called into question their adequacy in the 
face of strikes and demonstrations of mounting scale and violence which 
many in the US and Japanese administrations saw as signs of instability 
and portents of revolution.18 
 
The capabilities of the police were also constrained due to shortages of 
equipment and weaknesses in Japan’s infrastructure. 19  The police 
suffered from a critical shortage of vehicles which made performance of 
their duties, particularly amongst the partially damaged transport 
infrastructure of Occupied Japan, very taxing. Amongst the vehicles which 
the Japanese police did posses many were in very poor condition due to 
excessive use during wartime without proper fuel, maintenance or parts.20 
The situation was judged so urgent that G2’s Public Safety Division (PSD) 
looked into giving the Japanese police some worn out US Army trucks. 
PSD officials found 2,000 large cargo trucks and 1,000 lights trucks, 
although these all lacked radios and were impractical either for use in 
narrow Japanese streets or for patrol work. Five hundred dilapidated 
Jeeps were also found but were judged to have required almost a mi llion 
dollars of work to repair. The plan was rejected, but indicatively of the 
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impoverished state of the police, even if all these vehicles had been put 
into service the number available across the country would have still been 
about one car or truck for every forty policemen. 21  Shortages of key 
equipment extended literally from top to toe with the Osaka Police force 
even suffering from a critical lack of shoes for foot patrol as late as 1949.22  
 
The shortage of radios and communications equipment was another major 
obstacle to effective policing in occupied Japan, with wire and radio 
telegraph installations and infrastructure heavily bomb damaged in urban 
areas and badly maintained in rural areas. Furthermore, repairs were not 
even started in some areas until the late 1940s.23 A fortnight after the 
Taira incident and the day before the Mitaka incident a report on acquiring 
radios for the police found that there were no US Army surplus radios 
available and that training the police to use them would be too time 
consuming, but suggested that as there was an ‘emergency’ the Japanese 
police telephone lines should be given the same protection as the US 
military lines to prevent them being cut or tampered with.24 
 
Scarcity of firearms was also a serious concern for the Japanese police 
and their Japanese and American masters. The police handed in their 
weapons at the end of war as they thought they were to be disarmed like 
the Japanese military.25 In January 1946 GHQ informed the Japanese 
government that the police were indeed allowed to carry arms, but in the 
preceding months large numbers of weapons had gone missing with only 
enough remaining to equip 20-25% of policemen.26 Types of weapons and 
ammunition varied and incompatibilities between them further reduced the 
usable number. These shortages meant that as late as December 1948 
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roughly one gun was shared between five or six officers in the cities and 
one between three in the countryside.27 This situation was far from ideal 
and with the dire public order situation and high crime rate, firearm 
‘supplies were insufficient to ensure effective policing’.28  
 
In October 1948 MacArthur reported to Washington that the police only 
had 26,000, pistols of which 12,000 were working, and recommended that 
125,000 revolvers, holsters, ammunition and spare parts be sent to Japan. 
A total of 107,000 revolvers of .38 and .45 calibres were sent from 
January 1949 onwards, which helped strengthen the police somewhat. 
This move also demonstrated SCAP and Washington’s commitment to the 
maintenance of internal security in Japan and their belief that a more 
heavily armed, effective police force was necessary to do this. 29 
Nevertheless, the pressing shortage of firearms and equipment were 
keenly felt by both the Americans and Japanese and prompted Yoshida to 
ask SCAP if the police could be equipped with infantry weapons to help 
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The ‘Constabulary Letter’ 




To General of the Army Douglas MacArthur  
From General Marshall 
October 2, 1945  
 
Radio No. WARX-72310. Washington, D.C.  
Secret  
 
Ultimate composition and organization of occupational forces for Japan, 
Korea and the Ryukyus is being considered here. WARX 70811 and CAX 
52442 illustrate one phase of this problem. Additional suggestions are 
receiving consideration. One proposal under consideration envisages that 
the major portion of the occupational force ultimately might be organized 
along a super military police line with highly mobile tactical units in reserve 
rather than along the present lines of purely combat organizations. In such 
an organization, U.S. personnel would be placed in local command staff and 
other key positions with most subordinate positions held by Japanese for 
Japan and Ryukyus and by Koreans for Korea. In addition with the 
establishment of such a police force, it would be necessary that it have the 
backing of small U.S. combat formations on the order of regimental combat 
teams located in various strategic areas and capable of rapid movement to 
threatened points by air or ground. Under this concept, the total of U.S. 
combat elements might not be greater than the equivalent of one or two 
divisions. 
 
The type of U.S. personnel to be utilized in this proposed integrated military 
police organization is also being considered. Over-age or limited duty 
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personnel might be satisfactory. Special enlistments in high NCO grade for 
U.S. personnel to be utilized for this purpose might provide inducement to 
enable the procurement of sufficient personnel. Commissioned rank might be 
given to outstanding NCO types as we did for [Philippine] Scouts. Some 
special legislation might be required.  
 
Methods of effecting the integration of such a force might take one of the 
following forms:  
 
All officers and NCO's to be U.S., the remainder to be natives.  
All officers and NCO's and one squad per military police platoon to be U.S., 
the remainder to be native.  
 
Variations of the above proposal might consist of replacing native personnel 
in the integrated organization proposed above by Chinese or Filipino 
personnel.  
 
Will you consider the foregoing and forward your comments with respect to 
(1) Japan, (2) Korea and (3) Ryukyus [sic].1 
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Macarthur to Yoshida, Letter 
Authorising the Creation of the 
NPR  
8 July 1950 
 
 
Letter                                                                                             July 8, 1950 
To: Premier Yoshida 
From: Gen. MacArthur  
 
 
 In keeping with my established policy to re-invest autonomous 
authority in the Japanese Government as rapidly as the situation permits, I 
have visualised the progressive development of law enforcing agencies 
adequate to the maintenance of internal security and order and the 
safeguard of Japan’s coastline against unlawful immigration and smuggling. 
 By the letter of September 16, 1947 I approved the recommendation 
of the Japanese Government for an increase in the overall strength of 
Japan’s police fore to 125,000 men, making provision for a new national rural 
police of 30,000 men. It was then the view of the government, in which I fully 
concurred, that the strength recommended and authorized was not an 
arbitrary determination of future police requirements but designed to provide 
an adequate force around which might be built a modern and democratic 
police system oriented to an effective decentralisation of the police 
responsibility in harmony with the constitutional principle of local autonomy. 
 Subsequent action in the recruitment, equipping and training of the 
police force then authorized has proceeded with commendable efficiency. 
The concept of autonomous responsibly has been faithfully observed, 
essential coordination has been carefully developed and the proper 
relationship between the police and private citizenry has been progressively 
forged. As a consequence, the Japanese people today may take justifiable 
pride in this agency for the enforcement of law at all levels of government. 
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Indeed, it may be credited to both organizational police efficiency and the 
law-abiding character of the Japanese people that, despite a much lower 
police strength in relation to population here than is to be found in most of 
the other democratic states and the general post-war impoverishment and 
other adverse conditions usually conductive to lawlessness, Japan stands 
out with a calmness and serenity which lends emphasis to the violence,  
confusion and disorder which exist in other nearby lands. 
To insure that this favourable condition will continue unchallenged by 
lawless minorities, here as elsewhere committed to the subversion of the due 
process of law and assaults of opportunity against the public welfare, I 
believe that the police system has reached that degree of efficiency in 
organisation and training which will permit its augmentation to a strength 
which will bring it within the limits experience has shown to be essential to 
the safeguard of the public welfare in a democratic society. 
Insofar as maritime safety in the harbours and coastal waters of Japan 
is concerned the Maritime Safety Board has achieved highly satisfactory 
results but events disclose that the safeguard of the long Japanese coastal 
line against unlawful immigration and smuggling activity requires 
employment of a larger force under this agency than is presently provided for 
by law. 
Accordingly, I authorize your government to take necessary measures 
to establish a national police reserve of 75,000 men and expand the existing 
authorised strength of the personnel serving under the Maritime Safety 
Board by an additional 8,000. The current year’s operating cost of these 
increments to existing agencies will be made available from the funds 
previously allocated in the General Account of the National Budget towards 
retirement of the public debt. The appropriate sections of this Headquarters 
will be available, as heretofore, to advise and assist in the technical aspects 
of these measures.1 
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Airborne units are designated by combining a gull wing 









The following symbols placed either in boundary lines or  above the 
rectangle, triangle, or circle inclosing the identifying arm or service symbol 
indicate the size of military organization: 
 
 
Squad   
Section   
Platoon   
Company, troop, battery, Air Force flight                     
Battalion, cavalry squadron, or Air Force 
squadron            
 
Regiment or group; combat team (with abbreviation 
CT following identifying numeral)  
 
Brigade, Combat Command of Armoured Division, 
or Air Force Wing  
 
Division or Command of an Air Force                        




















The letter or number to the left of the symbol indicates the unit 
designation; that to the right, the designation of the parent unit to which it 
belongs Letters or numbers above or below boundary lines designate the 
units separated by the lines. 
 
Company A, 137th Infantry                
 
8th Field Artillery Battalion                 
 
Combat Command A, 1st Armoured Division    
 
Observation Post, 23d Infantry               
 
Command Post, 5th Infantry Division         
 






Machine gun            
Gun  
 
Gun battery            
 













Stalin’s New Year’s Message to the 
Japanese People  
31 December 1951 
 
 
I have received your [Chief Editor of the Kyodo News Agency, Iwamoto 
Kiishi] request to send a New Year’s message To the Japanese people. 
 
It is not a tradition with Soviet leaders that the premier of a foreign State 
should address his wishes to the people of another State. However, the 
profound sympathy of the peoples of the Soviet Union for the Japanese 
people who are in straits owing to foreign Occupation impels me to make an 
exception to the rule and meet your request.  
 
Please convey to the Japanese people that I wish them freedom and 
happiness, that I wish them full success in their gallant struggle for the 
independence of their homeland. 
 
In the past the peoples of the Soviet Union themselves experienced the 
horrors of foreign occupation in which the Japanese imperialists also took 
part. Therefore the fully understand the sufferings of the Japanese people, 
deeply sympathise with them and believe that they will achieve the 
regeneration and independence of their homeland as the peoples of the 
Soviet Union achieved it in the past. 
 
I wish the Japanese workers deliverance from unemployment and low wages, 
elimination of high prices of consumer goods and success in the struggle for 




I wish the Japanese peasants deliverance from landlessness and land 
shortage, elimination of high taxes and success in the struggle for the 
preservation of peace. I wish the entire Japanese people and their 
intelligentsia full victory of the democratic forces of Japan, revival and 
advance of the country’s economic life, the flowering of national culture, 
science and art and success in the preservation of peace.1 
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Incident Location Date Notes 
„Second Kobe 
Riots‟ 









27/12/1951 Pistol also stolen.3 
Assassination 
of Police Chief 
Sapporo 21/1/19524  
Mass demos  Tokyo and across 
Japan (21 other 
locations) 
21/2/52 „Anti Colonialisation 
Day‟. 3,000 demonstrate, 
20 police injured, 30 
demonstrators arrested.5 
Raid on police 
station 
Arakawa 28/2/1952  
Bomb Attempt  Yokohama 30/3/52 A number of small 
bombs placed under US 
Officers‟ cars.6 
Major strike Nation wide 1/4/52 250,000 participate.7 






Osaka and Kyoto) 
1/5/1952 13 US and 60 Japanese 
cars destroyed. 800 
police, 2,300 people, 12 
US military and 6 US 
civilians injured. Two 
killed. 9 
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 FO 371/99393, Acting Secretary, Department of State Bruce to Speaker of the House of 
Representatives Rayburn, 3/7/52. 
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Raids on Police 
boxes and tax 
offices 
30/5/1952 3 killed and 80 injured.10 
Osu Incident Nagoya 6/7/52 269 arrested, 70 police, 
2 firemen, 4 civilians, 19 







scale demos and 
violence in Osaka, 
Kobe, Nagoya and 
Tokyo. 
25/6/52 21,000 participate in 
demos and attacks 
police, US vehicles and 
installations. 
43 police, 21 
demonstrators, 4 press 
and 7 civilians injured.11 
Acid Bomb 
Attack  
Osaka 25/6/52 Damages car and 
Brigadier General Carter 






24-25/5/52 Attack on arsenal and 
employees.12 
Attack on Itami 
base 
Itami, Osaka 25/6/52 Raid on US housing 
complex. 
Suita Incident Suita Rail Yard, 
Osaka 








Plot to Destroy 
Hirakata 
Arsenal 
Hirakata 5/12/5214  
Attempts at 
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The SDF and the 1960 ANPO Crisis 
 
 
The role of the Ground Self Defence Force (GSDF) in the 1960 security 
treaty crisis is another interesting case study relating to the reluctance of the 
Japanese Government to employ its security services domestically. Although 
it involved the GSDF and not the NPR, many of the individuals involved were 
the same, such as Hayashi Keizo, the Chief of staff of the NPR in 1950, and 
the Joint Staff Council head in 1960. Furthermore, the issues involved were 
very similar to ‘Bloody May Day’ 1952 and are useful in illustrating the 
difficulties which existed in the use of the NPR. 
 
After returning from the United States in January 1960 the Japanese Prime 
Minister Kiishi Nobusuke (a former purgee) faced recurrent mass protests 
over the revision of the 1951 US-Japan security treaty and the forthcoming 
visit of US President Dwight Eisenhower. Concerned about the rising tide of 
protest, Kishi gave directions to leading Liberal Democratic Party politicians 
to study the possibility of deploying the SDF against demonstrations.1 GSDF 
Chief of Staff Sugita Ichiji, took Kiishi’s concerns further, fearing that a full 
scale revolution is at hand as the demonstrations were becoming 
increasingly violent.2 Preparations undertaken by the GSDF for their possible 
use included a large ‘police exercise’ on 1 April and national scale public 
security ‘war games’ three weeks later.3 Twenty thousand troops were also 
deployed to the capital, who fortified their positions with sand bags and 
barbed wire.4 The troops were issued live ammunition and were supported 
                                                             
1
 Y. Hara, Sengo Nihon to Kokusai Seiji (Postwar Japan and World Politics), Chūō Kōronsha, 
Tokyo, 1988, p 425. 
2
 Sugita, a former senior IJA officer, was both present at the British surrender of Singapore 
in 1942 and the Japanese surrender on USS Missouri in 1945. I. Sugita, Wasurerarete Iru 
Anzen Hoshō (Forgotten Security), Jiji Tsushinsha, Tokyo, 1967, p 56. 
3
 T. Maeda, The Hidden Army, Edition Q, Tokyo, 1995, p 121. 
4
 C. Tsuzuki, The Pursuit of Power in Modern Japan, 1825-1995, Oxford University press, 
Oxford, 2000, p 386. 
382 
 
by fifty tanks and sniper detachments on the roofs of buildings near the 
protests. 5 Their commanders maintained close liaison with the civil police 
and continued their preparations for a showdown with the protestors.  
 
Soon the stage appeared to be set for this showdown, as following the 
passing of the new security treaty by the lower house of the Diet on 19 May, 
violence erupted across Tokyo.6 Street battles took place between leftwing 
demonstrators and Rightwing vigilantes led by men such as Kodama Yoshio. 
Eight thousand members of the radical communist student movement 
Zengakuren attacked the Diet building.7 The police eventually restored order 
but the incident resulted in forty-three injuries, 182 arrests and one death.8 
During this unrest Eisenhower set off for Japan, despite the fact that his 
press secretary James Hagerty had been attacked in his car by protestors 
and needed be evacuated by military helicopter.  
 
Concerned about the mounting violence and defiance of the protestors and 
over the safety of Eisenhower, Kishi became resolved to call in the SDF to 
restore order on the streets of the capital.9 Senior members of the LDP and 
then Kishi himself pressed the Director General of the Defence Agency, 
Akagi Munenori, for a commitment to use the SDF to defend the Diet during 
Eisenhower’s visit.10 Akagi strongly opposed the idea. In a move mirroring 
the events of Bloody May Day, eight years earlier, Akagi knew that the use of 
the SDF in this case would seriously harm its public image and could have 
even prompted further and more serious violence.11 In his meeting with Kishi, 
Akagi voiced his extreme reluctance to use the SDF unless the police lost 
control of the situation or a genuine insurrection broke out. Akagi also 
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stressed the high numbers of deaths which could have resulted if the SDF 
had been used.12 
 
Sensing that Akagi would not be swayed to use SDF in what could be seen 
as a political role, Kishi backed down, Eisenhower’s visit was postponed and 
the Prime Minister subsequently resigned. The protestors and much of the 
opposition to the treaty correctly noted that concerns over the public image of 
the SDF and the possibly bloody results of their use resulted in Kishi’s climb-
down. A disappointed Sugita, head of the GSDF, also felt that the retreat 
from the use of the SDF was a victory for the communists and a loss of a 
good training opportunity for the SDF. The crisis also prompted the 
production of ‘Public Security Mobilisation Guidebook’ by the SDF later that 
year, which when discovered by the press also caused major controversy.13 
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Chapter VII, Article 51 





Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in 
the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the 
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any 
time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.1 
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Japanese Policy Document: 
‘Initial Steps for  Re-armament 
Program’, 3 February 1951 
 
 
(Tokyo) February 3, 1951 
[unsigned] 
 
Simultaneously with the coming into force of the Peace Treaty and the 
Japanese-American Security Cooperation Agreement it will be necessary for 
Japan to embark upon a program of rearmament. The following are the 
principal features of this program contemplated by the Japanese government. 
 
(a) Security forces, land and sea, totalling 50,000 will be created apart 
from the existing police forces and the National Police Reserve. These 
security forces will be specially trained and more powerfully equipped, and 
placed under the proposed Ministry of National Security. The 50,000 men will 
mark the start of Japan's new democratic armed forces. 
 
(b) What might be termed a ‘Security Planning Headquarters’ will be 
set up in the National Security Ministry. Experts, conversant with American 
and British military affairs, will be assigned to this Headquarters; they will 
participate in the activities of the Joint Committee to be established under the 
Japanese-American Security Cooperation Agreement, and they will 
constitute the nucleus for the future General Staff of Japan's democratic 
armed forces. The government will seek the advice of American military 
experts (soldiers).1 
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